JOHNSON v. BYRD, ET AL.
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 11/21/2016; that this Court dismiss the Complaint (Docket Entry 3 ) without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to litigate her claims in an appropriate forum. FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this Court deny the PI Motion (Docket Entry 4 ) as moot. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TALIA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID V. BYRD, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:16cv1052
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
case
comes
before
determination of frivolousness.
the
Court
for
a
sua
sponte
For the reasons that follow, the
Court should dismiss this action without prejudice to Plaintiff’s
right to pursue her claims in a proper forum.
INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 2016, Plaintiff initiated the instant action by
filing an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
(Docket Entry 1) (the “IFP Application”), “Complaint” (Docket Entry
3)
(the
“Complaint”),
“Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
a
Preliminary
Injunction” (Docket Entry 4) (the “PI Motion”), “Memorandum in
Support of [the PI Motion]” (Docket Entry 5), “[Plaintiff]’s
Supporting Declaration” (Docket Entry 6), and numerous exhibits
(Docket Entry 6-1 at 1-60). The Complaint challenges approximately
20 orders entered by the District Court of Yadkin County (the
“State Court”) in an ongoing child custody case involving Plaintiff
and
her
ex-husband,
Daniel
Brock
Johnson
(“Brock
Johnson”).
(Docket Entry 3 at 2 (“This action stems from file number 14-CVD568, Daniel Brock Johnson . . . v. Talia Dratsch Johnson, pending
before the [State Court]”), 14 (discussing divorce of Plaintiff and
Brock Johnson), and 44 (requesting injunction against enforcement
of 20 orders entered by the State Court); see also Docket Entry 6-1
(providing copies of several of the State Court’s orders).)
The
Complaint names defendants David V. Byrd, Chief District Court
Judge for the 23rd Judicial District (“Defendant Byrd”), Jeanie R.
Houston, District Court Judge for the 23rd Judicial District
(“Defendant Houston”), William F. Brooks, District Court Judge for
the 23rd Judicial District (“Defendant Brooks”), Angela B. Puckett,
District Court Judge for the 17B Judicial District (“Defendant
Puckett,” and collectively with Defendants Byrd, Houston, and
Brooks, the “Judge Defendants”), and Renee M. Hauser, DC Trial
Court Coordinator for Wilkes County - District 23, North Carolina
(“Defendant Hauser,” and collectively with the Judge Defendants,
the “Defendants”).
(Docket Entry 3 at 1, 7-8.)
Plaintiff sues
Defendants in both their individual and official capacities for
their alleged involvement in her pending child custody case in the
State Court.
(Id. at 1-2.)
According to the Complaint, “Defendants conspired to commit
fraud upon the court to deprive constitutional rights under color
of state law to retaliate against the Plaintiff for speaking
-2-
against in [sic] court about federal and constitutional violations
by the Defendants in favor of [Brock Johnson].”
(Id. at 2.)
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Brock Johnson’s family
“are well known and have influence throughout Yadkin . . . and
other surrounding counties” (id. at 17), resulting in an overall
bias against Plaintiff throughout her child custody case (see,
e.g., id. (“Plaintiff was desperate to be heard [in the State
Court], but just could not make that happen . . . .
On the other
hand, [Brock Johnson] effortlessly moved through court proceedings
. . . .”)).
Johnson’s
The Complaint also asserts that, as a result of Brock
influence,
Defendants
“engag[ed]
in
ex
parte
determinations that effectively terminate[d] Plaintiff’s parental
rights [in favor of Brock Johnson] based on bogus allegations,” and
violated and continue to violate Plaintiff’s state and federal
constitutional rights. (Id. at 39.) Further, the Complaint states
that
Defendants
entered
Plaintiff
without
“reliance
on
numerous
“proceeding
specific
law,”
“ex-parte”
transcripts,”
thereby
orders
against
“findings,”
“mak[ing]
adequate
or
and
meaningful state appellate review remedies unavailable to the
Plaintiff.”
(Id. at 5 (bold and all-caps font omitted).)
Although it generally describes collective mistreatment by
Defendants,
the
Complaint
also
presents
specific
against Defendant Houston. (See id. at 19-24.)
allegations
In particular, the
Complaint asserts that Defendant Houston declared a mistrial and
-3-
recused herself from Plaintiff’s child custody case based on
Defendant
Houston’s
false
accusation
that
“Plaintiff
went
to
[Defendant Houston’s] church on purpose.” (Id. at 19; see also id.
at 20 (stating that “Plaintiff was informed that a [j]udge from
another district was to be brought in to handle the case”).)
Complaint
alleges
that
the
mistrial
and
recusal
The
effectively
“sabotaged everything Plaintiff worked for, putting [her child
custody] case back at square one.”
(Id. at 19.)
The Complaint
further alleges that, after Defendant Houston declared a mistrial,
Brock Johnson moved for attorney’s fees (id.), and that Defendant
Houston conducted ex parte communications with Brock Johnson’s
attorney regarding her reasons for the recusal and declaring a
mistrial (id. at 19-20, 24). According to the Complaint, Defendant
Houston testified at the hearing on the attorney’s fees motion and
“changed her story” about her interactions with Plaintiff. (Id. at
23.)
Plaintiff contends that these actions amount to judicial
misconduct.
(Id. at 13, 24, 46.)
In pursuing relief, the Complaint asserts violations of North
Carolina law and its constitution (see, e.g., id. at 8-9, 13-14,
39-40), as well as violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986,
arising
from
Defendants’
alleged
interference
with
Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights (see, e.g., id. at 1011).
The Complaint requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (id. at 1) that “Plaintiff’s parental right is
-4-
constitutionally protected,” “Defendants’ state deprivation of
parental right and freedom of movement requires due process of law
and the application of strict scrutiny,” and Defendants’ alleged
practices of (1) engaging in ex parte communications, (2) failing
to provide adequate notice and stenographic recordings of child
custody proceedings, and (3) entering judgments against Plaintiff
without
jurisdiction
or
findings
unconstitutional (id. at 44-48).
of
fact,
qualify
as
Finally, the Complaint seeks an
injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing the 20 challenged
orders
and
from
engaging
in
unrecorded,
ex
parte
custodial
proceedings that deprive Plaintiff of due process and prevent
meaningful appellate review.
(Id. at 44-45.)
ANALYSIS
After filing the IFP Application (Docket Entry 1), Plaintiff
paid the filing fee (see Docket Entry dated Aug. 25, 2016).
