KNOWLIN v. WADE et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 09/06/2017, that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of considering this recommendation of dismissal. RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Garland, Leah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

HASSIE-DEMOND; KNOWLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARKEITA M. WADE, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1:17cv644

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) in conjunction with his
pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2).

For the reasons that follow,

the Court will grant Plaintiff’s instant Application for the
limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.

Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

1995)

(en

banc)

(internal

“Dispensing

with

filing

fees,

problems. . . .

quotation

however,

[is]

marks
not

omitted).

without

its

In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).
To

address

this

concern,

the

in

forma

pauperis

statute

provides that “the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if
the [C]ourt determines . . . the action . . . is frivolous.”
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

28

“[A] complaint, containing as it does both

factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it
lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In assessing such matters, the
Court may “apply common sense.”

Nasim, 64 F.3d at 954; see also

Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256–57 (“The word ‘frivolous’ is inherently
elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition. . . .

The

term’s capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible
analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all
factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.”

(some internal

quotation marks omitted)).
The Court may consider subject matter jurisdiction as part of
its frivolity review.

Overstreet v. Colvin, 4:13-CV-261, 2014 WL

353684, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2014) (citing Lovern v. Edwards,
190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[d]etermining the
question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the
litigation is often the most efficient procedure”)).

“‘[F]ederal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ constrained to exercise
-2-

only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and
affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking,
Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978)).
invoking

jurisdiction,

here

Plaintiff,

establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

bears

the

The party
burden

of

Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d

1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction . . . is on the plaintiff, the party asserting
jurisdiction.”).

“The complaint must affirmatively allege the

grounds for jurisdiction,” Overstreet, 2014 WL 353684, at *3, and
the Court must dismiss the action if it determines that subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
INTRODUCTION
Asserting jurisdiction pursuant to “Article IV, § 2 of, and
the

First,

Fourth,

Fifth,

and

Thirteenth

Amendments

to,

the

Constitution of the United States, and 28 USC [§§] 2201 and 2202,”
Plaintiff initiated this action against Markeita M. Wade, Jenny
Spradley, Spradley Realty, and “any and all marital communities
enjoined thereto” (collectively, the “Defendants”).
2 at 1 (all-caps font omitted)).
Defendants,
impoundment

collectively
of

transportation.

Plaintiff’s

and/or

According to the Complaint,
individually,

automobile,

(See id. at 3.)

(Docket Entry

leaving

caused
him

the

without

The Complaint further alleges

that Defendants’ acts violated Plaintiff’s rights to due process,
-3-

equal privileges and immunities, free association, and liberty, as
well as to freedom from unreasonable seizure and conditions of
involuntary servitude.

(See id. at 3-4.)

For relief, Plaintiff

requests monetary damages and declaratory judgments denominating
Defendants’ actions as wrongful.

(See id. at 6.)

ANALYSIS
Federal

courts

“have

original

jurisdiction

of

all

civil

actions arising under the Constitution[ and] laws . . . of the
United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1331.1

Here, the Complaint asserts

federal jurisdiction under the United States Constitution and 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201 & 2202.

(Docket Entry 2 at 2.)2

1

Federal courts also maintain “original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
. . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Under
Section 1332(a), original “jurisdiction does not exist unless each
defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.”
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)
(emphasis in original).
In this case, the Civil Cover Sheet
asserts that Plaintiff and Defendants qualify as citizens of North
Carolina (Docket Entry 3 at 1), thus precluding original
jurisdiction over this action under Section 1332(a). Moreover, the
Complaint expressly invokes only federal question jurisdiction.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 2 (asserting jurisdiction under the U.S.
Constitution).)
Accordingly,
the
Court
lacks
diversity
jurisdiction over this matter.
2

Sections 2201 and 2202 concern declaratory judgments and do
not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Michigan Sav.
& Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957, 960 (6th Cir. 1982)
(“Appellants[’] assertions reflect a gallant, but futile attempt to
use the Declaratory Judgment Act to invoke subject matter
jurisdiction. This statute confers no such jurisdiction. Rather
the Declaratory Judgment Act is discretionary ancillary relief.”
(footnote omitted)).
-4-

With respect to Plaintiff’s jurisdictional references to the
United States Constitution, Plaintiff may bring a federal action
for violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50
(1999) (explaining that Section 1983 authorizes an action for
deprivations of federal constitutional rights committed by state
actors).

To pursue such an action, Plaintiff must “establish that

[he was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
[by a person acting] under color of state law.”
added).
exercising

Id.

(emphasis

“A person acts under color of state law only when
‘power

possessed

by

virtue

of state

law

and made

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law.’”

Bailey v. Prince George’s Cty., 34 F. Supp. 2d

1025, 1026 (D. Md. 1999) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).

Put another way, “[t]he person charged

[under Section 1983] must either be a state actor or have a
sufficiently close relationship with state actors such that a court
would conclude that the non-state actor is engaged in the state’s
actions.”

DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 506 (4th Cir. 1999);

see also Bailey, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 (“The alleged infringement
of federal rights must be fairly attributable to the state.”
(citing Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982))). “In general,
private companies and corporations do not act under color of state
-5-

law.”

Ellis v. Santander Consumer USA, Civ. Action No. 13-2099,

2013 WL 3753624, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. July 15, 2013).
Here, Plaintiff asserts claims against a private company,
Spradley Realty, and two private persons, Markeita M. Wade and
Jenny Spradley, who serve as agents of Spradley Realty.
Entry 2 at 1-2.)

(Docket

Importantly, the Complaint contains no factual

matter suggesting that any Defendant (1) works as a state official,
(2) acted in concert with a state official, or (3) violated
Plaintiff’s rights under compulsion of a state official.
at 1-7.)3

(See id.

Accordingly, Defendants’ alleged conduct qualifies as

private, rather than state, action.

See DeBauche, 191 F.3d at 507

(explaining that “private activity will generally not be deemed
‘state action’ unless the state has so dominated such activity as
to convert it into state action”).

Section 1983 cannot therefore

provide the grounds for federal jurisdiction over this matter. See
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 50 (holding that Section
3

Violations of the Thirteenth Amendment do not require that
a defendant act under color of state law. See Terry Props., Inc.
v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986)
(“[Private parties] may also be liable directly under the
Thirteenth Amendment as it absolutely prohibits the practice of
slavery.” (citing City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120
(1981))). However, the Complaint contains no factual allegations
indicating that Defendants enslaved Plaintiff and, accordingly, the
Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Thirteenth Amendment claims. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the
standard for a complaint “does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))).
-6-

1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement “excludes from its
reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or
wrongful” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ellis, 2013
WL 3753624, at *5 (explaining that Section 1983 claims grounded
upon the repossession of the plaintiff’s vehicle failed as a matter
of law because “[t]here are no allegations whatsoever in the
complaint that reasonably suggest that [the defendant] engaged in
conduct that could be construed as ‘state action’”).
As a final matter, the Complaint appears to assert state law
claims of conversion and interference with contract regarding
Defendants’ alleged impoundment of Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Docket Entry 2 at 4.)
for common law torts.”

(See

However, “Section 1983 provides no remedy
Bailey, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (citing

Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir. 1974)).

Plaintiff

must pursue any such state law claims in state court.
CONCLUSION
The Complaint fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction
and the obviousness of this defect renders this action legally
frivolous.
IT

IS

THEREFORE

ORDERED

that

Plaintiff’s

Application

to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED for the
limited purpose of considering this recommendation of dismissal.

-7-

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
This 6th day of September, 2017.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

-8-