MOBLEY v. GUILFORD COUNTY PROBATION et al
Filing
4
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 04/20/2017, that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of considering this recommendation of dismissal. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claim(s) against Guilford Co. Probation be dismissed with prejudice. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claim(s) for monetary relief against Officer Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claim(s) against Officer Defendants in their individual capacities be dismissed without prejudice. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JASON DARNELL MOBLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
GUILFORD CO. PROBATION,
et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:17cv116
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) in conjunction with his
pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2).
For the reasons that follow,
the Court will grant Plaintiff’s instant Application for the
limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
1995)
(en
banc)
(internal
“Dispensing
with
filing
fees,
quotation
however,
[is]
marks
not
omitted).
without
its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).
To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .
the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As to the first of these grounds, “a complaint, containing as
it
does
both
factual
allegations
and
legal
conclusions,
is
frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
‘frivolous’
is
inherently
elastic
and
not
“The word
susceptible
to
categorical definition. . . . The term’s capaciousness directs
lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the
frivolity of a claim.”
Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256–57 (some internal
quotation marks omitted).
In determining frivolousness, the Court
may “apply common sense.”
Nasim, 64 F.3d at 954.
As to the second ground, a plaintiff “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
when the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis
-2-
added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
“Where
a
complaint
pleads
facts
that
are
‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the
line
between
relief.”’”
possibility
and
plausibility
of
“entitlement
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
to
This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”
Id.
In other words, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.
elements of
a
cause
of
Threadbare recitals of the
action, supported
statements, do not suffice.”
by
mere
conclusory
Id.1
The third ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
generally applies to situations in which doctrines established by
the
United
States
Constitution
or
at
common
law
immunize
governments and/or government personnel from liability for damages.
1
Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
-3-
See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (discussing sovereign immunity of states and state officials
under the Eleventh Amendment); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
(describing
interrelationship
between
42
U.S.C.
§
1983
and
common-law immunity doctrines); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376,
379
(4th
Cir.
1982)
(noting
that,
even
where
“damages
are
theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some
cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to
public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
INTRODUCTION
Asserting jurisdiction pursuant to “42 U.S.C. § 1983” (Docket
Entry 2 at 1), Plaintiff initiated this action against three
defendants:
(1)
“B.
Henderson,
Probation
Officer”
(“Officer
Henderson”), (2) “R. Stone, Probation Officer” (“Officer Stone,”
and collectively with Officer Henderson, the “Officer Defendants”),
and
(3)
“Guilford
Co.
Probation”
(collectively
Defendants, the “Defendants”) (id. at 1-2).
with
Officer
The Complaint’s
statement of claim states in its entirety:
While being [i]nvalidly [i]ncarcerated and held in
captivity since October 31, 2013 and it [was] discovered
[that] there w[as] no due process in my [r]egards. On
December 6, 2013 the Guilford Co. Probation Department
issued a complaint for Felony Probation Violation dated
12-18-12 and [s]erved 1-8-13 for an offense 10-31-12
along with the [i]ncompetence of the Court Services
Bureau these Probation offense[s] were to justify this
lengthy confinement with no merit. These charges were
-4-
also dismissed on February 4, 2014 by a Superior Court
Judge in chambers.
(Id. at 2.) The Complaint further requests $10 million in punitive
damages for Plaintiff’s “Invalid Felony Probation Violation.” (Id.
at 3.)2
DISCUSSION
I.
Guilford Co. Probation
As an initial matter, Guilford Co. Probation does not qualify
as a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In that
regard, to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff
must assert “that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged
deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).3
2
Plaintiff attached a variety of documents to his Complaint.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 4-9.) The undersigned Magistrate Judge has
considered the Complaint in conjunction with each of the attached
documents for purposes of this Section 1915(e)(2) review. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Miller, Civ. Action No. 0:08-743, 2008 WL
5100845, at *1 n.2, *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2008) (construing the
plaintiff’s pro se complaint and attached documents together when
deciding whether the action failed to state a claim for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).
3
Specifically, Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
-5-
“Buildings
and
correctional
institutions,
like
sheriff’s
departments and police departments, are not usually considered
legal entities subject to suit.”
Evans v. City of Sumter, S.C.,
Civ. Action No. 3:07-2688, 2008 WL 4177225, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 3,
2008) (concluding that “the [Sumter City Police Department] is not
a ‘person’ subject to suit under § 1983”).
In other words,
Plaintiff must raise his Section 1983 claims “against a ‘person’”
capable of committing a violation of his constitutional rights.
Conley v. Ryan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 502, 519 (S.D. W. Va. 2015) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983). Because Guilford Co. Probation does not qualify
as a person amenable to suit under § 1983, the Court should dismiss
any claims against Guilford Co. Probation with prejudice.
See
Anderson v. Dauphin Cty. Adult Prob. Office, No. 1:15-CV-878, 2016
WL 769278, at *5, 10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2016) (recommending
dismissal with prejudice of complaint against county probation
office because, in part, it “is not a ‘person’ amenable to suit
under § 1983”), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 759162, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 26, 2016).
II. Officer Defendants
With respect to Officer Defendants, (1) eleventh-amendment
immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief against them
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
-6-
in their official capacities, (2) the Complaint fails to state a
claim for relief against Officer Defendants as it does not allege
that either of them violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and
(3) Plaintiff cannot utilize a Section 1983 action to challenge any
conviction or resulting term of incarceration he may have received
for his felony probation violation.
First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages from
Officer Defendants in their official capacities, eleventh-amendment
immunity bars such claims.
See Gilmore v. Bostic, 659 F. Supp. 2d
755, 763-64 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (holding that the “plaintiff’s claim
for damages against [the probation officer defendant] in her
official capacity must be dismissed on the ground that she is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity”).