To the
extent that conduct effectively withdrew the IFP Application, the
Court may no longer dismiss the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
See Yi v. Social Sec. Admin., 554 F. App’x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that, “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] is neither a prisoner
nor proceeding in forma pauperis in district court, the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A (2006), permitting sua sponte
dismissal
of
complaints
which
fail
to
state
a
claim
are
inapplicable”). Regardless, the Court possesses inherent authority
to dismiss a frivolous action, even when “the filing fee has been
-5-
paid.”
Id. (citing Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1989) (explaining that the
informa pauperis statute “authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous
or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have the
power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”));
see also Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57
(4th Cir. 2004) (“The word frivolous is inherently elastic and not
susceptible
to
categorical
definition.
.
.
.
The
term’s
capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis,
in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors
bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
matter
Moreover, “because a [federal] court lacks subject
jurisdiction
over
an
obviously
frivolous
complaint,
dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”
Yi, 554 F.
App’x at 248 (citing Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177,
1181–83 (7th
Cir.
1989));
see
also
Constantine
v.
Rectors
&
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“A federal court has an independent obligation to assess its
subject-matter jurisdiction, and it will raise a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction on its own motion.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).1
1
The Court (per the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge) entered an order “staying any further action in this case,
including service of process, pending review by the Court of
subject-matter jurisdiction.” (Text Order dated Aug. 25, 2016.)
-6-
In this case, the Complaint’s federal claims qualify as
frivolous
in
light
of
various
immunity-related
jurisdictional bars, and abstention principles.
doctrines,
Additionally, the
Court lacks original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims (as
diversity jurisdiction does not exist), and the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.
I. Immunity and Related Doctrines
As an initial matter, each Defendant enjoys immunity in this
Court from liability for the allegations in the Complaint.
All
four of the Judge Defendants serve as North Carolina district court
judges. (Docket Entry 3 at 7-8.) “Judges performing judicial acts
within their jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from
civil liability claims,” In re Mills, 287 F. App’x. 273, 279 (4th
Cir. 2008) (emphasis added), “even if such acts were allegedly done
either maliciously or corruptly,” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356
(4th Cir. 1992) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
See also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (stating that
“judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment
of
damages”).
To
determine
whether
an
action
constitutes a “judicial act” protected by judicial immunity, the
Court must consider “whether the function is one normally performed
by a judge, and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or
her judicial capacity.”
King, 973 F.2d at 357.
-7-
Thus, a plaintiff
can overcome the judicial immunity bar to recovery only if the
judge’s “actions were non-judicial or the actions were judicial but
were
taken
without
jurisdiction.”
Evans
v.
Downey,
No.
1:15-CV-117, 2016 WL 3562102, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 24, 2016)
(citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13).
The
Complaint’s
allegations
against
the
Judge
Defendants
concern their judicial actions in child custody matters before the
District Court Division of the North Carolina General Court of
Justice.
(See Docket Entry 3 at 2; see also Docket Entry 6-1
(providing relevant State Court orders).)
District
Court
Division
maintains
The North Carolina
“original,
exclusive,
and
continuing jurisdiction over child custody . . . actions instituted
pursuant to Chapters 50A and 52C of the North Carolina General
Statutes.”
Warren v. Bray, No. 1:13CV1144, 2014 WL 3404962, at *5
(M.D.N.C. July 10, 2014) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A–244; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 52C–1–102), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C.
Aug. 5, 2014).
orders
at
Thus, in presiding over hearings and entering the
issue,
the
Judge
Defendants
“properly
exercised
jurisdiction over matters vested by law in the district court
division.”
Id. (concluding that absolute judicial immunity barred
the plaintiff’s claims against a North Carolina state district
court judge presiding over a child custody and support dispute);
see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (recognizing
judges’ entitlement to absolute immunity unless acting in “clear
-8-
absence of all jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Further, as each of Plaintiff’s allegations concern the Judge
Defendants’ judicial acts, even if their judicial orders involved
ex
parte
communications
and/or
denied
judicial immunity would still apply.
Plaintiff
due
process,
See Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F.
Supp. 2d 596, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that the “[j]udges are
absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages
arising from their judicial acts,” even if such acts took “place ex
parte and without notice or a hearing” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Accordingly,
the
Judge
judicial immunity in this action.
Defendants
enjoy
absolute
See Harry v. Lauderdale Cty.,
212 F. App’x 344, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of
the plaintiff’s claims against state court judge brought under
state law and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 because
judicial immunity barred liability).
Plaintiff also takes issue with Defendant Houston’s testimony
as a witness in one of the hearings.
Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Houston “changed her story” when testifying
at the hearing on Brock Johnson’s motion for attorney’s fees.
(Docket Entry 3 at 23.)
However, the common-law immunity for
witnesses bars Plaintiff’s claims for damages based on that alleged
testimony.
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 328 (1983) (noting
that
witnesses
“all
.
.
.
are
absolutely
immune
from
civil
liability based on their testimony in judicial proceedings”); see
-9-
also Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 390 (6th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that “[a] witness is entitled to testimonial immunity
no matter how egregious or perjurious that testimony was alleged to
have
been”
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
Moreover,
Defendant Houston’s testimony involved the reasons she recused
herself and ordered a mistrial in Plaintiff’s child custody case
(see Docket Entry 3 at 20-24), matters intricately related to her
judicial actions (see id. at 19).
Under these circumstances, even
if the Complaint’s assertion that Defendant Houston changed her
story about the reasons for recusal or declaring a mistrial could
qualify as malicious or corrupt, judicial immunity would still
apply.
See generally King, 973 F.2d at 356.
Next, to the extent the Complaint attempts to hold Defendant
Hauser liable as a trial court coordinator (see Docket Entry 3 at
8), quasi-judicial immunity bars those claims.
See In re Mills,
287 F. App’x at 279 (ruling that quasi-judicial immunity extends to
“judge’s subordinates for ‘functions that are more administrative
in character [that] have been undertaken pursuant to the [judge’s]
explicit direction’” (quoting Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601
(7th Cir. 1992))); see also Shelton v. Wallace, 886 F. Supp. 1365,
1371 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting that “[q]uasi-judicial immunity
extends
to
those
persons
performing
tasks
so
integral
or
intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are
-10-
considered to be figurative arms of the very commanding judge who
is immune”).2
The Complaint also seeks relief from Defendants in their
official capacities.
