HOWARD v. MCCLANAHAN et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR. on 4/20/2017, that for the reasons stated herein, that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9 ) is GRANTED and that Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1 ) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith. (Butler, Carol)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
VICTOR HOWARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOUGLAS MCCLANAHAN,
individually and in his
personal capacity,
MCCLANAHAN LAW FIRM, PLLC,
R. KEITH SHACKLEFORD,
individually and in his
personal capacity, and
WARREN SHACKLEFORD
ATTORNEYS P.L.L.C.,
Defendants.
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1:16CV1020
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
This matter is before the court on a Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants. (Doc. 9.)
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a response and brief in
opposition (Docs. 13, 14), and Defendants filed a reply (Doc.
16). This matter is ripe for resolution and, for the reasons
stated below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
In June 2012, Plaintiff entered into a Lease Agreement with
Option to Purchase for certain property owned by Patricia
Chambers (“Chambers”) and located in Durham, North Carolina.
(Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 1) ¶ 7.) In March 2013, Plaintiff
discovered a 2004 survey of the property performed by land
surveyor Jason L. Panciera with Cawthorne, Moss & Panciera, P.C.
(collectively “Panciera”). (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff hired Panciera
to do another survey of the property, which was completed in
April 2013. (Id.) In May 2013, Plaintiff and Chambers entered
into an Offer to Purchase and Contract Agreement. (Id. ¶ 10.)
In June 2013, Plaintiff received a letter from a Durham
County Deputy Attorney stating that the property did not comply
with Durham County zoning regulations. (Id. ¶ 11.) Thereafter,
Plaintiff terminated the purchase agreement because Chambers
could not convey the property with clear and marketable title.
(Id. ¶ 13.) Chambers refused to refund Plaintiff’s $4,000
purchase option fee and threatened to evict Plaintiff. (Id.) On
July 16, 2013, Plaintiff brought suit in the Durham County
Superior Court, case number 13 CVS 3675, against Chambers,
Panciera, and Steve N. Mattocks and Mattocks Enterprises, Inc.
(“Mattocks”) alleging fraud, unfair and deceptive trade
practices, and civil conspiracy (the “State Action”). (Id.
¶¶ 14-15.) In the State Action, Mattocks hired Defendants
Douglas McClanahan and McClanahan Law Firm, PLLC (collectively
“McClanahan”), and Panciera hired Defendants R. Keith
Shackleford and Warren Shackleford Attorneys P.L.L.C.
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(collectively “Shackleford”) (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss (“Defs.’ Br.”) (Doc. 10) at 2.) Defendants brought
motions for summary judgment on behalf of their respective
clients. (Id.)
On December 11, 2014, a hearing on Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment in the State Action was held in the Superior
Court of Durham County. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 15.) McClanahan
presented evidence and oral argument on behalf of their clients
Mattocks and Shackleford presented evidence and oral argument on
behalf of their client Panciera. (Id.) On December 15, 2014,
Defendants’ summary judgment motions were granted and all claims
brought against Defendants’ clients were dismissed. (Id. ¶ 16.)
In January 2015, Plaintiff appealed the Superior Court’s
order granting summary judgment to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) The North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s order stating that Plaintiff “failed
to forecast any evidence showing that [the defendants]
misrepresented or concealed anything from him, that they had any
intent to deceive, or that [Plaintiff] relied on any alleged
misrepresentations to his detriment.” (Id. ¶ 19; Howard v.
Chambers, No. COA15-590, 2016 WL 409697, *1 (N.C. Ct. App.
Feb. 2, 2016), appeal dismissed, ____ N.C. ____, 787 S.E.2d 38
(2016).) The Court of Appeals further found “no indication in
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the record that counsel for [the defendants] misstated anything
to the trial court and certainly nothing so improper that it
amounted to a constitutional violation.” Howard, 2016 WL 409697
at *3.
Plaintiff then filed this action on August 1, 2016.
Plaintiff alleges that at the summary judgment hearing,
Defendants “committed fraud upon the North Carolina Superior
Court through multiple misleading statements,
misrepresentations, and concealment of facts,” which caused
damage to Plaintiff. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 21; id. at 7-13.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “worked together in a
prearranged scheme to mislead the court” regarding the actions
of their clients. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff further alleges that
his constitutional rights were violated and he was damaged
because of Defendants’ fraud upon the court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 23-28.) Plaintiff seeks the
enforcement of his civil rights, damages, “injunctive relief
from all existing and any future damages”, and for this court to
order that the State Action decision and the North Carolina
Court of Appeals decision “be set aside and made of no effect.”
(Id. at 17.)
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Once a defendant raises a court's potential lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court
has authority to proceed. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d
642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). The court must determine whether it
has subject matter jurisdiction over an action before proceeding
any further. Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason
Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479–80 (4th Cir. 2005). When assessing a
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court may look
beyond the face of the complaint and consider other evidence
outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for
summary judgment. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.
1982). A court should dismiss for lack of federal subject matter
jurisdiction “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v.
