NORMAN v. CALL-A-NURSE, LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE LORETTA C. BIGGS on 12/4/2018. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 35 ), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A Judgment dismissing this case will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum and Order. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MARTY NORMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CALL-A-NURSE, LLC; NOVANT
HEALTH TRIAD REGION, LLC; AND
THE MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL
OPERATING CORPORATION,
Defendants.
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1:16CV1388
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.
Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that Defendants unlawfully terminated her
employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA” or the
“Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 623, and the public policy of North Carolina, specifically N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 143-422.2. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25, 29.) Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 35.) For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ motion will be
granted.
As background, in 1994, Plaintiff established, and was the sole owner of, a call–in
nursing service called Call a Nurse, P.C. (ECF No. 35-3 at 13.) In 1996, Call a Nurse, P.C.
was purchased by Triad Health Ventures, Inc. 1 (“Triad Ventures”) for $360,000. (Id. at 21–
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Novant Triad Region, LLC and The Moses H. Cone Hospital
Corporation were the controlling owners and directors of Triad Ventures. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 12.)
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22.) Contemporaneously with the purchase of the business, on June 28, 1996, Triad Ventures
entered into an Executive Employment Agreement with Plaintiff in which she agreed to serve
as Executive Director of the business. (Id. at 15–16, 42.) Triad Ventures later conveyed its
assets to Call-A-Nurse, LLC (“CAN”), a limited liability company owned by Defendants,
Novant Health and Moses Cone. (See ECF No. 35-8 at 4; ECF No. 42-5 at 7.) At that time,
Plaintiff became an employee of CAN, and continued to serve as its Executive Director until
she was terminated, effective June 27, 2015. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 18–19; ECF No. 35-3 at 16.)
Plaintiff was 57 years of age at the time of her termination. (ECF No. 42-1 ¶ 1.)
Defendants now move for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s unlawful
termination claims based on age, contending that there is no genuine issue of material fact
related to either claim and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (ECF
No. 35.)
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
court must view the evidence and “resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational
inferences in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d
516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st
Cir. 1996)). The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when “there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
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Id. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment
may be granted.” Id. at 249–50 (citations omitted).
In opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
cannot rest on “mere allegations or denials,” id. at 248, and “must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party must support its assertions
by citing to particular parts of the record or showing that materials cited do not establish the
absence of a genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986). “The summary judgment inquiry thus scrutinizes the plaintiff’s case to determine
whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient proof, in the form of admissible evidence, that
could carry the burden of proof of [her] claim at trial.” Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d
1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s ADEA Claim
The Act makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual based on age. 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The Act specifically prohibits discrimination of employees and applicants
based on age for individuals aged 40 and above. Id. § 631(a). The burden of proving that age
was a determining factor in an employment decision is on the plaintiff. Mereish v. Walker, 359
F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff can establish her claim of discrimination through
direct or circumstantial evidence that age bias motivated the employment decision, or by
relying on the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973), and its progeny. Mereish, 359 F.3d at 334. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
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a plaintiff “must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id.; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). To
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she was a
member of the protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the job; (3) that she suffered an
adverse employment action, and (4) that following discharge she was replaced by a
substantially younger person with comparable qualifications. Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435
F.3d 510, 513 (4th Cir. 2006). If Plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of her
claim, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206
F.3d 420, 429 (4th Cir. 2000). If the defendant satisfies this burden, the presumption of
discrimination created by the prima facie case disappears and the burden then shifts back to
the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s proffered
justification is pretextual. See Mereish, 359 F.3d at 334.
In this case, Defendants deny that they discriminated against Plaintiff but stipulate, for
the purposes of this motion, that Plaintiff can satisfy her initial burden, under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on age. (ECF
No. 36 at 1–2.) Defendants argue, however, that they have a legitimate business reason for
terminating Plaintiff. (Id.) Specifically, they contend “that the decision [to terminate Plaintiff]
was a direct result of [Novant Health’s] plan to cease operations of [a] flawed call center[,]
[CAN,] and to create an internal consumer engagement center with improved efficiencies and
expanded services and capabilities.” Id. Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is unable to
show that their business reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 2.