As noted, the Complaint alleges that, at all
relevant times, Defendants served as officers with the District
Court Division of the North Carolina General Court of Justice.
(Docket Entry 3 at 7-8.)
As such, Defendants constitute state
officials for purposes of this litigation.
See Warren, 2014 WL
3404962, at *5 (recognizing that North Carolina district court
judges qualify as state officials in parallel context).
“[A] suit for damages against a state official in his official
capacity is actually a suit against his office and, thus, the
State.”
Eller v. Kaufman, No. 2:11CV31, 2012 WL 3018295, at *8
(W.D.N.C. July 24, 2012) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).
“[A]bsent waiver by the State or
valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages
action against a State in federal court.
This bar remains in
effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official
capacity.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (internal
footnote and citation omitted).
Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 provide for suits against a
“person,” not a state.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, & 1986.
2
The Complaint offers no specific
Defendant Hauser. (See Docket Entry 3.)
-11-
allegations
Thus,
against
“Congress did not exercise its power to abrogate a state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. §[§] 1983[, 1985, and
1986].”
Coffin v. South Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 562 F.
Supp. 579, 585 (D.S.C. 1983) (ruling that, “just as neither [the
state agency defendant] nor the Board as alter egos of the state is
a ‘person’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, neither one is
a ‘person’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986”).
Likewise, because a suit against Defendants in their official
capacities constitutes a suit against the State, and the term
“person” under Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 does not encompass the
State, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims fail in such obvious
fashion as to qualify as frivolous.
See Woodward v. Chautauqua
Cty., No. 15-CV-246, 2016 WL 4491712, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 5, 2016)
(concluding that “[n]either a state agency nor a state officer
acting in his official capacity is subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, § 1985, and § 1986” (citing Posr v. Court Officer Shield
No. 207, 180 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999))), recommendation adopted,
2016 WL 4475044, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016); Warren, 2014 WL
3404962, at *5 (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars
Section 1985 claim against North Carolina district court judge sued
in her official capacity).3
3
Plaintiff’s Section 1985 and 1986 claims also cannot
establish federal jurisdiction because the Complaint contains no
factual allegations to support those claims. In that regard, all
three subsections of Section 1985 require proof of a particular
-12-
As a final matter, the Complaint’s requests for injunctive and
declaratory
relief
also
cannot
proceed.
Specifically,
the
Complaint asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the 20
orders entered in Plaintiff’s child custody case and from engaging
in unrecorded, ex parte proceedings.
48.)
(See Docket Entry 3 at 44-
By statute, “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an
“action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
species of conspiracy.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1), (2), & (3).
First, Section 1985(1) relates to a plaintiff’s office or official
duties.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1); Stankowski v. Farley, 251 F.
App’x 743, 747 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Section 1985(1) prohibits
conspiracies to prevent individuals from holding office or
discharging official duties.”).
The Complaint alleges no such
matters.
(See Docket Entry 3.)
Next, as concerns state court
proceedings, Section 1985(2) addresses acts involving either
“force, intimidation, or threat” against witnesses or jurors to
obstruct justice because of race or other group-related bias. See
42 U.S.C. § 1985(2); Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1983)
(explaining that portion of Section 1985(2) that addresses
obstruction of state court proceedings “contains language requiring
that the conspirators’ actions be motivated by an intent to deprive
their victims of the equal protection of the laws,” further
understood
as
“racial,
or
perhaps
otherwise
class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Stankowski, 251 F. App’x at 747 n.1 (“Section 1985(2)
prohibits conspiracies to prevent witnesses from testifying in
court, injuring witnesses who have testified, or attempting to
influence or injure grand or petit jurors.”).
The Complaint,
however, does not make allegations of that sort. (See Docket Entry
3.) Finally, Section 1985(3) requires proof of “some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators’ action.”
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102 (1971). No such allegations appear in the Complaint.
(See Docket Entry 3.) Moreover, because “[r]ecovery under § 1986
depends on the existence of a conspiracy under § 1985,” Bowie v.
Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Plaintiff’s purported
claim under Section 1986 also provides no basis for federal
jurisdiction.
-13-
taken
in
such
declaratory
decree
unavailable.”
immunity
in
officer’s
was
judicial
violated
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section
1983
capacity
or
.
.
.
declaratory
unless
relief
a
was
“Thus, the doctrine of judicial
actions
now
extends
to
suits
for
injunctive relief.” Clay v. Osteen, 1:10CV399, 2010 WL 4116882, at
*4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 19, 2010) (citing Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272,
1286 (D.C. Cir. 2006)), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C.
Nov. 17, 2010); see also Lepelletier v. Tran, 633 F. App’x 126, 127
(4th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the appellant’s “claims seeking
injunctive relief against a sitting state court judge for actions
taken in his judicial capacity . . . were barred by the plain
language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
As discussed above, the Judge
Defendants acted in their judicial capacities and within their
jurisdiction, and Defendant Hauser acted in her quasi-judicial
capacity,
with
Plaintiff’s
regard
to
constitutional
each
of
rights.
the
alleged
violations
Accordingly,
the
of
judicial
immunity bar extends to Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief.
Regarding relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiff effectively
seeks
a
declaration
that
would
immunity and impose liability.
strip
Defendants
of
judicial
(See Docket Entry 3 at 44-47
(requesting a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ practice of
adjudicating
child
custody
matters
violates
Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights and warrants entry of an injunction to stop
such violations).) However, “[d]eclaratory judgments are not meant
-14-
simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”
Johnson
v.
(citing
McCuskey,
72
F.
App’x
475,
478
(7th
Cir.
2003)
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1553–54
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Rather, declaratory judgments “define
the legal rights and obligations of the parties in anticipation of
some future conduct.”
Id. at 477 (holding declaratory relief
improper where the plaintiff sought declaration that the judicial
defendants acted improperly when deciding change of venue motion).
Because Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory relief merely attempt
to have the Court proclaim Defendants’ liability in this action,
those requests fail.
See Clay, 2010 WL 4116882, at *4 (denying
request that the court declare dismissal of action exceeded judge’s
authority because the “[p]laintiffs are not seeking declaratory
relief in the true legal sense,” but instead attempting to impose
liability on an immune defendant).
In sum, various immunity and related doctrines bar Plaintiff’s
claims for damages and injunctive relief, and Plaintiff has not
requested proper declaratory relief.
II. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine
also
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
deprives
the
Court
of
Derived from the Supreme
Court’s decisions in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923), the Rooker–Feldman doctrine generally prohibits
-15-
lower federal courts from reviewing state-court decisions.
Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997).
jurisdiction
to
review
such
decisions
lies
See
“[R]ather,
exclusively
with
superior state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court.”
Id.; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (clarifying that the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine bars a federal court from asserting jurisdiction in “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court
judgments
rendered
before
the
[federal]
court
proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] court review and
rejection of those judgments”).
The doctrine also “applies to
interlocutory orders issued by state courts.”
Brown & Root, Inc.
v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Indeed, it
cannot be the meaning of Rooker-Feldman that, while the inferior
federal courts are barred from reviewing final decisions of state
courts, they are free to review interlocutory orders.” (emphasis in
original) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)).
The Rooker–Feldman bar extends not only to issues actually
presented to and decided by a state court, but also to issues that
are “inextricably intertwined” with questions adjudicated by a
state court.
omitted).
state-court
Plyler, 129 F.3d at 731 (internal quotation marks
A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a
decision
where,
“in
order
to
grant
the
federal
plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that
-16-
the [state] court judgment was erroneously entered or must take
action that would render the judgment ineffectual.”
Jordahl v.
Democratic
Cir.
(internal
Party
of
Va.,
quotation marks
122
F.3d
192,
omitted).
202
(4th
Rooker–Feldman
1997)
therefore
applies when the federal action “essentially amounts to nothing
more than an attempt to seek review of [the state court’s] decision
by a lower federal court.”
Plyler, 129 F.3d at 733.
Despite the above-quoted language in Plyler and Brown & Root
barring
federal
court
review
of
all
levels
of
state-court
judgments, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recently suggested that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may
only apply when a federal court is “called upon to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over a final judgment from ‘the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had,’ 28 U.S.C. §
1257(a) . . ., as was the case in both Rooker and Feldman.”
Thana
v. Board of License Comm’rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314,
321 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original).
The Fourth Circuit,
however, also indicated that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not
preclude
federal
jurisdiction
in
that
case
because
(1)
the
plaintiff’s federal court action challenged a state administrative
agency’s decision “rather than alleging injury caused by a state
court judgment,” (2) “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply as
a
categorical
matter”
to
challenges
to
state
administrative
actions, (3) the numerous differences in the plaintiff’s state
-17-
court action as compared with the federal action (e.g., “[t]he
state proceeding . . . [involved] an agency-initiated proceeding,
in which limited and deferential judicial review was afforded,” and
the state court lacked authority to award damages, whereas the
federal court could provide such relief) “demonstrate that th[e]
federal action must be seen as an independent, concurrent action
that does not undermine the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over any
state court judgment,” and (4) the plaintiff “never sought to
bypass the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a) over any relevant state court judgment,” as it continued
to appeal the state court judgment through the state’s appellate
courts, “thereby remaining on track for potential review by the
U.S. Supreme Court.”
Id. at 321-22 (emphasis in original).
The Fourth Circuit, in Thana, ultimately concluded, “[a]t
bottom,
.
.
.
that
th[e]
federal
action,
commenced
by
[the
plaintiff] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging injury inflicted by
actions
of
a
state
administrative
agency,
qualifie[d]
as
an
independent, concurrent action that [did] not undermine the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, and
accordingly the Rooker–Feldman doctrine [did] not apply.”
Id. at
322-23. In light of that disposition, the Thana Court’s suggestion
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar federal challenges to
state court judgments that have yet to reach the highest level of
state appellate review appears to represent non-binding dicta.
-18-
See Board of Comm’rs of Hertford Cty., N.C. v. Tome, 153 F. 81, 87
(4th Cir. 1907) (“[E]xpressions found in opinions of courts which
relate to a doctrine of law not necessarily in issue in the case
then before the court are not to be regarded as deliberate and
binding enunciations of such doctrines.
Carroll v. Carroll’s
Lessee, 16 How. 275, 287, 14 L. Ed. 936 [(1853)].
It is probable
that there is no volume of the Supreme Court Reports in which the
idea is not advanced that expressions of opinion not necessary to
the determination of the case are to be regarded as dicta.”).4
As a result, pursuant to prior Fourth Circuit precedent (such
as Plyler and Brown & Root), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine still bars
federal review of all levels of state court judgments, including
Plaintiff’s claims in this case.
In that regard, the Complaint
asks this Court to enjoin Defendants from enforcing approximately
20 orders in her ongoing child custody dispute.
4
(Docket Entry 3 at
Shortly before the Fourth Circuit decided Thana, a
neighboring district court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (in
a case strikingly similar to the one at bar) to deny review of
certain state court judgments involving child custody matters and
constitutional challenges to those judgments. Steg v. Johnson, No.
5:16-CV-149, Docket Entry 6 (E.D.N.C. May 31, 2016). On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court issued its order
before Thana clarified the “narrow scope of the [Rooker-Feldman]
doctrine.” Steg v. Johnson, No. 16-1654, ___ F. App’x ___, ___
n.1, 2016 WL 5682664, at *1 n.1 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2016).
Nevertheless, “because the district court provided alternate and
sufficient bases for rejecting all of the [plaintiffs’] claims,
[the Fourth Circuit found] it unnecessary to consider whether the
[district] court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis [was] in line with
Thana.” Id.
-19-
44.)
Such
requests
would
necessarily
require
this
Court to
scrutinize the orders entered by the State Court, a course of
action which district courts in this Circuit have deemed the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine
to
prohibit.
See,
e.g.,
Powell
v.
Williams, No. 5:14-CV-282, 2014 WL 3809964, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July
14, 2014) (holding that, “to the extent such [child custody or
child support] matters have been determined by the state court,
this court is . . . barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine from
reviewing the state court’s decisions”).
In
addition,
Plaintiff’s
federal
claims
qualify
as
“inextricably intertwined” with the State Court’s orders in the
underlying child custody proceedings.
For instance, the Complaint
seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to alter the alleged
unconstitutional methods in which they conduct custody proceedings
(i.e.
prohibiting
ex
parte
communications
stenographic recordings of all proceedings).
45-46.)
and
mandating
(Docket Entry 3 at
Such relief would effectively determine that the Judge
Defendants’ methods of conducting past child custody proceedings
violated federal law and/or the United States Constitution.
That
determination, in turn, would necessarily establish that the Judge
Defendants improperly entered the 20 orders that Plaintiff asks
this Court to void.
