COURTNEY v. IKEA HOLDING U.S. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR. on 6/6/2017, that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10 ) is GRANTED and that this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. FURTHER that Defendants' request for costs and attorneys' fees (Doc. 10 ) is DENIED and that Plaintiff's Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 12 ) is DENIED. A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DAVIDA WIDENHOUSE COURTNEY,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
IKEA HOLDING US, INC., IKEA
)
U.S. EAST, LLC, IKEA U.S. WEST, )
Inc., and IKEA PROPERTY, INC., )
)
Defendants.
)
1:16CV1215
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
This matter is before the court on a Motion to Dismiss
filed by IKEA Holding US, Inc., IKEA U.S. East, LLC, IKEA U.S.
West, Inc., and IKEA Property, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”).
(Doc. 10.) Plaintiff Davida Widenhouse Courtney (“Plaintiff”)
has responded, (Doc. 12), and Defendants have replied. (Doc.
14.) For the reasons stated herein, this court will grant
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss includes a request for costs
and attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff has responded to that
request. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons stated herein, this court
will deny Defendants’ request for costs and attorneys’ fees.
Also before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer
Venue, (Doc. 12), to which Defendants have responded. (Doc. 14.)
For the reasons stated herein, this court will deny Plaintiff’s
Motion to Transfer Venue as moot.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges she fell in an IKEA Charlotte restaurant
store and is suing Defendants for negligence. (See Complaint
(“Compl.”) (Doc. 7).) Two different attorneys have filed
complaints containing identical claims in two different courts
on behalf of Plaintiff. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
(“Defs.’ Mem.”) (Doc. 11)); (see also Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss and Pl.’s Mot. to Transfer Venue (“Pl.’s Opp’n & Mot.
to Transfer”) (Doc. 12).) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss seeks
dismissal of the second-filed complaint as duplicative.
The differences between the two cases are the attorneys
representing Plaintiff and that the case filed in the Western
District of North Carolina (hereinafter “Courtney I”) has begun
the process of discovery (Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-00569). (See
Defs.’ Mem. (Doc. 11) at 1.) Plaintiff’s counsel in Courtney I
filed the complaint on June 22, 2016, in the Superior Court
Division for Mecklenburg County. (Id. at 2.) On July 22, 2016,
Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina based on diversity
jurisdiction. (Id. at 2, 4.) Defendants filed their answer on
July 29, 2016, and the parties filed a Proposed Discovery Plan
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with the court in the Western District of North Carolina on
August 15, 2016. (Id. at 2.) The parties have since exchanged
discovery requests. (Id. at 3.)
On August 10, 2016, Defendants learned from Plaintiff’s
counsel that another attorney had filed a complaint on behalf of
Plaintiff for the same claim in this district, but that the
dueling claims would be sorted out and the second suit would not
proceed. (Id.) However, in mid-September of 2016, Plaintiff
served Defendants with a complaint that had been filed on
June 23, 2016, in the Superior Court Division of Cabarrus County
by the same Plaintiff, pursuing the same claim (hereinafter
“Courtney II”). (See id.) Defendants removed the claim to this
court on October 7, 2016. (Id. at 4; see also (Doc. 1).)
Defendants move to dismiss Courtney II. (Defs.’ Mem. (Doc.
11).) Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Dismiss and has moved to
transfer venue of Courtney II, arguing that Plaintiff would
later ask a court in the Western District of North Carolina to
consolidate Courtney I and Courtney II into a single case.
(Pl.’s Opp’n & Mot. to Transfer (Doc. 12).) Defendants also
request costs and attorneys’ fees representing their time and
effort in litigating this duplicative case. (Defs.’ Mem. (Doc.
11) at 6).
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II.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Rather than a case of abatement, as argued by Defendants,
this court finds this case is one to which the first-filed
doctrine applies. The Fourth Circuit has described the firstfiled doctrine as being “of sound judicial administration.” See
Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., 502 F.2d 178, 181
(4th Cir. 1974). Courts apply the doctrine “when multiple suits
are filed in different Federal courts upon the same factual
issues.” Allied-General Nuclear Servs. v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 675 F.2d 610, 611 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Carbide &
Carbon Chems. Corp. v. U.S. Indus. Chems., Inc., 140 F.2d 47, 49
(4th Cir. 1944)). Under these circumstances, “the first or prior
action is permitted to proceed to the exclusion of another
subsequently filed.” Id.; see also Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982); Great N.
