MOBLEY v. FOSTER et al
Filing
4
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 04/20/2017, that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of considering this recommendation of dismissal. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's federal claim(s) against Guilford County General Court of Justice be dismissed with prejudice. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claim(s) against Judge Foster in bo th her official and individual capacity be dismissed with prejudice. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's official capacity federal claim(s) against Trial Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's individual capacity federal claim(s) against Trial Defendants be dismissed without prejudice. RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's state-law claims be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JASON DARNELL MOBLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANGELA C. FOSTER, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:17cv117
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) in conjunction with his
pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2).
For the reasons that follow,
the Court will grant Plaintiff’s instant Application for the
limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
1995)
(en
banc)
(internal
“Dispensing
with
filing
fees,
quotation
however,
[is]
marks
not
omitted).
without
its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).
To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .
the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As to the first of these grounds, “a complaint, containing as
it
does
both
factual
allegations
and
legal
conclusions,
is
frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
‘frivolous’
is
inherently
elastic
and
not
“The word
susceptible
to
categorical definition. . . . The term’s capaciousness directs
lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the
frivolity of a claim.”
Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256–57 (some internal
quotation marks omitted).
In determining frivolousness, the Court
may “apply common sense.”
Nasim, 64 F.3d at 954.
As to the second ground, a plaintiff “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
when the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis
-2-
added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
“Where
a
complaint
pleads
facts
that
are
‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the
line
between
relief.”’”
possibility
and
plausibility
of
“entitlement
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
to
This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”
Id.
In other words, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.
elements of
a
cause
of
action, supported
statements, do not suffice.”
The
third
Threadbare recitals of the
ground
by
mere
conclusory
Id.1
for
dismissal
under
28
U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) generally applies to situations in which doctrines
established by the United States Constitution or at common law
immunize governments and/or government personnel from liability for
1
Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
-3-
damages. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing sovereign immunity of states and state
officials under the Eleventh Amendment); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967) (describing interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and common-law immunity doctrines); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d
376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that, even where “damages are
theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some
cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to
public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
INTRODUCTION
Asserting jurisdiction under “42 U.S.C. § 1983,” Plaintiff
initiated this action against eight defendants:
(1) “Amanda
Fields, Deputy County Attorney” (“Defendant Fields”), (2) “Banita
Baker, Guilford Co. Dept. of Social Services” (“Defendant Baker”),
(3)
“Donna
Wright”),
Michelle
(4)
Wright,
“Carole
Attorney
Smith,
Guardian
Advocate”
ad
Litem”
(“Defendant
(“Defendant
Smith”), (5) “Angelique Hamlet, Guardian ad Litem Supervisor”
(“Defendant
Hamlet”),
(“Defendant
Stone,”
(6)
and
“Robert
Stone,
collectively
with
Probation
Defendant
Officer”
Fields,
Defendant Baker, Defendant Wright, Defendant Smith, and Defendant
Hamlet, the “Trial Defendants”), (7) “Judge Angela C. Foster”
(“Judge Foster,” and collectively with Trial Defendants, the “State
Defendants”), and (8) “Guilford County General Court of Justice.”
-4-
(Docket Entry 2 at 1-2.)
The Complaint’s statement of claim
section states in its entirety:
Due to my [f]alse [a]rrest on Oct. 31, 2013[,] I was
unable to appear in [the] General Court of Justice before
[Judge Foster], Juvenile Session[, for] a hearing [on]
Nov. 1, 2013[, in a] matter regarding my minor daughter
R.R.S. This invalid incarceration and invalid [f]elony
[p]robation [v]iolation gave credence [sic] that
strip[ped] me of my daughter and my [p]arental [r]ights.
The Juvenile Session used all measure of false
allegations to defame and stigmatize me as an unfit
father. The Juvenile Session assumed my guilt an[d] used
it[s] merit [to] terminat[e] my Parental Right. My child
was placed in foster care and adopted out as chattel.
This disparaging action never acknowledged [that] all
charges were dismissed [on] February 4, 2014.
(Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff’s
The Complaint further requests (1) the return of
child,
(2)
that
“all
defamation
of
[Plaintiff’s]
character [be] restored,” and (3) $10 million in “[p]unitive
[d]amages
[r]ights.”
for
the
[t]ermination
of
[Plaintiff’s]
parental
(Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff attached to the Complaint an “Order on Pretrial
Hearing” (id. at 4-6 (the “Hearing Order”)) and the first page of
an “Order Terminating Parental Rights” (id. at 7 (the “Termination
Order,” and collectively with the Hearing Order, the “Orders”))
entered in his underlying state-court parental rights case.2
2
The
The Complaint’s attachments also include a National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Complaint of
Discrimination detailing alleged discrimination by the “Guilford
County Sheriff’s Department, GPD, [and the] Greensboro Court
System,” in resolving Plaintiff’s state-court drug charges and in
providing medical treatment during Plaintiff’s incarceration on
those charges.
(Docket Entry 2 at 8-9; see also id. at 10
-5-
Hearing Order indicates that the state court held a hearing on
February 11, 2014, but did not take action on the parental rights
termination petition; instead, the state court continued the case.
(See id. at 4-5.)
The Termination Order reflects that:
(1) the
Guilford County Department of Social Services moved to terminate
Plaintiff’s parental rights (id. at 7 (the “Motion to Terminate”)),
(2) Trial Defendants, as well as Plaintiff and his attorney,
appeared at an adjudicatory hearing on the Motion to Terminate
during “the May 16, 2014 Juvenile Session of the Guilford County
District Court,” at which Defendant Baker testified (id.), and (3)
the state court granted the Motion to Terminate (see id. (entitled
an
“Order
Terminating
Parental
Rights”);
accord
id.
at
2
(documenting that the juvenile session “terminat[ed] [Plaintiff’s]
[p]arental [r]ight”)).
DISCUSSION
“Section
1983
provides
a
federal
statutory
remedy
for
deprivations of rights secured by the United States Constitution
(providing
additional
allegations
for
the
Complaint
of
Discrimination).)
However, the Complaint of Discrimination
contains no allegations against Defendants in this matter. (See
id. at 8-10.) Regardless, the undersigned Magistrate Judge has
considered the Complaint in conjunction with each of the attached
documents for purposes of this Section 1915(e)(2) review. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Miller, Civ. Action No. 0:08-743, 2008 WL
5100845, at *1 n.2, *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2008) (construing the
plaintiff’s pro se complaint and attached documents together when
deciding whether the action failed to state a claim for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).
-6-
and
federal
statutes,”
Clear
Sky
Car
Wash,
LLC
v.
City
of
Chesapeake, Va., 910 F. Supp. 2d 861, 888-89 (E.D. Va. 2012)
(citing Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th
Cir. 2009)), and provides, in pertinent part, that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable[,]
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, “[t]o state a claim for relief in an
action brought under § 1983, [a litigant] must establish that [he
was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under
color of state law.”
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).
A three-year statute of limitations applies to Section 1983
claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276–80 (1985) (holding
that, in Section 1983 actions, state personal injury limitations
period controls); Brooks v. City of Winston–Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181
(4th Cir. 1996) (applying North Carolina’s three-year limitations
period for personal injuries to Section 1983 actions).
-7-
As quoted
above, the Complaint focuses on a “Juvenile Session” on November 1,
2013 (Docket Entry 2 at 2), but Plaintiff did not file the
Complaint until February 10, 2017 (id. at 1).
Thus, to the extent
Plaintiff relies on actions taken at the November 1, 2013 Juvenile
Session
to
support
his
Section
limitations bars his claims.
1983
claims,
the
statute
of
See Tommy Davis Const., Inc. v. Cape
Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807 F.3d 62, 67 (4th Cir. 2015) (observing
that Ҥ 1983 claims arising in North Carolina are limited by the
three-year period for personal injury actions set forth in [N.C.
Gen. Stat.] § 1–52(5),” and concluding that because the plaintiff
filed the action outside of this three-year period, “the federal
claim was time-barred”).
