WELTON v. DURHAM COUNTY et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE CATHERINE C. EAGLES on 08/28/2017, that the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Wendell Davis in his individual capacity, Doc. 11 , is GRANTED. The motion to dismiss filed by the remaining defendants and Mr. Davis in his official capacity, Doc. 13 , is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: a. The motion is DENIED as to the Title VII retaliation claim against Durham County; b. The motion is otherwise GRANTED. c. All claims against the individual defendants and the Board of County Commissioners are DISMISSED. d. All claims against Durham County are DISMISSED except for the Title VII retaliation claim, which may proceed.(Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MARQUETA WELTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DURHAM COUNTY, DURHAM
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMISSIONERS, WENDELL
DAVIS, in his individual and official
capacity, and KATHY EVERETTPERRY, in her individual and official
capacity,
Defendants.
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1:17-CV-258
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge.
Marqueta Welton was employed for over ten years by Durham County, first as the
Director of Human Resources, then as Deputy County Manager, and finally as an
Economic Development Officer. She alleges that after a new County Manager was hired,
she was treated badly, demoted, and exposed to a work environment so hostile that she
left her job. She asserts claims against the defendants under § 1983, Title VII, and North
Carolina law. Except for her Title VII retaliation claim, the complaint fails to allege
sufficient facts to support the asserted federal causes of action, and her state claims are
barred by governmental and public official immunity. The Court will therefore grant the
motions to dismiss as to all claims except the Title VII retaliation claim against Durham
County.
I.
Facts Alleged in the Complaint
In 2013, Ms. Welton and defendant Wendell Davis were both finalists for the
position of Durham County Manager. Doc. 1 at ¶ 12. Mr. Davis asked Ms. Welton to
withdraw her application. Id. at ¶ 13. Ultimately, Ms. Welton withdrew and continued to
work for Durham County as one of two deputy managers. See id. at ¶¶ 8, 13, 81.
After Mr. Davis became the County Manager in April 2014, he treated Ms. Welton
with hostility, cancelled meetings with her for no reason, and made unsubstantiated
claims that she was not doing her job well. Id. at ¶¶ 14-20, 27-30. That summer, Mr.
Davis suspended her for five days without pay. Id. at ¶ 20. After she filed several
internal appeals, Mr. Davis rescinded the suspension but left in place a corrective action
plan. Id. at ¶¶ 21-26.
On February 1, 2016, Mr. Davis hired Jodi Miller, a white woman, as the other
deputy manager. Id. at ¶ 32. Soon after, he made Ms. Miller the Acting County Manager
while he was out of town, even though Ms. Welton was more experienced. Id.
On February 25, 2016, Mr. Davis notified Ms. Welton that he intended to
reorganize the county manager’s office. Id. at ¶ 33. Instead of two deputy managers,
there would be five general managers who were subject matter experts. Id. at ¶¶ 44-45.
Ms. Welton would not be a general manager under this plan, but would be demoted to the
new position of Economic Development Officer at significantly less pay. See id. at ¶ 37.
On March 10, 2016, Ms. Welton filed a grievance of her expected demotion and
pay reduction, which Mr. Davis denied. Id. at ¶ 44-45. On April 1, 2016, Ms. Welton
2
filed a new grievance with human resources and the Durham County Board of County
Commissioners. Id. at ¶ 58.
In April, Mr. Davis publicly announced and then implemented his reorganization
plan for the county manager’s office. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 40. Ms. Welton was demoted to
Economic Development Officer effective April 25. Id. at ¶ 37. With the assistance of the
Human Resources director, defendant Kathy Everett-Perry, Mr. Davis reduced Ms.
Welton’s salary almost fifty percent. Id. He also moved her office to another building
and blocked her access to the county administration offices. Id. at ¶ 41. Her new
building’s primary functions included probation services and drug testing, which created
circumstances not conducive to her economic development work. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 49. Ms.
Welton had little assistance or guidance in her new position and she did not receive her
June 2016 performance review or potential merit increase. Id. at ¶¶ 50-52.
Ms. Welton filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
complaint alleging race, sex, and age discrimination and retaliation on July 14, 2016.