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Plaintiff responds that because “[t]he undisputed evidence establishes [her] prima facie
case [of age discrimination,] . . . [she] has focused her argument primarily on pretext.” (ECF
No. 43 at 12.) According to Plaintiff, “[D]efendants justify their actions through a detailed
account of the planning and implementation of a new call center, allegedly to replace CAN.”
(Id. at 1.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]he arguments surrounding the new call center are a red herring,
intended to distract from the reality that [D]efendants terminated [Plaintiff] on June 1, 2015,
a full year prior to the call center fully replacing CAN.” (Id.)
Because the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff can meet the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on age, (ECF No. 36 at 2; ECF No. 43
at 12), the burden of production shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory business reason for terminating Plaintiff, Stokes, 206 F.3d at 429.
Defendants produced evidence showing the following: In 2013, Defendant Novant Health
Triad Region, LLC (“Novant Health”) hired a Senior Vice President of Marketing and
Communication, David Duvall (“Duvall”). (ECF No. 35-1 ¶ 3.) Duvall was charged with
managing the Novant Health brand and brand assets, guiding the public relations team, leading
communications to the nearly 26,000 Novant team members, and developing advertising
campaigns and consumer engagement programs. (ECF No. 35-4 at 4.) Once hired, Duvall
began conducting interviews to learn more about the organization and find ways to improve
the Novant Health brand. (ECF No. 35-1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 35-4 at 6.) Through these interviews
Duvall became aware of serious concerns with CAN, ranging from poor service and excessive
dropped calls to the absence of performance metrics. (ECF No. 35-4 at 6–9.) In response,
Duvall hired an outside consultant to evaluate CAN and its management. (ECF No. 35-1 ¶ 6;
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ECF No. 35-4 at 10.) On or about June 9, 2014, the consultant issued a report that concluded,
among other things: that CAN was “[n]ot an efficient operation” and failed to engage in “data
driven decision-making”; that Plaintiff as its Executive Director was “neither technologically
savvy nor business strategy savvy”; and that “CAN ha[d] grown beyond the capability of the
current management.” (ECF No. 35-3 at 59, 68, 84.) The report further concluded that
Defendant Novant Health should either sell CAN and create a new internal Novant Health
contact center or have Novant Health acquire CAN and install a Novant Health employee to
lead CAN’s operations. (ECF No. 35-3 at 86–87.) As a result, Novant Health made the
decision to create a new internal Novant Health consumer engagement center (“CEC”). (ECF
No. 35-1 ¶ 8.) A leadership team was put in place to develop a proposal for the CEC. (Id. ¶
10.) On October 3, 2014, the leadership team recommended that Novant Health hire new
leadership for CAN during the transition. (See id. at 3, 68.) In addition to the deficiencies
outlined in the consultant’s report, there was specific concern from the board’s perspective
“that Plaintiff, who regarded CAN as her ‘baby’ would not be amenable to the organizational
changes underway.” (ECF No. 36 at 21; see ECF No. 35-3 at 14; ECF No. 35-7 at 5–6.) On
June 1, 2015, Plaintiff was terminated. (ECF No. 42-1 ¶ 31.) On that same day, three other
management level employees of CAN, some over age 40 and some under age 40, were also
terminated. (See ECF No. 35-8 at 4; ECF No. 35-10 at 11.)
Defendants have produced substantial evidence supporting their business decision to
replace CAN with a multifaceted CEC, and further, to terminate certain members of CAN’s
current management, including Plaintiff, during the transition. (See, e.g., ECF No. 35-3 at 53–
88) Though Plaintiff has described Defendants detailed discussion of the planning and
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implementation surrounding the new call center as a “red herring” to distract from her firing,
(ECF No. 43 at 1), this Court disagrees with that characterization. Rather, the evidence
submitted by Defendants, as well as their detailed discussion of the evidence, provides
background and context for their business decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. “To
meet [its] production burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework, [Defendants are] not
required to persuade [the Court] that the proffered reason was the actual motivation for [its]
decision. . . . [They] must merely articulate a justification that is ‘legally sufficient to justify a
judgment’ in [their] favor.” Mereish, 359 F.3d at 335 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255). The
Fourth Circuit has found that such a strategic decision constitutes a legally sufficient
justification for a plaintiff’s termination. See id. at 335–336 (“Without the ability to update the
skills of their employees to meet the shifting demands of technology and society, business
could not thrive. . . . [T]he ADEA was not intended to obstruct the ability of a commercial
enterprise to making necessary adjustments in the face of economic challenges. . . . Neither
was it designed to prevent leaders . . . from achieving the mix of employee expertise that will
best fulfill [a business’s] goals.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Court
concludes that Defendants have met their burden of production by articulating and providing
evidentiary support for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their decision to terminate
Plaintiff. Thus, the presumption derived from Plaintiff having established a prima facie case
disappears from the case and the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to establish pretext. See id. at
334.