Ry. Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Adjustment Bd., First Div., 422 F.2d 1187,
1193 (7th Cir. 1970); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 508 (1947) (stating that plaintiff’s first choice of forum
should generally be honored, and that there are difficulties
that arise if cases are not handled by their origin court).
Invoking the first-filed doctrine is “an equitable
determination that is made on a case-by-case, discretionary
basis.” Nutrition & Fitness, Inc. v. Blue Stuff, Inc., 264
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F. Supp. 2d 357, 360 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (citing Plating Res., Inc.
v. UTI Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 899, 903 (N.D. Ohio 1999);
Guthy-Renker Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 179
F.R.D. 264, 269 (C.D. Cal 1998)). Courts have broad discretion
in determining when to apply the first-filed doctrine. Id. at
361 (citing Plating Res., 47 F. Supp. 2d at 903; Guthy-Renker,
179 F.R.D. at 270)). If the first-filed doctrine applies, the
district court has the discretion to dismiss, stay, transfer, or
enjoin the second-filed case. See Conboy v. Robert W. Baird &
Co., No. 90-3035, 1990 WL 135682 (4th Cir. Sept. 20, 1990);
Nutrition & Fitness, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 360. There are three
factors that a court within the Western District of North
Carolina and a court within this district have considered when
determining whether to apply the first-filed rule: “(1) the
chronology of the filings, (2) the similarity of the parties
involved, and (3) the similarity of the issues at stake.” E.g.,
Remington Arms Co. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., No. 1:03CV1051,
2004 WL 444574, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2004) (citing Nutrition
& Fitness, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 360).
This court finds the Fourth Circuit’s logic in Conboy, 1990
WL 135682, at *1, to be most instructive. In Conboy, a case was
filed in the Southern District of Texas and had proceeded into
discovery with an established trial date. Id. The same plaintiff
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then filed an identical claim in the District Court of Maryland.
Id. The District Court of Maryland dismissed the case “in the
interests of comity and the orderly administration of justice.”
Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed this dismissal upon appeal. Id.
In the case before this court, the three first-filed
factors are satisfied. First, Plaintiff’s counsel in Courtney I
filed the complaint in a state court in the Western District of
North Carolina one day before Courtney II was filed, and the
case was removed several months before Courtney II was served on
Defendants. (See Defs.’ Mem. (Doc. 11) at 2-3.) Second, the
parties in both Courtney I and Courtney II are identical; only
Plaintiff’s counsel is different in the two cases. (See id. at
3.) Third, as in Conboy, 1990 WL 135682, at *1, the issues in
the case before this court are identical to Courtney I. As
Plaintiff’s attorney in Courtney II states, “[t]he parties and
claims are virtually identical.” (Pl.’s Opp’n & Mot. (Doc. 12)
at 1.)
There are additional equitable considerations that weigh in
favor of the application of the first-filed doctrine in this
case which are consistent with the facts in Conboy, 1990 WL
135682, at *1. Courtney I has already proceeded into discovery
in the Western District of North Carolina, (Defs.’ Mem. (Doc.
11) at 3), just like the first case in Conboy. It would also be
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in the interest of judicial economy to dismiss Courtney II
because the dismissal would promote “the orderly administration
of justice,” Conboy, 1990 WL 135682, at *1, by avoiding
inconsistent judgments and expenses associated with duplicative
actions. Thus, although Courtney I and Courtney II were filed
only a day apart, the delay resulting from addressing the issues
of multiple law suits in this court makes the equitable
considerations weigh significantly in favor of proceeding with
the first-filed case.
Additionally, Plaintiff resides closer to the Western
District of North Carolina than to this district, and the
alleged incident also occurred closer to the Western District of
North Carolina than to this district. (See Compl. (Doc. 7) ¶¶ 1,
6, 8.) Due to the satisfaction of the three first-filed factors
and this case’s similarity to Conboy, the first-filed doctrine
should apply in this case.