I. Guilford County General Court of Justice
Guilford County General Court of Justice operates within the
state court system.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-4 (“The General Court
of Justice constitutes a unified judicial system for purposes of
jurisdiction, operation and administration, and consists of an
appellate division, a superior court division, and a district court
division.”).
As such, it does not qualify as a “person” amenable
to suit under Section 1983.
See, e.g., Oliva v. Boyer, No.
98-1696, 163 F.3d 599 (Table), 1998 WL 637405, at *1 (4th Cir.
Sept. 11, 1998) (affirming dismissal of “the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania” because that entity “is not a person as defined by 42
U.S.C.[] § 1983”); Brown v. Lewisburg City Court, No. 1:08CV332,
-8-
2008 WL 2390745, at *3 (M.D.N.C. June 9, 2008) (recommending
dismissal of Section 1983 claim against “Lewisburg City Court”
because it does not qualify as a person under Section 1983),
recommendation
adopted,
slip
op.
(M.D.N.C.
Nov.
12,
2008).
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Guilford County General
Court of Justice thus fail in such obvious fashion as to qualify as
frivolous.
See
7:07-CV-205,
2007
Black
WL
v.
Circuit
1289911,
at
Court
*1
of
(W.D.
Wythe
Va.
Cty.,
May
1,
No.
2007)
(dismissing as frivolous Section 1983 claims against the Wythe
County Circuit Court because “[a] circuit court is not a ‘person’
subject to suit under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983”).
II. State Defendants
Turning next to Plaintiff’s claims against State Defendants,
assuming, arguendo, that those defendants qualify as state actors
subject to constitutional restraints (see Docket Entry 2 at 2, 4-7
(reflecting that State Defendants consist of a North Carolina
district
court
judge,
deputy
county
attorney,
social
worker,
attorney advocate, guardian ad litem, guardian ad litem supervisor,
and probation officer)), Plaintiff has not identified whether he
proceeds against State Defendants in their individual capacities,
official capacities, or both capacities (see id. at 1-3).
-9-
A. Official Capacity Claims
With regard to official capacity liability, the Eleventh
Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced
or prosecuted
against
one
of
the United
States
by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.”
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
The United States Supreme
Court has extended eleventh-amendment immunity to suits brought “by
citizens against their own States.”
Board of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citing cases).
result,
“absent
waiver
by
the
State
or
valid
As a
congressional
override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a
State in federal court.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169
(1985).
Importantly, eleventh-amendment immunity “remains in effect
when State
capacity,”
officials
id.,
are
because
sued
“a
for
suit
damages in
for
damages
their
against
official
a
state
official in his official capacity is actually a suit against his
office and, thus, the State,” Eller v. Kaufman, No. 2:11CV31, 2012
WL 3018295, at *8 (W.D.N.C. July 24, 2012) (citing Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).
Moreover, the
State does not qualify as a “person” within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Will, 491 U.S. at 64–66, and thus “Congress did not
exercise
its
power
to
abrogate
-10-
a
state’s
Eleventh
Amendment
immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” Coffin v. South
Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 585 (D.S.C. 1983)
(citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)); see also Will, 491
U.S. at 67 (concluding that Section 1983 was not “intended to
disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued
without its consent”).
Applying these principles to Plaintiff’s case, a suit against
State Defendants in their official capacities constitutes a suit
against North Carolina; however, because North Carolina does not
qualify as
a
“person”
under
Section 1983,
Plaintiff
may
not
maintain a Section 1983 damages claim against State Defendants in
their official capacities.
See Eller, 2012 WL 3018295, at *9
(observing that “the State is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of
Section 1983 and, therefore, [the p]laintiff may not maintain a
Section
1983
defendant]
in
claim
his
for
damages
official
against
capacity”);
[the
see
state-official-
also
Woodward
v.
Chautauqua Cty., No. 15-CV-246, 2016 WL 4491712, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
July 5, 2016) (concluding that “[n]either a state agency nor a
state officer acting in his official capacity is subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” (citing Posr v. Court Officer Shield No.
