CRABTREE V. BERRYHILL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 04/13/2018, that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 10 ) be denied, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 13 ) be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.(Taylor, Abby)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Gail Crabtree, brought this action pursuant to the
Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social
(Docket Entry 1.)
Defendant has filed the
certified administrative record (Docket Entry 7 (cited herein as
“Tr. __”)), and both parties have moved for judgment (Docket
Entries 10, 13; see also Docket Entry 11 (Plaintiff’s Memorandum);
Docket Entry 14 (Defendant’s Memorandum)).
For the reasons that
follow, the Court should enter judgment for Defendant.
Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging an onset date of January
1, 2011. (Tr. 199-200.) Upon denial of that application initially
(Tr. 77-90, 113-16) and on reconsideration (Tr. 91-105, 117-24),
Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law
vocational expert (“VE”) attended the hearing.
ALJ subsequently ruled that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled
under the Act. (Tr. 17-29.) The Appeals Council thereafter denied
Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-6, 14-16, 282-87), making the
ALJ’s ruling the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
[Plaintiff] last met the insured status requirements
of the . . . Act on December 31, 2014.
[Plaintiff] did not engage in substantial gainful
activity from her alleged onset date of January 1, 2011
through her date last insured of December 31, 2014.
. . .
Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] had the
following severe impairments: status post subtotal
colectomy and fistula repair, with residual effects of
urgency and incontinence; mood disorder; and anxiety
. . .
Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff] did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
. . . [T]hrough the date last insured, [Plaintiff]
had the residual functional capacity to perform medium
work . . . except limited to occasional climbing of
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no operation of a motor
vehicle at night; and only occasional exposure to extreme
heat. [Plaintiff] is mentally limited to simple, routine,
and repetitive tasks.
. . .
Through the date last insured, [Plaintiff]
unable to perform any past relevant work.
. . .
[Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that [she] could have performed.
. . .
11. [Plaintiff] was not under a disability, as defined
in the . . . Act, at any time from January 1, 2011, the
alleged onset date, through December 31, 2014, the date
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.”
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006).
However, “the scope
of [the Court’s] review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely
Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff has not established entitlement to relief under the
extremely limited review standard.
Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).
the Court “must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ if they are
application of the correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Hunter v. Sullivan,
993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“It consists of more than a mere scintilla
of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro
v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted).
“If there is evidence to justify a
refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there
quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Commissioner].”
Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence
allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
[Commissioner] (or the ALJ).” Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether
[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the
claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and
was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration has . . .
detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-vocational
evaluation policies that take into account a claimant’s age,
education, and work experience in addition to [the claimant’s]
‘sequential evaluation process’ to determine whether a claimant is
The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. [DIB] . . . provides
benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while employed.
The Supplemental Security Income Program . . . provides benefits to indigent
The statutory definitions and the regulations . . . for
determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant
here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations
This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
“The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of
specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.”
Albright v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475
n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).2
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of
several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry.
For example, “[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is
engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied.
The second step determines if the
claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.”
Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity
“Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[Commissioner] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 179.3
Step four then requires the ALJ to assess
whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can perform past relevant
work; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled.
See id. at
However, if the claimant establishes an inability to
return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step,
whereupon the ALJ must decide “whether the claimant is able to
perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC] and [the
claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work
experience) to adjust to a new job.”
Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65.
If, at this step, the Commissioner cannot carry its “evidentiary
burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other
Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.4
“RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s]
limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative regulations
require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-related physical
and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . .
[which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule”
(internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)).
The RFC includes both a
“physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as
“nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin impairments).” Hall, 658
F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers
all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (e.g.,
pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
A claimant thus can establish disability via two paths through the SEP. The
first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three in
the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail at
steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations of
the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a claimant
on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993 F.2d at
35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the process,
review does not proceed to the next step.”).
Assignments of Error
Plaintiff argues that the Court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability on these grounds:
1) “[t]he ALJ’s decision violates [Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d
630 (4th Cir.
Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or
pace (“CPP”) in the RFC (Docket Entry 11 at 4 (bold font omitted));
2) “[t]he ALJ erred by failing to account for Plaintiff’s
urgency and incontinence status post colectomy and fistula repair
in the RFC” (id. at 5 (bold font omitted)).
Defendant contends otherwise and seeks affirmance of the ALJ’s
(Docket Entry 14 at 3-11.)
