MOBLEY v. BARNES

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD signed on 4/20/2017. ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of con sidering this recommendation of dismissal. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against the Guilford County Sheriff's Office, Court Services Bureau, Greensboro Detention Center, Legal Process Division, and Greensboro Detention Infirmar y be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2), as those defendants are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's speedy due process and false arrest claims against Sheriff Barn es be dismissed with prejudice for failing to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's bacterial infection claim against Sheriff Barnes be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failing to state a claim, but without prejudice. (Daniel, J)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JASON DARNELL MOBLEY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
GUILFORD COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.

1:17cv115

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) in conjunction with his
pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2).

For the reasons that follow,

the Court will grant Plaintiff’s instant Application for the
limited

purpose

frivolous

and

of

for

recommending
failure

to

dismissal

state

a

of

claim

this
under

action
28

as

U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2).
LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.

Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

1995)

(en

banc)

(internal

“Dispensing

with

filing

fees,

quotation

however,

[is]

marks
not

omitted).

without

its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).

To address this

concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .
the action . . . is frivolous . . . [or] fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations
and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.”
319, 325 (1989).
not susceptible

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

“The word ‘frivolous’ is inherently elastic and
to

categorical

definition.

. .

.

The

term’s

capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis,
in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors
bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.”
(some

internal

quotation

marks

Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256–57

omitted).

frivolousness, the Court may “apply common sense.”

In

determining

Nasim, 64 F.3d

at 954.
Additionally, a plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when the
complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added)
-2-

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’”
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Id.

This standard “demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Id.

In other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.
of

action,

suffice.”

Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

supported

by

mere

conclusory

statements,

do

not

Id.1

1

Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). Put another
way, “[t]he mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se
pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings
to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it
should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to
include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174
F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct the plaintiff’s
legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18
(7th Cir. 1993), or ‘conjure up questions never squarely presented’
-3-

INTRODUCTION
Asserting jurisdiction pursuant to “42 U.S.C. § 1983” (Docket
Entry 2 at 1), Plaintiff initiated this action against the Court
Services

Bureau,

Greensboro

Detention

Center,

Legal

Process

Division, Greensboro Detention Infirmary (collectively, the “Jail
Defendants”), Sheriff BJ Barnes (“Sheriff Barnes”), and Guilford
County Sheriff’s Office (collectively with Jail Defendants and
Sheriff Barnes, the “Defendants”) (id. at 1-2).

The Complaint’s

statement of claim states in its entirety:
On October 31, 2013[, Plaintiff] was arrested and falsely
accused of the possess[ion] of marijuana with the intent
to sell and drug paraphernalia.
On that date[,
Plaintiff] was finger printed and booked on these
allegations. This imprisonment lasted five (5) months
and ten (10) days. [Plaintiff] was denied a Speedy Due
Process based upon the [i]ncompetence of the Court
Services Bureau scheduling an Attorney who was not a
Court-Appointed Attorney.
By the time this error had
been remedied and [Plaintiff’s] case assigned to a
current Court-Appointed Attorney with a calendar date,
this duration of confinement continued. On February 4,
2014[,] Court-Appointed Attorney, Michah Huggins met
behind closed Quarts [sic] in a Superior Judge[’]s
chambers and all charges were dismissed.
During this
confinement[, Plaintiff] was housed in 3B6.
This
accommodation also was infected with a bacterial
infection which [Plaintiff] became contaminated with.
[Plaintiff] was given a[n] antibiotic cream and placed
into isolation.
Since coming in contact with this
unknown bacteria [Plaintiff’s] body has exacerbated into
full multiple sclerosis.

to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th
Cir. 1985).” Anderson v. Galvin, Civ. Action No. 0:08-744, 2008
WL 4441940, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008).
-4-

(Id. at 2-3.)

