YOUNG v. FERGUSON

Filing 36

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOI ELIZABETH PEAKE on 7/26/2019; that Plaintiff's Motion [Doc. # 26 ] seeking appointment of counsel is denied. RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 28 ] be granted, that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 31 ] be denied, and that this action be dismissed. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JAMES JETER JR YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
B. FERGUSON,
Defendants.

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1:17CV1063

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION, AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a pro se civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff James Jeter Jr
Young, an inmate in the North Carolina Department of Public Safety. His central allegations
in this case are that Defendant B. Ferguson, a police officer in Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
improperly searched his person before discovering a bag of heroin in Plaintiff’s pants.
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #28] which Plaintiff opposes.
Plaintiff also filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #31], as well as an earlier
Motion [Doc. #26] seeking the appointment of counsel. The Court will now address all three
pending motions. As set out below, the Court concludes that the prior denial of Plaintiff’s
motion to suppress in his state criminal case precludes Plaintiff from now bringing his claims
here challenging that same search.
I.

Allegations and Facts
Plaintiff’s Complaint makes only sparse factual allegations.

Plaintiff claims that

Defendant searched him during a traffic stop on a ramp to an interstate highway in Winston-

Salem at approximately 9:30 p.m. on March 24, 2017. (Complaint [Doc. #2] § IV.) Plaintiff
states that Defendant justified the search of Plaintiff’s person by stating that he smelled the
odor of burnt marijuana coming from Plaintiff. (Id., Attach.) He alleges that Defendant
ordered him out of the vehicle he was driving, ordered him to leave his cellular telephones in
the seat, and grasped Plaintiff’s right arm as he stepped out of the vehicle. (Id.) Plaintiff
contends that Defendant then put Plaintiff’s hands on the hood in “frisk position” before
asking whether he had smoked marijuana or been around anyone smoking it. (Id.) When
Plaintiff stated that he had not, Defendant then asked if Plaintiff minded if he checked. (Id.)
Plaintiff replied, “NO!” and Defendant then began to frisk him. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant ordered him to spread his legs further and then began to “cuff and grasp
[Plaintiff’s] genitals.” (Id.) Plaintiff objected and attempted to turn around, but Plaintiff
prevented him by leaning into his lower back. (Id.) Defendant then allegedly began to
“explore [Plaintiff’s] buttock area with his hand by squeezing sliding and clinching between
his anal area.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant had no probable cause or reasonable
suspicion justifying a search of Plaintiff’s person, that Plaintiff did not willingly consent to any
search, and that, if he did consent, he did not consent to a search of his genitals and buttocks.1
(Id.) Therefore, he concludes that the search of his person violated his rights under the
constitutions of both the United States and the State of North Carolina. (Id. § II(B).)2 Based
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At times in the briefing, Plaintiff also appears to allege that the initial stop of the vehicle he was driving was
improper. However, there is no allegation that Defendant made that stop and all evidence indicates that he
arrived on the scene after the stop was made by other officers. Given Defendant’s lack of involvement in the
stop, Plaintiff cannot raise a claim against him based on the stop itself.
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Regarding Plaintiff’s claims under the United States Constitution, Plaintiff cites the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments as having been violated. The facts of his claim appear to attempt
to raise a claim under the Fourth Amendment, which covers searches and seizures, and the Fourteenth

