BASSETT, ET AL. V. STRICKLAND'S AUTO & TRUCK REPAIRS, INC.

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, signed by JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR on 7/23/2018, that for the reasons set forth herein, that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 5 ), is DENIED. (Butler, Carol)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RONALD W. BASSETT, BASSETT
GUTTERS AND MORE, INC., a
North Carolina Corporation,
BR RACING, LLC, a North
Carolina Limited Liability
Company, and LISA BASSETT,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STRICKLAND’S AUTO & TRUCK
REPAIRS, INC.,
Defendant.

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1:17CV590

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Pending before this court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendant Strickland’s Auto & Truck Repairs, Inc. (“Defendant”).
(Doc. 5.) This motion is made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and
alleges that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Defendant. 1 Plaintiffs responded to the motion

1

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, (Doc. 5), and an
affidavit in support of its motion. However, although the motion
refers to a brief, (see Doc. 5 at 2), it does not appear that a
brief in support of the motion was filed until after Plaintiffs’
response, (Doc. 11), was filed. Furthermore, it appears
Defendant’s brief was docketed as a Reply Brief. (Doc. 13.) The
briefing that has occurred here is not only confusing to the
court but also violates LR 7.3(a), which requires a brief in
support of a motion. It appears this may have been inadvertent
on the part of counsel since the motion itself refers to a
brief, (Doc. 5 at 2); however, counsel is cautioned not to allow
this to happen again.

(Doc. 11) 2 and filed a memorandum in support of their response
(Pls.’ Mem. (Doc. 12)). Plaintiffs also filed an amended motion
requesting limited jurisdictional discovery. (Doc. 14.) That
motion was granted by the Magistrate Judge and discovery was
allowed on the issue of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 15.) The
timetable set forth in the order suggests that discovery should
be completed within thirty days. On December 6, 2017,
approximately fifty days after the discovery order was entered,
Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief addressing additional
facts found during discovery. (Doc. 16.) Defendant has not filed
a further response. The motion to dismiss, (Doc. 5), is ripe for
ruling. For the following reasons, this court finds Defendant’s
motion should be denied.

2

In response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs
filed a brief that included an exhibit which appears to be a
printout of Defendant’s website. (Doc. 12-2.) Generally
speaking, this court does not consider documents submitted in
support of a jurisdictional issue that are not in the form of an
affidavit or alleged in a complaint as are generally relied upon
by a court. See, e.g., Vision Motor Cars, Inc. v. Valor Motor
Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (M.D.N.C. 2013.) A website that is
not supported by an explanatory affidavit is complicated to
consider in any form, as this court is not able to tell whether
the web pages are accurate and what time frame is applicable to
the information attached, whether current, at the time of filing
of the complaint or at the time of the activities complained of
in the complaint. Nevertheless, in light of the other facts of
record that are either admitted in the complaint, or alleged in
an affidavit or discovery responses, this court does not find it
necessary to substantively consider the information about the
website.
– 2 –

I.

The Complaint and Jurisdictional Facts
According to the Complaint and admitted in the Answer,