Accordingly,
the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine
(at
least
as
understood prior to Thana) precludes this Court from exercising
-20-
jurisdiction in this case.
See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 521 F. App’x 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding
that, because the plaintiff’s “due process claim is a mere pretext
for the
real
focus
of
the
[c]omplaint,
which
challenges
the
validity of records and proceedings of the North Carolina courts
that resulted in the termination of the [plaintiff’s] parental
rights,” the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars consideration of that
claim); see also Amerson v. Iowa, 94 F.3d 510, 513 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting that “a plaintiff’s incidental insertion of a general claim
for damages will not suffice to prevent the dismissal of a § 1983
case where the damages sought cannot be awarded without first
declaring unconstitutional a state court judgment on a matter
firmly committed to the states”); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754
(7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a dissatisfied state litigant
“‘may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by
casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action’”
(quoting Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985))); Guess v. Board of
Med. Exam’rs of State of N.C., 967 F.2d 998, 1005 (4th Cir. 1992)
(“Artificial
attempts
to
redefine
the
relief
sought
are
not
sufficient to overcome the requirements of Feldman.”).
III. Younger Abstention
Abstention principles articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S.
37
(1971),
further
compel
-21-
dismissal
of
the
Complaint’s
requests
for
declaratory
and
injunctive
relief.5
“Younger
abstention requires a federal court to abstain from granting
injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending
state judicial proceedings.”
O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638,
643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 40-41); see also
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (holding that, “where an
injunction
would
be
impermissible
under
[Younger
abstention]
principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as
well”).
Three “exceptional circumstances” can trigger Younger
abstention.
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, ___ U.S. ___, ___,
134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Specifically, Younger abstention precludes federal intrusion
into
ongoing
state
(1)
criminal
prosecutions,
(2)
“civil
proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions,” and (3) civil
proceedings that “implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the
orders and judgments of its courts.”
588.
Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at
If an action falls into one of those three categories, a
federal
court
evaluating
whether
to
proceed
may
consider
“additional factors” described in Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
5
See Sprint, ___ U.S.
“[T]he Court’s discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction by dismissing under Younger does not extend to . . .
causes of action for damages, which may be stayed but not dismissed
on abstention grounds.” Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC,
83 F. Supp. 3d 635, 647 (D. Md. 2015) (citing Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996)).
-22-
at ___, 134 S.Ct. at 593 (emphasis omitted).
Those additional
factors include whether the ongoing state proceedings “implicate
important state interests” and provide “an adequate opportunity .
. . to raise [federal] challenges.”
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432.
Here, the relevant circumstances call for abstention under
Younger.
First, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that proceedings
in the State Court child custody case began before the initiation
of this action and remain ongoing.
(See Docket Entry 6-1 at 13
(providing copy of order entered in the State Court child custody
case
dated
October
6,
2014);
see
also
Docket
Entry
3
at
2
(reflecting the “pending” nature of the State Court custody case
when Plaintiff filed the Complaint on August 12, 2016).)6
Second,
the Complaint requests declaratory and injunctive relief that would
impact enforcement of 20 State Court orders entered by the Judge
Defendants determining, inter alia, Plaintiff’s rights to custody
of her child.
(See Docket Entry 3 at 6.)
6
According to Plaintiff’s filings, the State Court entered an
“Ex Parte Emergency Custody Order” earlier this year that awarded
temporary legal and physical custody of Plaintiff’s minor child to
“Brock Johnson pending a full and final hearing.” (Docket Entry 61 at 52.) Although the State Court scheduled a hearing “to review
th[at] temporary order” (id. at 53), it subsequently entered
certain continuances, extending the date for said hearing (id. at
57-60). As of Plaintiff’s initiation of this action (see Docket
Entry 3 (filed August 12, 2016)), the State Court had not yet held
the hearing to resolve that child custody matter (see Docket Entry
6-1 at 60 (continuing matter until September 12, 2016)).
-23-
The
Complaint
thus
falls
into
the
third
category
of
“exceptional circumstances” warranting Younger abstention (i.e.
civil proceedings that “implicate a State’s interest in enforcing
the orders and judgments of its courts,” Sprint, ___ U.S. at ___,
134 S. Ct. at 588)).
See, e.g., Carlson v. County of Ramsey,
Minn., Civ. Action No. 16-765, 2016 WL 3352196, at *6 (D. Minn.
June 15, 2016) (determining that federal challenge to state court’s
child custody, contempt, and disclosure orders in ongoing child
custody dispute fell within Sprint’s third category of exceptional
cases warranting Younger abstention).
For example, declaring the
parameters of Plaintiff’s parental rights, including the standards
for determining those rights, and/or declaring unconstitutional the
State Court’s failure to require stenographic recordings at certain
“ex-parte deprivations” (Docket Entry 3 at 6), would necessarily
require
the
Court’s
interference
Plaintiff’s child custody case.
with
the
adjudication
of
To put it another way, the
Complaint effectively seeks a declaration from this Court that the
State Court wrongly deprived Plaintiff of her parental rights, as
well
as
the
reinstatement
of
those
rights.
Additionally,
preventing the Judge Defendants from enforcing their orders (as
Plaintiff seeks in her requests for injunctive relief (see id.))
would directly interfere with the Judge Defendants’ performance of
their judicial function of overseeing and adjudicating Plaintiff’s
child
custody
dispute,
see
Carlson,
-24-
2016
WL
3352196,
at
*6
(recognizing that custody, contempt, and disclosure orders “are
integral to the [s]tate court’s ability to perform its judicial
function in custody proceedings” (ellipsis and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The Middlesex factors (i.e. the importance of the issues to
the State and the ability to raise federal questions in the State
forum) further favor abstention under Younger.
First, Plaintiff’s
claims implicate important state interests as they concern an
ongoing child custody matter. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435
(1979) (noting that “[f]amily relations are a traditional area of
state concern”); see also C.C.S. v. Child Protective Servs. of
Orange Cty., No. 1:11CV81, 2011 WL 1325125, at *1-2 (M.D.N.C. Apr.
7, 2011) (recommending against exercising jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s claims because of, inter alia, Younger abstention
principles, and noting that child custody and visitation matters
“implicate important state interests”), recommendation adopted,
slip op. (M.D.N.C. June 6, 2011). Second, the State Court provides
a sufficient forum for Plaintiff to assert her federal rights. See
C.C.S., 2011 WL 1325125, at *2 (recognizing that state child
custody proceeding afforded the plaintiff an adequate opportunity
to present her federal questions).