In Plaintiff’s first issue on review, she contends that “the
ALJ found that [Plaintiff] suffered from moderate limitations in
[CPP,] noting in support that ‘[b]oth the consultative examination
report and [Plaintiff’s] treating notes indicate that [Plaintiff]
has moderate difficulties with concentration and memory’” (Docket
Entry 11 at 4 (quoting Tr. 23)), but that, “when assessing the RFC,
the ALJ only noted that mentally, [Plaintiff] was limited to
‘simple, routine, and repetitive tasks’ [(“SRRTs”)] (id. (quoting
According to Plaintiff, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “rejected th[e ALJ’s] approach” by
holding that “‘the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the
ability to stay on task[, and that o]nly the latter limitation
(quoting Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638 (internal citations omitted)).)
Plaintiff deems the ALJ’s error in that regard “particularly
harmful given that the only hypothetical referring to time off task
proffered to the [VE] returned a response that if [Plaintiff] was
off task more than 10 percent of the workday, competitive work
would be precluded.”
(Id. at 5 (citing Tr. 74).)
contentions miss the mark.
The Fourth Circuit has indeed held that “the ability to
perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task” and
that “[o]nly the latter limitation would account for a claimant’s
limitation in [CPP].”
Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638.
However, as a
neighboring district court has explained:
Mascio does not broadly dictate that a claimant’s
moderate impairment in [CPP] always translates into a
limitation in the RFC. Rather, Mascio underscores the
ALJ’s duty to adequately review the evidence and explain
the decision . . . . An ALJ may account for a claimant’s
limitation with [CPP] by restricting the claimant to
simple, routine, unskilled work where the record supports
this conclusion, either through physician testimony,
medical source statements, consultative examinations, or
other evidence that is sufficiently evident to the
Jones v. Colvin, No. 7:14CV00273, 2015 WL 5056784, at *10-12 (W.D.
Va. Aug. 20, 2015) (magistrate judge’s recommendation adopted by
district judge) (unpublished) (emphasis added).
Here, the ALJ’s
decision sufficiently explains why the restrictions in the RFC to
SRRTs (see Tr. 24) adequately accounted for Plaintiff’s moderate
limitation in CPP.
First, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s mental health treatment
(see Tr. 26), making the following, pertinent observations:
The record reflects that Plaintiff did not seek any
mental health treatment between “the winter of
2005-06, and [June 6,] 2013” (id.; see also Tr.
326-33, 430-35, 467-94);
“Treatment notes from 2014 and 2015 indicate that
medication and showing some improvement” (id.; see
also Tr. 454, 467-80);
Plaintiff “report[ed] successful trips to the
mountains, the beach, and New Orleans (id.; see
also Tr. 469, 470, 474, 476, 477, 479, 484);
Plaintiff “had found a sense of community and felt
productive in volunteering at an animal shelter”
(id.; see also Tr. 467, 468).
Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s summarization of Plaintiff’s
mental health treatment history.
(See Docket Entry 11.)
Second, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her
mental symptoms (see Tr. 25), but concluded that Plaintiff’s
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of [her] symptoms [we]re not entirely consistent with the
Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s
(See Docket Entry 11.)
Third, the ALJ also discussed and weighed the opinion evidence
(See Tr. 26-27.)
Most notably, the ALJ gave “significant weight”
to the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants (Tr.
26), who each concluded that, despite moderate deficit in CPP (see
Tr. 82, 97), Plaintiff remained capable of “SRRTs at least” (Tr.
83, 97), and “ab[le] to carry out or maintain concentration long
enough to complete a simple task as would be required of unskilled
work” (Tr. 86, 101).
supported the conclusion that, despite moderate limitation in CPP,
Plaintiff remained capable of performing SRRTs.
See Sizemore v.
Berryhill, __ F. App’x __, __, 2017 WL 467712, at *6 (4th Cir. Oct.
17, 2017) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument under Mascio where
ALJ relied on opinions of consultative examiner and state agency
psychologist that, notwithstanding moderate deficit in CPP, the
plaintiff could sustain attention sufficiently to perform SRRTs).
In sum, Plaintiff’s first assignment of error fails as a
matter of law.
2. Urgency and Incontinence
Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ erred by failing to
colectomy and fistula repair in the RFC.”
(bold font omitted).)
