WATSON v. MCPHATTER et al

Filing 142

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 02/11/2022, that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Docket Entry 83 ) and his Counsel Request (Docket Entry 127 ) are DENIED.(Taylor, Abby)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TRAVIS L. WATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DETECTIVE MCPHATTER, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:17CV934

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for
Appointment of Counsel (Docket Entry 83 (the “instant Motion”)), as
well as

his

Request”)).

Counsel

Request

(Docket

Entry

127

(the

“instant

Because the record does not reflect exceptional

circumstances that would warrant the Court attempting to tap the
limited pro bono resources available to it on Plaintiff’s behalf
(but instead reveals good reasons not to make any such attempt),
the Court will deny the instant Motion and the instant Request.1

1

In regards to “motions for appointment of counsel,” Handy v.
City of Sheridan, 636 F. App’x 728, 733 (10th Cir. 2016),
“[m]agistrate judges have authority to issue final decisions on
such nondispositional matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),
subject to review by the district court,” Handy, 636 F. App’x at
733; accord, e.g., Cordero v. Kelley, Civ. No. 17-1596, 2021 WL
351361, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2021) (unpublished); Hampton v.
Peeples, No. CV614-104, 2015 WL 4112435, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 7,
2015) (unpublished); Campbell v. Mitchell, No. 14-2257, 2014 WL
4929292, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2014) (unpublished); Johnson v.
Honda, No. 3:13CV485, 2014 WL 117230, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 10,
2014) (unpublished); Sanzone v. Goode, No. 10CV4431, 2010 WL
5152303, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2010) (unpublished); Daniels
v. Ruan, No. 05CV922, 2007 WL 1125683, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16,
2007) (unpublished); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (authorizing
(continued...)

Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 1 of 18

INTRODUCTION
The Court (per the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge)
permitted Plaintiff to proceed as a pauper in this action, which he
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(See Docket Entry 3 at 1; see also

Docket Entry 2 at 2-3 (naming three detectives employed by City of
Greensboro as Defendants).) After discovery closed, the Court (per
United States District Judge Loretta C. Biggs) entered summary
judgment for Defendants on all of the claims in this action, except
as “to Detective Altizer on Plaintiff’s fourth-amendment claim for
illegal searches of his mail.”

(Docket Entry 53 at 1; see also

Docket Entry 61 at 2 (dismissing Plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal
of that order).)
2022.

The Clerk subsequently set a trial date of May 2,

(See Docket Entry 81 at 1.)

Plaintiff, in turn, filed the instant Motion, pursuant to “28
U.S.C. [§] 1915(e)(1)” (Docket Entry 83 at 1), “mov[ing] the
[C]ourt for an order appointing counsel in this case” (id.), based
on this showing:
1. [Plaintiff] is currently unable to afford counsel.
He has requested leave to proceed In Forma Pauperis.

1

(...continued)
magistrate judges “to hear and determine any pretrial matter
pending before the court, except” eight categories of motions,
which do not include motions for appointment of counsel, and
district judges to “reconsider any pretrial matter under this
subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate
judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law”); Grooms v.
Thomas, No. 1:19CV396, 2020 WL 377948, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 23,
2020) (unpublished) (Osteen, J.) (“The motion to appoint counsel is
a pretrial matter, not dispositive of [the p]etitioner’s claims.”).
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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 2 of 18

2. Issues involved in [Plaintiff’s] case are complex and
require the expert opinion and analytical skills of a
Fraud Analyst and/or Counterfeit Document Analyst/Expert.
3. [Plaintiff] cannot currently afford to pay an expert.
4. A trial in this case will likely involve conflicting
testimony and counsel would better enable [Plaintiff] in
management of presenting his evidence and cross-examining
witnesses.
(Id.; see also id. at 2 (“I have fraudulent and counterfeit
documents in my possession that require an expert’s examination for
trial purposes.”).)