Nevertheless, although the equitable first-filed doctrine
applies, there are exceptions to the doctrine which must be
considered before a case should be dismissed.
Another court within this district has previously
identified three additional circumstances in which the firstfiled doctrine would have applied, but an exception to the
doctrine prevented its application to particular cases. See
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Remington Arms, 2004 WL 444574, at *2 (citing Tripath Imaging,
Inc. v. Cytyc Corp., No. 1:03CV550, slip op. at 12 (M.D.N.C.
Oct. 30, 2003)). The first variety of exception arises when a
plaintiff brings a suit in a district that has no, or very
little, connection to the case. See id. A second exception arises
when a plaintiff has filed a “hip pocket” suit so that their
suit retains priority. Id. A “hip pocket” suit is one in which a
complaint is filed early so that it can be pulled out (of one’s
“hip pocket”) if necessary to ensure the plaintiff who filed may
maintain an upper hand. See id. at *3. The third exception
arises when an action is filed while settlement negotiations are
occurring between the parties. Id. at *2.
None of the exceptions apply to this case. First,
Plaintiff’s counsel filed Courtney I in Mecklenburg County,
(Defs.’ Mem. (Doc. 11) at 2), the county in which Charlotte is
located and where the alleged incident occurred, creating no
doubt as to whether there exists a strong connection between the
location of the first filing and the alleged incident that took
place at the Charlotte IKEA store restaurant. (See id.) Second,
the Courtney I case is not a “hip pocket” case because the
summons and complaint were served approximately two days after
the complaint by Plaintiff was filed; Courtney I was not waiting
dormant in Plaintiff’s “hip pocket.” (Id.) If either of these
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cases could be said to have been “waiting dormant,” it is
Courtney II, in which the second attorney for Plaintiff waited
until mid-September of 2016 to alert Defendants as to the
June 23, 2016 complaint. (See id. at 3.) Last, neither party has
suggested the parties were in the midst of settlement
negotiations. Therefore, no exceptions to the first-filed
doctrine apply.
Having determined that the first-filed doctrine applies
without exception, this court will grant the Motion to Dismiss
and will dismiss the case without prejudice.1
III. DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Defendants request costs and attorneys’ fees representing
the time they expended on this issue. (Defs.’ Mem. (Doc. 11) at
6.) Defendants claim this expenditure could have been avoided if
Plaintiff had promptly withdrawn Courtney II. (Id.) Defendants
Plaintiff argues that a transfer of venue is the
appropriate action, relying solely upon an annotation from the
Manual for Complex Litigation. (Pl.’s Opp’n & Mot. to Transfer
(Doc. 12) at 2.) While this court is most appreciative of the
Federal Judicial Center’s guidance in many different areas of
law, such a citation is a secondary source and not persuasive
here. First, the “related cases” references in the manual is
much broader than the issue presented here. Second, the quoted
annotation contains a footnote with citations, neither of which
are addressed by Plaintiff. Because this court is dismissing
Plaintiff’s action, this court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to
Transfer Venue as moot.
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state that there is no specific authority for costs and
attorneys’ fees. (Id.)
Defendants’ issue with Courtney II flows from their
argument that Plaintiff should have withdrawn Courtney II
because it is duplicative. (Id.) Defendants’ argument is most
similar to a violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(b)(1), which states that a pleading may not “[be] presented
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” In order
for the rule to be violated, the purpose of the pleading must
have been improper, not the result of it. Id.
Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel in
Courtney II submitted the complaint with an improper purpose, to
harass Defendants, or to delay Courtney I. Although Courtney II
may have increased the cost of litigation, this court finds no
bad faith by Plaintiff, for as Plaintiff’s counsel argues, there
was a meritorious issue as to the manner in which the
duplicative litigation should be addressed. Therefore,
Defendants’ request for costs and attorneys’ fees will be
denied.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is GRANTED and that this
case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ request for costs
and attorneys’ fees (Doc. 10) is DENIED and that Plaintiff’s
Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 12) is DENIED.
A judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This the 6th day of June, 2017.
_______________________________
United States District Judge
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