MARTIN v. COLVIN

Filing 17

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 2/23/2017; that the Commissioner's amended motion for leave to file excess pages (Docket Entry 14 ) is GRANTED and the Commissi oner's motion to exceed page limit (Docket Entry 11 ) is DENIED as moot. The Court has considered all of the pleadings of record. RECOMMENDED that that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be REVERSED, and the matter be REMAND ED to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner should be directed to remand the matter to the ALJ for further administrative action as set out above. To this extent, Plaintiffs motion for judgment (Docket Entry 9 ) should be GRANTED and Defendant's motion for judgment (Docket Entry 12 ) should be DENIED. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
KIM KRISTINE MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v

NANCY BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of the Social
Security Administr ation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1:l6CYt7l

)

Defendant.

)

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, I(im Iftistine Mattin, brought this action pursuant to Section 1631(c)(3) of
the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. $ 1383(c)(3)), to obtain teview of a

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Securityl denying her claim fot Supplemental
Secutity Income ("SSI") under Title

XVI of the Acl The Court has before it the certified

administrative tecord, cross-motions for judgment, and two motions2 by the Commissionet
seeking leave

to file

a

memorandum in excess of twenty pages

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff ptotectively filed an application for SSI in April of

A{

201,2 requesting

that the

teopen the 201,1 denial of her eatlier filed claim and further alleging an inability to work

I Nancy Berryhill recently became the Âcting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy Benyhill should be substituted for Caroþ
W. Colvin as Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by teason
of the last sentence of section 205(9) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 405@.

'

The Court will grant one of these motions and deny the other as moot.

sinceJune 201,1.

(r.

42-43,204,21.4-22,231.,233,235.)3 The application was denied initially

and again upon reconsideraion. (Id. at 157-60,166-69.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge 1"ALJ") and at the July 17,2014 hearing were Plaintiff,

her attorney, and a vocational expert

("VE").

Qd. at39-1,09.) The ALJ determined that

Plaintiff v/âs not disabled under the Act. (Id. at 10-32.) On January 20, 201,6, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiffs request for teview, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's
final decision for purposes of review. Qd. at 1.-7 .)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 47 yearc old on the date the application was
least a high school education and was able

filed.

Qd.

at31,.)

She had at

to communicate in English. (Id.)

III. STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of
the

Act.

The scope of judicial teview of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and

narrow. Smith

u. Schweiker,795

tr.2d 343, 345 (4th Cfu. 1986). This Coutt's teview of that

decision is ümited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support

the Commissioner's decision. Hanter u. Salliuan,993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1,992); Hay
Sulliuan,907 F.2d1453,1,456
as a reâsonable

(tb

u.

Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such televant evidence

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Hanter,993 F.2d at

34 (citing Ncbardnn u. Pera/es,402 U.S. 389,401 (1971)).

3

It

"consists of mote than a mete

Transcrþt citations refer to the ,{.dministrative Transcrþt of Record filed manually with the
Commissioner's Answer. (Docket Enuy 7.)
2

scintilla" "but may be somewhat less than a preponderaîce." 1/. (quoting

368F.2d640,642 (4th Cir.

I-^øw¡ a. CelebreTTe,

1,966)).

The Commissioner must make fìndings

of

fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence.

HEs,907 F.2d at 1456 (citing Kingu. Califano,599 F.2d 597,599 (4th Cir. 1979)). The Court
does not conduct a de novo review
Schweiker,795 F.2d

^t

of the

evidence nor

345. In reviewing fot

of the Commissionet's

fìndings.

substantial evidence, the Coutt does not

undetake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make credibility detetminations, or to substitute
its udgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chater, T 6 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cit. 1,996)
f

(citing Ha1s,90l F.2d at 1456). "\)(/here conflicting evidence allows teasonable minds to

differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the
[Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)." Cmig76F.3da;t 589 (quoting
IYalker u. Bowen,834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.

only
See

19S7). The denial of benefits will be tevetsed

if no reasonable mind could accept the record as adequate to suppoff the detetmination.

Nchardson,402 U.S. at

401. The issue before the Coutt, therefote, is not whethet Plaintiff

is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Plainuff is not disabled is supported
by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a cot:ect application of the televant law
See

id.; Cofnan u. Bowen,829 F.2d 51.4, 517 (4th Cir. 1,987).

IV. THE AIJ'S DISCUSSION
The Social Security Regulations define "disability" for the putpose of obtaining
disability benefits as the "inability

to do any

a
J

substantial gainful activity by reason of. any

medically determinable physical or mental impairmenta which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

12 months." 20 C.F.R. S 416.905(a);

see also

42 U.S.C. $ 1382c(a)(3XA). To meet this

definition, aclaimantmust have a severe impairmentwhich makes itimpossible to do previous
work or

^ny

other substantial gainful activitys that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.