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on this contention, he sues Defendant in his individual capacity seeking damages in the amount
of $250,000. (Id. §§ I(B), VI.)
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant filed an Affidavit
(Defendant’s Brief [Doc. #29], Attach. 2) with supporting exhibits. In that document,
Defendant recounts his version of events. He states that he arrived on the scene of the traffic
stop involving the vehicle Plaintiff was driving and, a few moments later, engaged Plaintiff in
conversation through an open window of the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 6-7.) However, he then smelled
the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the driver’s side of the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant
asked Plaintiff if he had smoked any marijuana and Plaintiff replied that he had not. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Having been informed by another officer that he had consent to search the vehicle, Defendant
asked Plaintiff to step out. (Id.) Defendant states that he then asked Plaintiff if he minded
Defendant searching his person for drugs or other items and that Plaintiff answered, “‘No.’”
(Id.)
Defendant then searched Plaintiff’s person. As he neared Plaintiff’s buttocks area, he
noticed Plaintiff clinching his buttocks together, as if to keep something from falling. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Defendant alleges that he then felt a hard object in the area of Plaintiff’s buttocks that
Defendant knew was not part of Plaintiff’s body. (Id.) He claims that Plaintiff “flinched” at
this point, leading him to attempt to handcuff Plaintiff as Plaintiff reached for the area where
Defendant felt the hard object. (Id.) After other officers helped him handcuff Plaintiff, a bag
Amendment, through which the Fourth Amendment extends to state officers. However, nothing in the
Complaint implicates the Fifth (indictment, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, federal due process, taking of
private property for public use), Sixth (speedy and public jury trial, informing of accusations, confrontation and
compulsion of witnesses, assistance of counsel), Eighth (cruel and unusual punishment, excessive fines and
bail), or Ninth (reservation of rights not enumerated) Amendments.

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of what later turned out to be heroin fell out of the left leg of Plaintiff’s pants. (Id.) Defendant
asked Plaintiff if he had any other contraband, at which point Plaintiff stated that he did not,
but that he had a digital scale. (Id. ¶ 10.) He then shook his right leg and the scale fell out of
his pants on that side. (Id.) Plaintiff later pled guilty to possession and trafficking of heroin.
(Id. ¶ 15.)
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists. Shealy

v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). A genuine issue of fact exists if the evidence
presented could lead a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A court considering a
motion for summary judgment must view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence before it in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. The proponent of
summary judgment “bears the initial burden of pointing to the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). If the movant carries this burden, then
the burden “shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with facts sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact.” Id. at 718-19 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).
III.

Discussion
A.

Claims Under the United States Constitution

As noted above, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his rights under the United
States Constitution by frisking him without proper justification, without consent, and/or
outside the bounds of any justification or consent. Defendant’s primary argument in response
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is that these claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because Plaintiff already
litigated these issues and lost on them at a suppression hearing in his state court criminal
proceedings.
“The federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). “Under collateral estoppel,
once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may
preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the
first case.” Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). This applies not
only to decisions by other federal courts, but also decisions from the state courts. In fact,
“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state–court
judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”
Id. at 96. The doctrine also extends to actions under § 1983, id. at 104-05, and, specifically, to
decisions made by state courts in deciding suppression issues during state criminal cases, Gray
v. Farley, 13 F.3d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) (“A suppression hearing in an earlier state criminal
trial collaterally estops the relitigation of the same issues in a § 1983 action if the elements of
collateral estoppel are met.”).
Because the decision upon which Defendant seeks to rely came from the courts of
North Carolina, this Court must look to North Carolina law to determine whether or not
Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from asserting his claims in this case. North Carolina law
holds that defensive collateral estoppel applies where “the issue in question was identical to
an issue actually litigated and necessary to the judgment, that the prior action resulted in a final
judgment on the merits, and that the present parties are the same as, or in privity with, the
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parties to the earlier action.” Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Thomas
M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556–57 (1986)). Also,
“North Carolina courts have abandoned the final requirement of ‘mutuality of estoppel’ for
the defensive use of collateral estoppel, so long as the party seeking to reopen the issue ‘had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the matter in the previous action.” Id.
Applying those principles to the present case, the transcript of Plaintiff’s suppression
hearing in state court reveals that Plaintiff clearly litigated as part of his suppression hearing
the questions of whether there was a sufficient constitutional basis for the frisk of his person,
whether he gave valid consent for the frisk, and whether the subsequent frisk by Defendant
was unreasonable in scope or beyond the bounds of any consent. His attorney specifically
argued that both probable cause and exigent circumstances were required for the search that
occurred. (Defendant’s Brief, Attach. 3 at 57-59.) He also argued that Plaintiff did not validly
consent to the search. (Id. at 61-62, 64-65.) Finally, he asserted at every turn that the search
exceeded the scope needed for a simple check for marijuana or the bounds of any consent
given by Plaintiff. (Id. at 59-62.)
In denying Plaintiff’s motion to suppress, the state court found that there was a
“reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle” that Plaintiff was driving and that
subsequent contact between Plaintiff and the officers involved led to probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff for several offenses. (Id. at 66.) The court also found that Defendant genuinely
smelled the odor of burnt marijuana on Plaintiff. (Id. at 66, 71.) The state court also
specifically found that Plaintiff consented to a search of his person for marijuana by stating
“no” when asked if he minded a search for the same. (Id. at 71-72.) The state court further
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found that Defendant engaged in an “ordinary pat-down of frisk” of Plaintiff’s lower body
which involved patting down the outer and inner sides of Plaintiff’s left leg before instructing
Plaintiff to spread his feet further apart. (Id. at 72.) When Defendant’s hands passed near
Plaintiff’s buttocks area, Defendant then had a “spontaneous and sudden reaction to feeling
something hard located on the [Plaintiff’s] bottom, his buttocks area.” (Id.) After that
“startled reaction,” Plaintiff clinched his body and began to resist, leading other officers to
intervene and handcuff Plaintiff before the bag of drugs fell out of the leg of his pants. (Id.
at 72-73.) All of these events were illustrated not only by testimony from the officers, but also
by video footage from a body camera worn by one of the officers. (Id. at 74.) Based on those
findings, the state court concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff at the time he
was searched or frisked, that he additionally gave knowing and voluntary consent for that
search, and that the search that followed “was not an unreasonable search under the totality
of the circumstances then existing, and thus, did not offend the [Plaintiff’s] rights pursuant to
the United States and or North Carolina constitutions[’] . . . protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” (Id. at 76.) The court then ruled against Plaintiff on his suppression
motion. (Id. at 77.)
Based on the foregoing record, it is abundantly clear that Plaintiff raised in the state
court the same issues he raises here, that he not only had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
them, but actually did litigate them, that the issues were necessary to a decision on his
suppression motion, and that he lost on every issue. For that reason, under the authority cited
above, he is collaterally estopped from relitigating these issues in the present action.