The Complaint further requests $10 million in

punitive damages for Plaintiff’s “[i]nvalid [i]ncarceration” (id.
at 4).
Plaintiff attached to the Court’s “Pro se [Non-prisoner]
Complaint Form” (id. at 1) the following documents:
County

Court

Plaintiff’s

Information”
charges

for

(id.

at

5-6),

misdemeanor

“Guilford

verifications

possession

of

of
drug

paraphernalia and felony possession with intent to sell/distribute
marijuana (id. at 7-9),2 a one-page statement elaborating upon
Plaintiff’s claims and injuries (id. at 10), and several letters
that

Plaintiff

wrote

to

various

individuals

regarding

his

underlying state-court criminal case and the appointment of counsel
issue in that case (id. at 11-15).

The undersigned Magistrate

Judge has considered the Complaint in conjunction with each of
these filings for purposes of this Section 1915(e)(2) review. See,
e.g., Anderson

v.

Miller,

Civ.

Action

No.

0:08-743,

2008

WL

5100845, at *1 n.2, *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2008) (construing the
plaintiff’s pro se complaint and attached documents together when
deciding whether the action failed to state a claim for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).

2

Two of the verifications state that the charges remain
“pending” (Docket Entry 2 at 7-8 (all-caps omitted)), and the third
verification shows that the felony possession with intent to
sell/distribute marijuana charge was “disposed” (id. at 9 (all-caps
omitted)).
-5-

DISCUSSION
Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s filings appear to raise three
Section 1983 claims:

(i) “Speedy Due Process” violation (i.e.,

delay in receiving a court-appointed attorney), (ii) false arrest,
and

(iii)

However,

“bacterial

for

the

infection.”

reasons

(Docket

explained

below,

Entry

2

at

Plaintiff’s

2-3.)
claims

qualify as frivolous against Jail Defendants and the Guilford
County Sheriff’s Office, and his filings fail to state a claim for
relief against Sheriff Barnes.
I.

Jail Defendants and the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office
As an initial matter, Jail Defendants consist of various

divisions within the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office.
Guilford

County

Sheriff’s

Office,

Court

Services

(See
Bureau,

http://www.gcsonc.com/command/court-services-bureau (last visited
Apr. 19, 2017) (stating that the Court Services Bureau operates the
detention centers within the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office);
Guilford

County

Sheriff’s

Office,

http://www.gcsonc.com/detention-centers
2017)

(noting

that

the

“Guilford

Detention

(last

County

visited

Sheriff’s

Centers,
Apr.

19,

Office

is

responsible for the care and custody of inmates incarcerated at
. . . [the] Greensboro Detention Center,” including “[h]ealthcare
[s]ervices”); Guilford County Sheriff’s Office, Legal Process,
http://www.gcsonc.com/legal-division (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)

-6-

(stating that the “Guilford County Sheriff’s Office Legal Process
Division consists of the Warrant Squad, Civil Process Section and
Records Section”).

The Guilford County Sheriff’s Office, however,

does not qualify as a legal entity capable of being sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
“State law dictates whether a governmental agency has the
capacity to be sued in federal court.
111, 113–14 (4th Cir. 1981).

Avery v. Burke, 660 F.2d

There is no North Carolina statute

authorizing suit against a county’s sheriff’s department.”

Efird

v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (M.D.N.C. 2004); see also
Parker v. Bladen Cty., 583 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D.N.C. 2008)
(dismissing Section 1983 claims against the Bladen County Sheriff’s
Department because it “lacks legal capacity to be sued,” as no
North Carolina “statute authoriz[es] suit against a North Carolina
county’s sheriff’s department” (citing Efird, 342 F. Supp. 2d at
420)).

Therefore, the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office and Jail

Defendants - as various divisions within the Guilford County
Sheriff’s Office - “[are] not amenable to suit under § 1983.”
Bettis v. Madison Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:10-CV-69, 2012 WL
161250,

at

*2

(W.D.N.C.

Jan.