(Docket Entry 11 at 5
In particular, Plaintiff maintains that,
although the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “status post subtotal
colectomy and fistula repair with residual effects of urgency and
incontinence” qualified as a severe impairment at step 2 of the SEP
(Tr. 22), the ALJ erred by failing to “include any limitations
regarding Plaintiff’s increased need to use the restroom or change
her clothes during the workday” in the RFC.
(Docket Entry 11 at
In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s error in that
regard prejudiced her, because the VE testified that the need to
use the restroom three to 10 times on an unscheduled basis during
a workday would preclude competitive employment (id. (citing Tr.
74)), and further opined that even a need for two restroom breaks
beyond regularly scheduled breaks would preclude such employment
entitlement to relief.
As an initial matter, the Court should reject Plaintiff’s
suggestion that the ALJ’s finding at step two that the residual
effects of Plaintiff’s colectomy and fistula repair qualified as a
severe impairment required the ALJ to include restrictions related
to that impairment when formulating the RFC (see Docket Entry 11 at
The determination of a “severe” impairment at step two of
the sequential evaluation process is a de minimis test,
designed to weed out unmeritorious claims. See Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). A finding of de minimis
limitations is not proof that the same limitations have
the greater significant and specific nature required to
gain their inclusion in an RFC assessment at step four.
See, e.g., Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 268 n.12 (3d
Hughes v. Astrue, No. 1:09CV459, 2011 WL 4459097, at *10 (W.D.N.C.
Sept. 26, 2011) (unpublished); accord Burkstrand v. Astrue, 346 F.
App’x 177, 180 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To the extent [a claimant]
necessarily requires limitations on a claimant’s ability to perform
basic work activities, this argument has no merit.”); Goodwin v.
Colvin, No. 2:14-cv-11582, 2015 WL 1181392, at *26 (S.D.W. Va. Mar.
13, 2015) (unpublished) (describing as “fundamentally flawed” the
impairment at step two, “she was bound to include functional
limitations in the RFC finding to account for [the impairment]”);
Perez v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-868 (JCH), 2014 WL 4852848, at *19 (D.
Conn. Sept. 29, 2014) (unpublished) (holding ALJ “not required to
Chappell v. Colvin, No. 1:10CV384, 2014 WL 509150, at *4 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 7, 2014) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.) (ruling that ALJ need not
“separately include limitations from each of [the plaintiff’s] step
two severe impairments when assessing [the] RFC”), recommendation
adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2014) (Osteen, Jr., C.J.);
Burns v. Astrue, No. 2:11-cv-151-GZS, 2012 WL 313705, at * (D. Me.
Jan. 30, 2012) (unpublished) (noting that “a finding of a severe
impairment need not always result in limitations in an RFC”),
recommendation adopted, No. 2:11-CV-151-GZS, 2012 WL 567254 (D. Me.
Feb. 21, 2012) (unpublished); see also Felton-Miller v. Astrue, 459
F. App’x 226, 230 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Step two of the sequential
evaluation is a threshold question with a de minimis severity
Moreover, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument (see Docket Entry
11 at 5-11), the ALJ sufficiently explained the basis for the RFC
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including her reports that she
needed to use the restroom five to seven times before she left the
house in the morning and two to three times per hour after that,
discomfort from cramping, and suffered incontinence with sneezing,
lifting/carrying, or a dog pulling on a leash.
also Tr. 49, 53, 64, 68.)
(See Tr. 25; see
However, the ALJ ultimately found that
her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of [her] symptoms [we]re not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record” (Tr. 25).
ALJ supported his analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
with substantial evidence, including a discussion of Plaintiff’s
daily activities, such as cooking, cleaning, light gardening,
caring for her dog, using her computer, reading, grocery shopping,
volunteering at the animal shelter, and taking successful trips to
the mountains, the beach, and New Orleans.
(See Tr. 25, 26.)
Plaintiff’s gastroenterologist, Dr. John Perry, noted on July 8,
2013, that Plaintiff’s “diarrheal symptoms improved with Imodium
and fiber, and ‘can be controlled with medications,’ although this
will cause her to develop some abdominal discomfort.”
According to Plaintiff, she cannot “sustain th[o]se medications,”
because, although they “could stop the diarrhea, it did not result
in tolerable [bowel movements] but rather her suffering significant
cramping pain in her abdomen and prolonged constipation.”
(citing Tr. 53, and Social Security Ruling 16-3p, Titles II and
XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, 2017 WL 5180304,
individual may not agree to take prescription medications because
the side effects are less tolerable than the symptoms”).)
