GUNTER v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC. et al
Filing
70
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR on 03/22/2017, that the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Davie County Board of Commissioners and Stokes County Board of Commissioners pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 28 ) is GRANTED and that all claims against Defendants Davie County Board of Commissioners and Stokes County Board of Commissioners are dismissed with prejudice. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DAVID RAY GUNTER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC., )
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
1:16CV262
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
This matter is before the court on the Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by
Defendants Davie County Board of Commissioners and Stokes County
Board of Commissioners (collectively “moving Defendants”). (Doc.
28.) In their memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss,
moving Defendants contend, inter alia, that a county board of
commissioners is not a legal entity capable of being sued. (Doc.
29 at 5.) Plaintiff has filed a response and brief in opposition
(Docs. 39, 41), and moving Defendants have replied (Doc. 42).
This matter is ripe for ruling and, as explained below, this
court will grant moving Defendants’ motion.
In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted,” a court must determine
whether the complaint is legally and factually sufficient.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). For a claim to be facially plausible, a plaintiff must
“plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations
as true. Id. However, a court does not have to accept as true
mere legal conclusions, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
Moving Defendants allege that neither the Davie County
Board of Commissioners nor the Stokes County Board of
Commissioners are legal entities capable of being sued, and that
Davie County and Stokes County, both of which are named
Defendants in this case, are the real parties in interest. (Doc.
42 at 2.) “State law dictates whether a governmental agency has
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the capacity to be sued in federal court.” Efird v. Riley, 342
F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing Avery v. Burke,
660 F.2d 111, 113–14 (4th Cir. 1981)). North Carolina statute
§ 153A–11 acknowledges that a county is a legal entity which may
be sued. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-11. However, there is no
corresponding statute authorizing suit against a county's board
of commissioners. See, e.g., Craig v. Cty. of Chatham, 143 N.C.
App. 30, 31, 545 S.E.2d 455, 456 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (noting
that county's Board of Health and Board of Commissioners “are
not entities capable of being sued”); Piland v. Hertford Cty.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 141 N.C. App. 293, 296, 539 S.E.2d 669, 671
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that county, not Board of
Commissioners, was real party in interest). Accordingly, the
Davie County Board of Commissioners and the Stokes County Board
of Commissioners lack the legal capacity to be sued. See, e.g.,
Efird, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (dismissing claims against county
sheriff's department for lack of capacity); Bess v. Cty. of
Cumberland, No. 5:10-CV-453-BR, 2011 WL 3055289, at *1 (E.D.N.C.
July 25, 2011) (unpublished).
This rule applies with equal force to claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Hill v. Robeson Cty., 733 F. Supp. 2d
676, 690 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (dismissing § 1983 claim against county
sheriff’s office for lack of legal capacity to be sued); Parker
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v. Bladen Cty., 583 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D.N.C. 2008)
(dismissing § 1983 claim against county sheriff's department for
lack of capacity); see also Avery, 660 F.2d at 114 (if plaintiff
entitled to recover damages under § 1983, the county would be
liable, not county boards).
The proper parties here appear to be Davie County and
Stokes County. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-11 (providing counties
have capacity to sue and be sued); see also Piland, 141 N.C.
App. at 296, 539 S.E.2d at 671 (holding county was proper party
rather than board of county commissioners). Because Davie County
and Stokes County were also named as defendants in this case,
amendment is not necessary.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of
Defendants Davie County Board of Commissioners and Stokes County
Board of Commissioners pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 28) is
GRANTED and that all claims against Defendants Davie County
Board of Commissioners and Stokes County Board of Commissioners
are dismissed with prejudice.
This the 22nd day of March, 2017.
_______________________________________
United States District Judge
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