Doc. 14-3; see Doc. 1. at ¶ 60. On September 1, 2016, Ms. Welton received a new
project from her supervisor, general manager Jay Gibson. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 48, 52. The
project had short deadlines and required specialized engineering skills outside her
expertise and job description. Id. at ¶¶ 52-56. After informing Mr. Gibson that she did
not feel “comfortable taking the lead,” Mr. Gibson replied that while “others can offer
input,” he expected her to “lead and manage” the project. Id. at ¶¶ 55-56. Ms. Welton
developed stress and anxiety from these working conditions and took leave under the
3
Family Medical Leave Act at the end of September 2016. Id. at ¶ 57. She ultimately
resigned. Id. at p. 2.
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Ms. Welton sued Durham
County, the Durham County Board of County Commissioners, Mr. Davis in his
individual and official capacities, and Ms. Everett-Perry in her individual and official
capacities. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 60. She asserts claims under § 1983, Title VII, and North
Carolina law. The defendants move to dismiss all claims against them. Docs. 11, 13.1
I.
First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Ms. Welton asserts that the defendants retaliated against her for (1) “competing
against Davis for the position of county manager,” and (2) “for seeking redress of her
grievances.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 62. Neither of these qualifies as speech on “a matter of public
concern.” Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 351 (4th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). Ms. Welton’s application to be County Manager and her
withdrawal from that application process constituted “a general course of conduct, not the
expression of any idea or opinion” sufficient to state a claim of First Amendment
retaliation. Dennison v Cty. of Frederick, 921 F.2d 50, 54 (4th Cir. 1990).2 Likewise, “a
public employee’s expression of grievances concerning [her] own employment is not a
1
Mr. Davis moves to dismiss all claims against him in his individual capacity. Doc. 11
(asserting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6)). The remaining defendants, including Mr. Davis in
his official capacity, likewise move to dismiss all claims against them. Doc. 13 (same).
2
Cf. Loftus v. Bobzien, 848 F.3d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting the Fourth Circuit has not
recognized a First Amendment right to hold elected office); Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 853
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding that while political belief, expression and affiliation, partisan political
activity and expression of opinion may be protected under the First Amendment, there is no
fundamental right to candidacy).
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matter of public concern.” Huang v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134,
1140 (4th Cir. 1990). The Court will dismiss Ms. Welton’s First Amendment retaliation
claim for failure to state a claim.
II.
§ 1983 Claims: Fourteenth Amendment
a. Liberty
Without public communication, negative statements about a plaintiff do not impair
the due process liberty interest in her “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.”
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (quotation omitted); Sciolino v. City of
Newport News, 480 F.3d 642, 646-47 (4th Cir. 2007) (requiring stigmatizing statements
to be “made public by the employer”). Ms. Welton asserts that the defendants
“stigmatized [her] as incapable of handling the rigorous duties of a deputy county
manager or county manager,” Doc. 1 at ¶ 68, but she has not alleged any specific
statements made by any defendant to that effect, nor has she alleged that any such
stigmatizing reasons for her demotion were made public. Her complaint does not state a
claim for deprivation of a liberty interest.
b. Property
“Under North Carolina law, an employee has a protected ‘property’ interest in
continued employment only if the employee can show a legitimate claim to continued
employment under a contract, a state statute, or a local ordinance.” Peace v. Emp’t Sec.
Comm’n of N.C., 349 N.C. 315, 321, 507 S.E.2d 272, 277 (1998). Durham County
ordinances establish that county employees are at-will employees and do not have “any
property rights in employment.” Durham Cty. Code of Ordinances § 18-84; see Jenkins
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v. Weatherholtz, 909 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding Virginia law precluded
property interest in continued employment); Hooper v. North Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d
804, 816 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (finding North Carolina law precludes the same).
Ms. Welton asserts that she had “an expectancy . . . of continuing employment”
based on the compensation policy, personnel policies, and the County’s disciplinary
process. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 74-75; see e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972)
(finding mutual understanding of continued employment creating a protectable property
interest may be based on “rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state
officials”). However, she has not alleged any facts tending to show or from which one
could plausibly infer that these policies were incorporated into her employment contract
or into state or local law. See Pittman v. Wilson Cty., 839 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1988)
(finding at-will employee had no property interest in continued employment based on a
personnel resolution that lacked the formal process for a county ordinance); Johnson v.
Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 4:16-CV-214-D, 2017 WL 2304211, at *9, 13 (E.D.N.C. May
25, 2017) (dismissing claim because personnel manuals and policies were not part of
plaintiff’s employment contract and did not create a mutual understanding of continued
employment). Ms. Welton’s complaint does not state a claim for deprivation of a
property interest.
III.
Title VII Claims
a. Claims Against Non-Employers
Title VII provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her]
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race [or] sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII authorizes claims
against an employer, but not against non-employers or supervisors. See Lissau v. S. Food
Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Mann v. Winston Salem State Univ., No.
1:14CV1054, 2015 WL 5336146, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2015). Ms. Welton alleges
that she was employed by Durham County. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 81, 88. To the extent Ms.
Welton seeks to assert Title VII claims against any other defendants, those claims must
be dismissed.
b. Statute of Limitations
Under Title VII, a timely charge must be filed with EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Howell v. N.C. Cent. Univ., No.
1:16CV576, 2017 WL 2861133, at *10-11 (M.D.N.C. July 5, 2017). Each allegedly
unlawful practice must separately satisfy the 180-day test. Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,
370 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 113 (2002)). Here, the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on July 14, 2016. Doc.
14-3. Any claims of discrimination or retaliation that occurred before January 16, 2016,
are time-barred and will be dismissed.
c. Discrimination Claim
i. Race and Sex
A Title VII discrimination claim must be dismissed unless it “include[s] adequate
factual allegations to support a claim that the [employer] discriminated against [the
plaintiff] because she was African American or female.” McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t
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of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1162 (2016). “Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory
job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from
similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Court of
Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). Ms. Welton offers insufficient factual
allegations to make her discrimination claims plausible.
She offers no facts tending to indicate directly that race or gender affected her
demotion or other adverse employment action, nor does she allege facts from which one
could reasonable infer such discrimination. See Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 248 (4th
Cir. 2017) (repeating well-established rule that at motion to dismiss stage, the court
should draw all reasonable factual inferences from the alleged facts in the plaintiff’s
favor). She alleges no facts tending to indicate that race or gender affected hiring or
salary decisions for her or any other employees. She does not state the age, gender, or
race of the relevant decision-makers. Nor does she allege sufficient facts to indicate a
prima facie claim is plausible. Ms. Welton alleges that Ms. Miller, the other deputy
manager who did become a general manager, was “a white female with less experience,”
Doc. 1 at ¶ 83(d), but she does not mention the four other comparators hired as general
managers, much less their race or gender.3 While she alleges that she was qualified to be
Indeed, the complaint is even silent as to Ms. Welton’s race. See Doc. 1. As she does
mention that some other employees were white, Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 19, 20, the Court assumes Ms.
Welton is not white.
3
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a general manager, see id. at ¶ 46, she is silent as to how her qualifications for any of the
general manager positions compared to the persons actually hired.4
It is not enough to make conclusory allegations that employment action was taken
based on race or gender. See Martin, 858 F.3d at 248; Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190-191.
While a complaint does not have to set forth detailed facts to support every single
element of a cause of action, it must allege some facts tending to plausibly support the
claim. See McKissick-Melton v. N.C. Cent. Univ., No. 1:16-CV-605, 2016 WL 6806234,
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2016). Here, the complaint contains virtually no factual
allegations tending to indicate that Ms. Welton and the new general managers were
similarly situated or that race or gender was the reason for her demotion. Therefore, the
Court will dismiss her claims of race and gender discrimination. See McCleary-Evans,
780 F.3d at 588.
ii. Hostile Work Environment
In passing, Ms. Welton asserts that the County created a hostile work environment
in violation of Title VII. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 83(f), 88. To establish a claim of hostile work
Ms. Welton does allege that “[s]imilarly situated individuals not of her race, gender or age
were allowed to attend various conferences, while [she] was continually denied permission to
attend” the National Association of Counties conference. Doc. 1 at ¶ 28. However, this conduct
appears to have occurred in 2014 and 2015, id., and is time-barred. In any event, refusal to allow
an employee to attend a conference is not an adverse employment action sufficient to support a
disparate treatment claim. See James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376-77 (4th
Cir. 2004) (holding that exclusion from a conference that a similarly situated white male was
permitted to attend did not affect terms of employment).
Ms. Welton also alleges that Ms. Miller was made Acting County Manager for a short time
while the County Manager was out of the office. Doc. 1 at ¶ 32. However, she does not allege
any financial or other consequences from the decision, nor has she provided any support for the
view that this constituted an adverse employment action.
