DOE v. NORTH STATE AVIATION, LLC

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 05/09/2017, that Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Under Fictitious Name (Docket Entry 3 ) is DENIED. FURTHER that on or before May 30, 2017, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint complying with Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure by Plaintiff to comply with this Order will result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice. (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JOHN DOE, individually and
on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTH STATE AVIATION, LLC,
Defendant.

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1:17cv346

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on “Plaintiff’s Motion to
Proceed Under Fictitious Name.”

(Docket Entry 3 (the “Motion”).)

For the following reasons, the Court will deny the Motion.
BACKGROUND
This

action

involves

alleged

violations

of

the

Worker

Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2101 et seq., arising out of Plaintiff’s recent termination from
Defendant’s employment.

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 1, ¶ 1.)

The

Motion asserts that “Plaintiff is actively seeking reemployment in
the niche aviation market,” and requests an order barring public
disclosure

of

Plaintiff’s

identity

due

to

“fears”

that

such

disclosure “will adversely impact his ability to find a replacement
job and provide for his family.”

(Docket Entry 3 at 1-2; see

also id. at 3 (“Plaintiff’s need to preserve his privacy is crucial
to his ability to find new employment. . . . This case will likely

attract significant media attention – as Defendant’s decision to
lay off its employees did – and disclosure of Plaintiff’s name will
adversely impact his ability to find employment in a niche field in
a

tightknit

community

like Winston-Salem.”

(internal footnote

omitted)).)1
DISCUSSION
Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”)
provides that “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the
parties.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).

“The . . . intention of [Rule

10] is to apprise the parties of their opponents and to protect the
public’s legitimate interest in knowing all the facts and events
surrounding court proceedings.

Generally, lawsuits are public

events and the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the
pertinent facts.

Among the pertinent facts is the identity of the

parties.” Free Mkt. Comp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311,
312 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (“It is axiomatic that lawsuits are public events
and that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the facts
involved, including the identities of the parties.”).
Under certain special circumstances, however, the Court may
authorize a plaintiff to proceed under a fictitious name.
1

Free

“Plaintiff has no objection to providing his name to
Defendant provided the Court enters a protective order barring the
dissemination of his name and requiring any documents containing
Plaintiff’s true name be filed under seal.” (Docket Entry 3 at 2.)
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Mkt. Comp., 98 F.R.D. at 312.

“Pseudonymous litigation is for the

unusual or critical case, and it is the litigant seeking to proceed
under pseudonym that bears the burden to demonstrate a legitimate
basis for proceeding in that manner.”
F.R.D. 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2005).

Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228

“[F]ederal courts operate openly by

default” and a “defendant facing a pseudonymous plaintiff need not
come forward with reasons why this default procedure should be
followed.”

Id.

“The decision whether to allow the use of fictitious names
based on a need for anonymity in a particular lawsuit is left to
the discretion of the trial court.”
640, 642 (S.D. Miss. 1987).

Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D.

“The decision requires a balancing of

considerations calling for maintenance of a party’s privacy against
the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness
in judicial proceedings.”
Cir. 1981).

Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit has recognized certain factors as relevant to anonymity
requests:
whether the justification asserted by the requesting
party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that
may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a
matter of sensitive and highly personal nature; whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or
mental harm to the requesting party or even more
critically, to innocent non-parties; the ages of the
persons whose privacy interests are sought to be
protected; whether the action is against a governmental
or private party; and, relatedly, the risk of unfairness
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to the opposing party from allowing an action against it
to proceed anonymously.
James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) (the “James
Factors”).
In this case, the Motion addresses only two of the James
Factors.

First, Plaintiff contends that “[he] has a legitimate

fear that public disclosure could adversely impact his ability to
find replacement employment,” and thus, that the Motion “is not
merely seeking to avoid the ‘annoyance and criticism that may
attend any litigation.’” (Docket Entry 3 at 3 (quoting James, 6
F.3d at 238).)

Notably, however, Plaintiff has not shown that

disclosing his identity would require him to reveal information of
a

sensitive

and

highly

personal

nature.

(See

id.

at

1-4.)