207, 180 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999))), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL
4475044, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016).
As such, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks damages against State Defendants in their official
capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his claims cannot proceed.
-11-
B. Individual Capacity Claims
i. Judge Foster
With respect to Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, the
Complaint asserts that Judge Foster presided over a “Juvenile
Session” in Plaintiff’s state-court parental rights case (Docket
Entry 2 at 2 (asserting that “[Plaintiff] was unable to appear in
General Court of Justice before Judge Angela C. Foster, Juvenile
Session”)), and the Hearing Order establishes that Judge Foster
serves as a North Carolina District Court Judge for the General
Court of Justice, District Court Division, Guilford County, North
Carolina (see id. at 4-6 (providing copy of the Hearing Order that
Judge Foster signed as “Guilford County District Court Judge
Presiding” and that she filed in the General Court of Justice,
District Court Division, Guilford County, North Carolina)).
Complaint
raises
multiple
allegations
against
Judge
adjudication of Plaintiff’s parental rights case.
The
Foster’s
(See id. at 2
(alleging that Judge Foster wrongly (1) considered Plaintiff’s
“invalid
incarceration
and
invalid
[f]elony
[p]robation
[v]iolation,” (2) used “false allegations to defame and stigmatize
[Plaintiff] as an unfit father,” (3) “assumed [Plaintiff’s] guilt”
for certain crimes and used that guilt to terminate Plaintiff’s
parental rights, and (4) failed to acknowledge that all charges
against Plaintiff “were dismissed”).)
-12-
As a consequence of these
alleged wrongdoings, the Complaint seeks the return of Plaintiff’s
child, the restoration of Plaintiff’s character, and monetary
damages.
(Id. at 3.)
“Judges performing judicial acts within their jurisdiction are
entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability claims,” In re
Mills, 287 F. App’x. 273, 279 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added),
“even if such acts were allegedly done either maliciously or
corruptly,” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1992)
(citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554).
See also Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (stating that “judicial immunity is an immunity
from
suit,
not
just
from
ultimate
assessment
of
damages”).
Judicial acts constitute those acts that are “normally performed by
a judge” and that affect parties who “dealt with the judge in h[er]
judicial capacity.”
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also King, 973 F.2d at 357 (noting that to
determine whether a judge’s action constitutes a “judicial act”
protected by judicial immunity, the Court must consider “whether
the function is one normally performed by a judge, and whether the
parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity”).
A
plaintiff can overcome the judicial immunity bar to recovery only
if the judge’s “actions were non-judicial or the actions were
judicial but were taken without jurisdiction.”
Evans v. Downey,
No. 1:15-CV-117, 2016 WL 3562102, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 24, 2016)
(citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13).
-13-
In this case, the Complaint’s allegations against Judge Foster
concern judicial actions that she took in a parental rights case
pending in the District Court Division of the North Carolina
General Court of Justice.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 2; see also id.
at 4-6 (Hearing Order).)
By statute, the North Carolina District
Court Division maintains “exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and determine any petition or motion relating to termination of
parental rights . . . .”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–1101; see also In re
D.B., 186 N.C. App. 556, 558 (2007) (“North Carolina General
Statutes
section
7B–1101
confers
on
the
District
Court
the
exclusive power to hear actions to terminate parental rights.”).
Thus, in presiding over hearings and entering orders in Plaintiff’s
parental rights case, Judge Foster properly exercised jurisdiction
over matters vested by law in the district court division.
See
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (recognizing judges’
entitlement to absolute immunity unless acting in “clear absence of
all jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Further, as each of Plaintiff’s allegations concern Judge
Foster’s judicial acts of considering evidence and entering orders
in Plaintiff’s state-court parental rights case, even if her
judicial acts denied Plaintiff due process, judicial immunity still
applies.
See Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 660 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (holding that “[j]udges are absolutely immune from suit under
section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial
-14-
acts,” even if such acts took “place ex parte and without notice or
a hearing” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly,
absolute judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s Section 1983 damages
claims against Judge Foster.
See Harry v. Lauderdale Cty., 212 F.