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environment, a plaintiff must show that she experienced harassment that was (1)
unwelcome; (2) based on her protected status; (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) imputable to the
employer. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir.
2010). Ms. Welton includes no factual allegations in the complaint that any offensive
touching occurred, that any offensive language was used in her presence, or that she was
intimidated, ridiculed, or insulted, see Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp, 786 F.3d
264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015), nor has she alleged facts which plausibly support a claim that
any harassment was based on her protected status of race or gender. See supra at 9.
Therefore, this claim also fails. See Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d
761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
iii. Age
Ms. Welton also asserts an age discrimination claim.5 Doc. 1 at ¶ 84. However,
she mentions age only in passing and does not identify her own age, the age of the
individual defendants, or the age of any of the general managers. She has not alleged a
prima facie case of discrimination based on age, see Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801802 (4th Cir. 1998), or other facts tending to indicate that any employment decision was
5
Ms. Welton mentions age discrimination in a section of her complaint asserting a claim
under Title VII. Doc. 1 at ¶ 84. However, age discrimination claims arise under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), not Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 623; see Zombro
v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The conclusion is irresistible
that the ADEA provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of age discrimination.”). The
Court construes her allegations as an attempt to state an ADEA claim.
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based on her age. In the absence of facts giving rise to a plausible assertion of age
discrimination, the Court will dismiss this claim.
d. Retaliation
Title VII prohibits an employer from “retaliating against an employee for
complaining about prior discrimination.” Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243,
249 (4th Cir. 2015). A plaintiff may prove retaliation “either through direct and indirect
evidence of retaliatory animus, or through the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas.” Id. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, “a plaintiff must prove (1) that she engaged in a protected activity,
as well as (2) that her employer took an adverse employment action against her, and (3)
that there was a causal link between the two events.” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 281
(quotations omitted).
As to this third element, “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to
traditional principles of but-for causation,” meaning evidence “that the unlawful
retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or
actions of the employer” is required. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517, 2533 (2013). “Temporal proximity” between the protected activity and retaliatory
act provides some evidence of causation. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,
273 (2001).6 If that is the only evidence of causation, then the temporal proximity must
6
See also Waag v. Sotera Def. Sols., Inc., 857 F.3d 179, 192 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that in
medical leave context under McDonnell Douglas framework, “close temporal proximity between
activity protected by the statute and an adverse employment action may suffice to demonstrate
causation”).
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be “very close.” Id.; see also Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650-51 (4th Cir.
2007) (finding other evidence of retaliatory conduct in seven months between
discrimination complaint and firing was sufficient to prove causation); King v. Rumsfeld,
328 F.3d 145, 151 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding period of ten weeks “weaken[ed]
significantly the inference of causation,” but that with other evidence, it was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case).
Ms. Welton alleges that she participated in protected activity by filing an EEOC
charge dated July 2016. See Doc. 14-3; Doc. 1 at ¶ 60. Drawing all inferences in her
favor, she also engaged in protected activity by submitting a grievance asserting racial
discrimination in March or April 2016.7 See Doc. 1 at ¶ 83(e); DeMasters v. Carilion
Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 417 (4th Cir. 2015). Nothing in the complaint indicates that she
engaged in protected activity before then.
Ms. Welton appears to assert that every action taken by Mr. Davis after his hiring
in 2014 was retaliatory, including his announcement in February 2016 that she would not
be one of the new general managers, but would be demoted. See Doc. 1 at p. 2, ¶¶ 33, 89.
However, the announcement of her demotion and any actions in 2014 occurred before
Ms. Welton submitted either the grievances or the EEOC complaint. Her protected
In her complaint, she characterizes her grievance as a “grievance of racial discrimination.”
Doc. 1 at ¶ 83(e). She does not state anywhere else that she complained of discrimination in the
grievance, and it is not clear from her complaint whether this was the alleged March grievance or
the alleged April grievance. However, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
Court is to draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Martin, 858 F.3d at 248; but see Doc. 181 (document submitted by the plaintiff with briefing which appears to be the April 1, 2016,
grievance submitted to Ms. Everett-Perry asserting age, gender, and race discrimination).
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activities in March or April and July could not have caused adverse actions in February.
See Morrall v. Gates, 370 F. App’x 396, 398 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2010).
