BLUE RHINO GLOBAL SOURCING, INC. v. SUMXING INTERNATIONAL LTD.

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by JUDGE LORETTA C. BIGGS on 8/18/2017, that Defendant Sanxin International Ltd.'s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15 ) is GRANTED, based on lack of personal jurisdiction and the claims against Defendant, SI, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. FURTHER that Defendant Carlos E. Rodriguez's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17 ) is GRANTED, based on lack of personal jurisdiction and the claims against Defendant, Rodriguez, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants SI and Rodriguez's Motion to Amend Motions to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Due to Change in Patent Venue Law (ECF No. 22 ), is DENIED AS MOOT. (Daniel, J)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BLUE RHINO GLOBAL SOURCING, INC.
Plaintiff,
v.
SANXIN INTERNATIONAL LTD. f/k/a
SUMXING INTERNATIONAL LTD.,
BAZHOU SANXIN STEEL PIPE CO.,
LTD., and CARLOS E. RODRIGUEZ
Defendants.

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1:16CV581

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.
Plaintiff initiated this action on June 6, 2016, alleging patent infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 1. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendants, Sanxin
International Ltd. (“SI”) and Carlos E. Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) (collectively “Defendants”),
for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, (ECF Nos. 15, 17). Also before
the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Amend their motions to dismiss, (“Motion to Amend”),
(ECF No. 22). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Sanxin International Ltd.’s Motion
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint will be granted; Defendant Carlos E. Rodriguez’s
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint will be granted; and Defendants’ Motion to
Amend will be denied as moot.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Blue Rhino Global Sourcing, Inc. (“Blue Rhino”), describes itself as “a leading

distributor of grills and other outdoor living accessories” in the United States. (ECF No. 10

¶ 14.) Blue Rhino is the assignee of United States Design Patent No. D680,795 (“the ‘795
Patent”), entitled “Barbecue Grill,” issued by the United States Patent & Trademark Office
on April 30, 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16; see ECF No. 10-1.)
None of the Defendants in this action are residents of North Carolina. Rodriguez is a
resident of Minnesota and serves as President and a director of Defendant, SI. (Id. ¶ 4; ECF
No. 16-1 ¶ 1.) SI, formerly known as Sumxing International, Ltd.,1 is a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Cottage Grove, Minnesota. (ECF No. 10 ¶ 2; ECF No.
16-1 ¶ 2.) SI does not have any offices or employees in North Carolina, and it does not lease
or own any property in the state. (ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 4.) In the Spring of 2016, SI was purchased
by Defendant, Bazhou Sanxin Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. (“Bazhou Sanxin”), a Chinese corporation
“engaged in the business of making, importing, marketing, offering for sale, and selling, a
variety of outdoor living accessories, including grills.” (ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 3, 18; ECF No. 16-1
¶ 3.)
SI’s business includes: (1) serving as a customer service contact for certain products
manufactured by Bazhou Sanxin, (id. ¶ 7); and (2) serving “as a sales representative in the
[United States] for Bazhou Sanxin,” (id. ¶ 8). As a customer service contact, SI fields “postpurchase inquiries” from individual purchasers of Bazhou Sanxin products, as well as inquiries
from retail stores that carry Bazhou Sanxin products. (Id. ¶ 7.) One such product is a 17.5
inch Square Charcoal Grill (“Charcoal Grill”), bearing model number BY16-102-002-02,

1

SI formally changed its name from Sumxing International, Ltd. to Sanxin International, Ltd. on
March 15, 2016. (ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 3; ECF No. 16-1 at 14.)

2

which, according to the Complaint, 2 infringes on Plaintiff’s patent. (ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 26, 27,
30; ECF No. 16-1 ¶¶ 5, 9.) The Charcoal Grill is only sold through Walmart,3 and although
SI “does not market, manufacture, sell or offer to sell” this (or any other) grill, (ECF No. 161 ¶¶ 6, 15), it “serves as a customer service contact when purchasers of the [Charcoal Grill],
or a retail store carrying the [grill], have missing or damaged parts or questions regarding the
grill,” (ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 9). SI’s email address and telephone number are included in the
Owner’s Manual provided in each box containing the unassembled Charcoal Grill. (ECF No.
10-2 at 12; ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 9.)
SI does not initiate contact with customers or retailers of the Charcoal Grill. (See ECF
No. 16-1 ¶¶ 9–10, 15.) It “is only involved with providing replacement parts after a grill has
been purchased and it is discovered to inadvertently have been supplied with missing or
damaged parts.” (Id. ¶ 31.) As such, SI “has never shipped an entire grill” to North Carolina
or any other state in response to a customer inquiry. (Id. ¶ 30.)
When a customer or retail store contacts SI to request replacement parts for a Bazhou
Sanxin product, including the Charcoal Grill, SI sends the requested parts at no cost to the
customer or retailer. (See id. ¶¶ 9, 10, 14.) SI then invoices Bazhou Sanxin for the shipping
costs incurred. (Id. ¶ 11.) Between March 20144 and October 10, 2016, SI fielded 131