$ a16.905(a); rce a/:o

42U.5.C. $ 1382c(a)(3)(B).

A"

The Five-Step Sequential Analysis

The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascettain whether the
claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. S 416.920.
Sec.

See

Albright u. Comm'r of

Soe

Admin.,174F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cit. 1999). The ALJ must detetmine:

(1)

\)(/hether the claimant is engaged in substanttal gainful activity (i.e.,whether the
claimant is working).

Q)

'S7hether

If

so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.

the claimant has a severe impairment.

If

not, then the claimant is not

disabled and the inquiry ends.

(3)

'S7hether

the impairment meets or equals to medical cdteria of 20 C.F.R., Part

404, Subpat P, Á.ppendix 1, which sets forth a list of impairments thatwanant

a

a

A "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment resulting from "anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonsttable by medically acceptable clinical
andlabontory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. $ 1382c(a)(3)(D).
5

"substantial gainful activity" is work that (1) involves performing significant or productive
physical or mental duties, and Q) is done (or intended) for pay or ptofit. 20 C.F.R. S 416.910.
4

finding of disability without consideting vocational criteria.

If

so, the claknant is

disabled and the inquiry is halted.

(4)

\)Thether the impairment prevents the claimant from perfotming past relevant

work. If not, the claimant

(5)

is not disabled and the inqurry is halted.

Whethet the claimant is able to perform any othet work considering both her
residual functional capacitye ('RFC") and her vocational abilities.

If

so, the

claímant is not disabled.

20 c.F.R.

S

416.920.

Here, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff had not engaged
acttvity since

in

substantial gainful

April 11,201.2, her application date. (Ir. 15.) The AtJ next found in step two

that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: liver disease, hepatitis C, degenerative
disc disease, headaches, chtonic obstuctive pulmonary disease, asthma, headng loss, mood

disorder, anxiety, drug abuse, and alcoholism. Qd.)

At

step thtee, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, ot medically
equal to, one listed in Appendix

1

.

could not return to her past relevant

(d. at 1,6.) At step four, the ALJ detetmined that Plaintiff

work.

(Id. at31,.)

At step five, the ALJ determined that

considering Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC, there wete jobs

6

in the

"Residual functional capactty" is the most a claimant can do in a work setting despite the
physicalandmentallimitationsof herimpaitment andany relatedsymptom (e.g.,pan). See20 C.F.R.
g al6.9a5(a) (1); see also Hines u Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006). The RFC includes both a
"physical exertional or strength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "ability to do sedentary, light,
medium, heav/, or very heavy work," as well as "nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory ot skin
impairments)." Hall a. Hams,658 F.2d 260,265 (4th Cir. 198i).
5

national economy that she could

B.

petform.

(Id. at31-32.)

Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Prior to step fout, the ALJ determined Plaintiffs RFC based on an evaluation of the
evidence. (Id. at19-20.) Based on the evidence

as a

whole, the ALJ detetmined that Plaintiff

retained the RFC to perform light work in that she could

lift ot c ffy

ten pounds frequently

and twenty pounds occasionally and could sit, walk, and stand, each for up to six hours in any

combination as needed

to complete a notmal eight-hout workday. (Id. at 1,9.) The ALJ

futher concluded that Plaintiff could frequently climb ramps or stairs, but could never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.

Qd)

The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff could frequently

balance, and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and

crawl. (Id.) The ALJ next found that she

must avoid exposure to workplace hazatds, such as dangetous or moving machinery and
unprotected heights, as well as extreme heat and contâct with skin

irritants. (Id) The ALJ

next found that Plaintiff must avoid concentrated exposure to atmosphedc itdtants.

Qd.)

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff required a quiet to modetate noise environment and was
limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks ("SRRT's"), consistent with unskilled wotk, further
defined as consistent with a Specific Vocational Preparation rating
the Diction ary of Occupational

Titles.

C.

of ot 2 as described in
'1-.

(Id. at 20.)

Past Relevant \üüork

The ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff was "unable to perform any past televant

work."

(Id. at31,.)

6

D.