Detective Altizer responded (see Docket Entry

90) and Plaintiff replied (see Docket Entry 107).
A short time later, Plaintiff filed the instant Request, which
(A) notes the pendency of the instant Motion “requesting counsel
which would assist him in fraud analyzation, presenting evidence,
and cross[-]examination of witnesses” (Docket Entry 127 at 1), and
(B) “ask[s] the [C]ourt to extend counsel’s services to also assist
[Plaintiff] in formally bringing criminal charges against the state
actors in this case that have wrongfully engaged in criminal
misconduct, colluded, and conspired to defraud [Plaintiff] of his
[c]onstitutional [r]ights and [o]bstruct[ed j]ustice in [c]overing
it up” (id.; see also id. at 1-2 (“[Plaintiff] needs counsel’s
assistance in assigning criminal liability in reference to the
fraudulent documents in his possession . . . and certain substances

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 3 of 18

that have been placed in [his] food and drink to prevent his voice
from being heard on these matters.”)).2
DISCUSSION
The statute cited by Plaintiff as authority for the relief he
has sought states: “The court may request an attorney to represent
any person unable to afford counsel.”
(emphasis added).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

The language of that provision makes clear that

“a plaintiff does not have an absolute right to appointment of
counsel.”

Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987).

In fact, in federal civil actions, “there is no statutory provision
for appointment of counsel.

The statute [in question] says that a

judge may ‘request’ that an attorney represent a litigant and so [a
motion for] ‘appointment of counsel’ is actually a polite way of
saying that [a court should] call[] multiple attorneys in an effort
to get one of them to take a case for no pay.”

Gruenberg v.

Gempeler, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (emphasis

2

Given the obvious frivolousness of the instant Request
(detailed in the Discussion section that follows above), the Court
has elected not to consider Detective Altizer’s opposition (see
Docket Entry 136) or to await any reply from Plaintiff.
See
generally Kanu v. Siemens PLM, No. 1:18CV38, 2019 WL 1090398, at *1
n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2019) (unpublished) (“Based upon the
frivolous nature of the motion, the undersigned finds no need to
await any response by the [d]efendants prior to issuing this
[recommendation].”), recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4110434 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 29, 2019) (unpublished); United States v. FloridaUCC,
Inc., No. 4:09CV46, 2009 WL 1971428, at *8 (N.D. Fla. July 3, 2009)
(unpublished) (observing that, where issues raised in motion “are
frivolous[, ] there is no need to await a response to the motion
. . . before ruling on the motion”).
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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 4 of 18

added), aff’d, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Mallard v.
United States Dist. Ct. for S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989)
(holding that provision now codified at Section 1915(e)(1) “does
not authorize the federal courts to make coercive appointments of
counsel”); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976)
(plurality) (“The established rule is that the expenditure of
public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that
public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.”);
Evans v. Kuplinski, 713 F. App’x 167, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A pro
se prisoner does not have a general right to counsel in a [Section]
1983 action.”); Taylor v. Pulliam, 679 F. App’x 264, 266 (4th Cir.
2017) (“[C]ivil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel
. . . .”); Geter v. Taharra, 429 F. App’x 265, 266 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]here is no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case
. . . .”); Valcarcel v. ABM Indus./Diversico Indus., 383 F. Supp.
3d 562, 564 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (Schroeder, C.J.) (“This is a civil
case. As such, [the plaintiff] is not constitutionally entitled to
appointment of counsel.”); Clarke v. Blais, 473 F. Supp. 2d 124,
125 (D. Me. 2007) (recognizing that, under Section 1915(e)(1),
“there are no funds appropriated to pay a lawyer or even to
reimburse a lawyer’s expenses”); Osipova v. Home Energy Assistance
Program, No. 85CIV4498, 1985 WL 3956, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,
1985) (“[N]o public funds are available to compensate courtappointed counsel in civil cases.”).

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 5 of 18

Ultimately, judicial solicitation of the bar for free legal
representation for a pro se party remains “a matter within the
discretion of the [] Court.

It is a privilege and not a right.”

Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1968).

In delineating

the scope of that discretion, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has held that a pro se party “must show that
his [or her] case is one with exceptional circumstances.”

Miller,

814 F.2d at 966. “The question of whether such circumstances exist
in any particular case hinges on characteristics of the claim and
the litigant.”

Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir.

1984), abrogated in part on other grounds, Mallard, 490 U.S. at 300
& n.2.

More pointedly, “[i]f it is apparent to the district court

that a pro se litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity
to present it, the district court should appoint counsel to assist
him.”

Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir. 1978).

Here (as noted in the Introduction), a trial will occur on
Plaintiff’s one claim that survived summary judgment, and the Court
often looks to its Pro Bono Representation Program (“PBR Program”)
“where summary judgment has been denied and the case is set for
trial,” Amended Standing Order No. 6 at 1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 23, 2016);
however, if the bare conclusion that record evidence “technically
put a fact in issue and suffice[d] to avert summary judgment[]
require[s] appointment of an attorney under § 1915[(e)(1)], the
demand for such representation could be overwhelming,” Cooper v. A.

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 6 of 18

Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708,
711 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]here are too many indigent litigants and
too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.”);
McLeod v. Henderson, No. 98-1534-CIV-T-17A, 1999 WL 1427749, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 1999) (unpublished) (“The number of volunteer
lawyers willing to accept appointment in such cases on a pro bono
publico

basis

consistent

is

with

limited.”
Section

(italics

omitted)).

1915(e)(1)’s

plain

Accordingly,

language

and

the

foregoing Fourth Circuit rulings, in utilizing the PBR Program, the
Court retains “absolute discretion in making a determination of
whether exceptional circumstances exist and whether appointment of
a pro bono attorney is appropriate.”

Amended Standing Order No. 6

at 1; see also Osipova, 1985 WL 3956, at *2 (“This [c]ourt is
favored by a pro bono panel of attorneys who are able to volunteer
limited

amounts

of

their

time[,]

but

the

judges

exercise

a

necessary discretion in referring cases to the panel . . . .”
(underscoring omitted)).
Furthermore, on multiple occasions, the Fourth Circuit has
upheld denials of requests for counsel under Section 1915(e)(1) in
cases that proceeded to trial, even when the pro se plaintiffs’
errant approach to trial-related matters (which they well might
have altered with the aid/advice of counsel) appeared to have
compromised their cases.

See Underwood v. Beavers, 711 F. App’x

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 7 of 18

122, 123

(4th

Cir.

2017)

(“The

record

establishes

that

[the

plaintiff] was capable of adequately presenting his claims, so the
denial of his motions to appoint counsel was not an abuse of
discretion. Next, although [the plaintiff] arguably challenges the
jury verdict, he did not file a postverdict motion pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50 or 59(a) within 28 days of the judgment.

Having

failed to file such a motion, [the plaintiff’s] challenge to the
jury verdict is foreclosed.”); Clary v. Harper, 694 F. App’x 913,
916-17 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[The plaintiff] asserts that the district
court erred in denying him counsel, and he claims that, had he been
provided with an attorney, . . . he would have prevailed at
trial. . . .

[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in

failing to appoint counsel for [the plaintiff]. . . .

Regarding

his trial, [the plaintiff’s] own statements that [the defendant]
meant [the plaintiff] no harm were fatal to his claim that [the
defendant]

was

deliberately

indifferent

to

[the

plaintiff’s]

safety.”); Taylor, 679 F. App’x at 266 (holding that “record
establishes

that

[the

plaintiff]

was

capable

of

adequately

presenting his claims, and [] therefore conclud[ing] that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion
to appoint counsel,” while also affirming district court’s decision
“not [to] allow[ the plaintiff] to present photos or witnesses to
the jury,” because “[he] failed to disclose the evidence prior to
trial” and “failed to present a witness list prior to trial”).