Plaintiffs are all residents of North Carolina. (Complaint
(“Compl.”) (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 1-3; Answer (Doc. 7) at 2.) Plaintiffs
Ronald and Lisa Bassett are residents of Forsyth County, North
Carolina; Plaintiff Bassett Gutters and More, Inc., is a North
Carolina corporation with a principal place of business in
Davidson County; and Plaintiff BR Racing, LLC, is a North
Carolina limited liability company with a principal place of
business in Forsyth County. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 1-3.) Defendant
is a Virginia corporation with a principal place of business in
Cana, Virginia. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that they sought to have
a replacement engine installed in a 2005 Freightliner tractor.
(Id. ¶ 10.) Defendant operates a truck repair business in Cana,
Virginia. (Id. ¶ 20.) Defendant towed Plaintiffs’ Freightliner
tractor to Defendant’s business in Virginia and Defendant
installed a replacement engine. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 41.) Plaintiffs
paid for repairs and picked up the tractor. (Id. ¶ 43.)
Plaintiffs allege that they moved the tractor to their garage
and thereafter the garage caught fire, causing damage to the
garage, machines, and tools stored in the garage. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48,
52-54.) Plaintiffs contend, generally as the basis of their
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claims, that the origin of the fire was the tractor, (id. ¶ 58),
and the fire in the tractor’s engine resulted from improper
installation of electrical wiring of the replacement engine.
(Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) Plaintiffs assert claims of negligence and
breach of an express warranty. (See generally Compl. (Doc. 1).)
In support of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, Defendant has filed the affidavit of Kristie
Strickland (“Strickland”), the current owner of Defendant. (Aff.
of Kristie Strickland (“Strickland Aff.”) (Doc. 6) ¶ 1.)
Strickland states in her affidavit that Defendant does not
solicit business in North Carolina and “all work is performed in
Virginia at Strickland’s place of business.” (Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.)
Strickland states that its customers are primarily from Virginia
but that they also have customers in other states including
North Carolina. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Strickland candidly acknowledges
that it does on occasion receive calls for auto services in
North Carolina, (id. ¶ 7), and that Defendant does travel to
North Carolina occasionally to pick up cars or trucks for jobs
that it performs in Virginia, (id. ¶ 10). Defendant advertises
in the Carolina/Virginia Truck Trader, distributed in North
Carolina and Virginia. (Id. ¶ 8; see also Pls.’ Suppl. Br.,
Ex. A, Limited Interrogs. (“Interrogs.”) (Doc. 16-1) at 3.) With
respect to the work on the tractor for Plaintiffs, Strickland
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states that Defendant traveled to North Carolina, towed the
tractor back to its business in Cana, Virginia, and performed
the work in Virginia. (Strickland Aff. (Doc. 6) ¶ 11.)
Plaintiffs picked up the tractor in Virginia. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Following jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs submitted
additional facts obtained from Defendant through interrogatories
and document production. (Pls.’ Suppl. Br. (Doc. 16) at 2;
Ex. A, Interrogs. (Doc. 16-1).) Those invoices submitted show
that in the last three years, forty-nine of seventy-nine
invoices were billed to customers in North Carolina. (Pls.’
Suppl. Br. (Doc. 16) at 2; Ex. A, N.C. Invoices attached to
Interrogs. (“Invoices”) (Doc. 16-1) at 8-88.) Four invoices
reflect that Defendant towed the vehicle from North Carolina to
its garage in Virginia. (Pls.’ Suppl. Br. (Doc. 16) at 2;
Invoices (Doc. 16-1) at 8-88.) Defendant did not file a
supplemental brief following jurisdictional discovery.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant must affirmatively raise

a personal jurisdiction challenge, but the plaintiff bears the
burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction at every stage
following such a challenge.” Grayson v. Anderson, 816 F.3d 262,
267 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); Combs v. Bakker, 886
F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989). Such a challenge may be resolved
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by the court as a preliminary matter. Grayson, 816 F.3d. at 267.
While this burden varies depending on the procedural posture of
the case,
when the court addresses the personal jurisdiction
question by reviewing only the parties’ motion papers,
affidavits attached to the motion, supporting legal
memoranda, and the allegations in the complaint, a
plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction to survive the jurisdictional
challenge. When determining whether a plaintiff has
made the requisite prima facie showing, the court must
take the allegations and available evidence relating
to personal jurisdiction in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.
Id. at 268 (citations omitted). “A plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing in this context when it ‘present[s] evidence sufficient
to defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law.’” Debbie’s
Staffing Servs., Inc. v. Highpoint Risk Servs., LLC, No.
1:17CV657, 2018 WL 1918603, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2018)
(citations omitted).
“Where the defendant has provided evidence, however, that
denies facts essential for jurisdiction, the plaintiff must
present sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute on each
jurisdictional element that has been denied by the defendant and
on which the defendant has presented evidence.”

Vogel v.

Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594 (M.D.N.C.
2008); see also Wolf v. Richmond Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d
904, 908 (4th Cir. 1984) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss for
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lack of personal jurisdiction, the allegations of the complaint,
except insofar as controverted by the defendant’s affidavit,
must be taken as true.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A federal district court may only assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when two conditions
are satisfied: “First, the exercise of jurisdiction must be
authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and,
second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must also comport
with Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements.” Christian
Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan,
259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). North
Carolina’s long-arm statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(1)d, is
construed “to extend jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.” Christian
Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 259 F.3d at 215 (citing Century Data Sys.,
Inc. v. McDonald, 109 N.C. App. 425, 427, 428 S.E.2d 190, 191
(1993)). “Thus, the dual jurisdictional requirements collapse
into a single inquiry as to whether the defendant has such
‘minimal contacts’ with the forum state that ‘maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

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Minimum contacts sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may exist by virtue of
either specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction. See
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334
F.3d 390, 397 (4th Cir. 2003). Specific jurisdiction considers
instances where the nonresident defendant’s “contacts with the
forum also provide the basis for the suit” whereas general
jurisdiction considers instances where the defendant’s contacts
with the forum are so “continuous and systematic” as to provide
support for jurisdiction over any cause of action. See id.
(citation omitted). A defendant’s conduct and connection to the
forum must be “such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.” Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR,
S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2014)
III. ANALYSIS
In their Complaint and response to Defendant’s motion,
Plaintiffs allege this court has personal jurisdiction over
Defendant because Defendant engages in substantial activity in
North Carolina, has customers in North Carolina, the injury was
suffered in North Carolina, and Defendant solicited business
within this state. (Compl. (Doc. 1) at 2; Pls.’ Mem. (Doc. 12)
at 7.) Defendant contends this court does not have personal
jurisdiction because the work performed for Plaintiffs was
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performed in Virginia, and Defendant does not actively nor
regularly solicit business in North Carolina. (Def.’s Br. (Doc.
13) at 7.) In this case, Plaintiffs have not stated whether they
seek to demonstrate that this court has general or specific
jurisdiction over the corporate Defendant in this case. Because
it is apparent to this court that it does not have general
jurisdiction over Defendant, 3 it will proceed to consider whether
it has specific jurisdiction. Again, specific jurisdiction may
exist where the nonresident defendant’s “contacts with the forum
also provide the basis for the suit.” See Carefirst of Md., 334
F.3d at 397. Because North Carolina construes its long-arm
statute as providing for personal jurisdiction to the fullest
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, this court considers

3

“[A] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and
all claims against them when their affiliations with the State
are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially
at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
127 (2014) (citation omitted). For example, the Supreme Court
explained, a corporation is “essentially at home” when it is
incorporated or has its principal place of business there. Id.
at 137-38. “It is the ‘exceptional case’ when a court exercises
general jurisdiction in a forum outside of those paradigm
bases.” Hicks v. Jayco, Inc., No. 1:16CV1236, 2018 WL 1363843,
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2018) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139
n.19.) In this case, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant is
a Virginia corporation with a principal place of business in
Virginia. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 4.) Nor does Plaintiffs offer any
other basis for finding general jurisdiction over Defendant.

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whether Plaintiffs have made an adequate showing that Defendant
has sufficient contacts with North Carolina to satisfy
constitutional due process.
It is undisputed that Defendant maintained no place of
business in North Carolina, had no office in North Carolina, and
does not own property in North Carolina. It is further
undisputed that Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of Defendant’s
business activities, that is, the repair of a tractor engine. It
is also undisputed that Plaintiffs met with Defendant in
Virginia to arrange repairs to the tractor and thereafter
Defendant traveled to North Carolina to pick up the tractor in
order to perform those repairs. Although Defendant performed
those repairs in Virginia, the performance of those repairs is
alleged to have caused injury and damage to Plaintiffs’ business
in North Carolina.
“Fairness is the touchstone of the jurisdictional inquiry,”
Tire Eng'g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co.,
682 F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2012), and a three-part test is
employed to determine whether exercise of jurisdiction comports
with due process. This test requires analyzing: “(1) the extent
to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the
plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the
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State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
would be constitutionally reasonable.” ALS Scan, Inc. v. Dig.
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotations omitted). This court considers each inquiry
in turn.
A.