Given these considerations, the Court should abstain from
adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief involving her ongoing child custody dispute in the State
-25-
Court.
See, e.g., Wattie-Bey v. Attorney Gen.’s Office, 424 F.
App’x 95, 96 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that “Younger abstention
principles dictated dismissal of the complaint . . . with regard to
the [plaintiffs’] claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief based on alleged violations of their constitutional rights
in the ongoing state court custody proceedings”); C.C.S., 2011 WL
1325125,
at
*2
(abstaining
under
Younger
from
exercising
jurisdiction over action that concerned ongoing state court child
custody and visitation matters).
IV. Domestic Relations Exception
The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction also
should cause the Court to decline to consider Plaintiff’s child
custody dispute claims. That exception “divests the federal courts
of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). The Ankenbrandt
Court’s discussion of the domestic relations exception focused on
the
text
of
the
originally enacted.
federal
diversity
jurisdiction
See id. at 697-702.
statute
as
However, a review of the
historical and statutory analysis in Ankenbrandt confirms that the
domestic
relations
exception
should
apply
equally
to
federal
question cases.
The Supreme Court first described the domestic relations
exception more than 150 years ago, stating that federal courts lack
-26-
“any jurisdiction . . . upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony . . . .”
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584
(1858); see also Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 306 (2006)
(recognizing that Barber’s announcement of the domestic relations
exception
qualified
Ankenbrandt,
the
as
“dicta”).
Supreme
Court
Over
a
discussed
century
the
recognized the domestic relations exception.
later,
reasons
in
Barber
Id. at 693-699.
Finding no Article III impediment to federal jurisdiction in
domestic relations cases, id. at 697, the Supreme Court determined
that the Barber Court had grounded the domestic relations exception
in the text of the federal diversity jurisdiction statute as
originally enacted, id. at 697-700.
The
original
federal
diversity
jurisdiction
statute
(the
Judiciary Act of 1789) provided that:
the circuit courts shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where
the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United
States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a
party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (emphasis added).
In
Ankenbrandt, the Supreme Court noted that, although the Barber
majority’s invocation of a domestic relations exception did not
reference
this
diversity
statute,
-27-
the
dissenters
made
that
connection.
Id. at 698-99.
As Ankenbrandt explained, the Barber
dissenters observed that England’s “court[s] of chancery lacked
authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees.”
Id. at 699.
The
Barber dissenters reasoned that federal courts similarly lack
authority to issue such decrees because “‘the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in chancery is bounded by that of the
chancery in England.’”
Id. (quoting Barber, 62 U.S. at 605
(Daniel, J., dissenting)).
Such relief, in the Barber dissenters’
view, would not fall within the diversity statute’s original grant
of jurisdiction over “‘all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in
equity.’”
Id.
Thus,
in
Ankenbrandt,
the
Supreme
Court
concluded that “it may be inferred fairly that the jurisdictional
limitation
recognized
by
the
[Barber]
Court
rested
on
statutory basis” indicated by the dissenters in that case.
th[e]
Id.
In Ankenbrandt, the Supreme Court further stressed that “[t]he
defining phrase, ‘all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity,’ remained a key element of statutory provisions demarcating
the terms of diversity jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress
amended the diversity jurisdiction provision to eliminate this
phrase and replace in its stead the term ‘all civil actions.’”
Id.
at 698 (quoting 1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930,
28 U.S.C. § 1332). With no indication to the contrary, the Supreme
Court presumed that Congress meant to leave undisturbed “the
Court’s nearly century-long interpretation of the prior statutes,
-28-
which had construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain
an exception for certain domestic relations matters.”
Id. at 700.
That same historical analysis supports the conclusion that the
domestic relations exception also applies to the federal question
jurisdictional statute.
the
diversity
Specifically, in 1875, Congress amended
jurisdiction
statute
to
add
federal
question
jurisdiction, providing that:
the circuit courts of the United States shall have
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred
dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority, or in which the United
States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there
shall be a controversy between citizens of different
States or a controversy between citizens of the same
State claiming lands under grants of different States, or
a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign
states, citizens, or subjects . . . .
Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (emphasis
added).
The text, “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity,” id., precedes the grant of federal jurisdiction over suits
“arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,” id.,
and thus delimits Congress’ grant of federal question jurisdiction.
At
the
time
of
that
1875
amendment,
the
domestic-relations
exception had become well-established in the case law. See Barber,
62
U.S.
582.
Based
on
the
Supreme
Court’s
reasoning
in
Ankenbrandt, by leaving in place the language “all suits of a civil
-29-
nature at common law or in equity,” Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1875,
§ 1, 18 Stat. 470, Congress must have intended for the domestic
relations exception to limit federal question jurisdiction, as well
as diversity jurisdiction.
The notion that the domestic relations exception extends
beyond diversity cases finds further support in the fact that the
Supreme Court has applied the exception in other contexts.
For
example, in Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890), a habeas corpus
case involving the custody of a child, the Supreme Court explained:
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
states, and not to the laws of the United States. As to
the right to the control and possession of [a] child,
. . . it is one in regard to which neither the congress
of the United States, nor any authority of the United
States, has any special jurisdiction.
Whether [one
person or another] is entitled to the possession does not
depend upon any act of congress, or any treaty of the
United States or its constitution.
Id. at 593-94.
Again, based on the logic of Ankenbrandt, when
Congress amended the federal jurisdiction statute to replace “all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity” with “all civil
actions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it presumably knew that the exception
applied outside the diversity jurisdiction context, see Burrus, 136
U.S. at 593-94.
Simply put, there appears “no good reason to strain to give a
different meaning to the identical language in the diversity and
federal-question statutes.”
Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307
-30-
(7th Cir. 2006).
Reinforcing this view, the Seventh Circuit has
acknowledged that child custody proceedings (one type of domestic
relations matter) “are in rem in character — they are fights over
a thing of value that is in the court’s control — and another court
should not try to elbow its way into the fight.”
Id.
Further, as
a district court in this Circuit has explained:
Issuance of [divorce, alimony, or child custody] decrees
. . . frequently involve retention of jurisdiction by the
state court and deployment of social workers to monitor
compliance.