19,

2012)

(observing

that

the

plaintiff “fail[ed] to present any authority indicating that the
[county’s sheriff’s office] is an entity with the capacity to be
sued”)); see also Landry v. North Carolina, No. 3:10-CV-585, 2011
WL 3682788, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2011) (dismissing claims
-7-

against the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office because “[t]here is
no

statute

in

North

Carolina

that

authorizes suit

against

a

county’s sheriff’s department”); cf. Efird, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 420
(concluding that “the sheriff, rather than the department or
associated county, may be held liable for . . . violations within
the department”).3

3

Consistent with the conclusion above, Section 1983 provides,
in pertinent part, that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Plaintiff must therefore raise
his Section 1983 claims “against a ‘person.’” Conley v. Ryan, 92
F. Supp. 3d 502, 519 (S.D. W. Va. 2015); see also Latham v.
Southern Health Partners, No. 4:14-CV-4160, 2016 WL 867026, at *1
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 16, 2016) (collecting cases holding that “[t]he
sheriff’s department is a building and not a person or a legal
entity subject to suit under § 1983”), recommendation adopted, 2016
WL 868832 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2016); Wiley v. Buncombe Cty., 846 F.
Supp. 2d 480, 486 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (“In order to successfully allege
a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that a
‘person’ acting under the color of state law violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The [county detention facility]
is not a person under § 1983.”); Evans v. City of Sumter, S.C.,
Civ. Action No. 3:07-2688, 2008 WL 4177225, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 3,
2008) (“Buildings and correctional institutions, like sheriff’s
departments and police departments, are not usually considered
legal entities subject to suit. Hence, the [police department] is
not a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983.” (citations omitted)).
-8-

Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s claims against Jail
Defendants and the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office fail in such
obvious

fashion

as

to

qualify

as

frivolous.

See

28

U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
II.

Sheriff Barnes
With regard to Sheriff Barnes, Plaintiff fails to identify

whether he proceeds against Sheriff Barnes in his official and/or
individual capacity.

(See Docket Entry 2 at 1-15.)4

Out of an

abundance of caution, the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge will therefore analyze Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims under
both official and individual capacity theories of liability.
A. Sheriff Barnes - Official Capacity Claims
First, official capacity liability attaches under Section 1983
only if “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”

Collins

v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted).5

Notably, an official’s discretionary

4

In fact, other than listing Sheriff Barnes as a party to
this action (Docket Entry 2 at 2), none of Plaintiff’s filings so
much as mention his name (see id. at 1-15), much less provide
sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief (see id.)
5

“Sheriff [Barnes], as a local official,
Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim[s].”
Gantt v. Whitaker, 203 F.
(M.D.N.C. 2002) (citing Harter v. Vernon, 101
Cir. 1996)).
-9-

is not entitled to
official capacity
Supp. 2d 503, 509
F.3d 334, 343 (4th

acts, exercised in carrying out official duties, do not always
represent official policy. Gantt v. Whitaker, 203 F. Supp. 2d 503,
509 (M.D.N.C. 2002).

“Rather, the official must have ‘final

authority’ over government policy with respect to the action in
question” to trigger official liability.

Id. (quoting Pembaur v.

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1986)).

Further, “[o]fficial

liability under § 1983 may not be premised on a respondeat superior
or other vicarious liability theory.”

Id. (emphasis in original)

(citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 121).
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that his Section 1983
claims resulted from an official policy or custom that Sheriff
Barnes implemented.

(See Docket Entry 2 at 1-15.)

For example,

Plaintiff does not contend “that Sheriff [Barnes], as the official
whose acts or edicts represent the official policy of the [Guilford
County] Sheriff’s Office, ordered, directed, or otherwise caused,”
Gantt, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 509-10 (brackets, ellipsis, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted), the alleged speedy due process
violation (i.e., delay in receiving a court-appointed attorney),
false arrest, or bacterial infection.

(See Dock Entry 2 at 1-15.)