App’x 344, 346-47 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ Section 1983 suit against a state court judge because
judicial immunity barred liability).
With regard to Plaintiff’s request for the return of his child
and restoration of his character (see Docket Entry 2 at 3), Section
1983 states that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an
“action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken
in
such
declaratory
officer’s
decree
was
judicial
violated
unavailable,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
immunity
in
injunctive
Section
relief.”
capacity
or
.
.
.
declaratory
unless
relief
a
was
“Thus, the doctrine of judicial
1983
actions
Clay
v.
now
Osteen,
extends
No.
to
suits
1:10CV399,
2010
for
WL
4116882, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 19, 2010) (citing Roth v. King, 449
F.3d 1272, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2006)), recommendation adopted, slip op.
(M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2010); see also Lepelletier v. Tran, 633 F.
App’x 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the appellant’s
“claims seeking injunctive relief against a sitting state court
judge for actions taken in his judicial capacity . . . were barred
by the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
Judge
Foster
acted
in
her
judicial
-15-
As discussed above,
capacity
and
within
her
jurisdiction in connection with each of the alleged violations of
Plaintiff’s
constitutional
rights.
Accordingly,
the
judicial
immunity bar extends to Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief.
ii. Trial Defendants
Turning last to Trial Defendants, the Complaint utterly lacks
any factual matter that would support a Section 1983 claim against
these defendants.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 1-3.)
In fact, aside
from listing Trial Defendants as parties to this action, the
Complaint
contains
no
specific
allegations
Defendants’ conduct in the Complaint.
alone warrants their dismissal.
(See id.)
regarding
Trial
This deficiency
See Weller v. Department of Soc.
Servs. for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir. 1990)
(affirming trial court’s dismissal of two defendants for failure to
state a claim because “a careful review of the complaint reveals no
allegations against [them]”); see also id. at 391 (“The special
judicial solicitude with which a district court should view such
pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.
Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may
properly
be
addressed.”
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted));
Anderson v. Galvin, Civ. Action No. 0:08-744, 2008 WL 4441940, at
*2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (“The mandated liberal construction
afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably
read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff
-16-
could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not
rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented,
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or
construct
the
plaintiff’s
legal
arguments
for
him,
Small
v.
Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or ‘conjure up
questions never squarely presented’ to the court, Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).”).
Moreover, even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the
“Juvenile Session” involve Trial Defendants, his claims still fail.
In that regard, the Complaint asserts that “[t]he Juvenile Session
used all measure of false allegations to defame and stigmatize
[Plaintiff]
as
an
unfit
father,”
including
by
“assuming
[Plaintiff’s] guilt” regarding his “[f]alse [a]rrest,” “invalid
incarceration,” and “invalid [f]elony [p]robation [v]iolation,”
without acknowledging
dismissed.”
that
Plaintiff’s
(Docket Entry 2 at 2.)3
3
criminal
“charges were
However, the Complaint fails
The Termination Order confirms that Defendant Baker
testified at the state-court hearing on the Motion to Terminate.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 7 (providing that, “as to the adjudicatory
hearing on grounds, the [c]ourt received the sworn testimony of
[Defendant] Baker”).) To the extent Plaintiff challenges Defendant
Baker’s testimony in the adjudicatory hearing, the common-law
immunity for witnesses bars any damages claim based on that
testimony. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 328 (1983) (noting
that “all witnesses . . . are absolutely immune from civil
liability based on their testimony in judicial proceedings”); see
also Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 390 (6th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that “[a] witness is entitled to testimonial immunity
no matter how egregious or perjurious that testimony was alleged to
-17-
to connect those allegations to any specific conduct committed by
any of the Trial Defendants.
Additionally,
“Section
(See id. at 1-3.)
1983
is
not
itself
a
source
of
substantive rights, but rather provides a method for vindicating
federal
constitutional
and
statutory
rights.”
Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir. 2016).
Jones
v.
Thus, to state a
claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege a
“depriv[ation] of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.”
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 49.
Importantly, “[d]efamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under
the laws of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation.”
