ARMITAGE v. BIOGEN INC.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 1/2/2019; that Plaintiff's motion (Docket Entry 25 ) is GRANTED, and Defendant's motion (Docket Entry 20 ) is DENIED. Biogen shall produce to Plaintiff discovery requests as stated herein. (Sheets, Jamie)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JACK ARMITAGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIOGEN, INC.,
Defendant.
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1:17CV1133
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jack Armitage’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to
Compel Discovery (Docket Entry 25) and Biogen, Inc.’s (“Biogen”) Motion for Protective
Order (Docket Entry 20.) For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion
to compel, DENY Defendant’s motion for protective order, and order Biogen to respond to
Plaintiff’s discovery requests as set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed at Biogen from 2003 until March 28, 2017. (Compl. ¶ 10,
Docket Entry 6.) Plaintiff held the position of Quality Control Supervisor from 2003 until
2015. (Id. ¶ 11.) In 2015, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Associate Director of
Manufacturing and held the title until termination of employment on March 28, 2017. (Id. ¶
12.) Plaintiff alleges that Biogen stripped Plaintiff of his job duties and required him to sit
alone with nothing to do all day while at work with the intent of making Plaintiff’s work
environment so intolerable to him that he would resign his position. (Id. ¶¶ 26, Document
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Entry 21-2.) Plaintiff also alleges that due to his age he was disciplined, demoted, and
constructively discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
(Document Entry 21-2.) Plaintiff was 52 years of age when the alleged discrimination
occurred. (Id.)
Biogen alleges that Plaintiff was removed from his position because Plaintiff created a
“culture of fear” in his division. (Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Prot. Order at 2, Docket Entry 21.)
James Phillips, aged 47, immediately replaced Plaintiff. Id. Mr. Phillips served in that position
for ten months before accepting a promotion to Director of Manufacturing at Biogen’s
Switzerland facility. (Id. at 3.) Mr. Phillips accepted the offer in July 2017 but remained in
Plaintiff’s former position until November 2017. (Id.) In August 2017, Plaintiff filed two
charges with the EEOC while Mr. Phillips was in Plaintiff’s former position. (Id.) However,
in June 2017, Biogen announced that Mr. Phillips accepted the position in Switzerland and
Biogen posted Plaintiff’s former position internally for applicants. (Wagstaff Decl. ¶ 3, August
30, 2017, Docket Entry 26-9.) Ms. Rachel Ney, Plaintiff’s alleged comparator, replaced Mr.
Phillips. At the time of hire, Ms. Ney was between 38 and 40 years old.1 (Pltf’s Br. Supp. Mot.
Compel at 1, Document Entry 26.)
On March 12, 2018, the undersigned approved the parties’ joint motion establishing a
period for discovery. (See Joint 26(f) Report, Docket Entry 12; Docket Entry 13.) The joint
report provided, “[r]eports required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and disclosures required by Rule
26(a)(2)(C) are due during the discovery period.” (Joint 26(f) Report at 2.) On June 15, 2018,
Although the position was posted in June 2017, it is unclear when Ms. Ney was hired, or how old she was when she was
hired. See also Wagstaff Dep. 134:9-11 (Mr. Wagstaff guessed Ms. Ney’s age to be “somewhere around 40” years old).
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the parties stipulated to a consent protective order. (Docket Entry 18.) On April 10, 2018,
Plaintiff served his first set of interrogatories. (Docket Entry 26-1.)
In the motion(s) at issue, Plaintiff moves the Court to compel Biogen to produce
answers to Plaintiff’s first interrogatory No. 4 and documents requested pursuant to Plaintiff’s
second request for production of documents Nos. 3 and 6. (Docket Entry 25 at 4.) On April
10, 2018, Plaintiff asked Biogen to provide detailed information regarding the process utilized
to hire for Plaintiff’s position once it was posted, pursuant to Biogen’s company policy.
(Docket Entry 25-2 at 6.) Biogen responded in part2, but objected to the bulk of Plaintiff’s
request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case.
(Docket Entry 26-5 at 7.) After meeting and conferring with Biogen’s counsel, Plaintiff asserts
that Biogen was planning to take the position that James Phillips, Plaintiff’s immediate
replacement, was a “permanent” replacement — although Biogen did not follow its internal
policies when it transferred Mr. Phillips into the position, and employees were under the
impression that the transfer was temporary. (Docket Entry 26 at 3.) This prompted Plaintiff
to serve a second set of Discovery on August 16, 2018. In pertinent part, request for document
No. 3 asked Biogen to produce documents reflecting communications between Ms. Ney (who
eventually replaced Mr. Phillips), and any member of Human Resources regarding Plaintiff
and/or his position. (Docket Entry 26-4 at 5.) Request No. 6 asked Biogen to produce a copy
of Ms. Ney’s personnel file, including any documents relating to compensation. (Id. at 6.)
Biogen’s response indicated that James Phillips was transferred to Plaintiff’s position and there was
no recruiting effort to fill Plaintiff’s position. Biogen also asserted that “Biogen is presently pursuing
discovery and investigation of the facts relating to this case, and has not completed discovery or
preparation for trial.” (Docket Entry 26-5 at 7-8.)