Because Plaintiff fails to allege that Sheriff Barnes “order[ed] or
authorize[d] any constitutionally proscribed action,” he has not
stated a Section 1983 official liability claim.

Gantt, 203 F.

Supp. 2d at 510 (citing Jackson v. Long, 102 F.3d 722, 731 (4th
Cir. 1996)).
-10-

In sum, Plaintiff’s filings do not contain sufficient factual
matter to proceed against Sheriff Barnes in his official capacity.
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff asserts official capacity
claims against Sheriff Barnes, the Court should dismiss those
causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failing to state a claim.
B. Sheriff Barnes - Individual Capacity Claims
With

respect to

individual

capacity

liability,

Plaintiff

further fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes.
i. Speedy Due Process Violation
In that regard, Plaintiff grounds his alleged “Speedy Due
Process” violation on “the [i]ncompetence of the Court Services
Bureau” initially appointing him an ineligible attorney.
Entry 2 at 2 (emphasis added).)

(Docket

According to Plaintiff, that

“error” resulted in his “continued” confinement until after he
received a court-appointed attorney that secured dismissal of his
state-court criminal charges.

(Id.; see also id. at 10 (asserting

that “[Plaintiff] was incarcerated for two months without legal
representation”

because

the

lawyer

initially

assigned

to

Plaintiff’s case “was not a court-appointed lawyer”).)
To state a viable Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must assert
“that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was

-11-

committed under color of state law.”

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).

The Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

“The term ‘deprive,’ as

employed in the Fourteenth Amendment, suggests more than a mere
failure to take reasonable care:

it connotes an intentional or

deliberate denial of life, liberty, or property.”

Pink v. Lester,

52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
As such, a mere negligence theory of liability will not
support a Section 1983 claim.

See id. (discussing the “elementary

lesson” that “negligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property
are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); see also Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015)
(observing that “‘liability for negligently inflicted harm is
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process’”
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)));
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (recognizing that,
historically, the Fourteenth Amendment’s “guarantee of due process
has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,” and holding that
a “mere lack of due care by a state official,” thus, cannot
“‘deprive’ an individual of life, liberty, or property under the
Fourteenth

Amendment”);

Ballinger
-12-

v.

Dagher,

Civ.

Action

No.

2:09-414, 2010 WL 1379923, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 30, 2010)
(holding that “[the p]laintiff’s allegations of negligence and
incompetence simply do not support a claim of constitutional
dimension”).

Instead,

Section

1983

claims

require

“official

conduct that entails some measure of deliberateness.”

Pink, 52

F.3d at 75.
In this case, Plaintiff does not assert that Sheriff Barnes
(or anyone else) behaved in a manner that would meet the foregoing
standard. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-15.) Rather, Plaintiff grounds
the speedy due process violation in the Court Services Bureau’s
purported “incompetence” in initially appointing him an ineligible
attorney.

(See id. at 2.)

Importantly, however, “incompetence”

does not qualify as the measure of deliberateness required to state
a claim for relief under Section 1983.

See Burris v. Crosby, Civ.

Action No. 3:09-3114, 2010 WL 60906, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2010)
(“The law is well settled that negligence, in general, is not
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

As negligence is not a

constitutional violation, [the p]laintiff’s claims regarding [the
defendant]’s alleged incompetence fail to state a claim under §
1983.” (citations omitted)).
asserted

the

speedy

due

As a result, even if Plaintiff had

process

claim

against

an

individual

employee of the Court Services Bureau, that claim fails.

See id.

(dismissing section 1983 claims brought directly against a police
department employee for alleged “incompetence”).
-13-

To summarize, because a constitutional violation based upon a
defendant’s “incompetence” does not state a claim for relief under
Section 1983, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s speedy due
process claim with prejudice.
ii.

False Arrest
Turning to the false arrest claim, Plaintiff asserts that he

“was arrested and falsely accused of the possess[ion] of marijuana
with the intent to sell and drug paraphernalia,” and that he “was
finger printed and booked on these allegations.”
at 2.)