“Once the question comes down to pretext, a plaintiff ‘must be afforded the
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
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by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.’” Holland v.
Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)). A plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the alleged
nondiscriminatory explanation is “unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of
circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of age discrimination.” Mereish, 359 F.3d at 336
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, a plaintiff may not “simply show that the
articulated reason is false; [s]he must also show that the employer discriminated against [her]
on the basis of age.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2006). At this stage,
Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate pretext “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Merritt v. Old
Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
Here, to avoid judgment as a matter of law on her ADEA claim, Plaintiff must establish
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that Defendants’ proffered
reason for her termination was pretextual. See Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 278–79
(4th Cir. 2000). However, Plaintiff’s brief, affidavits, and arguments related to pretext focus
primarily on countering Defendants’ assessment of Plaintiff’s performance as executive
director of CAN and the performance of CAN under her leadership, with her own assessment
of both. (See ECF No. 43 at 13–16.) This approach is misguided. The Fourth Circuit has
held that Plaintiff cannot establish discrimination by disagreeing with her employer’s
assessment of her work performance, and in this case the performance of CAN, since in a
wrongful discharge action only the perception of the employer matters, not a self-assessment
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by Plaintiff. See Hawkins, 203 F.3d at 280; Howard v. Coll. of the Albemarle, 262 F. Supp. 3d 322,
333 (E.D.N.C. 2017) (“Although [Plaintiff] contests the factual accuracy of the critiques of his
performance, . . . the accuracy of those critiques is irrelevant to the [C]ourt’s inquiry. Rather,
the issue is whether the . . . decisionmaker[ ] believed the critiques to be true.”), aff’d, 697 F.
App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2017). Further, assuming Plaintiff’s effort is to show that Defendants’
articulated reason for termination is false, to establish her claim of pretext, Plaintiff must still
present evidence that the real reason for her termination was age discrimination. Laber, 438
F.3d at 430–31. Plaintiff has failed to do so here. When asked in her deposition to provide
the basis for her claim that her termination was based on age and not a legitimate business
reason, Plaintiff stated:
A. . . . Because no one came to me and said, “[y]ou are not
performing in the manner that you need to be performing. You
are lacking in job performance. You are not operating this
company in the way it needs to be operated.” I have to assume
it was my age.
Q. . . . So, it’s just an assumption?
A. What else was it? I’m not sure what else it would have been.
(ECF No. 35-3 at 11–12.)
In addition to Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the basis for her age discrimination claim
was an assumption, Plaintiff provides very little independent evidence from which a reasonable
juror could infer age discrimination as the “real” reason for her termination. See Dockins v.
Benchmark Commc’ns, 176 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[P]laintiff’s own assertions of
discrimination in and of themselves are insufficient to counter substantial evidence of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for a discharge.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Plaintiff cites statements by two Novant Health employees and an email from Novant Health’s
in-house counsel as evidence of pretext. 2 The first are statements by Melissa Lucas (“Lucas”),
the individual whom Plaintiff claims was hired as her replacement. (ECF No. 43 at 15; ECF
No. 42-1 ¶ 28.) According to Plaintiff, in April and May 2015 she spent considerable time
with Lucas, at CAN, who stated on numerous occasions that “this isn’t the way we do this
anymore.” (ECF No. 42-1 ¶ 28.) Plaintiff further stated that she was “aware that Ms.
Lucas . . . is more than twenty years younger than [she],” and that Ms. Lucas “was very curt,
negative or critical, and very condescending.” (Id.) Other statements, evidencing pretext
according to Plaintiff, were made by Marty Lambeth (“Lambeth”) who Plaintiff identifies as
“a manager of Novant [Health].” (Id ¶ 26.) According to Plaintiff, on or about March, 2015,
Lambeth met with Plaintiff and introduced Lucas to her. (Id.) Lambeth then stated: “In the
old days you and I would just sit down and discuss what was going on, what changes were
needed, what concerns I had, but times have changed; now things no longer work that way.”
