GWALTNEY v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY et al
Filing
4
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 06/13/2016; that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of entering this recommendation of dismissal. IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RICHARD A. GWALTNEY,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
et al.,
Defendants.
1:16CV428
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) in conjunction with his
pro
se
Complaint
Plaintiff’s
(Docket
instant
Entry
Application
2).
for
The
the
Court
will
limited
grant
purpose
of
recommending dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
1995)
(en
banc)
(internal
“Dispensing
with
filing
fees,
quotation
however,
[is]
marks
not
omitted).
without
its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).
To
address
this
concern,
the
in
forma
pauperis
statute
provides that “the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if
the [C]ourt determines . . . the action . . . is frivolous.”
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
28
“[A] complaint, containing as it does both
factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it
lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In assessing such matters, the
Court may “apply common sense.”
Nasim, 64 F.3d at 954; see also
Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256–57 (“The word ‘frivolous’ is inherently
elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition. . . . The
term’s capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible
analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all
factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” (some internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The Court may consider subject matter jurisdiction as part of
the frivolity review.
Overstreet v. Colvin, No. 4:13-CV-261, 2014
WL 353684, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2014) (citing Lovern v.
Edwards,
190
F.3d
648,
654
(4th
Cir.
1999)
(holding
that
“[d]etermining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the
outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure”)).
“‘[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ constrained
to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the
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Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.”
In re
Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978)).
The party invoking jurisdiction, here Plaintiff, has the burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d
1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction . . . is on the plaintiff, the party asserting
jurisdiction.”).
“The complaint must affirmatively allege the
grounds for jurisdiction,” Overstreet, 2014 WL 353684, at *3, and
the Court must dismiss the action if it determines that subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
ANALYSIS
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff resides in Kannapolis,
North Carolina, and that Defendant Chris Hess resides in Charlotte,
North Carolina. (Docket Entry 2 at 1-2.) Therefore, Plaintiff has
failed
to
carry
his
burden
of
establishing
subject
matter
jurisdiction through diversity, as Plaintiff and at least one
defendant
are
both
residents
of
North
Carolina,
diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
precluding
See, e.g., Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005)
(“[T]he presence in the action of a single plaintiff from the same
State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original
diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.”); Sanderlin v.
Hutchens,
Senter
&
Britton,
P.A.,
-3-
783
F.
Supp.
2d
798,
801
(W.D.N.C.
2011)
(“Plaintiffs
diversity
requirement.
have
not
Specifically
satisfied
Plaintiffs
the
and
complete
Defendant
Hutchens, Senter & Britton, P .A. are both citizens of North
Carolina.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not assert any claims
under the United States Constitution, federal law, or federal
treaties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; instead, it purports to assert a
state-law claim in connection with Defendants’ repossession of
Plaintiff’s vehicle, see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 25-9-601 et seq.
(See
Docket Entry 2 at 2-3 (alleging that “[m]anagement needs to address
[i]ssue about not working with customers,” and requesting the Court
order that Defendants pay Plaintiff “for the cost of [his] truck”);
see also Docket Entry 1 at 1 (asserting that “[t]he nature of this
action is: [i]llegal [r]epossession of truck - [d]id not give
notice - [d]id not send certified mail - [d]id not work with
[Plaintiff] [at] all”); Docket Entry 3 at 1 (alleging cause of
action for “repossess[ing] property”).)1
1
The Complaint thus, as a
The Complaint requests “remov[al] of [the repossession from
Plaintiff’s] credit report.” (Docket Entry 2 at 3.) To the extent
this request arguably invokes the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (the “FCRA”), the Complaint contains no
factual matter that conceivably could support such a claim, see
generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a
plausible claim for relief, and that “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions”).
In addition, Plaintiff’s
Civil Cover Sheet asserts that the nature of this suit arises
under, inter alia, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.
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matter of law, fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction, and
the
obviousness
of
this
defect
renders
this
action
legally
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
IT
IS
THEREFORE
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff’s
Application
to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED for the
limited purpose of entering this recommendation of dismissal.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
June 13, 2016
(Docket Entry 3 at 1.) The False Claims Act provides a cause of
action for fraud committed against the United States. Harrison v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999).
In this case, the Complaint does not allege that Defendants
committed any fraud against the United States. (See Docket Entry
2.) Under these circumstances, the Complaint fails to assert a
cause of action under either the FCRA or False Claims Act that
would confer federal question jurisdiction upon this Court. See,
e.g., Citimortgage, Inc. v. Dhinoja, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381
(N.D. Ga. 2010) (“In determining the presence of a federal
question, this [c]ourt looks to the substance, not the labels, of
the plaintiff’s claims as contained in the factual allegations in
the complaint.”).
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