The Court should thus
dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims seeking monetary relief
from Officer Defendants in their official capacities.
See, e.g.,
Lawson v. Dauphin Cty. Work Release, No. 1:15-CV-2450, 2016 WL
6090758, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2016) (recommending dismissal
with prejudice of the plaintiff’s claims against the probation
officer
defendants
Amendment
in
their
immunity grounds”),
official
capacities
recommendation
“on
adopted,
Eleventh
2016
WL
6082127, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2016); see also Gregory v.
Stephens, No. 3:14-cv-605, 2015 WL 149985, at *2-3 (W.D.N.C. Jan.
12, 2015) (holding that, “to the extent that [the defendant] is
being sued in her official capacity as an assistant district
-7-
attorney for Mecklenburg County, the Eleventh Amendment bars [the
p]laintiff’s claims for damages”).
Second, “[t]he mandated liberal construction afforded to pro
se pleadings means that if the [C]ourt can reasonably read the
pleadings to state a valid claim on which the [P]laintiff could
prevail, it should do so.”
Anderson v. Galvin, Civ. Action No.
0:08-744, 2008 WL 4441940, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (emphasis
added).
The Court must remain mindful, however, that it “may not
rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented,
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or
construct the [P]laintiff’s legal arguments for him, Small v.
Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or ‘conjure up
questions never squarely presented’ to the [C]ourt, Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).”
Anderson,
2008 WL 4441940, at *2.
In this case, the Complaint lists Officer Defendants as
parties to this action (Docket Entry 2 at 2), but it does not even
so
much
as
mention
them
in
any
of
its
sections
explaining
Plaintiff’s claims for relief (see id. at 2-3).
Further, the
Complaint’s
that
Henderson
attached
served
as
documents
the
merely
complainant
(1)
show
for
Plaintiff’s
Officer
felony
probation violation (id. at 4), and (2) assert that Plaintiff
informed Officer Stone before he “was released from prison” of the
-8-
dismissal of his state-court drug charges (id. at 8; see also id.
at 9 (“informing [Officer Stone] that [a]ll charges [were] dropped
[and that Plaintiff] would like for [Officer Stone] to come release
[him] so [that he] can get back to life and [his] respon[sibility]
as
[a]
father”)).
Thus,
even
considered
collectively,
the
Complaint and attached documents fail to establish a Section 1983
claim against Officer Defendants due to the lack of factual matter
suggesting
that
Officer
constitutional rights.
Defendants
violated
Plaintiff’s
See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S.
at 49 (requiring allegations of a “depriv[ation] of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States” to state a
Section 1983 claim); see also Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685,
691 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Section 1983 is not itself a source of
substantive rights, but rather provides a method for vindicating
federal constitutional and statutory rights.”).
Put another way, nothing in the record indicates in any way
that Officer Defendants engaged in any violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights in connection with the alleged “Invalid
Felony Probation Violation,” as remains necessary to state a
plausible Section 1983 claim.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”).
therefore
dismiss
this
action
against
The Court should
Officer
Defendants
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
-9-
for
Third, to the extent Plaintiff grounds his Section 1983 claims
in
his
conviction
for
felony
probation
violation
and/or
his
resulting term of incarceration for such conviction, such claims
fail unless Plaintiff can prove that the state court reversed,
expunged, or declared invalid his conviction.4
section
1983
plaintiff
who
seeks
to
Specifically, “[a]
recover
damages
for
an
unconstitutional conviction, imprisonment, or other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render the conviction or sentence
unlawful, must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed,
expunged, or
declared
invalid.”
Mack
v.
Fox, No.
1:07CV784, 2008 WL 4610029, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2008) (citing
Heck
v.
Humphrey,
512
U.S.
477,
487
(1994)),
recommendation
adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2009), aff’d, 328 F. App’x 257
(4th
Cir.
2009).
revocations.
Courts
routinely
apply
Heck
to
probation
See id. (citing Antonelli v. Foster, 104 F.3d 899,
901 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim
fails under Section 1915(e)(2).
Should Plaintiff elect to re-file
an action against Officer Defendants, he must remain mindful that
4
Plaintiff attached a letter to his Complaint that he wrote
to his civil attorney inquiring “how long [a] probation violation
is[] for not paying off probation [fines] and [submitting a] dirty
drug test” because, by Plaintiff’s calculation, he should have only
spent “90 days” in jail for such violation, but, as of the writing
of that letter, Plaintiff “[had] been incarcerated 98 days . . .
for [the] C.R.V. violation.” (Docket Entry 2 at 6.)
-10-
he cannot challenge a conviction for felony probation violation
through a Section 1983 action.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Guilford Co. Probation does not qualify as a “person”
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff’s claims for
money
damages
against
Officer
Defendants
in
their
official
capacities constitute claims against the State, not a “person” as
required under Section 1983, as construed in light of eleventhamendment immunity principles, Plaintiff has failed to allege a
plausible claim for relief against Officer Defendants, and Heck
precludes Plaintiff from using a Section 1983 action to challenge
a conviction for felony probation violation unless Plaintiff shows
that the conviction qualified as invalid.
IT
IS
THEREFORE
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff’s
Application
to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED for the
limited purpose of considering this recommendation of dismissal.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claim(s) against Guilford
Co. Probation be dismissed with prejudice.
IT
monetary
IS
FURTHER
relief
RECOMMENDED
against
that
Officer
Defendants
capacities be dismissed with prejudice.
-11-
Plaintiff’s
in
claim(s)
their
for
official
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claim(s) against
Officer Defendants in their individual capacities be dismissed
without prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
April 20, 2017
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