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991); see also Paul v.
Davis,
424
U.S.
693,
708-11
(1976)
(holding
that
injury
to
reputation by itself does not qualify as a “liberty” interest
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment); Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F.
Supp. 2d 1253, 1262 & n.3 (D. Kan. 2008) (refusing to construe
Plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant “defamed him in an
attempt to further interfere with his parental rights” as a federal
claim because “controlling case law clearly rejects any attempt to
transform a basic state law defamation claim into one arising under
the Constitution”); Watterson v. Fowler, Civ. Action No. 9:06 1064,
2006 WL 1663801, at *4 (D.S.C. June 8, 2006) (ruling that “an
have been” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
-18-
alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is
not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Brisbane v. Beaufort Cty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, Civ. Action No. 4:04-401, 2006 WL 279024 at *5 (D.S.C. Feb.
2, 2006) (“The plaintiff’s claims relating to defamation and
slander are subject to summary dismissal because defamation of
character or of reputation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”).
Under these circumstances, the Complaint’s shotgun-style,
conclusory allegations do not “allow the [C]ourt to draw the
reasonable inference” that Trial Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also id. at 679
(“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
Therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible Section 1983 claim
against Trial Defendants.
As such, the Court should dismiss the
Complaint against Trial Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),
but without prejudice to the presentment of claims supported by
appropriate factual allegations as to particular defendants.
C. State-Law Claims
As a final matter, given the dismissal of the Complaint’s
federal claims (i.e., the Section 1983 claim(s)), the Court should
also dismiss any related state-law claims (e.g., defamation).
Federal courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
-19-
arising under the Constitution[ and] laws . . . of the United
States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1331.4
“[I]n any civil action of which the
[federal] courts have original jurisdiction, the [federal] courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so
related
to
claims
in
the
action
within
such
original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.”
§ 1367(a).
28 U.S.C.
Nevertheless, a federal court “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if it dismisses “all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s federal claims (i.e.,
those claims arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States) warrant dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
thus
may
appropriately
decline
4
to
exercise
The Court
supplemental
Federal courts also maintain “original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
. . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Under
Section 1332(a), original “jurisdiction does not exist unless each
defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.”
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)
(emphasis in original). In this case, the Complaint asserts that
Plaintiff and at least one defendant qualify as citizens of North
Carolina (Docket Entry 2 at 1; see also Docket Entry 3 at 1
(asserting that Judge Foster also resides in North Carolina)), thus
precluding original jurisdiction over this action under Section
1332(a).
Moreover, the Complaint does not purport to invoke
diversity jurisdiction.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 1 (asserting
jurisdiction under “42 U.S.C. § 1983”).)
Accordingly, federal
question jurisdiction provides the only source of the Court’s
original jurisdiction over this matter.
-20-
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
See Shanaghan v.
Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “a [federal] court has discretion to
dismiss or keep a case when it ‘has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction,’” and that “[t]here are no situations
wherein a federal court must retain jurisdiction over a state law
claim, which would not by itself support jurisdiction” (emphasis in
original)).
CONCLUSION
In sum, Guilford County General Court of Justice does not
qualify
as
Plaintiff’s
a
“person”
official
amenable
capacity
to
suit
claims
under
against
Section
State
1983,
Defendants
cannot proceed in light of the restriction of Section 1983 to
actions against “persons,” as informed by the doctrine of eleventhamendment immunity, absolute judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s
individual capacity claims against Judge Foster, the Complaint
fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Trial Defendants in
their individual capacity, and the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
IT
IS
THEREFORE
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff’s
Application
to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED for the
limited purpose of considering this recommendation of dismissal.
-21-
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s federal claim(s) against
Guilford
County
General
Court
of
Justice
be
dismissed
with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claim(s) against
Judge Foster in both her official and individual capacity be
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s official capacity
federal
claim(s)
against
Trial
Defendants
be
dismissed
with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s individual capacity
federal claim(s) against Trial Defendants be dismissed without
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s state-law claims be
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
April 20, 2017
-22-
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