WATSON v. MCPHATTER et al
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD signed on 1/29/2019. RECOMMENDED that the Dismissal Motion (Docket Entry 12 ) be denied. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TRAVIS L. WATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DETECTIVE MCPHATTER, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
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)
)
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)
)
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1:17cv934
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
case
comes
before
the
undersigned
United
States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on “Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss” (Docket Entry 12) (the “Dismissal Motion”).
For the
reasons that follow, the Court should deny the Dismissal Motion.
BACKGROUND
Alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth Amendment,
Plaintiff Travis L. Watson initiated this pro se action against
Detective McPhatter, Detective Altizer, and Detective Ludemann
(collectively, the “Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Docket Entry 2 (the “Complaint”) at 2-3.)1
More specifically,
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that Defendants conducted an “illegal
search and seizure” (id. at 3) at his apartment around 8:35 a.m. on
December 29, 2016 (id. at 4).
According to the Complaint:
1 Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF
footer’s pagination.
“[He] was arrested outside of [his] residence,” and, “[a]fter
[he]
was
handcuffed,
[Defendants]
immediately
enter[ed]
the
residence without a search warrant or probable cause or exigent
circumstances” (id. at 6) or “consent to enter or search” (id. at
5).
His “fianc[é]e (Carla Morris) and [his] mother (Judy West)
also were present” during this event.
(Id.)
“Detective Matthews
stood outside the door of the residence while [Defendants] detained
Carla Morris inside the apartment.
[Plaintiff]
until
officers
approximately 8:40 a.m.”
Judy West was outside with
escorted
(Id.)
[him]
away
.
.
.
at
Defendants’ “illegal search”
resulted in the discovery and seizure of a firearm (id. at 6) and
caused, inter alia, “[e]motional and mental suffering” and “[j]ob
loss” (id. at 5).
Thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(the “Rules”).
(See Docket Entry 12 at 1.)
In particular,
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s allegations that “there was no
probable cause or exigent circumstances are legal conclusions” and
“provide no
basis
for
this
[C]ourt
to
draw
[the]
reasonable
inference that [Defendants] are liable for to [sic] [P]laintiff for
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”
(Docket Entry 15 at 4.)
Defendants further assert that qualified immunity protects them
from liability because “Plaintiff has failed to provide any facts
in the [C]omplaint to show that his rights were clearly established
2
at the time of the alleged illegal search such that the three
officers should have known that their actions were illegal.”
(Id.
at 6.)
In
response
to
the
Dismissal
Motion,
Plaintiff
filed
“Plaintiff’s Answer To Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss (Motion To
Deny Dismissal).”
(Docket Entry 19 (the “Supplement”) at 1.)
Filed within twenty-one days of the Dismissal Motion’s filing
(compare id. at 7, with Docket Entry 12 at 2), the Supplement
contains additional factual allegations and “is supported by the
affidavits of Judy West and Carla Morris” (Docket Entry 19 at 2),
as well as other exhibits (see, e.g., id.; Docket Entry 19-4 at 1).
(See Docket Entry 19 at 1-6.)
The Rules permit a party to “amend
its pleading once as a matter of course within,” as relevant here,
“21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b),” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(1)(B).
Plaintiff’s
Defendants treat the Supplement as amending
Complaint
(see,
e.g.,
Docket
Entry
21
at
1-3
(discussing allegations from the Supplement and its exhibits)),
and, in the absence of an objection to this interpretation from
Plaintiff (see Docket Entries dated May 7, 2018, to present), this
Opinion does the same.
As relevant to the Dismissal Motion, the
Supplement alleges that:2
2
This recitation includes only those portions of the
Supplement’s exhibits that Plaintiff adopted in his Supplement.
See Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 167-68 (4th
Cir. 2016).
3
Defendants,
in
contravention
of
the
Fourth
Amendment,
“violate[d] and disregard[ed Plaintiff’s] expectation of privacy
in” the apartment where he “resided at the time of the violation.”
(Docket Entry
19
at 1.)
In
particular,
Defendants
violated
Plaintiff’s fourth-amendment rights “when after arrest (outside of
[P]laintiff’s residence) [D]efendants entered, searched, and seized
a firearm without getting advance judicial approval for the search
and seizure through the warrant procedure.”
(Id.)
“Defendants,
after non-consented entry (see Detective Altizer’s body cam on Dec.
29, 2016 — day of arrest) did also conduct an illegal protective
sweep in which they used to gain entry,” in violation of, inter
alia, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
(Id. at 1-2.)
More specifically, “[t]he police came to the [residence’s]
door early on December 29, 2016. After they identified themselves,
[Plaintiff] came to the door with his hands up.”
(Docket Entry 19-
1, ¶ 3.)
“[Plaintiff] came out of the apartment door with his
hands up.
The police grabbed him as soon as he was about two feet
(2’) outside of the apartment.”