2

Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement on September 6, 2016. (ECF
No. 10.) All references to “the Complaint” herein refers to the First Amended Complaint.
3
According to Rodriguez’s Affidavit, the Charcoal Grill is also offered for sale on websites by sellers
who would have originally purchased the grill from Walmart and then “attempt[ed] to re-sell the grill
for a higher price.” (ECF No. 16-1 ¶¶ 9, 23; ECF No. 10-4 at 7.)
4

SI began receiving post-purchase inquiries from individuals and retail stores in March 2014. (ECF
No. 16-1 ¶ 12.)

3

customer service inquiries from individuals and retail stores in North Carolina; 24 of those
inquiries involved the Charcoal Grill, and the remaining 107 of those inquiries involved other
Bazhou Sanxin products. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 20–24.) Rodriguez, who handled “approximately ten
percent” of the post-purchase inquiries, recalls having “shipped a replacement part for [the
Charcoal Grill] to North Carolina only one time.” (ECF No. 18-1 ¶ 24.)
The other aspect of SI’s business—i.e., its sales representative services—is “limited to
specific products and specific retailers in North America.” (ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 8.) This “does
not, and never has,” included serving as a sales representative for the Charcoal Grill. (Id. ¶¶
8, 9, 15.) SI has made no sales in North Carolina, nor has it ever offered for sale, or sold,
products via online marketplaces such as Amazon or eBay. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 25.) SI does not provide
any sales representative services to Walmart, the sole retailer of the allegedly infringing grills.
(Id. ¶ 15.) In or around 2013 and 2014, SI attempted to have two North Carolina retailers—
Family Dollar and Lowe’s Companies, Inc. (“Lowe’s”)—carry Bazhou Sanxin products, none
of which included the Charcoal Grill. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) Ultimately, neither Family Dollar nor
Lowe’s elected to carry any Bazhou Sanxin products. (Id.)
The instant lawsuit arises from Blue Rhino’s allegations that the Charcoal Grill infringes
the ‘795 Patent. Defendants have each moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 15, 17.) Defendants have also filed a
Motion to Amend their motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 22.) To date, Defendant Bazhou
Sanxin has not made an appearance in this case.

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II.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(2), and failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 15 at 1; ECF No. 17 at 1.) The Court must first address the
threshold issue of personal jurisdiction. See Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471
F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “dismissal of a case on an issue relating to the
merits of the dispute, such as failure to state a claim, is improper without resolving threshold
issues of jurisdiction, including personal jurisdiction” (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999))).
A.

Personal Jurisdiction

When evaluating personal jurisdiction in patent cases, courts apply Federal Circuit law
“because the jurisdictional question at issue . . . is ‘intimately involved with the substance of
the patent laws.’” Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Akro
Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). On a personal jurisdiction challenge, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003). However,
where, as here, the court decides a pretrial personal jurisdiction motion without jurisdictional
discovery or an evidentiary hearing—relying instead on “affidavits and other written materials”
in the record—the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). When considering whether
the plaintiff has made such a showing, the court “must accept the uncontroverted allegations in
the plaintiff’s complaint as true and resolve any factual conflicts . . . in the plaintiff’s favor.”
5