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 8 of 18

Simply put, the mere fact that this case will proceed to trial
on a single claim against a single Defendant and that Plaintiff,
like “[a]lmost everyone[,] would benefit from having a lawyer,”
Olson, 750 F.3d at 711; see also Joe v. Funderburk, Civ. No. 8:06119, 2006 WL 2707011, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2006) (unpublished)
(“[The p]laintiff cites that he is unable to afford counsel . . .
[and] that he has . . . limited knowledge of the law . . . .
Almost every prisoner bringing a [Section] 1983 claim would be able
to cite the same circumstances . . . so the [c]ourt can hardly
consider these circumstances to be exceptional.”), aff’d, 215
F. App’x 307 (4th Cir. 2007), does not compel the Court to endeavor
to

find

counsel

willing

to

represent

Plaintiff

for

free,

particularly given the relatively simple nature of the claim left
for trial and his proven ability to present that claim.

Regarding

the first of those two considerations, although the instant Motion
baldly asserts that “[i]ssues involved in [Plaintiff’s] case are
complex” (Docket Entry 83 at 1), as well as that “[a] trial in this
case will likely involve conflicting testimony and counsel would
better enable [Plaintiff] in management of presenting his evidence
and cross-examining witnesses” (id.), the lone surviving claim
turns on a very straight-forward “material factual dispute” (Docket
Entry 46 at 34), i.e., “whether, without consent, Detective Altizer
(twice) searched through Plaintiff’s mail (A) after Plaintiff’s
removal from the scene, (B) after clearing the apartment for other

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 9 of 18

people, and (C) prior to the arrival of a search warrant” (id.; see
also id. (observing that “resol[ution of that dispute] against
Detective Altizer[] would support a finding that she violated the
Fourth Amendment”).

As to the second consideration, Plaintiff –

after conducting discovery (see, e.g., Docket Entry 30 at 1-4
(Plaintiff’s

Interrogatories

and

Request

for

Production

of

Documents)) – lucidly argued in opposition to summary judgment
(citing supporting evidence he had gathered) that “[c]onsent was
given to sweep only but officers did not depart the residence.
Scope of consent was exceeded because officers . . . search[ed]
papers
. . . .”

(see

Judy

West

Affidavit

and

Carla

Morris

Affidavit)

(Docket Entry 42 at 4 (citing Docket Entries 19-1, 19-2);

see also id. at 5 (“Defendants talk of securing the residence until
Det. Tyndall obtained a search warrant (p[age] 8 of Defendants’
motion) and yet Defendants had already initiated search and seizure
as aforementioned.” (citing Docket Entry 34 at 8)); Docket Entry 49
at 2 (“Ms. Morris had agreed that Detective Altizer could enter the
apartment to speak with her and check the apartment to confirm that
it remained empty (see Altizer video at 13:54; Docket Entry 43-1 at
15-16, 25, 44).

No consent was given to search mail . . . .

A

search that exceeds the scope is invald [sic].” (misplaced closed
parenthesis

moved)),

4

(“After

the

sweep,

Detective

Altizer

continued her presence with constant observation of the residence
and . . . looked through [Plaintiff’s] mail . . . .”).)

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 10 of 18

In other words, the sole claim for trial “is not extremely
complex and [Plaintiff i]s able to adequately present his case, as
demonstrated by his [prior filings on point].” Harden v. Green, 27
F. App’x 173, 175 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Braxton v. Harrah, No.
2:18CV585, 2020 WL 2820148, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. May 29, 2020)
(unpublished) (“In this case, as demonstrated by the fact that [the
p]aintiff’s pro se complaint survived [dispositive] motions . . .
and the fact that [he] is presently pursuing discovery . . ., [he]
appears capable of prosecuting this action on his own behalf
without the aid of counsel.

Moreover, this action, which is based

on an allegedly unlawful search warrant and the allegedly wrongful
seizure of [the p]laintiff’s property, is neither so legally nor
factually complex as to constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’
warranting

the

appointment

of

counsel.”