(Docket Entry 19-2, ¶ 3; see also
Docket Entry 19-1, ¶ 3 (“The police grabbed him and took him
outside the apartment.”).)
“As soon as they grabbed [Plaintiff],
approximately three (3) police officers went into the apartment.
Two of the police officers stayed in the apartment and one left.”
(Docket Entry 19-2, ¶ 4; accord Docket Entry 19-1, ¶ 4.)
The
police entered “right after Officer J.L. Matthews cleared the
4
residence from the front door . . . .
There was no reports or
indications that the officers felt threatened or that they had any
basis to believe that evidence was being destroyed.” (Docket Entry
19 at 2.)
“After the entry (without a search warrant) the search of
[the] residence did not end.” (Id.) “Detective Altizer physically
remained in the residence” and “[t]he police kept the residence
door open” (id.) with another officer standing near the apartment
door “looking at the living room and what was in the living room”
(Docket Entry 19-1, ¶ 9), for approximately two hours (see id.,
¶ 9; Docket Entry 19 at 3).
The officers ordered Carla Morris “to
remain on the couch and not to move” and “did not allow her to
answer her phone.”
(Docket Entry 19 at 2.)
For “a long time”
(Docket Entry 19-1, ¶ 6; Docket Entry 19-2, ¶ 6), police officers
detained Carla Morris on the couch and refused to let Judy West
enter the residence.
(Docket Entry 19-1, ¶¶ 5, 8; Docket Entry 19-
2, ¶ 5.) “[D]uring this time,” Defendants “look[ed] through papers
inside the apartment” (Docket Entry 19-2, ¶ 7) and “searched
through
the
mail
of
the
residence”
accord Docket Entry 19-1, ¶ 4).
(Docket
Entry
19
at
2;
“After the search had been ongoing
for (2) two hours (see search warrant for verification of the
execution of the warrant which was at 10:30 a.m. Search began at
8:30 a.m.), Detective W.C. Tyndall obtained a search warrant to
5
search the residence and [P]laintiff’s 1997 Acura from Magistrate
Watts at 9:30 a.m. on December 29, 2016.”
(Docket Entry 19 at 3.)
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss Standards
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the sufficiency of a complaint,”
but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of
a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Republican Party of
N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, in
reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept the facts
alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App.,
626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Coleman v. Court
of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
The Court must also “draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, a pro se
complaint must “be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted);
but see Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir.
2008) (explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth
Circuit
requirement
that
has
a
“not
read
pleading
Erickson
contain
to
more
undermine
than
conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6
labels
[the]
and
To avoid Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). To qualify as plausible, a claim needs sufficient factual
content to support a reasonable inference of the defendant’s
liability for the alleged misconduct.
U.S. at 556).
Id.
(citing Twombly, 550
The complaint need not contain detailed factual
recitations, but must provide “the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
“At
bottom, determining whether a complaint states . . . a plausible
claim for relief . . . will ‘be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.’” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.
2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
II. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As the
Supreme Court has explained, the “physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.”
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
As such, “[i]t is a basic principle of
7
Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”
Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless,
“this
presumption
circumstances
because
the
ultimate
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”
459
(2011)
(internal
may
be
overcome
touchstone
of
in
the
some
Fourth
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
quotation
marks
and
brackets
omitted).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has specified certain “narrow and
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement,” Flippo v.
West Va.,
protective
528
U.S.
sweep
11,
13 (1999),
exception
to
the
including
warrant
“a
well-settled
requirement,
as
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325
(1990),” United States v. Jones, 667 F.3d 477, 482 (4th Cir. 2012)
(parallel citations omitted).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] ‘protective sweep’ is
a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and
conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.
It
is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places
in which a person might be hiding.”
Buie, 494 U.S. at 327.
In
such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment permits a protective sweep
“if the searching officer possessed a reasonable belief based on
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the
officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individual
8
posing a danger to the officer or others.” Id. (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Importantly, though, the
Supreme Court has
emphasize[d] that such a protective sweep, aimed at
protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the
circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the
premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of
those spaces where a person may be found.
The sweep
lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the
reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer
than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the
premises.
Id. at 335-36 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 335 n.3 (“A
protective sweep is without question a ‘search,’ as was the patdown
in Terry[ v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)]; they are permissible on
less than probable cause only because they are limited to that
which is necessary to protect the safety of officers and others.”).
Finally, a protective sweep remains permissible even if police
arrest an individual “just outside the residence.” Jones, 667 F.3d
at 485 n.10.
Here, Defendants arrested Plaintiff within two feet of his
apartment door, in his fiancée’s presence.
(See generally Docket
Entry 19-1; Docket Entry 19-2, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5.)
Regardless of whether
those circumstances justify a protective sweep (compare Docket
Entry 21 at 4, with Docket Entry 19 at 5), Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ actions “exceeded [the] allowable scope” of “a lawful
protective sweep” (Docket Entry 19 at 5). In particular, Plaintiff
alleges that “[D]efendants[] did not limit themselves to searching
9
for persons.