Id. (emphasis added). See Akro Corp., 45 F.3d at 1543 (stating “where the plaintiff’s factual
allegations are not directly controverted, they are taken as true for purposes of determining
jurisdiction” (quotation omitted)). “Once the defendant presents evidence indicating that the
requisite minimum contacts do not exist, the plaintiff must come forward with affidavits or
other evidence in support of its position.” Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC v. Willowood, LLC, 139
F. Supp. 3d 722, 728 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
A federal district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
only if: (1) such jurisdiction is proper under the long-arm statute of the state in which the
district court sits; and (2) exercising jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant in the forum
state is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Polar Electro
Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). North Carolina’s long-arm statute
“permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . to the outer limits allowable under federal
due process.” Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2014). See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(1)(d); Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (N.C.
1977) (“[I]t is apparent that the [North Carolina] General Assembly intended to make available
to the North Carolina courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible under federal due
process.”). Therefore, when North Carolina is the forum state, the two-prong test “collapse[s]
into a single inquiry” allowing the court to proceed directly to the constitutional analysis. See
Inamed, 249 F.3d at 1360; accord Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 558–59.
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction. AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per
curiam). General jurisdiction, “permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based
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on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit . . . .” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115,
1121 n.6 (2014). Courts can exercise general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when
the defendant is essentially at home in the forum state, and “maintains contacts with the forum
state that are sufficiently ‘continuous and systematic,’ even when the cause of action has no
relation to those contacts.” Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (explaining that a court can exercise
general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only when the defendant’s “affiliations with
the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State” (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)
(alteration in original))). “[S]poradic and insubstantial contact” with the forum state is
insufficient to confer general jurisdiction. Grober, 686 F.3d at 1346.
“Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, must be based on activities that arise out of
or relate to the cause of action, and can exist even if the defendant’s contacts are not
continuous and systematic.” Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1017
(Fed. Cir. 2009). The Federal Circuit has “outlined a three-prong minimum contacts test for
determining if specific jurisdiction exist[s]: (1) whether the defendant purposefully directed its
activities at residents of the forum, (2) whether the claim arises out of or relates to those
activities, and (3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” 3D Sys.,
Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “The ‘minimum contacts’ test
examines the number and nature of a defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Red Wing Shoe
Co. v. Hockerson–Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “Due process requires
that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the
7

State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting
with other persons affiliated with the State.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)); see Red Wing Shoe Co., 148 F.3d at 1359. Thus, the
relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation “must arise out of
contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122
(quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). In actions involving corporate employees, because
a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its officers and directors, corporate
employees “are not subject to personal jurisdiction, even as to the employee’s corporate
activities unless the employee has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.” May Apparel
Grp., Inc. v. Ava Import-Export, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 93, 97 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first two prongs of the minimum contacts
test, and then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction is unreasonable. Grober, 686 F.3d at 1346. Only if the court finds that the plaintiff
has satisfied the first prong of the analysis—that the defendant has purposefully directed his
activities to the forum state—does the court need to consider the remaining prongs of the
specific jurisdiction test. See 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1380.
B.

Analysis
1. General Jurisdiction

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants have had continuous and systematic contacts with
this State and District.” (ECF No. 10 ¶ 9.) However, the evidence before the Court shows
that neither SI nor Rodriguez have had such continuous and systematic contacts with North
Carolina that render them essentially at home in the state. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
8