Moreover, fear of negative treatment from “prospective future
employers”

does

anonymously.

not

justify

allowing

a

plaintiff

to

proceed

See Southern Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women Law

Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting

argument

that

disclosure

of

certain

plaintiffs’

“identities will leave them vulnerable to retaliation” from current
and future employers and an organized local bar because those
plaintiffs “face no greater threat of retaliation than the typical
plaintiff alleging Title VII violations, including the other women
who, under their real names and not anonymously, have filed sex
discrimination suits against large law firms”); see also id. at
-4-

712-13 (emphasizing that courts allowing plaintiffs to proceed
anonymously due to disclosure of personal information all involved
“information of the utmost intimacy,” such as “birth control,
abortion, homosexuality, or the welfare rights of illegitimate
children or abandoned families,” and that, in many of those cases,
the plaintiffs “also had to admit that they either had violated
state laws

or

government

regulations

or

wished

to

engage

in

prohibited conduct” (internal footnotes omitted)); Free Mkt. Comp.,
98 F.R.D. at 312-13 (denying anonymity request where the plaintiff
argued that disclosing his identity would “cause him to ‘lose his
job

and

suffer

embarrassment

extreme

and

economic

humiliation

and
his

in

social

harm

as

professional

well

and

as

social

community’” because those concerns do not “implicate a recognized
privacy interest involving ‘matters of a sensitive and highly
personal nature’” and the plaintiff’s “desire to avoid professional
embarrassment and economic loss is insufficient to permit him to
appear without disclosing his identity”).
Second,

Plaintiff

contends

that

“there

are

no

risks

of

unfairness if [he] proceeds under a fictitious name because this
case pertains solely to whether Defendant’s conduct violates the
WARN Act,” and that his individual actions “simply have no bearing
on that determination as Defendant’s conduct was uniformly directed
to all 345 employees affected by its layoff.”
3-4.)

Plaintiff’s

contention

in

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this

(Docket Entry 3 at

regard

overlooks

that

“[b]asic

fairness

dictates”

the

disclosure

of

a

plaintiff’s

identity when he accuses a defendant “of serious violations of
federal law.”

Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d at 713 (highlighting the

fact that “the mere filing of a civil action against . . . private
parties may cause damage to their good names and reputation and may
also

result

in

economic

harm,”

and

that

therefore,

fairness

generally requires disclosure of the accusers’ names); see also
Qualls, 228 F.R.D. at 13 (“[W]hen courts require litigants to use
real names, they encourage suits by the most zealous, passionate,
and sincere

litigants,

those

who

are willing

to

place

their

personal and public stamp of approval upon their causes of action.
While a few valid causes of action, by plaintiffs’ own choices and
calculations, may stay out of court, but [sic] so will many more
frivolous and less heartfelt causes, which is in the interest of
both the public and the courts.”).

In any event, given that this

action does not involve Plaintiff’s (or any other class member’s)
individual conduct, Plaintiff’s pursuit of this case provides
little, if any, reason for potential future employers to treat him
negatively.

That finding further undermines Plaintiff’s request

for anonymity.
With respect to the remaining James Factors, Plaintiff does
not contend that revealing his identification will pose a risk of
retaliatory physical or mental harm to himself or to innocent
non-parties.

(See Docket Entry 3 at 1-4.)
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Likewise, Plaintiff

neither asserts that his age favors anonymity (see id.), nor
proceeds against a governmental party (see Docket Entry 1, ¶ 5
(describing Defendant as private limited liability company)).

The

absence of such considerations weighs against Plaintiff’s request
for anonymity.

See generally Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 40-41

(W.D. Va. 2016) (deeming retaliatory harm factor as favoring the
plaintiff where case involved sexual misconduct allegations that
could spark reprisal and could reveal information about non-party
and

concluding

that

age

factor

favored

anonymity

where

the

plaintiff was young); Doe v. Pittsylvania Cty., Va., 844 F. Supp.
2d 724, 730 (W.D. Va. 2012) (observing that courts are generally
“less likely to grant a plaintiff permission to proceed anonymously
when the plaintiff sues a private individual than when the action
is against a governmental entity” because, unlike private parties,
the government incurs no harm to its reputation or risk of economic
loss when sued (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
On balance, Plaintiff has not shown that the James Factors
warrant sealing his identity from the public record in this case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed
Under Fictitious Name (Docket Entry 3) is DENIED.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

on

or

before

May

30,

2017,

Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint complying with Rule 10 of

-7-

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Failure by Plaintiff to

comply with this Order will result in the dismissal of this case
without prejudice.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
May 9, 2017

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