Ms. Welton also alleges that several retaliatory actions occurred shortly after her
protected activities. Her office was relocated to unsatisfactory space and she was isolated
from the county administration in the weeks following her April grievance, and she did
not receive her June performance review. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 41, 51. Likewise, within
seven weeks of her EEOC complaint,8 her superiors gave her primary responsibility for a
project requiring engineering skills that she did not have, refused to provide her with
meaningful assistance or support, and set her up to fail in her new position as Economic
Development Officer. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 52-56, 87.
These allegedly retaliatory actions are sufficiently close in time to Ms. Welton’s
protected activity to plausibly allege causation. See O’Neal v. Harrison, No. 5:14-CV198-FL, 2015 WL 1084321, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2015) (finding plaintiff stated a
claim when “approximately six weeks elapsed between the protected activity . . . and the
last retaliatory action”); Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cty., No. TDC-14-0821, 2015
WL 996752, at *16 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2015) (finding plaintiff stated a claim when “just
over one month” passed between her complaint and removal). The Court will deny the
motion to dismiss this claim as against Durham County.
8
Ms. Welton has not alleged that any of the decision-makers knew about the EEOC
complaint. Construing the complaint liberally, at this stage of the litigation that is a plausible
inference from the other allegations of the complaint.
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IV.
State Law Claims9
The state law claims against Mr. Davis and Ms. Everett-Perry in their individual
capacities must be dismissed because North Carolina law entitles them to public official
immunity. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 656–57 (4th Cir. 2012); Paschal v.
Myers, 129 N.C. App. 23, 30, 497 S.E.2d 311, 316 (1998). Ms. Welton has not alleged
any facts to “pierce the cloak of official immunity,” such as actions by Mr. Davis or Ms.
Everett-Perry that were “malicious, corrupt or outside of the scope of official duties.”
Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 42, 476 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1996). Absent clear
allegations to the contrary, “it will always be presumed that public officials will discharge
their duties in good faith[.]” Leete v. Cty. of Warren, 341 N.C. 116, 119, 462 S.E.2d 476,
478 (1995) (quotation omitted).
Ms. Welton’s state law tort claims against Durham County, the Board, and Mr.
Davis and Ms. Everett-Perry in their official capacities are barred by governmental
immunity. Local government entities are immune from claims “for torts committed by
officers or employees while performing a governmental function.” Reid v. Town of
Madison, 137 N.C. App. 168, 170, 527 S.E.2d 87, 89 (2000); see also Estate of Williams
ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cty. Parks & Rec. Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 198, 732 S.E.2d
137, 140 (2012). “[I]n a suit against a public employee in his official capacity, the law
entitles the employee to the same protection as that of the entity.” Reid, 137 N.C. App. at
9
Ms. Welton alleged claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, and infliction
of emotional distress against the defendants. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 92-108. In the alternative, the Court
concludes that she has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
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171, 527 S.E.2d at 89. Ms. Welton has alleged no facts to plausibly support a claim that
Durham County has waived its governmental immunity.
V.
Conclusion
Ms. Welton has not alleged any speech on her part which would give rise to a First
Amendment retaliation claim. Her claims of discrimination based on race, gender, and
age are conclusory, as are her due process claims. Her state law claims are barred by
public official and governmental immunity. Therefore, the Court will grant the
defendants’ motions to dismiss in substantial part.
Drawing all reasonable factual inferences from the specific facts alleged, Ms.
Welton’s complaint asserts that her employer, Durham County, took several specific
negative actions against her soon after she complained of racial discrimination in March
or April 2016 and again after she filed an EEOC charge in July 2016. Consequently, the
Court will deny the motion as to her Title VII retaliation claim against Durham County.
It is ORDERED that:
1. The motion to dismiss filed by defendant Wendell Davis in his individual
capacity, Doc. 11, is GRANTED.
2. The motion to dismiss filed by the remaining defendants and Mr. Davis in his
official capacity, Doc. 13, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as
follows:
a. The motion is DENIED as to the Title VII retaliation claim against
Durham County;
b. The motion is otherwise GRANTED.
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c. All claims against the individual defendants and the Board of County
Commissioners are DISMISSED.
d. All claims against Durham County are DISMISSED except for the
Title VII retaliation claim, which may proceed.
This the 28th day of August, 2017.
__________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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