Purposeful Availment

Although there are no “talismanic jurisdictional formulas,”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485 (1985), the
Fourth Circuit has cited a number of nonexclusive factors that a
court may consider in the business context when determining
whether a defendant has “purposefully availed” itself of the
benefits and protections of a particular jurisdiction:
(1) “whether the defendant maintains offices or agents
in the forum state;” (2) “whether the defendant owns
property in the forum state;” (3) “whether the
defendant reached into the forum state to solicit or
initiate business;” (4) “whether the defendant
deliberately engaged in significant or long-term
business activities in the forum state;” (5) “whether
the parties contractually agreed that the law of the
forum state would govern disputes;” (6) “whether the
defendant made in-person contact with the resident of
the forum in the forum state regarding the business
relationship;” (7) “the nature, quality and extent of
the parties’ communications about the business being
transacted;” and (8) “whether the performance of
contractual duties was to occur within the forum.”
Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 560 (citation omitted).
“The purposeful availment inquiry is grounded on the
traditional due process concept of ‘minimum contacts,’ which
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itself is based on the premise that ‘a corporation that enjoys
the privilege of conducting business within a state bears the
reciprocal obligation of answering to legal proceedings there.’”
Id. at 559. “The analysis must focus on the nature, quality, and
quantity of the contacts, as well as their relation to the forum
state.” Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273,
279 n.5 (4th Cir. 2009)
In this case, with respect to the first and second factors,
it is undisputed that Defendant does not maintain an office or
place of business in North Carolina, nor does Defendant own
property in North Carolina. However, with respect to the third
factor, it appears from this record that Defendant does
regularly solicit business in North Carolina. Defendant derives
its customers due to word of mouth, (Strickland Aff. (Doc. 6) at
2), but Defendant has also advertised in the Carolina/Virginia
Truck Trader. (Id.; see also Interrogs. (Doc. 16-1) at 3.) That
publication is distributed in North Carolina and Virginia.
(Interrogs. (Doc. 16-1) at 3.) Defendant also runs ads in a
national breakdown services directory. (Id. at 5-6, 87-88.) As a
national directory, it appears the directory includes North
Carolina. Advertising in the Carolina/Virginia Truck Trader
evidences Defendant’s general intent to do business with North
Carolina residents while advertising in a national breakdown
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services directory is not especially probative on this issue.
See Pathfinder Software, LLC v. Core Cashless, LLC, 127 F. Supp.
3d 531, 542-43 (M.D.N.C. 2015); Burleson v. Toback, 391 F. Supp.
2d 401, 415 (M.D.N.C. 2005). Defendant’s advertising, although
limited, manifests a general intent to do business with North
Carolina residents. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality
op.) (reasoning that a defendant “may indicate an intent or
purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for
example, . . . [by] advertising in the forum State”); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(considering whether solicitation of business had occurred
“through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State”).
Furthermore, as to the fourth inquiry, Defendant’s invoices
demonstrate that Defendant’s advertisements and its word of
mouth reputation have generated significant business in North
Carolina. Defendant’s invoices show that in the last three
years, approximately forty-nine of seventy-nine invoices were
billed to customers in North Carolina. (Pls.’ Suppl. Br. (Doc.
16) at 2; Invoices (Doc. 16-1) at 8-88.) While it may very well
be true that Defendant’s primary business intent is that of a
Virginia business, the contacts described above are repetitive
and substantial. Cf. Reed v. Beverly Hills Porsche, Case No.
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6:17-cv-00059, 2018 WL 797444, at *7 (W.D. Va. Feb. 8, 2018)
(considering the percentage of total sales to forum state
purchasers in analyzing defendant’s significant and/or long-term
business activities within forum state). “[I]f the sale of a
product of a manufacturer or distributor [in the forum state]
. . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the
efforts of [defendant] to serve directly or indirectly, the
market for its product . . . , it is not unreasonable to subject
it to suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-97
(considering whether Volkswagen “regularly [sold] cars at
wholesale or retail to [forum state] customers or residents” in
determining whether purposeful availment had occurred).
The invoices reflecting work for customers are for
substantial engine repairs and the work carries a sixty-day
warranty as reflected on the stamp on the front of the invoice;
that warranty is extended to customers in North Carolina. (See,
e.g., Invoices (Doc. 16-1) at 8, 15, 16, 17.) The warranty
appears to extend Defendant’s contact with its North Carolina
customers beyond that necessary to perform the substantive
repair work in Virginia. Where a defendant “has created
‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents of the
forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business there . . . .” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476
– 14 –