As a matter of judicial economy, state
courts are more suited to work of this type than are
federal courts, which lack the close association with
state and local government organizations dedicated to
handling issues that arise out of conflicts over child
custody and support decrees. Moreover, as a matter of
judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the
rule that federal courts lack power over these cases
because of the special proficiency developed by state
tribunals over the past century and a half in handling
issues that arise in the granting of such decrees.
Samuels v. Gelfman, Civ. Action No. 16-722, 2016 WL 1071003, at *2
(D. Md. Mar. 16, 2016); see also Jones, 465 F.3d at 307 (declaring
that “state courts are assumed to have developed a proficiency in
[child custody] matters, to have procedures tailored to them, and
to work closely with and even employ specialized staff not found in
federal
courts”
(citing
Ankenbrandt,
504
U.S.
at
703-04)).
Additionally, because “state courts are authorized to decide issues
of federal law unless Congress decrees otherwise, confining a class
of federal-law cases to state courts does not deprive litigants of
their federal rights.”
Jones, 465 F.3d at 307.
-31-
Despite these sound reasons for deeming the domestic relations
exception applicable to federal question cases, the circuit courts
remain divided on the issue.
Ninth
Circuits
have
both
Since Ankenbrandt, the Fifth and
stated
that
the
exception only applies to diversity cases.
domestic
relations
Atwood v. Fort Peck
Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1231 (5th Cir. 1997).7
7
Before
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bailey involved a
constitutional challenge to the Child Support Recovery Act
(“CSRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 228, a federal criminal statute. Bailey, 115
F.3d at 1224. The defendant in that case argued that “the CSRA
transgresses state sovereignty by running afoul of the domestic
relations exception to diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at 1231. The
Bailey Court disagreed, stating that “[t]he domestic relations
exception obtains from the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1332, . . . and therefore it has no application where, as
here, there exists an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
The instant action is based not on diversity but on an express
grant of jurisdictional authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because
this case clearly arises under this [c]ourt’s federal question
jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception presents no bar.”
Id.
In fact, because Bailey involved a federal criminal
prosecution, federal jurisdiction actually rested there on 18
U.S.C. § 3231, not on Section 1331, which concerns only civil
actions. See United States v. Schooler, Nos. 3:10-cr-134, 3:12-cv201, 2012 WL 2814322, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2012) (“This
[c]ourt is indeed a limited jurisdiction court, but its exclusive
power to try federal crimes is conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3231. [The
d]efendant’s references to 28 U.S.C. §[§] 1331 and 1332 are not
relevant; those sections govern only jurisdiction in civil
cases.”), recommendation adopted, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9,
2012). In any event, the Bailey Court ultimately concluded that
the domestic relations exception did not apply in that case,
because “[t]he CSRA in no way endeavors to regulate th[e state
courts’] hallowed ground” over “the issuance of divorce, alimony,
and child custody decrees.” Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1231. The Bailey
Court further determined that the CSRA addressed matters within
Congress’ constitutional power to regulate commerce. Id. at 122730. In other words, the Bailey Court’s pronouncement about whether
-32-
Ankenbrandt, the Third Circuit held likewise, Flood v. Braaten, 727
F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984), and has stood by that holding in an
unpublished, post-Ankebrandt decision, Wattie-Bey, 424 F. App’x at
96 n.1.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has enforced the domestic
relations
exception
Ankenbrandt.
in
the
federal
question
context
after
Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding no federal jurisdiction in action brought by husband
against wife’s ex-husband and state-court judge alleging that
granting ex-husband visitation rights violated husband’s federal
constitutional rights).
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in a pre-
Ankenbrandt case, applied the domestic relations exception to bar
federal question jurisdiction.
Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co.,
654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting that, “[e]ven when
brought under the guise of a federal question action, a suit whose
substance is domestic relations generally will not be entertained
in a federal court” (citing Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098
(6th Cir. 1973) (holding that “it is readily apparent that the
substance of th[e] [civil rights] claim is an intrafamily custody
the domestic relations exception applies in the federal question
context constitutes mere dicta. Thus, it appears that the Ninth
Circuit stands alone in holding (in a post-Ankenbrandt, published
opinion) that the domestic relations exception only limits
diversity jurisdiction.
-33-
battle,” and that “[a]s such this court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the present suit”))).
Whether
the
domestic
relations
exception
limits
federal
question jurisdiction remains an unsettled issue in this Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit first addressed that question in United States
v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), when a criminal defendant
challenged his conviction for willfully failing to pay child
support in violation of the Child Support Recovery Act (“CSRA”), 18
U.S.C. § 228.
the
CSRA
Id. at 478.
qualified
as
The Johnson defendant suggested that
an
“impermissible
invasion
of
state
sovereignty in the area of domestic relations,” violating “the
domestic-relations
exception
to
federal
jurisdiction
policies of federalism and comity that underlie it.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
analysis
by
stating
that
the
and
the
Id. at 481
The Fourth Circuit began its
domestic
relations
exception
“applie[s] only as a judicially implied limitation on the diversity
jurisdiction; it has no generally recognized application as a
limitation on federal question jurisdiction.”
Id.
The Johnson
Court then went on to hold that the “CSRA does not attempt to
regulate domestic relations,” and “does not purport to modify, or
to allow federal judicial modification of, any state domestic
relations law or judicial decree; nor to require state enforcement
of its own domestic relations laws and decrees.”
Id.
In deciding
the case in that fashion, the Fourth Circuit reduced to dicta its
-34-
statement that the domestic relations exception only applies in the
diversity context.
See generally Tome, 153 F. at 87 (explaining
that “expressions of opinion not necessary to the determination of
the case are to be regarded as dicta”).
Thereafter, in Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2006),
the Fourth Circuit construed a federal statute, the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (“ICARA”),
to
effectively
incorporate
Cantor, 442 F.3d at 202-05.8
the
domestic
relations
exception.
In Cantor, the plaintiff (residing in
Israel) challenged the district court’s dismissal of her “access
claims” brought under ICARA, seeking visitation of her minor
children that resided with her ex-husband in the United States.
Id. at 198.
The Fourth Circuit explained that, “[w]ith the
exception of the limited matters of international child abduction
or wrongful removal claims, which is expressly addressed by the
Convention and ICARA, other child custody matters, including access
claims, would be better handled by the state courts which have the
experience to deal with this specific area of the law.”
202.
Id. at
In reaching that conclusion, the Cantor Court reviewed
ICARA’s legislative history, and found that Congress did not intend
to have federal courts embroiled in deciding child custody matters.