The officers looked through papers while in the
course of the protective sweep.
In addition, [D]efendants grossly
exceeded the allowable duration of a protective sweep,” as “the
sweep/search lasted for (2) two hours before Detective Tyndall came
with a warrant to search.”
(Id.)
These allegations plausibly support a fourth-amendment claim.
As the Fourth Circuit has observed:
A protective sweep is limited to a cursory
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found
and should last no longer than it takes to complete the
arrest and depart the premises. We have distilled this
language to indicate that the sweep may last no longer
than needed to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger
and no longer than needed to arrest the suspect and leave
the premises.
United States v. Laudermilt, 677 F.3d 605, 610 (4th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United
States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 693 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Thus, the
extent of any Fourth Amendment intrusion undertaken for purposes of
officer safety must be ‘no more than necessary to protect the
officer from harm.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Buie, 494 U.S.
at 333)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants arrested him
around 8:35 a.m. (see Docket Entry 2 at 4) and “escorted [him] away
. . . at approximately 8:40 a.m.” (id. at 5).
Yet, Defendants
allegedly remained in Plaintiff’s residence for nearly two more
hours, during which time “[t]hey looked through some mail in the
living room” (Docket Entry 19-1, ¶ 4) and “were looking through
papers inside the apartment” (Docket Entry 19-2, ¶ 7).
10
Such
actions
exceed
the
bounds
of
a
legitimate
protective
sweep.
See Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36; see also Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 767 (1969) (“After arresting a man in his house, to
rummage at will among his papers in search of whatever will convict
him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what might be done
under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more
protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff therefore states a
plausible fourth-amendment claim against Defendants.3
Defendants, however, maintain that qualified immunity protects
them from Plaintiff’s claim.
Entry 21 at 7.)
(See Docket Entry 15 at 5-7; Docket
“To establish a qualified-immunity defense, a
public official must demonstrate that (1) a plaintiff has not
3
Relying on Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001),
Defendants also assert that “the question presented by Plaintiff’s
response and his attachments to the response, also raised the
question of whether the officers could enter the apartment to
secure the scene for the execution of the search warrant” (Docket
Entry 21 at 4-5) given that, upon learning of Defendants’ arrest of
Plaintiff at 8:56 a.m., “Detective Tyndall informed the officers he
was en route with a search warrant for the Plaintiff’s apartment
and vehicle” (id. at 3). This argument misses the mark. To begin,
it overlooks Defendants’ actions in the sixteen-minute interval
between “escorting [Plaintiff] away” (Docket Entry 2 at 5) and
learning about the (not-yet-issued) search warrant (see Docket
Entry 19 at 3, 6).
Moreover, as Defendants concede, “[t]he
question presented to the [Supreme] Court [in McArthur] was whether
the detention while waiting for an officer to obtain and deliver
the search warrant was unreasonable.”
(Docket Entry 21 at 5.)
Here, however, Plaintiff asserts no claim on behalf of Carla Morris
regarding the legality her detention. (See Docket Entry 19 at 4
(“Ms. Morris is only a witness for the purposes of this civil
action.”).) Accordingly, Defendants’ McArthur contentions fail to
justify dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim.
11
alleged
or
shown
facts
that
make
out
a
violation
of
a
constitutional right, or that (2) the right at issue was not
‘clearly established’ at the time of its alleged violation.” Owens
v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 395–96
(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
“A qualified immunity defense can be presented in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, but, . . . when asserted at this early stage in the
proceedings, the defense faces a formidable hurdle and is usually
not successful.”
Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“This is so because dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate
only if a plaintiff fails to state a claim that is plausible on its
face.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
Here, Defendants contend that “Plaintiff . . . failed to
provide facts which would support an argument that the officers
violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”
7; accord Docket Entry 15 at 6.)
(Docket Entry 21 at
However, “[i]t is well settled
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted
without
a
warrant
issued
upon
probable
cause
is
‘per
se
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.’”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
It remains equally well-
established that “a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the
12
arresting
officers,
if
justified
by
the
circumstances,
is
nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only
to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be
found” and may last “no longer than it takes to complete the arrest
and depart the premises.”
Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in a search of his
apartment, including his mail and papers, long after they arrested
and
removed
allegations
him
from
“show
the
that
premises.
Accepted
[Plaintiff’s]
rights
as
true,
were
such
clearly
established at the time of the alleged illegal search such that the
three officers should have known that their actions were illegal”
(Docket
Entry
15
at
6).
The
Court
should
therefore
reject
Defendants’ qualified immunity argument at this stage of the
proceedings.
See Owens, 767 F.3d at 396.
CONCLUSION
Defendants failed to justify Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Dismissal Motion (Docket
Entry 12) be denied.
This 29th day of January, 2019.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
13
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