Adiustment to Other Work

The claimant bears the initial burden of proving the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C.

g 1382c(a)(3XHXi); 20 C.F.R. S 41,6.202-03 Snith u. Calfano,592F.2d 1235, 1,236 (4th Cu.
1,979). If the claimant has established at step fout that she cannot do any wotk she has done

in the past because of her severe impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step
five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant

could perform consistent with her RFC, age, education, and past work experience. Hanter,
993 F.2d at 35; Il/ilson u. Califuno, 61,7 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The ALJ found here
that given Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC, thete were jobs in the national

economy that she could perform, such as a ticket taker, matket, and

V.

router. Qt

32.)

ANALYSIS

In pertinentp^tt, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to propetly account in the RFC

for her moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace ("CPP"). (Docket Et try
1,0

at

5-7

.)

Fot the following reasons, the Coutt

agrees.

On March 18, 201.5, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Citcuit
published its opinion in Mastio u. Coluin,780 F'.3d 632 (4th

Cu.2015). In Masdo, the Fourth

Circuit determined that remand was apptopriate for three distinct reasons, one of which is
relevant

to the analysis of this case.

because the hypothetical the

Specifically, the Fourth Circuit remanded

in

Mascio

ALJ posed to the VE, and the coresponding RFC assessment,

did not include any mentâl limitations other than unskilled wotk, despite the fact that, at step

three

of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ detetmined that the claimant had
7

moderate

difûculties in maintaining CPP. Masdo,780 F.3d

^t

637-38.

The Fourth Circuit specifically held that it "agtee[s] with othet circuits that anALJ does

not account fot a claimant's limitations in concenttation, persistence, and pace by restricting
the hypothetical question to simple, toutine tasks ot unskilled work." Id. at 638 (quoting
Il/in:chela. Comm'r of Soa Sec.,63L F.3d 1176,11S0 (11th Cu.201,1)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In

so holding, the

Fourth Circuit emphasized the distinction between the ability to

perform simple tasks and the ability to stay on task, stating that "[o]nly the lattet limitation

would account fot a claimant's limitation in concentration, petsistence, or pace."
Although the Fourth Circuit noted that the

A{'s

Id.

errot might have been cured by

an

explanation as to why moderate difficulties in CPP did not translate into a limitation in the
claimant's RFC, it held that absent such an explanation, remand was necessary. Id.7
Here, the ALJ determined at step three that the claimant had modetate limitations in

CPP. (Ir. 19.) In support, the ALJ's

assessment,

in its entirety, was, "[t]he claimant

has

repotted decteased concenttation and neuropsychiatric testing in April 201,2, showed some
difficutty in understanding and following instructions. \X/hile the claimant was d"iagnosed with
memory lapses, these were attributed to medications and insomnia as well as het depression."

7

Prc-Ma¡rio, an ALJ's fird-S fhat a claimant had a moderate limitation, as opposed to a mild
or no limitation, was generally insignifrcant. See Hanþ u. Comn'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-09-1.66,
201,5 WL 9302972, at *3 n.4 (D. Md. Dec 22,2015) (unpublished). The finding that potentially

triggered a listing was that of a "rnarked" limitation. Id. Thus, the omission of a meaningful
explanation to iustifu a "moderate" finding would likely have been, at most, harmless error. Id.
Now, post-Masdo, a reviewing court must understand the rationale behind a finding of moderate
limitation to assess the validity of the presence or absence of cortesponding limitations in an RFC.
Id. An A.LJ firdirg a moderate limitation, therefore, has to ensure that the precise nature of that
limitation is addressed in sufficient detail. Id. Here, as explained below, the analysis in this case does
not meet that standard.
8

(d. at1,9.) "Pursuant to Mauio, once anA{

has made a step three

findingthat aclaimant

suffers from moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ must eithet
include a corresponding limitation in her RFC assessment, ot explain why no such limitation
is necessary." SeeTølmo

Lt.

Clmm'r,

Soc. Sec.,Civil Case

No. ELH-1,4-221,4,2015

lfl-

23951'08,

at *3 (D.Md. May 1.9,201,5) (unpublished). Hete, the ALJ did neither.

More specifically, the ALJ did not include a limitation in the RFC assessment that
accounts for PlaintifPs moderate limitations in

CPP.

Instead, the ALJ concluded that Plainuff

"requires a quiet to moderate noise environment and is limited to simple, toutine, tepetitive
tasks, consistent

with unskilled work, futher defined

Preparation tating

as consistent

with

a Specific Vocational

of L or 2 described in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles." (Tt.

19.)