(Id.) At best these statements are ambiguous and make no reference to age; thus, such
statements are not sufficient to create a triable issue of age discrimination. See Birkbeck v.
Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511–12 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the statement that
“there comes a time when we have to make way for younger people” is not sufficient to create
an inference of age bias); see also EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that statements about the need to “attract newer, younger people or “young blood”
were insufficient evidence of age bias). While isolated statements can constitute evidence of
In their Reply Brief, Defendants make three objections to this evidence tendered by Plaintiff
based on attorney-client privilege, authentication, and hearsay. (ECF No. 44 at 12–13.) The Court
has determined that those objections shall be overruled.
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discrimination, such statements must be contemporaneous to the adverse employment action.
McCray v. Pee Dee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 263 F. App’x 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2008); but see Loveless v.
John’s Ford, Inc., 232 F. App’x 229, 234 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding evidence of discrimination
when, during the conversation in which an employee was terminated, supervisor stated that
he needed “younger, more aggressive Managers” and referring to another employee as “an F’n
dinosaur” who was “next” to be terminated); Gott v. Town of Chesapeake Beach, Md., 44 F. Supp.
3d 610, 615–16 (D. Md. 2014) (finding evidence of discrimination when employer told plaintiff
during a meeting that the reason for not rehiring her was that the company was “just looking
for younger people”). Further, the probativeness of such isolated statements “is circumscribed
if they . . . were not related to the employment decision in question, or were made by
nondecisionmakers.” Huang v. Gutierrez, No. AW-08-2882, 2010 WL 93274, at *10 (D. Md.
Jan. 5, 2010) (quoting Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir. 2001)). Here,
Plaintiff does not contend that Ms. Lucas was a decisionmaker, nor does she contend that any
of the statements were made in the context of her termination. Lastly, the email from Novant
Health’s in-house counsel stating “our story can simply be that we decided not to renew her
contract,” fails to provide support for Plaintiff’s assumption that the real reason for her
termination was discrimination based on age. (ECF No. 42-21 at 3.) The Court concludes
that this evidence is insufficient to show pretext.
Plaintiff next argues that “following the termination, [D]efendants have engaged in
inconsistent, unsupportable, post hoc efforts to justify the termination, clearly establishing
pretext.” (ECF No. 43 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, “three primary decisionmakers—David
Duvall, Krista Tillman [(“Tillman”)], and Tim Clontz [(“Clontz”)]—all had different reasoning
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and explanations for the decision [to terminate Plaintiff].” (Id. at 8.) A careful review of the
deposition testimony of each of these individuals demonstrates that they each viewed
Plaintiff’s termination as a necessary outgrowth of Novant Health’s decision to create a new
consumer engagement center, internal to Novant Health and run by Novant Health
employees, and to wind down CAN as proposed in the consultant’s report.
As cited by Plaintiff, Duvall did state in his deposition that “we felt it was important
that the leadership of the new entity be Novant Health so that they could help grow our
culture, that they could infuse the culture, the service standards that we are known for into the
organization.” (ECF No. 42-8 at 16.) The statement was, however, a part of a greater
discussion by Duvall:
There was never a decision about Marty Norman, yay or nay. It
was Call-A-Nurse [that] was going to be sunsetted, and a net new
entity was going to be stood up. . . . It just was not at all logical
to think that we would take a leader of this entity that we were
going to sunset, which, by the way, was poorly performing, and
make it part of a new entity. It just didn’t enter into anyone’s
calculus.
(Id.)
Tillman’s testimony is consistent with Duvall’s testimony. She testified that she was
hired by Novant Health as a consultant two months before Plaintiff was terminated; that she
met with Plaintiff three or four times; and that she did not “make an independent assessment”
of Plaintiff as an executive director. (ECF No. 42-6 at 14.) Tillman testified as follows: “The
purpose of the assessment[ ] [I was hired to provide] was to try to decide if the implementation
plan that Novant Health had when I started in March was a reasonable and feasible
implementation plan to start a new engagement center.” (Id.) Tillman further testified that
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she “was asked not only to help stand up—implement the plan to stand up a new engagement
center, but to also . . . improve and, hopefully, keep from declining any worse the service that
was currently provided by Call-A-Nurse while the new engagement center was being stood
up.” (Id. at 19.) According to Tillman “[t]he management team, including Marty Norman, . .