(citation omitted); see also Hicks v. Jayco, Inc., No.
1:16CV1236, 2018 WL 1363843, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2018).
Fifth, there is no evidence that the parties in this case
made a contractual agreement regarding whether Virginia or North
Carolina law would govern disputes.
With respect to Plaintiffs specifically, the invoice for
the engine replacement is attached to the Complaint. (Compl, Ex.
A, Invoice (Doc. 1-1) at 1.) That invoice also includes a sixtyday warranty. (See id.) The warranty reflected in that invoice
is the basis for Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action (Compl.
(Doc. 1) at 12-13), but regardless, the warranty reflects
Defendant’s specific acceptance of a continuing obligation as to
the tractor repairs underlying Plaintiffs’ claims in this case.
See Hicks, 2018 WL 1363843, at *5 (finding that a warranty which
entitled plaintiff to repairs either in or out of state
“evidences [defendant’s] intent to provide servicing of its
products in North Carolina – another indication of purposeful
availment”).
As to the sixth factor, in this case, the contract was
negotiated in Virginia, the repair work was performed in
Virginia, and Plaintiffs picked up the tractor in Virginia. On
the other hand, Defendant traveled to North Carolina to tow the
tractor to Virginia and Defendant extended its warranty for the
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work performed to a North Carolina company. Thus, as to the
sixth factor, Defendant did make limited, in person contact with
Plaintiffs in North Carolina regarding the business relationship
at issue in this case.
Seventh, the nature, quality, and extent of the parties’
communications about the business being transacted occurred both
in Virginia and North Carolina as Plaintiffs traveled to
Virginia to discuss the repair work with Defendant and Defendant
traveled to North Carolina to pick up the tractor to start the
repair process. Eighth, the performance of the contractual
duties at issues was to occur in Virginia with respect to the
repair work itself.
In objecting to the exercise of jurisdiction, Defendant
contends this case is similar to Marion v. Long, 72 N.C. App
585, 325 S.E.2d 300 (1985). The court in Marion held that while
the requirements under the North Carolina long-arm statute were
satisfied, the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts
was not. Id. at 587, 325 S.E.2d at 302. In Marion, only two
contacts were present – an advertisement placed in a national
magazine and the defendants’ trip to North Carolina and the
closing of the contract. Id. at 587, 325 S.E.2d at 323. Even
assuming that Marion might constitute persuasive authority in
this court as to a constitutional question, the Marion court
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stated that “[w]hile we are aware that jurisdiction may
constitutionally be based on a single contract, the singlecontract cases finding sufficient contact have, unlike this one,
involved other factors beyond simple formation of a contract.”
Id. at 589, 325 S.E.2d at 303 (citation omitted). In support of
this proposition, the Marion court cited Fiber Industries v.
Coronet Industries, 59 N.C. App. 677, 298 S.E.2d 76 (1982) for
the proposition that “substantial other business in North
Carolina” was a distinguishing factor in Fiber Industries in
supporting jurisdiction. Marion, 72 N.C. App. at 589, 325 S.E.2d
at 304. Similarly, in this case, Defendant has conducted
“substantial other business in North Carolina” sufficient to
support a finding of personal jurisdiction.
In sum, in this case, the first two factors do not weigh in
favor of personal jurisdiction; the third factor weighs somewhat
in favor of jurisdiction; the fourth factor weighs heavily in
favor of jurisdiction; the fifth factor does not weigh in favor
of either outcome; the sixth factor weighs somewhat in favor of
jurisdiction; the seventh factor weighs somewhat in favor of
jurisdiction; and the eighth factor does not weigh in favor of
jurisdiction.