(italics

omitted));

Velasquez v. O’Keefe, 899 F. Supp. 972, 974 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (“While
it is possible that there will be conflicting evidence requiring
cross-examination at the trial of this matter, this factor alone is
not determinative of a motion for appointment of counsel.”).3

3

Those considerations also materially distinguish this case
from another in which the Fourth Circuit “f[ou]nd that the record
present[ed] the rare exceptional circumstances that render [a]
district court’s denial of [a pro se plaintiff’s] requests for
counsel an abuse of discretion,” Evans, 713 F. App’x at 168
(emphasis added).
See id. at 170 (“[W]e find that exceptional
circumstances exist here because (1) [the] claims implicate a
complex . . . issue and (2) [the plaintiff] suffers from severe
mental illness and was committed to a psychiatric facility . . .
for the entirety of the litigation below.” (emphasis added)).
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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 11 of 18

Finally, Plaintiff’s elaboration on the use to which he would
put counsel confirms that, in this instance, “pro bono civil
representation would not lead to a quicker and more just result by
sharpening the issues and shaping examination,” Securities & Exch.
Comm’n v. Bennett, No. 8:17CV2453, 2021 WL 4421087, at *2 (D. Md.
Sept. 27, 2021) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213
(5th Cir. 1982) (“The district court should also consider whether
the appointment of counsel would be a service to . . . the court
and [the] defendant as well, by sharpening the issues in the case,
shaping the examination of witnesses, and thus shortening the trial
and assisting in a just determination.”).

Specifically, according

to the instant Motion, Plaintiff would direct counsel to obtain
“the expert opinion and analytical skills of a Fraud Analyst and/or
Counterfeit Document Analyst/Expert” (Docket Entry 83 at 1), as to
“fraudulent and counterfeit documents in [his] possession that
require an expert’s examination for trial purposes” (id. at 2).
Per Plaintiff’s Reply, that analysis would bear not on the unlawful
mail search claim set for trial, but instead his proposed new
claims “that many N.C. state officials have committed criminal
offenses

including

but

not

limited

to

[c]onspiracy,

[f]raud,

[c]ounterfeiting, [f]orgery, and [c]ontaminating [his] food to
cause harm and obstruct justice in this case.”

(Docket Entry 107

at 1; see also id. at 2 (“These claims . . . have been pleaded into

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 12 of 18

this lawsuit through Motion [t]o Amend Pleading for Requested
Relief and Supplementals.” (referring to Docket Entries 79 and 100,
respectively)).)4

The

Court

(per

the

undersigned

Magistrate

Judge), however, rejected the injection of any such new claims into
this case at this late stage, by “denying as futile [Plaintiff’s]
Motion to Amend Pleading for Requested Relief” (First Text Order
dated Feb. 5, 2022 (addressing Docket Entry 79)), and “treating
[his] Supplemental[] as a motion for leave to file a supplemental
pleading . . . and denying [it] as futile” (Fifth Text Order dated
Feb. 5, 2022 (internal lettering omitted) (addressing Docket Entry
100); see also First Text Order dated Feb. 4, 2022 (“denying as
futile [Plaintiff’s] Supplemental Motion and Proposed Injunction”
(addressing Docket Entry 69)); Second Text Order dated Feb. 5, 2022
(“denying [Plaintiff’s] Motion to Implead Participating Officers
into this Case, [his] Motion to Implead Additional Defendant, [his]
Motion to Implead Liable State Actors, and [his] Motion to Implead”
(addressing Docket Entries 71, 76, 77, and 87, respectively));
Third

Text

Order

dated

Feb.

5,

2022

(“denying

as

futile

[Plaintiff’s] Request for Leave to File Supplemental Pleading”
(internal brackets omitted) (addressing Docket Entry 88))).

These

facts weigh heavily against the instant Motion.