Despite the Commissionet's arguments to the contrary Q)ocket Etttty 1,3 at1.8-23), this is not,
by itself, a suffìcient limitation to account for moderate limitations in

CPP. There

are,

tn fact,

marry post-Masdo cases stating that limitations like the aforementioned ate, without more,

insufficient to account fot moderate limitations in CPP.8

8

See e.g.,Patton a. Coluin,No. 1:15CV61,6,201,6WL341,7361,,at*3-4 (À4.D.N.C. J:une1.6,201'6)
(unpublished) reconnendation adoþtedsltp Op. GVI.D.N.C.July 13, 201,6);Ta/oru. Coluin,No. 1:14CV629,
2015 WL 4726906,at*6-7 (i\4.D.N.C. Aug. 10,2015) (unpublished) reconmendation adoþted Slip Op.
(i\,t.D.N.C. Sept.9,2015);Ta/oru. Coluin,No. T:14CV00616,201.5WL4400534,x3 (lüØ.D.Va.July 17,
2015) (unpublished); Herup u. Commissioner, No. SAG-14-2855,201.5 !øL 41 1.1.483, +3 Q).Md. July 7,
Md July
2015) (unpublished); IWinkler a. Commissioner,No. SAG-14-2720,201,5WL 4069334,*2-3
2, 2015) (unpublished); Bailelt u. Cohin, No. 5:14-CY-0248, 2015 WL 2449044, *13 (D.S.C. }t'fay 21',
201,5); Talmo a. Commisioner, No. ELH-1,4-221,4, 201,5 WL 23951.08 (D.Md. M.ay 1'9, 201'5)
(unpublishe d), recomnendarion adopte,/, slip op. (D. Md. June 5, 2015) (unpublished); S*ggt a, Coluin,No.
3:1,4-cv-00466,201.5 WL 2250890, x4-5 flX/.D.N.C. May 1,3,2015) (unpublished); Salmon u. Coluin,

p

1.:1.2CY1.209,201.5WL 1526020,*2-3 (A{.D.N.C. Apt.2,2015) (unpublished)'
9

Nor did the AtJ here sufficiently explain why additional limitations were unnecessary

to account for Plaintiffs moderate limitations in CPP. Although the ALJ g ve

^

lengthy

recitation of Ptaintiffs treatment for her mental impairments, she did not specifically link any

of this recitation to the mental RFC finding fot what was essentially a limitation to SRRT's.

Qr. 25-30.) This tecitation

alone does not constitute an explanation for why Plaintifls

moderate limitations in CPP were sufficiently captured by a limitation to SRRT's.

Moreover, the Court is troubled by the ALJ's âssessment of the non-examiûing stâte
agency psychiatrists that evaluated the

tecotd. Specifically, the ALJ stated:

Dr. Newman found the claimant with sevetal matked
Iimitations, including the ability to accept insttuction ot tespond
apptopriately to criticism, interact with the public, and maintain
attention and concenttation for extended pedods. However, he
also found that clatmant's use of drugs ot alcohol was matetial to
these findings. @". 5 A, pp. 8-11). During the subsequent
MRFC assessments, neither Dr. Lloyd not Dr. \X/ax found more
than amodetate limitation fot any specific mental ability and both
concluded that the claimant could perform simple, routine,
repetitive tasks in a non-production, low social setting work
environment (Ex. 1 A, pp. 11-13, Ex. 3Â, pp. 13-15).
The undetsþed gives some weight to the MRF'C
findings as consistent with contemporaneous teating records.

G'.

30.)

In rendering this analysis, and giving "some weight" to the findings of Dts. Lloyd and
\X/ax, the ALJ presumably gave some weight

to their conclusions that Plaintiff should

be

limited to tasks in a non-production, low social setting work environment. Nevertheless, the
ALJ never explained why she omitted these limitations ftom the mental RFC finding, not did
the ALJ explain why those limitations were unnecessary.
10

Not is the answer to this question

self-evident.e Consequently, the Court is left to speculate as to whethet the ALJ, at least in
part, tacitJy discounted without explanation the opinions of Dts. Lloyd and ìØax, or, instead,
simply forgot to include the production pace limitation in the mental RFC

finding. Fot these

reasons, the undersigned cannot ptopetly review this case for substantial evidence. Cliford

Apft[221 F.3d 863,872 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that ALJ is required to draw "^Ít

^ccut^te

u.

and

logical bddge from the evidence to [the] conclusion").