(Docket Entry 2

Plaintiff further reports that B.D. Estes arrested and

jailed him without finding drugs or paraphernalia on his person.
(Id.

at

12.)

eventually

Finally,

secured

Plaintiff

dismissal

paraphernalia charges.

of

alleges
the

that

his

marijuana

attorney
and

drug

(Id. at 2.)

To state a cognizable Section 1983 claim for false arrest,
Plaintiff must allege that law enforcement officers arrested him
without probable cause.

Pleasants v. Town of Louisa, 524 F. App’x

891, 897 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Fourth Amendment also protects
‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . .
against unreasonable . . . seizures.’

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

An

arrest is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and such a seizure
is reasonable only if based on probable cause.”); see also Wilson
v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that an
arrest qualifies as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and
-14-

requires probable cause to remain reasonable).6

“[P]robable cause

to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person,

or

one

of

reasonable

caution,

in

believing,

in

the

circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense.”

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443

U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Probable

cause requires more than bare suspicion but requires less than
evidence necessary to convict.

It is an objective standard of

probability that reasonable and prudent persons apply in everyday
life.

And when it is considered in the light of all of the

surrounding circumstances, even seemingly innocent activity may
provide a basis for finding probable cause.”

Porterfield v. Lott,

156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Barnes took part
in his arrest, observed his arrest, or even knew of his arrest.

6

It appears that a claim of false arrest could also
constitute a claim of false imprisonment. See Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (stating that “[f]alse arrest and false
imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter,”
referring “to the two torts together,” and explaining that the tort
requires “detention without legal process” and thus “ends once the
victim becomes held pursuant to such process — when, for example,
he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges”); Rogers
v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing false
arrest and false imprisonment as both “essentially claims alleging
a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
-15-

(See

Docket

Entry

2

at

1-15.)

Under

these

circumstances,

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that he “was arrested and falsely
accused of the possess[ion] of marijuana with the intent to sell
and drug paraphernalia” (Docket Entry 2 at 2) fall far short of
stating a plausible false arrest claim against Sheriff Barnes. See
Anderson v. Galvin, Civ. Action No. 0:08-744, 2008 WL 4441940, at
*4 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (“While [the p]laintiff is not required
to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary
matter in the complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim
for relief.” (citing Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.
2003)).7

7

Because Plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Barnes
assisted in his arrest or subsequent detention, to the extent the
Court could construe Plaintiff’s filings to allege a claim of
malicious prosecution, such claim similarly fails to state a claim
for relief against Sheriff Barnes. See Snider v. Seung Lee, 584
F.3d 193, 199 (4th Cir. 2009) (“While it is not entirely clear
whether the Constitution recognizes a separate constitutional right
to be free from malicious prosecution, if there is such a right,
the plaintiff must demonstrate both an unreasonable seizure and a
favorable termination of the criminal proceeding flowing from the
seizure.” (citations omitted)); see also Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390
(“[After a victim is held pursuant to legal process], unlawful
detention forms part of the damages for the entirely distinct tort
of malicious prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not
by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal
process. If there is a false arrest claim, damages for that claim
cover the time of detention up until issuance of process or
arraignment, but not more.
From that point on, any damages
recoverable must be based on a malicious prosecution claim and on
the wrongful use of judicial process rather than detention itself.”
(citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
-16-

Moreover, on the same date that Plaintiff filed this action
(see Docket Entry 2 at 1 (showing time-stamped filing date of
February 10, 2017)), he filed a separate case directly against
“Police

Officer

B.D.

Estes”

of

the

“Greensboro

City

Police

Department” for his involvement in Plaintiff’s purported false
arrest, Mobley v. Estes, No. 1:17-cv-114, Docket Entry 2 at 1-3
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2017) (reflecting time-stamped filing date of
February 10, 2017).