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B.

Facts Giving Rise to Plaintiff’s Claims

The next step requires determining whether or not
Defendant’s contacts with North Carolina form the basis of the
present lawsuit. As recently acknowledged by another court in
this district:
To satisfy the second prong, [plaintiff’s]
negligence claim must result from alleged injuries
that “arise out of or relate to” [defendant’s] abovenoted contacts with North Carolina. Burger King, 471
U.S. at 472–73, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)); see also
Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F.Supp.2d
601, 620 (E.D.Va.2002) (“If a defendant’s contacts
with the forum state are related to the operative
facts of the controversy, then an action will be
deemed to have arisen from those contacts.” (quoting
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1267 (6th
Cir. 1996))). Contrary to [defendant’s] assertion, the
“proper question is not where the plaintiff
experienced a particular injury or effect but whether
the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a
meaningful way.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125.
Accordingly, personal jurisdiction can be appropriate
where the injury “would not have occurred but for” a
defendant’s contacts with the forum State. Id. at 1124
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also
characterized the arising-out-of prong as akin to
proximate causation. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475,
105 S. Ct. 2174 (“Jurisdiction is proper, however,
where the contacts proximately result from actions by
the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial
connection’ with the forum State.”).
Broadus v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 554, 560–61
(M.D.N.C. 2015).

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In this case, it appears to this court that, but for
Defendant’s extensive business with North Carolina customers and
occasional practice of towing vehicles from North Carolina to
its shop in Virginia, repairing them, and then knowingly sending
them back into North Carolina, Plaintiffs’ injury would not have
occurred. Here, Defendant entered into a business relationship
with Plaintiffs, another North Carolina consumer, picked up
Plaintiffs’ tractor in North Carolina, and then repaired the
tractor knowing it would be returned to North Carolina. But for
Defendant’s contact with North Carolina, Plaintiffs’ injury
would not have occurred. Defendant should have anticipated, by
servicing copious North Carolina customers, including traveling
into North Carolina to pick up said equipment, that it could be
haled into a court in North Carolina for injuries it inflicted
during provision of its services. This court concludes that
Plaintiffs’ injuries arose directly out of, and are closely
related to, Defendant’s connection with North Carolina.
C.

Constitutional Reasonableness

“Under the final prong — the constitutional reasonableness
inquiry — a defendant ‘who purposefully has directed his
activities at forum residents’ defeats jurisdiction if he can
‘present a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’” Hicks,
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2018 WL 1363843, at *8 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
“This prong of the analysis ‘ensures that litigation is not so
gravely difficult and inconvenient as to place the defendant at
a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.’” Tire
Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 303 (citation omitted). In making this
determination, the court has considered “(1) the burden on the
defendant of litigating in the forum; (2) the interest of the
forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the
shared interest of the states in obtaining efficient resolution
of disputes; and (5) the interests of the states in furthering
substantive social policies.” Consulting Eng’rs, 561 F.3d at
279.
In this case, the burden on Defendant of litigating in
North Carolina is slight, as evidenced by Defendant not arguing
any unusual inconvenience of litigating in this court; Defendant
has continued significant business relationships with North
Carolina customers; Plaintiffs are interested in litigating in
this forum; North Carolina has a strong interest in protecting
one of its companies from damages caused by others; and Virginia
has some interest in the dispute but not any interest greater
than North Carolina’s. Therefore, this court’s exercise of

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personal jurisdiction over Defendant is constitutionally
reasonable.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,

(Doc. 5), is DENIED.
This the 23rd day of July, 2018.

____________________________________
United States District Judge

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