4

The Reply also adverts to Plaintiff “ma[king] a claim and
giv[ing n]otice of the [u]nconstitutionality of a common practice
by the State of N.C.” (Docket Entry 107 at 2; see also id. (denying
“aware[ness] of the statute that applies to the pattern of practice
and [stating that] counsel is needed on this complex issue”)).
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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 13 of 18

The instant Request veers even further afield, by “ask[ing]
the [C]ourt to extend counsel’s services to also assist [Plaintiff]
in formally bringing criminal charges against the state actors in
this case that have willfully engaged in criminal misconduct,
colluded, and conspired to defraud [him] of his [c]onstitutional
[r]ights and [o]bstruct[ed j]ustice in [c]overing it up.”

(Docket

Entry 127 at 1; see also id. at 1-2 (“[Plaintiff] needs counsel’s
assistance in assigning criminal liability in reference to the
fraudulent documents in his possession . . . and certain substances
that have been placed in [his] food and drink to prevent his voice
from being heard on these matters.”).)

Plaintiff’s desire to

convert (A) a civil trial on a single (relatively simple) claim
against a solitary Defendant (employed by a municipality), into
(B) a sweeping criminal inquisition about far-flung fraud and
obstruction of justice via poisoning by a wide-array of state
executive and judicial officials, could not possibly justify the
Court’s solicitation of free legal representation for Plaintiff,
because – as explained in connection with the denial of his Motion
for Quasi Criminal Proceeding (Docket Entry 72) – “‘Plaintiff
cannot bring criminal charges through a [Section] 1983 action’”
(Third Text Order dated Feb. 4, 2022 (quoting Fiore v. Benfield,
No. 1:15CV271, 2015 WL 5511156, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2015)
(unpublished)

(Peake,

M.J.),

recommendation

adopted,

slip

(M.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2015) (Biggs, J.))).

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 14 of 18

op.

Plaintiff’s trial-related filings similarly indicate that
judicial efforts to find him pro bono counsel would not promote
efficient resolution of the surviving claim, as they manifest an
intent by Plaintiff to treat the trial as a platform to air other
(ever-evolving) allegations.

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 66 at 1-12

(devoting Trial Brief to “Issues Presented” of “1. Search Warrant
Insufficient To Support Probable Cause For a Search Warrant and/or
Search,” “2. False Arrest and Imprisonment Without Probable Cause,”
“[3.]

FRAUD,

DECEPTION,

PROCEDURE

VIOLATIONS,”

“4.

Fraud

By

Detective Tyndall In Obtaining of Search Warrant,” and “5. Docket
Sheet in this Case Does Not Reflect that Detective McPhatter was
served with summons,” rather than unlawful mail search claim);
Docket Entry 89 at 1-14 (identifying and addressing as pertinent
issues in “[A]mended Trial Brief [] to supercede and replace prior
Trial Brief”:

“1. Malicious Arrest, Malicious Accusation, Illegal

Search and Seizure, Fraudulent Investigation, Lack of Probable
Cause, False Imprisonment [by] Greensboro Police Dep’t,” “2. False
Imprisonment by the Guilford County Jail (GCJ) and the [State]
Court,” 3. False Imprisonment by the Dep’t of Public Safety (DPS)
prisons,” “4. At Craven Correctional Institution, Officials Told
[Plaintiff] That He Was A ‘Parole Violator,’” “5. July 3, 2017[,
Plaintiff] notifies the Guilford County Senior Resident judge of
his Unlawful Imprisonment in the DPS,” “6. D.A. Commits Fraud On
The [State] Court[, Which] Denies Right To Counsel,” “7. Post