Importantly, in this case, Plaintiff does not

assert that Sheriff Barnes shares a connection with the Greensboro
City Police Department (see Docket Entry 2 at 1-15), but instead
asserts that Sheriff Barnes serves as the sheriff of Guilford
County (see id. at 1-2).

As alleged, Sheriff Barnes therefore had

nothing to do with Plaintiff’s arrest; rather, B.D. Estes, a police
officer that worked for a different police department (i.e., the
Greensboro City Police Department) conducted Plaintiff’s arrest.
(See id. at 12.)

That fact precludes any claim against Sheriff

Barnes for Plaintiff’s alleged false arrest. The Court should thus
dismiss Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Sheriff Barnes with
prejudice.
iii.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Bacterial Infection
Plaintiff’s allegations of a bacterial infection fare no

better.

In

that

regard,

Plaintiff

asserts

that

his

jail

“accommodation . . . was infected with a bacterial infection which
[he] became contaminated with,” that he “was given a[n] antibiotic
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cream and placed into isolation,” and that, “[s]ince coming in
contact

with

this

unknown

bacteria[,

Plaintiff’s]

exacerbated into full multiple sclerosis.”

body

has

(Docket Entry 2 at 3.)

Plaintiff further alleges that he was “jailed for months” with no
regard for his “declining” health, that his “medical situation
wasn’t handled

properly

in

jail,”

and

that

“[w]hen

[he] was

incarcerated [his] health declined even further and [he] had an
exacerbation
sclerosis.”

in

jail,

(Id. at 10.)

all

while

being

sick

with

multiple

Against this backdrop, it appears that

Plaintiff rests his “bacterial infection” claim on the allegedly
improper

medical

treatment

bacterial infection in jail.

he

received

after

contracting

the

(See id. at 2-3, 10.)8

Pretrial detainees enjoy “a constitutional right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the provision of medical care, which right
is violated when a jail or prison official acts with deliberate
indifference to ‘a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.’”
Layman v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 2d 784, 793 (W.D.N.C. 2003)

8

To the extent Plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation
for the mere presence of bacteria in the jail, because his filings
provide no factual content that would establish deliberate
indifference by anyone (see Docket Entry 2 at 1-15), such claim
fails, see Grady v. Greenfield, Civ. Action No. 5:14-CT-3005, 2016
WL 7668463, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2016) (“To make out a prima
facie case that prison conditions violate the Due Process Clause,
‘a plaintiff must show both (1) a serious deprivation of a basic
human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on
the part of prison officials.’” (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989
F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993))).
-18-

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment requires provision of necessary medical care
to prisoners)); see also Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th
Cir. 2001) (deeming Eighth Amendment’s standard for deliberate
indifference of serious medical needs of prisoners applicable to
parallel

claims

detainees).9

under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

by

pre-trial

A claim for deliberate indifference to a pretrial

detainee’s serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a plaintiff to show that “he was detained under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and that “a prison or
jail official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his

9

The United States Supreme Court has held that an objective
standard of reasonableness applies to a pretrial detainee’s claim
of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. See Kingsley, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2470, 2473.
That holding has called into question whether an objective standard
of reasonableness applies to a pretrial detainee’s claims that his
prison conditions and/or medical treatment violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d
17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (concluding “that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kingsley altered the standard for deliberate
indifference claims under the Due Process Clause,” and holding
that, in light of Kingsley, an objective standard of deliberate
indifference applies in due process cases); see also Castro v.
County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (interpreting Kingsley as standing for the proposition that
“a pretrial detainee who asserts a due process claim for failure to
protect [must] prove more than negligence but less than subjective
intent — something akin to reckless disregard”), cert. denied, No.
16–655, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 831, 832 (2017). However,
the Fourth Circuit has not applied Kingsley’s holding outside of
the excessive force context.
-19-

health or safety.”