The Commissioner's arguments to the contrary âre not persuasive. First, the
Commissioner contends that the ALJ's references in her decision to various treatment notes
constitute an explanation as to why the mental RFC finding is sufficient.
at.

pocket Entry

13

20-22.) As explained above, however, the ALJ's tecitation of the record evidence here

does not sufficiently explain the apparent discrepancy between het step three finding (that

Plaintiff suffered from moderate limitations in CPP) and her RFC assessment (imiting
Plaintiff to SRRT's) such that

it is susceptible to judicial review. The ALJ did not

meaningfully connect the treatment notes cited by the Commissionet to that discrepancy, and

the undersigned is unwilling to infer such a connection whete

it

does not appear clearly

waranted.lo

e

This is especially so given (1) the ALJ's step three finding that Plaintiff had modetate
limitations in CPP, (3) record evidence that Plaintiff showed difficulty understanding and repeating
words and insftuctions, difficulty following instructions, and difficulty with her memory, and (3) the
opinions of Dts. \Wax and Lloyd, discussed furthet above. Çn1'9,26,30.)
10

See, e.5.,

Ta/m0,2015

WL 2395708, at x3 (remanding where ALJ did not connect treâtment

notes cited by Commissioner with step three and RFC disctepancy on issue of moderate CPP) czmPare
withTolþert u. Coluin,No. 1:15CV437,201,6WL 6956629, at+9 (À{.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2016) (unpublished)
(affrming ALJ on similar issue where ALJ explained that the plaintiff did not seek mental health

treatment and "acknowledged that none of her impairments affected her memory, her ability to
11

Second, and likewise, the Commissioner assetts that

Plaintiffs argument is a conclusory

claim of simple legal ertor, which is not grounded in the evidence.

pocket Etttry 1'3 at 19.)

However, this argument largely ignotes the ALJ's step three finding that Plaintiff suffers ftom
moderate limitations in

CPP. The Commissionet's argument futther

fails to acknowledge the

other evidence discussed herein,ll and also begs the ultimate question at hand, which is
whether the decision in question is subject to judicial teview. As explained above, it is not.
Finally, in contending that the ALJ's mental RFC determination satisfied the dictates

of Mascio, the Commissioner points to, among other things, the opinions of Drs. ITax and
Lloyd, and chanctetizes them

as concluding that

performing SRRT's. (Docket Entry

1,3

Plain¡ff is capable of maintaining CPP while

at 26 referendngTr. 1,21,-22,1,39-40.) This is indeed

true, however, âs explained above, Drs. Tovah and \ü/ax also opined that Plaintiff should be

limited to

a

non-ptoduction and non-social environment.

Consequently, the Court concludes that remand is proper so that the ALJ may build a
logical bridge between the evidence of recotd and her conclusions. Matcio,780 F.3d

^t

638

("Perhaps the ALJ can explain why Masùo's moderate limitation in concenttation, petsistence,
or pace at step three does not translate into a limitation in Mascio's residual functional capacity
..

.þ]"t

because the

ALJ hete gave no explanation,

a

temand is in otder.")'

complete tasks, her ability to concenúate andunderstand things, ot her ability to follow insftuctions");
ll/a// a. Coluin, No. 1:15CV01089, 201.6 WL 5360682, at x6 (1\{.D.N.C. Sept. 23,201,6) (unpublished)
(affrming A.LJ on similar issue where "the ALJ expressl;' noted that both state agency consultants
found that Plaintiff suffered moderate limitation in CPP, but that, despite that concentrational deficit,
Plaintiff remained mentaliy able to perform work lfunited to SRRTs") (internal citation omitted),
recommendation adopTed, slip op. (l\{.D.N.C. October 14,201,6) (unpublished).
11

See sapra

note 8.

t2

None

of this necessarily

means that Plaintiff

undersigned expresses no opinion on that

is disabled undet the Act and the

mattet. Nevertheless, the undersigned

concludes

that the proper course here is to remand this matter fot furthet administrative ptoceedings.

The Court declines consideration of the additional issues taised by Plaintiff at this time.
Hancock u. Bømhart,206 F.Supp.2d757,763-764 CX/.D.

Ya.2002) (on remand, the pdot

decision of no preclusive effect, as it is vacated and the new hearing is conducted).

VI. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that the Commissioner's amended motion fot leave to

file excess pages pocket Entry 14) is GRANTED and the Commissionet's motion to exceed
page

limit (Docket Entry 11) is DENIED as moot. The Court has considered all of the

pleadings of tecotd.

FURTHERMORE, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that that
Commissioner's decision finding

no disability be REVERSED, and the mattet

the
be

REMANDED to the Commissionet under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. $ a05G). The
Commissioner should be directed to remand the matter to the ALJ for futthet administtative

action âs set out above. To this extent, Plaintiffs motion for judgment Q)ocket Entry 9)
should be

GRANTED and Defendant's motion fot judgment (Docket Entry 12) should

DENIED.

L lïçhuter
St*cr h{agistnteJ"dge

Febtuary 23,2017
Durham, North Carolina
13

be