HATCH et al v. DEMAYO et al
Filing
248
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE LORETTA C. BIGGS on 3/24/2021. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter, Amend, and/or to Grant Relief from Order on Summary Judgment Motions (ECF No. 242 ) is DENIED. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JOHNATHAN HATCH, et al.,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL A. DEMAYO, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:16CV925
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.
Plaintiffs initiated this action alleging that the above-named Defendants violated the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq., by obtaining their names
and addresses from automobile accident reports and using that information to advertise legal
services. (ECF Nos. 1; 5; 100.) On January 22, 2021, the Court granted summary judgment
on all counts in favor of Defendants. (ECF No. 240.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion
to Alter, Amend, and/or to Grant Relief from Order on Summary Judgment Motions. (ECF
No. 242.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
The DPPA holds liable certain parties for the misuse of a driver’s information if that
data has been collected from a “motor vehicle record.” 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). In their
Case 1:16-cv-00925-LCB-LPA Document 248 Filed 03/24/21 Page 1 of 5
complaint,1 the three named Plaintiffs alleged that they were each involved in car accidents.
(ECF No. 100 ¶¶ 28, 40, 52.) In each accident, either local police officers or North Carolina
State Highway Patrol troopers investigated and recorded their findings on a standard DMV349 form that was then provided to the state’s Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). (Id. at
¶¶ 29–30, 41–42, 53–54; see also ECF No. 187-31 at 2–3.) To complete the form’s driver
identification fields, the investigating officers first asked each Plaintiff for his or her driver’s
license before then transcribing all of the needed information onto the form. (Id.) In each
instance, the investigating officers also asked the Plaintiff whether the information on his or
her license was accurate. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 43, 55.) When each Plaintiff answered in the affirmative,
the officer checked a box to indicate that the address entered onto the form matched the
address on the driver’s license. (Id.)
In the weeks that followed, Plaintiffs received unsolicited marketing materials from
various North Carolina attorneys and law firms, including Defendants, who had obtained their
names and addresses from their respective DMV-349 accident reports. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 49, 61, 64.)
In some cases, Defendants collected information from Plaintiffs’ DMV-349s themselves, and
in other cases they purchased accident report data aggregated by a third party. (Id. ¶ 67.)
Although Plaintiffs reported that the “State of North Carolina considers a DMV-349 to be a
motor vehicle record,” (id. ¶ 24), they did not cite to any legal authority for such a finding nor
did they argued in their briefing that this is the case, (see ECF No. 187 at 31–39). Rather, they
contended that the information included in the report may be traced back to such records and
thus fall under the ambit of the DPPA. (Id. at 39.) Therefore, the central question forming
1
The complaint referenced throughout this Opinion is the Second Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 100).
2
Case 1:16-cv-00925-LCB-LPA Document 248 Filed 03/24/21 Page 2 of 5
the basis of this lawsuit was whether, as Plaintiffs alleged, Defendants’ conduct in gathering
personal information from DMV-349s and using it to market legal services is a violation of
the DPPA.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the “district court retains
the power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments . . . at any time prior to final
judgment when such is warranted.” Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514–
15 (4th Cir. 2003); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment.”). “Said power is committed to the discretion of the district
court” and may be exercised as justice requires. Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 515. The Fourth
Circuit has held that Rule 54(b) motions “are not subject to the strict standards applicable to
motions for reconsideration of a final judgment,” under Rule 59(e). Id. at 514. Nonetheless,
courts in this Circuit have frequently looked to the standards under Rule 59(e) for guidance in
considering motions for reconsideration under Rule 54(b).2 Accordingly, reconsideration
under Rule 54(b), like Rule 59(e), “is appropriate on the following grounds: (1) to account for
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for newly discovered evidence; or (3)
to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” South Carolina v. United States, 232
F. Supp. 3d 785, 793 (D.S.C. 2017). Although Rule 54(b) motions for reconsideration are held
to a less stringent standard than motions under Rule 59(e), such motions “should not be used
See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 3d 785, 792–93 (D.S.C. 2017); Cezair v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. DKC 13-2928, 2014 WL 4955535, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2014); Ruffin v. Entm’t of the E.
Panhandle, No. 3:11-CV-19, 2012 WL 1435674, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 25, 2012).
2
3
Case 1:16-cv-00925-LCB-LPA Document 248 Filed 03/24/21 Page 3 of 5
to rehash arguments the court has already considered” or “to raise new arguments or evidence
that could have been raised previously.” Id. at 793.
III.
DISCUSSION
In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that this Court emphasized two points in reaching its
decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants. (ECF No. 243 at 6). The first point is
(1) That Plaintiffs make “no allegations that the accident reports are ‘motor
vehicle records’ under the DPPA nor that the personal information was
obtained from a search of a DMV database.”
(Id. (citing ECF No. 240 at 17–18).) Plaintiffs contend that they “did present in their summary
judgment briefing an argument substantively identical to an allegation that DMV-349s are
DPPA motor vehicles.” (Id.) As evidence, they cite to a passage in their brief in which they
argue, in essence, that “the information on the DMV-349 is the information on the license or
in the DMV database.” (Id. at 8–9 (citing ECF No. 187 at 39).) Though such an assertion
fails to rebut the Court’s original statement, Plaintiffs contend that the Court should alter its
ruling and follow the lead of another court that “gave [plaintiffs] wide latitude in finding that
[they] had actually raised this argument.” (Id. at 10.) Yet Plaintiffs could have easily made the
straightforward contention that DMV-349s were in fact motor vehicle records and chose not
to do so. Given that there is no change in controlling authority nor clear error, the Court
declines to now subsequently alter, amend, or reconsider its Order on such a basis.
The second, and final, point of emphasis which Plaintiffs dispute is the Court’s finding
(2) That “Plaintiffs point to no decision—nor has this Court been able to find
one—where a defendant was adjudged liable as a matter of law for a DPPA
violation after obtaining, disclosing, or using ‘personal information’ that was not
gathered directly from a state DMV.
4
Case 1:16-cv-00925-LCB-LPA Document 248 Filed 03/24/21 Page 4 of 5
(ECF No. 243 at 6 (citing ECF No. 240 at 18).) Here, Plaintiffs cite extensively to Gaston v.
LexisNexis Risk Sols. Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. 160012 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2020), in which the federal
district court reached a different conclusion and found for Plaintiffs. Yet while the Court has
great respect for the work of other federal courts, the decision in Gaston is no more binding
on this case than this case is binding on Gaston. Further, a single, non-controlling case that
has reached a different conclusion fails to persuade the Court that its decision—when viewed
in the context of all of the other factors it considered—is plainly erroneous.
In sum, the Court finds that there has not been an intervening change in controlling
law, no newly discovered evidence, nor clear error of law manifesting injustice. The Court
therefore finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish any basis under Rule 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b)
for alteration, amendment, or reconsideration of its previous Order and will therefore deny
Plaintiffs’ motion.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter, Amend, and/or to
Grant Relief from Order on Summary Judgment Motions, (ECF No. 242), is DENIED.
This, the 24th day of March 2021.
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs
United States District Judge
5
Case 1:16-cv-00925-LCB-LPA Document 248 Filed 03/24/21 Page 5 of 5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?