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Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted on this basis, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment should be denied, and this case should be dismissed.2
B.

Claims Under the North Carolina Constitution

In addition to Plaintiff’s claims under the United States Constitution, Plaintiff also
attempts to raise claims under the North Carolina Constitution against Defendant in his
individual capacity. However, Plaintiff also litigated his claims under the North Carolina
Constitution in the state suppression hearing, where the state trial court ruled against him.
(Suppression Tr. at 76.) Therefore, any claims under the North Carolina Constitution are
barred for the same reasons discussed above. These claims also fail for a second reason, which
is that there is no direct cause of action against individual defendants under the North Carolina
Constitution. Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, et al., 330 N.C. 761, 787-88, 413 S.E.2d 276,
292-93 (1992); see also Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 789 (4th Cir. 2004). Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment denied as to these claims for this additional reason.
C.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Prior to filing his Motion for Summary Judgment in this case, Plaintiff filed a Motion
[Doc. #26] requesting an appointment of counsel in order to help him file for summary
judgment. His later filing of his Motion for Summary Judgment appears to moot that request.
Moreover, this Court has previously considered and denied Plaintiff’s prior requests for

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In addition, the Court notes that to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are an attempt to call his criminal convictions
into question, the claims would be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), absent a showing
that the convictions had been separately vacated.

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appointment of counsel in this case, and the Court finds no reason to revisit those
determinations at this time. As set out above, Plaintiff’s claims in the present action are clearly
barred by his prior unsuccessful litigation of those same claims through counsel in his state
criminal case. Therefore, the request will be denied.
Plaintiff has also filed a copy of Interrogatories to Defendant [Doc. #35]. However,
discovery has closed, and there is no basis for additional discovery given the determination set
out above.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. #26] seeking
appointment of counsel is denied.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
#28] be granted, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #31] be denied, and
that this action be dismissed.
This, the 26th day of July, 2019.

/s/ Joi Elizabeth Peake
United States Magistrate Judge

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