. was not helpful or supportive of being able to provide good service. So, the decision was
made after our April report to move as quickly as possible to install a new management team
to be able to provide better service.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also states that Clontz, the Moses Cone representative who had served on the
CAN board for eighteen years, (see ECF No. 42-5 at 7), was one of the decisionmakers who
provided a different reason for her termination, (ECF No. 43 at 8). According to Plaintiff,
Clontz stated that “the entirety of the motivation [for the decision to terminate Plaintiff] was
that Norman had hired her son . . . and that Novant [Health] informed him that Norman was
prioritizing third-party calls over those of Novant [Health] and [Moses] Cone.” (Id.) While
Clontz did state that those acts by Norman presented “a trust issue” for him, (ECF No. 42-5
at 34), Clontz also discussed the unsustainability of CAN based on Novant Health’s decision
to move in a new direction, (id. at 18–19), and he ultimately stated the following with respect
to Plaintiff’s termination:
Typically, when you are closing a business, you have, essentially,
two decisions you can make in terms of your lead administrative
person in that. If you believe that they are in a position to be able
to not only handle that gracefully, but do a great job of winding
down the business, then you have that conversation. You create
a severance packet that makes it very enticing for them to stay
the entire length of the wind-down and then to find other
employment. . . . On the other hand, if you believe that it is not
in the best interest of the organization for the Executive Director
to be a part of that wind-down, then you don’t do it that
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way. . . . I was concerned that it might not go well in terms of the
wind-down.
(Id. at 34.)
This evidence does not support Plaintiff’s claim of pretext. Contrary to Plaintiff’s
argument that these individuals—Duvall, Tillman, and Clontz—gave inconsistent and shifting
explanations for her termination, the reasons provided by each, when not selectively parsed,
are consistent and support the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by Defendants
for terminating Plaintiff during the transition period.
Plaintiff further argues that after her termination Novant Health continued to capture
her deleted emails and that the finance director for Novant Health ran a credit card analysis
of CAN which he then sent to the compliance department at Novant Health. (ECF No. 43
at 18–19.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]hose inquiries further underscore the pretextual nature
of [her] ouster.” (Id. at 19.) The evidence shows, however, that these actions were taken not
only with respect to Plaintiff, but with respect to each of the CAN employees terminated on
the same day as Plaintiff, irrespective whether they were over or under the age of 40. (See ECF
42-24 at 2; ECF No. 35-10 at 11.)
Moreover, as with all of the acts complained of by Plaintiff, which she argues
demonstrate pretext, she has failed to present evidence demonstrating a nexus between these
actions by Defendants and her claim that she is the victim of age discrimination. Plaintiff’s
failure to provide sufficient credible evidence of discriminatory animus related to age, from
which a reasonable jury could find that she was terminated based on her age, is fatal to her
claim. See Mereish, 359 F.3d at 336, 339. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to persuade this Court
that she is the victim of discrimination based on age, nor has she raised a genuine issue of
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material fact from which a jury could find in her favor. Defendants are entitled to summary
judgement as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s ADEA claim.
B. Wrongful Termination in Violation of North Carolina Public Policy
Defendants have likewise moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination
in violation of N.C. Gen Stat § 143-422.2. (See ECF No. 35.) This claim is based on the same
factual allegations as Plaintiff’s ADEA claim and the Court must apply the same legal standards
that apply under the ADEA claim. Alderman v. Inmar Enters., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546
(M.D.N.C. 2002), aff’d, 58 F. App’x 47 (4th Cir. 2003). Consequently, having determined that
there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the ADEA claim, and that Defendants
are entitled to judgment on that claim as a matter of law, this Court concludes, for the reasons
stated above related to her ADEA claim, that Plaintiff’s state law claim for wrongful
termination based on age discrimination must likewise fail. See id.
For the reasons outlined in the Memorandum above, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 35), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A Judgment dismissing this case will be entered contemporaneously with this
Memorandum and Order.
This, the 4th day of December 2018.
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs
United States District Judge
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