Specifically, neither Defendant is a resident of North Carolina. SI is incorporated in Delaware,
with its principal place of business in Minnesota. (ECF No. 10 ¶ 2; ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 2.) SI
maintains no offices, operations, or employees in North Carolina. (ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 4.) Nor
does SI own or lease any property in North Carolina. (Id.) Similarly, Rodriguez is a resident
of Minnesota, not North Carolina, and neither owns nor rents any property in this state. (ECF
No. 18-1 ¶¶ 1–3; ECF No. 10 ¶ 4.) Rodriguez does not vote in North Carolina; nor does he
maintain a bank account, telephone listing, or mailing address within the state. (ECF No. 181 ¶ 4.)
Beyond Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations alluding to general jurisdiction, Plaintiff offers
no evidence to establish general jurisdiction. See Vogel v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
2d 585, 594 (M.D.N.C. 2008) (explaining that when a defendant has presented evidence
denying facts necessary to confer jurisdiction, the plaintiff “must present sufficient evidence
to create a factual dispute on each jurisdictional element . . . on which the defendant has
presented evidence”). The Court, therefore, concludes that it lacks general jurisdiction over
Defendants SI and Rodriguez.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Courts have found the first prong of the minimum contacts test—the purposeful
direction prong—satisfied in instances where the defendant deliberately engaged in significant
activities within the forum state, thereby availing itself of the privilege of conducting business
in the state. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475–76. See, e.g., Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy
Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1231–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding that defendant purposefully
directed its activities at the forum state where, among other things, defendant received royalty
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payments from the sale of the allegedly infringing products in the forum state and distributed
the allegedly infringing product to an entity located in the forum state); Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M.
Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that
defendant purposefully directed its activities when its agents traveled into the forum state with
the allegedly infringing products, and displayed those products at a trade show attended by
forum residents); Taltwell, LLC v. Zonet USA Corp., No. 3:07cv543, 2007 WL 4562874, at *8
(E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2007) (concluding that a non-resident corporate defendant party has
purposefully directed its activities at the forum state, “if it enters into a business arrangement
with a resident of the forum state whereby the [non-resident defendant] delivers goods or
services to [the] forum state and receives payments therefrom”).
Here, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he uncontroverted allegations establish that [SI]
purposefully directed its activities at North Carolina.” (ECF No. 19 at 8.) In particular,
Plaintiff contends that SI “has engaged in substantial activity within North Carolina by availing
itself as the Customer Service Department [of Bazhou Sanxin] and inviting contact from, as
well as providing extensive customer service and post-sales support services to, customers
residing in North Carolina.” (Id.) Plaintiff points to the Owner’s Manual included with each
Charcoal Grill and alleges that SI “created the Owner’s Manual[,] . . . identifying itself as the
‘Customer Service Department.’” (Id.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, however, SI has presented evidence disputing
Plaintiff’s allegations that it purposefully directed activities at North Carolina. (See generally
ECF No. 16-1.) The record reflects that SI does not advertise or market its services to North
Carolina customers. (ECF No. 16-1 ¶¶ 6, 21.) SI also has not attended trade shows in the
10

state, nor does it manufacture, import, or sell any products, including the allegedly infringing
Charcoal Grills, to customers in North Carolina or elsewhere. (ECF No. 16-1 ¶¶ 6, 21, 25.)
Additionally, while the Owner’s Manual for the grill includes SI’s phone number and email
address as a customer service contact, SI plays no role in the creation, printing, publishing,
shipping, or distribution of the manuals. (ECF No. 10-2 at 12; ECF No. 21-1 ¶¶ 2–5.) SI also
has no control over where, or to whom, the grills are sold and shipped. (See ECF No. 16-1 ¶
6.) The Charcoal Grills are sold and shipped, with the accompanying manuals, by Bazhou
Sanxin to customers and retailers who, themselves, initiate contact with SI should they “need
help, have missing or damaged parts, or have any questions” regarding the grill. (ECF No.
10-2 at 12; ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 9.)
While a non-resident defendant’s shipment of an accused product into the forum state
is usually sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the defendant, see Beverly Hills Fan Co.
v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994), here, SI has never shipped the
allegedly infringing Charcoal Grill to a customer in North Carolina, (ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 30). In
response to post-purchase requests from individual customers and Walmart, the grill’s retailer,
SI ships only replacement parts5 for damaged or missing components of the grill. (Id. ¶¶ 9–
11, 30.) SI “has never shipped an entire grill” to a customer in North Carolina or elsewhere.
(Id. ¶ 30.) Nor has SI received payment from the customer or retailer (i.e., Walmart) for any

5

The replacement parts provided by SI to Walmart and customers of the Charcoal Grill include
hardware items such as “screws, cotter pins, wing nuts, and washers,” as well as “handles, hinges, leg
support cups, air vents, wheels and locks.” (ECF No. 16-1 ¶¶ 28–29.) These items are “stock
components” that are used on grills other than the Charcoal Grill at issue, as well as other types of
products. (Id.)

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costs associated with shipment of the requested replacement parts. (See id. ¶¶ 11, 14.) SI,
instead, invoices Bazhou Sanxin for its shipping costs. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff has failed to come forward with affidavits or other evidence to support its
position and, in light of SI’s evidence, Plaintiff’s bare allegations, without more, are insufficient
to show that SI purposefully directed its activities at the state of North Carolina. See Syngenta
Crop Protection, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 728 (“Once the defendant presents evidence indicating that
the requisite minimum contacts do not exist, the plaintiff must come forward with affidavits
or other evidence in support of its position.”). Because Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden
as to this first prong of the minimum contacts test for specific jurisdiction, the Court need not
proceed to the second and third prongs. See 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1380 (explaining that where
the court finds that defendant did not purposefully direct any activities at residents of the
forum state, the court need not examine the other two prongs); accord Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v.
Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2009) (“If, and only if, we find that the plaintiff has
satisfied this first prong of the test for specific jurisdiction need we move on to a consideration
of prongs two and three.”). Accordingly, the Court concludes that it lacks specific jurisdiction
over SI.
The Court likewise finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant, Rodriguez,
purposefully directed his activities at North Carolina.