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 15 of 18

Release Supervision and Parole Commission (PRSPC) Issue[s] A False
and Fabricated Order With False Assertions[,] Fraud, Conspiracy,”
“8. The Chief Administrator of the PRSPC Straightens the Record,”
“9. Motion to Suppress Denied by Fraud[/]Conspiracy,” “10. Guilford
County Courts Falsify the Official Case Record of a Superior Court
Judge’s Judgment Order, And Thereby Violate The Orders Of The
Court,” and “11. [DPS] Prison Officials Intervene And Assert
Themselves To Thrawt [sic] [Plaintiff’s] Litigation And Case And To
Intentionally Bring Him Harm”).)
In light of Plaintiff’s commitment to make his single-claim,
single-Defendant trial a forum for voicing voluminous grievances
against a multitude of alleged wrong-doers, asking an attorney to
volunteer to assist Plaintiff with that trial would not serve the
interests

of

justice,

particularly

because

Plaintiff

has

demonstrated a penchant for improperly lashing out at anyone he
perceives as an impediment to his objectives, as well as an intent
to continue on that course during his trial (where any responsible
pro bono counsel assigned to Plaintiff who declined to join a
misguided mission would become a likely target of his ire).

(See,

e.g., Text Order dated Feb. 16, 2018 (“warning Plaintiff . . . that
he must not make further frivolous allegations against employees of
the Court,” after he “irresponsibly suggested that ‘someone [in the
Clerk’s Office wa]s purposely hindering his progress in these
matters,’” when, “[i]n fact, the fault for any and all delays in

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[his] receipt of mailings l[ay] exclusively with him, due to his
failure to submit a properly[ ]captioned, timely notice of address
change” (internal brackets omitted)); Docket Entry 129 at 1-2
(stating

in

“Notice:

Fourth

Circuit

Courts

Follow

Suit

With

Obstructions In Post Conviction Proceedings” that “federal Fourth
Circuit [c]ourts have contributed in depriving [Plaintiff] of his
U.S.

Constitutional

rights

by

proffesional

[sic]

misconduct,

failures to address motions and claims, denial of motions before
receipt of supporting documents, judgments against the weight of
the

evidence,

abuses

of

discretion,

and

departures

from

the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,” that “certain
federal officials wanted to sweep the state’s fraud under a rug and
pull the

wool

over

[his]

eyes,”

that

the

“bias[ed],

unfair,

unconstitutional, and unlawful approach to this case has exposed
the good ole boy connection is very much alive and thriving in the
Fourth Circuit [c]ourts,” and that “[he] would like to reserve the
right to amend his pleadings at trial, in voicing and showing in
clear detail his post conviction experiences in this case within
the Fourth Circuit [c]ourts,” in order to “make [m]edia [h]eadline
[n]ews and give the citizens a more accurately [sic] depiction of
who they have placed in the seats that serve up Justice to our
children, brothers, mothers, fathers, sisters, and close friends
and relatives,” as well as to “[l]et this trial serve to expose the
corruption within the Fourth Circuit [c]ourts”).)

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Case 1:17-cv-00934-LCB-LPA Document 142 Filed 02/11/22 Page 17 of 18

Indeed, granting the instant Motion and/or instant Request
likely would do harm, for reasons recognized decades ago:
Volunteer lawyer time is a precious commodity. Courts
are given a major role in its distribution. Because this
resource is available in only limited quantity, every
assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client
deprives society of a volunteer lawyer available for a
deserving cause. We cannot afford that waste.
Available volunteer-lawyer time should not be allocated
arbitrarily . . . . The phrase pro bono publico suggests
meaningfully that distribution of this resource should be
made with reference to the public benefit. . . .
. . . [I]ndiscriminate assignment [of pro bono counsel]
. . . demoralize[s] volunteers and diminish[es] an
already inadequate resource. Injustice is not in short
supply. Lawyers who volunteer their services hope to be
employed in an effort to remedy injustice. If they find
repeatedly that their services instead are devoted to
giving the semblance of merit to undeserving complaints,
then instead of giving their time through the courts they
will offer it to agencies that make better use of it, or
will not offer it at all.
Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172-73 (italics omitted).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not shown exceptional circumstances justifying
the Court’s resort to the PBR Program to try to find counsel
willing to represent Plaintiff without compensation.
IT

IS

THEREFORE

ORDERED

that

Plaintiff’s

Motion

for

Appointment of Counsel (Docket Entry 83) and his Counsel Request
(Docket Entry 127) are DENIED.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
February 11, 2022
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