Layman, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (citing Brown,

240 F.3d at 389).
In this case, construed liberally, Plaintiff’s filings allege
that

his

contraction

of

the

bacterial

infection

created

a

substantial risk of harm to his health (i.e., a serious medical
need).

(See Docket Entry 2 at 3.)

However, Plaintiff’s filings

provide no factual matter showing that Sheriff Barnes (or any other
person for that matter) knew of and disregarded that substantial
risk of harm.
he

received

(See id. at 1-15.)
medical

treatment

Rather, Plaintiff asserts that
in

response

to

the

bacterial

infection (Docket Entry 2 at 3 (alleging that Plaintiff “was given
a[n] antibiotic cream and placed into isolation” after he became
“contaminated” with the infection)), without even contending that
such medical treatment qualified as unreasonable (see id. at 1-15).
Moreover, even though Plaintiff’s medical condition allegedly
worsened (see Docket Entry 2 at 3 (“Since coming in contact with
this unknown bacteria [Plaintiff’s] body has exacerbated into full
multiple sclerosis.”)), that fact alone does not establish a
section 1983 deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim,
see, e.g., Layman, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 793.

Accordingly, the Court

should dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of “bacterial infection” under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim, but

-20-

without prejudice, in the event Plaintiff possesses a good-faith
basis to present additional allegations in a new action.10
10

On a final note, to the extent liability could extend to
Sheriff Barnes as the supervisor of those individuals who operate
the jail, such “supervisory liability” exists only where the
plaintiff establishes “(1) that the supervisor had actual or
constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s
response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional
injury suffered by the plaintiff.”
Randall v. Prince George’s
Cty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also id. at 203 (explaining that “supervisory
liability arises from the obligation of a supervisory law officer
to insure that his subordinates act within the law”). Here, (as
detailed above) Plaintiff has not alleged a viable Section 1983
claim for a violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore,
supervisory liability has not attached.
Moreover, even if
Plaintiff’s filings contained a properly pleaded Section 1983
claim, Plaintiff has not alleged that Sheriff Barnes possessed
actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinates engaged in
pervasive conduct (i.e., “widespread, or at least [having occurred]
on several different occasions,” id. at 206 (internal quotation
marks omitted)) that posed an unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury to people like Plaintiff. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-15.)
Importantly, “in establishing deliberate indifference . . ., a
plaintiff ordinarily cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing
to a single incident or isolated incidents for a supervisor cannot
be expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his
properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to
anticipate the misconduct.” Randall, 302 F.3d at 206 (brackets,
ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff
further fails to allege that Sheriff Barnes responded so
inadequately to any purported constitutional violations as to
demonstrate deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of
those alleged violations. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-15 (failing to
even
allege
Sheriff
Barnes’s
awareness
of
Plaintiff’s
constitutional concerns).)
As to the third element of a
supervisory liability claim, Plaintiff has not alleged that Sheriff
Barnes’s inaction caused Plaintiff’s purported constitutional
injuries.
(See id.)
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s
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CONCLUSION
Jail Defendants and the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office are
not amenable to suit under Section 1983, warranting dismissal of
all claims against them.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s filings do not

state a claim for relief against Sheriff Barnes in either his
official or individual capacity.
IT

IS

THEREFORE

ORDERED

that

Plaintiff’s

Application

to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED for the
limited purpose of considering this recommendation of dismissal.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims against the Guilford
County

Sheriff’s

Office,

Court

Services

Bureau,

Greensboro

Detention Center, Legal Process Division, and Greensboro Detention
Infirmary be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),
as those defendants are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s speedy due process
and false arrest claims against Sheriff Barnes be dismissed with
prejudice

for

failing

to

state

a

claim

under

28

U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2).

filings provide no factual matter to support a supervisory theory
of liability against Sheriff Barnes.
-22-

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s bacterial infection
claim

against

Sheriff

Barnes

be

dismissed

under

28

U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) for failing to state a claim, but without prejudice.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
April 20, 2017

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