United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted). Should the court conclude that it lacks subject matter
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jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
(Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 10) at 6-9.) The presence of subject matter
jurisdiction is a threshold issue that this court must determine
before the merits of the case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is a jurisdictional doctrine that prohibits federal
district courts from reviewing or overturning certain statecourt decisions. See Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983). “Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, lower federal
courts generally do not have jurisdiction to review state-court
decisions; rather, jurisdiction to review such decisions lies
exclusively with superior state courts and, ultimately, the
United States Supreme Court.” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731
(4th Cir. 1997). More specifically, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine
prevents a federal court from passing upon the merits of a
state-court decision, determining that a state-court judgment
was erroneously entered, or taking action that would render a
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state-court judgment ineffectual. Jordahl v. Democratic Party of
Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Supreme Court has limited the scope of the doctrine “to
cases of the kind from which [the doctrine] acquired its name:
cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006). The Exxon holding requires this
court “to examine whether the state-court loser who files suit
in federal district court seeks redress for an injury caused by
the state-court decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of
Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir. 2006). “A claim seeking
redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself
– even if the basis of the claim was not asserted to the state
court – asks the federal district court to conduct an appellate
review of the state-court decision.” Id. at 719. Federal
jurisdiction to review most state court judgments is vested
exclusively in the United States Supreme Court. See Exxon, 544
U.S. at 291 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257). Similarly, a litigant
“may not escape the jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman by
merely refashioning its attack on the state court judgments as a
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§ 1983 claim.” Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202-03 (citing Leonard v.
Suthard, 927 F.2d 168, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1991) for the
proposition that “where plaintiffs' claims are ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with the merits of a state court decision, then the
district court is being asked to review the state court
decision, a result prohibited under Rooker–Feldman”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges in count one that he was damaged by
Defendants’ fraud upon the state court when Defendants “misled
the court into believing there were no material, genuine issues
in controversy.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) at 6-7.) Plaintiff seeks
damages as a result of Defendants intentionally concealing
material facts and knowingly making false statements that misled
the state court into entering summary judgment in the state
defendants’ favor. (Id. at 13-14.) In count two, Plaintiff makes
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stating that Defendants’ fraud
upon the court, and the ultimate dismissal of his case following
that fraud, deprived him of his constitutional rights. (Id. at
14-15.)
Plaintiff does not allege an injury independent from the
State Action nor does he challenge the constitutionality of the
state-court process. Rather, he claims Defendants abused the
state-court adjudicatory process causing the state court to
decline to hear his evidence or grant him a jury trial. He now
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seeks to vacate the state-court order and obtain an injunction
against existing damages, essentially “seek[ing] redress for an
injury caused by the state-court decision.” See Davani, 434 F.3d
at 718; see also Moore v. Idealease of Wilmington, 465 F. Supp.
2d 484, 490 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
Plaintiff argues that he raised an independent claim
because he sued the state-court defendants’ attorneys for fraud
upon the state court and not the state-court defendants
themselves. (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 14) at 8.) Although the RookerFeldman doctrine “may not be invoked against a federal-court
plaintiff who was not actually a party to the prior state-court
judgment”, Lance, 546 U.S. at 465, it does not necessarily
follow that a federal-court defendant who was not a state-court
party cannot challenge a state-court loser who in effect seeks
to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a
lower federal court. See Glatzer v. Barone, 614 F. Supp. 2d 450,
468 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 394 F. App’x 763 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A
rule requiring exact identity of parties, moreover, would enable
the losing state court litigant to avoid the application of
Rooker–Feldman in the subsequent federal proceedings simply by
means of ‘clever pleading,’ such as adding or subtracting a
plaintiff or a defendant, purposely for tactical reasons.”).
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Plaintiff also argues that his claim is based on violations
of his constitutional rights by Defendants when they obtained
the state-court judgment by fraud upon the court, not on the
state-court judgment itself. (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 14) at 8.) This
argument is without merit. To the extent Plaintiff seeks redress
for the alleged fraudulent acts of Defendants as the attorneys
for the state-court defendants, such relief is so “inextricably
intertwined” with the state-court decision that it would require
this court to reweigh the evidence and credibility of the
parties and their counsel in the State Action and reconsider
whether the state-court decision was proper. See Davani, 434
F.3d at 719; see also Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 203 (holding § 1983
claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the state court
decisions). A ruling by this court as requested by Plaintiff
would necessarily require this court to find that the state
court wrongly decided certain issues before it and improperly
entered orders against Plaintiff. The relief requested,
injunctive relief from existing damages and orders dismissing
the state-court decisions, “leaves little doubt that [Plaintiff]
want[s] the district court to reverse the state court's
judgment.” Willner v. Frey, 243 F. App’x 744, 746–47 (4th Cir.
2007) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of suit challenging
state-court judgment in adverse possession litigation under
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Rooker–Feldman doctrine). Even if this court awarded only
damages to Plaintiff, this would, as a practical matter,
directly nullify the order of the state court.
“Plaintiff's proper course, however, is to attack the
state-court judgment through the North Carolina appellate system
and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Moore, 465 F. Supp.
2d at 490 (citing Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d
194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000), and Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202).
Plaintiff did appeal the decision to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. However, Plaintiff also seeks this court to overturn
the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ decision, which affirmed
the lower court’s order and further found that there was no
indication that Defendants misstated anything to the trial court
nor acted in a way that amounted to a constitutional violation.
Following the state appellate decision, Plaintiff also
petitioned for review to the North Carolina Supreme Court.
(Defs.’ Br., Ex. B (Doc. 10-2).) The Court, upon consideration,
dismissed the notice of appeal. (Id., Ex. C (Doc. 10-3).) In
sum, whether Plaintiff seeks injunctions or an award of damages,
Plaintiff, as the state-court loser, seeks federal court review
of the validity of the state trial court and appellate court
decisions, a review which this court is not empowered to
undertake. See Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202-203; see also Moore, 465
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F. Supp. 2d 484 (2006) (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
barred civil rights action seeking to set aside state-court
judgment as violative of the plaintiff’s civil and
constitutional rights).
For these reasons, this court concludes that all claims
against Defendants are barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
The relief sought by Plaintiff could not be granted by this
court without rendering ineffectual the state trial court and
appellate court decisions. Therefore, all claims against
Defendants will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED and that
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This the 20th day of April, 2017.
_______________________________________
United States District Judge
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