Plaintiff argues that Rodriguez

“personally participated” in SI’s activities by: (i) creating the Owner’s Manual provided with
each Charcoal Grill; (ii) working with various retailers, “including initiating contact, discussing
potential sales, and attending business meetings, including with retailers in North Carolina;”
and (iii) “personally fielding customer service inquiries, and sending Charcoal Grill parts to
12

customers residing in North Carolina.” (ECF No. 19 at 14.) However, beyond its allegations
and contentions, Plaintiff provides no affidavits or other evidence to meet its burden of
establishing that Rodriguez purposefully directed his activities at North Carolina. Rather, the
evidence reflects that despite Plaintiff’s contention, Rodriguez played no role in the creating,
printing, or publishing of the Owner’s Manuals placed in each box containing a Charcoal Grill.
(ECF No. 21-1 ¶¶ 2–3.) Nor did Rodriguez place the Owner’s Manuals in boxes containing
the Charcoal Grills. (Id. ¶ 4.) Additionally, while Rodriguez contacted various retailers “in an
effort to have those retailers purchase products manufactured by Bazhou Sanxin,” none of
those contacts involved potential sales of the allegedly infringing Charcoal Grill. (ECF No.
16-1 ¶¶ 15, 16.) Further, Rodriguez’s only attempts to secure business in North Carolina, on
behalf of SI, were unsuccessful, and involved brief, sporadic contacts with Family Dollar and
Lowe’s. (See id. ¶¶ 19–20.) Specifically, he had “approximately three” email exchanges, in or
around 2014, with a Family Dollar employee in North Carolina who, in turn, placed Rodriguez
in contact with a company representative overseas. (ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 19.) He also made “three
or four visits to North Carolina” since October 2013, and contacted “different buyers at
Lowe’s over the years,” via emails and telephone calls, to arrange those meetings. (ECF No.
18-1 ¶ 29.) With respect to Rodriguez’s role in fielding customer service inquiries regarding
replacement parts for Bazhou Sanxin products, Rodriguez handled “approximately ten
percent” of the post-purchase inquiries, and recalls only one occasion on which he actually
shipped a replacement part for the Charcoal Grill to North Carolina. (ECF No. 18-1 ¶ 24.)
Such attenuated contacts with North Carolina fall far short of demonstrating that Rodriguez
purposefully directed his actions at North Carolina. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123.
13

Based on the above evidence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish
that Rodriguez purposefully directed his activities at North Carolina. Thus, the Court lacks
specific jurisdiction over Rodriguez.6
III.

CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of either

general or specific jurisdiction over Defendants SI and Rodriguez. Accordingly, the claims
against Defendants SI and Rodriguez in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the Court concludes that it lacks personal
jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 7 Further, in light of the Court’s
conclusion, Defendants’ Motion to Amend will be denied as moot.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Sanxin International Ltd.’s Motion
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED, based on lack of personal
jurisdiction and the claims against Defendant, SI, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
6

Plaintiff appears to advance an argument that Rodriguez is subject to this Court’s jurisdiction as a
result of a tort committed in North Carolina. (ECF No. 19 at 13–15.) While the cases cited by Plaintiff
support the general proposition that commission of a tort in the forum state may subject a party to
personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific act on the part of Rodriguez that allegedly
constitutes a tort. The Court, therefore, finds this argument unpersuasive.
7

See Hutton v. Hydra-Tech, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 746, 757 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (stating that, where
defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim,
the court need not address defendants’ arguments for dismissal for failure to state a claim because the
court concludes that it does not have personal jurisdiction over defendants); Provident Pharm., Inc. v.
Amneal Pharms., LLC, No. 3:08-CV-393, 2008 WL 4911232, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2008) (same).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Carlos E. Rodriguez’s Motion to
Dismiss First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED, based on lack of personal
jurisdiction and the claims against Defendant, Rodriguez, are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants SI and Rodriguez’s Motion to Amend
Motions to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Due to Change in Patent Venue Law (ECF
No. 22), is DENIED AS MOOT.
This, the 18th day of August, 2017.

/s/ Loretta C. Biggs
United States District Judge

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