8
ICARA implemented the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, October 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501
(1980). Cantor, 442 F.3d at 199.
-35-
See id.
Moreover, in refusing to interpret ICARA as conferring
jurisdiction upon federal courts to decide access claims, the
Cantor
Court
expressly
declined
litigation to federal courts.”
“to
move
domestic
relations
Id. at 204-05.
More recently, in an unpublished (and thus non-precedential,
see Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc))
decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court for applying
the domestic relations exception to bar an action brought under
Section
1983
that
alleged
“state
actors
had
deprived
plaintiffs] of their children without due process.”
Cty. Human Servs., 480 F. App’x 195, 197 (2012).
[the
Reale v. Wake
The complaint in
that case (similar to this one) specifically sought “an order
requiring the immediate return of the [p]laintiffs’ seven minor
children to the full legal and physical custody of the [p]laintiff
parents.”
Reale v. Wake Cty. Human Servs., 5:11-CV-682, Docket
Entry 1-1 at 53 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2011).
The Fourth Circuit did
not discuss whether federal courts can modify child custody decrees
in
civil
rights
actions,
but
observed
that
the
plaintiff
“specifically invoked § 1983 as a basis for jurisdiction.”
480
F.
App’x
at
197.
Quoting
Johnson,
the
Fourth
Reale,
Circuit
reiterated that “the domestic relations exception ‘is applied only
as a judicially implied limitation on the diversity jurisdiction;
it has no generally recognized application as a limitation on
federal question jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 114 F.3d at
-36-
481).
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that, “[b]ecause the
[plaintiffs’]
complaint
[was]
based
on
federal
question
jurisdiction, not diversity of citizenship, the domestic relations
exception d[id] not limit the district court’s jurisdiction over
it.”
Id.
Consistent with the view that no controlling authority exists
in the Fourth Circuit as to whether federal courts can issue or
modify child custody decrees in cases invoking federal question
jurisdiction, several district courts in this Circuit have declined
jurisdiction over domestic relations matters where a litigant
alleges violations of his or her federal constitutional rights
(even after Johnson).
See, e.g., Samuels, 2016 WL 1071003, at *1
(“[The p]laintiff claims subject matter jurisdiction based on
federal question jurisdiction. . . .
this court for a number of reasons.
family law.
state
or
The case may not proceed in
First, it involves matters of
Such issues have traditionally been reserved to the
municipal
court
systems
with
their
expertise
and
professional support staff. Under the domestic relations exception
to federal jurisdiction, federal courts generally abstain from
review of such cases.” (internal citation omitted)); Salvetti v.
Georgia Bar Ass’n, No. 1:05CV505, 2007 WL 433390, at *1 (M.D.N.C.
2007) (noting that the complaint alleges violations of federal law,
but concluding that the domestic relations exception deprives a
federal court of jurisdiction to award the plaintiff custody of her
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minor child); Freeze v. Veterans Admin. for N.C., No. 1:00CV963,
2001 WL 34013619, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (finding no
federal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s challenges to certain
state court orders regarding guardianship of his father, even where
the complaint alleged civil rights violations); but see Parks v.
Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Child Support Enf’t
Servs., 1:16-CV-568, 2016 WL 4384343, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
2016) (collecting cases and noting that the domestic relations
exception does not apply to federal question jurisdiction arising
under Section 1983).
On balance, applying the Supreme Court’s explication of the
historical lineage of the domestic relations exception to the
statutory evolution of federal question jurisdiction, the Court
should construe the exception as barring federal jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s
claims
seeking
modification
of
the
child
custody
decrees previously entered in the State Court.
V. Jurisdiction over State Claims
Lastly,
to
the
extent
the
above-mentioned
immunity,
abstention, and jurisdictional doctrines do not preclude litigation
in this Court of Plaintiff’s state claims (see, e.g., Docket Entry
3 at 8-9, 13-14), those claims still should not proceed in this
Court.
Federal
courts
“have
original
jurisdiction
of
all
civil
actions arising under the Constitution[ and] laws . . . of the
-38-
United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1331.9
Federal courts also maintain
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different
States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Under Section 1332(a), original
“jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of
a different State from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co.
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (emphasis in original).
“[I]n
any civil action of which the [federal] courts have original
jurisdiction,
the
[federal]
courts
shall
have
supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, a federal court “may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if it
dismisses “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
9
The Complaint’s jurisdictional statement alleges that
“[t]his Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1343(3) and (4).” (Docket Entry 3 at 6.) However,
Section 1343’s provision of federal jurisdiction over civil rights
claims against state actors “has had no legal effect since 1976,
when Congress amended § 1331 to eliminate any amount-in-controversy
requirement.” Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 554 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600
(1979)).
-39-
Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s federal claims (i.e.
those claims arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States) cannot proceed in this Court due to immunity, abstention,
and jurisdictional doctrines.
Nor does diversity jurisdiction
exist, as the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff resides in North
Carolina (Docket Entry 3 at 47) and she directed the issuance of
summonses to Defendants at North Carolina addresses (see Docket
Entry 7 at 1, 3, 5, 7, 9).
Furthermore, the
Complaint asserts
that the Judge Defendants serve as North Carolina district court
judges (Docket Entry 3 at 7-8), and the North Carolina Constitution
requires that State district court judges “reside in the district
for which [they are] elected,” N.C. Const. Art. IV, Sect. 10.
In
light of these circumstances, the Court lacks original jurisdiction
over this action under Section 1332(a). See Owen Equip. & Erection
Co., 437 U.S. at 373.
Given the frivolous nature of Plaintiff’s
effort to litigate her federal claims in this Court and the lack of
diversity jurisdiction, the Court may appropriately decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims.
See
Shanaghan
v.
Cahill,
58
F.3d
106,
110
(4th
Cir.
1995)
(explaining that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a federal
court has “discretion to dismiss or keep a case when it ‘has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,’” and
that “[t]here are no situations wherein a federal court must retain
-40-
jurisdiction over a state law claim, which would not by itself
support jurisdiction” (emphasis in original)).
CONCLUSION
Immunity, abstention, and jurisdictional doctrines render
Plaintiff’s federal claims frivolous (at least in this forum),
diversity of citizenship does not exist, and the Court should
decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that this Court dismiss the
Complaint (Docket Entry 3) without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right
to litigate her claims in an appropriate forum.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this Court deny the PI Motion
(Docket Entry 4) as moot.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
November 21, 2016
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