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints violated SSR 16-3p, that argument
SSR 16-3p provides as follows:
[I]f the frequency or extent of the treatment sought by
an individual is not comparable with the degree of the
individual’s subjective complaints, or if the individual
fails to follow prescribed treatment that might improve
symptoms, [the ALJ] may find the alleged intensity and
persistence of an individual’s symptoms are inconsistent
with the overall evidence of record. [The ALJ] will not
find an individual’s symptoms inconsistent with the
evidence in the record on this basis without considering
possible reasons he or she may not comply with treatment
or seek treatment consistent with the degree of his or
[The ALJ] may need to contact the
individual regarding the lack of treatment or, at an
administrative proceeding, ask why he or she has not
complied with or sought treatment in a manner consistent
with his or her complaints. When [the ALJ] consider[s]
the individual’s treatment history, [the ALJ] may
consider (but [is] not limited to) one or more of the
. . .
· An individual may not agree to take prescription
medications because the side effects are less tolerable
than the symptoms.
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *9-10 (emphasis added).
Here, however, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s statements
about the intensity of her symptoms not fully consistent with the
record because she failed to seek treatment or follow prescribed
(See Tr. 24-27.)
Rather, the ALJ simply credited the
observations of Plaintiff’s treating providers that medications
such as Imodium, fiber, and Questran (the latter of which Plaintiff
testified that she continued to take as of the date of the hearing
(see Tr. 53)) controlled Plaintiff’s symptoms, albeit with some
accompanying constipation and abdominal discomfort.
see also Tr. 438, 454.)
(See Tr. 25;
Although Plaintiff may disagree with the
determinations are “‘emphatically the province of the ALJ, not the
Vest v. Colvin, No. 5:13CV00067, 2014 WL 4656207, at *2
(W.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2014) (unpublished) (citing Dunn v. Colvin, 973
F. Supp. 2d 630, 649 (W.D. Va. 2013)).
So long as the record
provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s analysis, and
the ALJ complies with applicable law, as he did here, the reviewing
court should not disturb those findings.
Second, the ALJ accorded “significant weight” to the state
gastrointestinal symptoms, Plaintiff remained capable of performing
a full range of medium work without any additional non-exertional
(Tr. 26; see also Tr. 84, 99.)
(See Docket Entry 11.)
Third, the ALJ discussed consultative examiner Dr. Alan A.
Rosenbloom’s opinion that Plaintiff’s “condition d[id] not appear
to affect her ability to sit, stand, move about, lift, carry,
handle objects, hear, or speak”
(Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 428)), and
gave that opinion “significant weight” (id.).5
failed to allege error with respect to the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr.
(See Docket Entry 11.)
Dr. Rosenbloom also opined that traveling could pose problems for Plaintiff,
because, “if she develop[ed] any fecal urgency and [could] not get to a rest room
rapidly, she w[ould] soil herself.”
The ALJ did not expressly
discuss that opinion (see Tr. 26-27), but any such failure, if error at all,
remains harmless, as two of the jobs cited by the VE (see Tr. 72) (and adopted
by the ALJ at step five of the SEP (see Tr. 28)) do not list travel among their
duties, see Dictionary of Occupational Titles, No. 920.587-018 (Packager, Hand),
1991 WL 687916 (4th ed. rev. 1991) (“DOT”), DOT, No. 361.685-018 (Laundry Worker
II), 1991 WL 672987, and the remaining job describes only intermittent local
travel to retrieve items from storage, see DOT, No. 922.687-058 (Laborer,
Stores), 1991 WL 688132. Moreover, even if the store laborer job’s requirement
of local intermittent travel precluded that job, the VE testified that 165,000
hand packager jobs and 377,000 laundry worker jobs existed in the national
economy (see Tr. 72), amounts that clearly qualify as significant under Fourth
Circuit authority, see Hicks v. Califano, 600 F.2d 1048, 1051 (4th Cir. 1979)
(“Claimant contends that the light and sedentary jobs described by the [VE] . . .
do not exist in significant numbers within the region. We do not think that the
approximately 110 jobs testified to by the [VE] constitute an insignificant
In short, Plaintiff has not shown error with respect to the
ALJ’s failure to include in the RFC limitations beyond medium work,
occasional ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and occasional exposure
symptoms and, thus, Plaintiff’s second issue on review does not
entitle her to relief.
Plaintiff has not established an error warranting relief.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 13)
be granted, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
April 13, 2018
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