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Biogen served its responses on September 17, 2018, objecting generally, that Plaintiff’s
Request No. 3 is “overly broad and unduly burdensome in disproportion to the likelihood of
the production likely to lead to the discovery of information in this case.” (Document Entry
20-6 at 5.) More specifically, Biogen objected on the basis that Mr. Phillips immediately
succeeded Plaintiff; not Ms. Ney. (Id.) Biogen made the same objections to request No. 6 and
further objected on the grounds that Ms. Ney was “not identified in the EEOC charge,
complaint, initial disclosures, or Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories.” (Id. at 7-8.)
On October 3, 2018, Counsel for both parties met and conferred. Plaintiff’s counsel
discussed that they would consider withdrawing the requests for information regarding Ms.
Ney, if Biogen agreed to produce documentation showing that Biogen’s local RTP office
obtained the necessary internal approvals to circumvent Biogen’s internal policies for filling
open positions when Biogen transferred Mr. Phillips in Plaintiff’s former position. (See Docket
Entry 26 at 5; 29-7 at 2-4.) Biogen refused to provide any such information, and instead filed
a motion for protective order on October 11, 2018.
II. DISCUSSION
As a general rule, Federal Rule 26(b) provides general provisions regarding the scope
of discovery:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues
at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). District courts generally have broad discretion in managing discovery,
including whether to grant or deny a motion to compel. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v.
Alpha of Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 929 (4th Cir. 1995); Erdmann v. Preferred Research, Inc. of
Georgia, 852 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1988). “[T]he party or person resisting discovery, not the
party moving to compel discovery, bears the burden of persuasion.” Carter Hughes v. Research
Triangle Inst., No. 1:11CV546, 2014 WL 4384078, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2014) (citation
omitted) (unpublished).
Additionally, pursuant to Rule 26(c) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court may,
for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including . . . forbidding inquiry into certain matters,
or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
Protective orders pursuant to Rule 26(c) “should be sparingly used and cautiously granted.”
Medlin v. Andrew, 113 F.R.D. 650, 652 (M.D.N.C. 1987). “Not only are protective orders
prohibiting depositions rarely granted, but [P]laintiff has a heavy burden of demonstrating the
good cause for such an order.” Id. at 653 (citation omitted). “Normally, in determining good
cause, a court will balance the interest of a party in obtaining the information versus the
interest of his opponent in keeping the information confidential or in not requiring its
production.” UAI Tech., Inc. v. Valutech, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 188, 191 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (citation
omitted).
Thus, “[i]n order to obtain a protective order prohibiting a deposition, the
proponent must convince the Court that the information sought by the deposition lacks
relevance to the extent that the likelihood and severity of the harm or injury caused by the
deposition outweighs any need for the information.” Id. Trial courts have broad discretion
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“to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).
Plaintiff now moves the Court to compel Biogen to provide or produce answers to
Plaintiff’s first interrogatory No. 4 and documents requested pursuant to Plaintiff’s second
request for production of documents Nos. 3 and 6. (Docket Entry 25.) Biogen moves the
Court to grant a protective order over the same requests. (Docket Entry 20.) In this case, the
decision on the motion to compel will provide an answer to the motion for a protective order.
See e.g., Holtz v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
1. Interrogatory No. 4
The Rules provide, “a party may serve on any other party . . . written interrogatories.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be
answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). “The
responding party must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served
with the interrogatories.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). The Rules further authorize “[a] party
seeking discovery [to] move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or
inspection” to discovery requests if “a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under
Rule 33” or “fails to produce documents or fails to respond that inspection will be permitted
— or fails to permit inspection — as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B).
Plaintiff seeks a full response to first Interrogatory 4, which asked Biogen to state the
following: 1) the date when Biogen commenced recruiting activities; 2) the date when the
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position held by the Plaintiff was filled; and 3) the name and address of the person hired,
together with the person’s age and starting salary. (Docket Entry 26-2 at 6.)
In support of its objections, Biogen argues the following: Biogen adequately responded
to the interrogatory and identified James Phillips as the replacement, who was transferred from
small scale manufacturing to lead cell culture in large scale manufacturing in January 2017;
Biogen indicated that Mr. Phillips was aged 47 at the time, and indicated that there was no
recruitment effort because Mr. Phillips was known to be capable of performing the job and
improving the culture issues in large scale manufacturing. (Defs.’ Br. Opp. Mot. Compel at 7,
Docket Entry 30.) Biogen also argues that there was no reason for Biogen to believe from a
plain reading of Interrogatory No. 4 that a response would name anyone other than Mr.
Phillips. (Id.)
In its motion for protective order, Biogen argues that the motion should be granted
because Plaintiff’s requests are neither relevant nor proportionate to any claim or defense.
(Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Prot. Order at 6, Docket Entry 21.) In addition, Mr. Phillips as
Plaintiff’s replacement creates an inference of non-discrimination that will be dispositive in
this manner. (Id. at 8.) Biogen argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s ADEA claims to the extent they are based on Ms. Ney replacing Plaintiff. Biogen
asserts that, “Plaintiff was obligated to file an EEOC Charge regarding Biogen’s selection of
Ms. Ney to succeed James Phillips if he intended to pursue an age discrimination claim under
the ADEA on that basis, and cannot rely on the EEOC Charges that he filed while Mr. Phillips
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was still the LSM Associate Director, Cell Culture for such a claim.”3 (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff
argues that the focus of an age discrimination analysis must be on the age difference between
the plaintiff and her permanent replacement, not between the plaintiff and her temporary
replacement.4 Although the court will not address the parties’ merit-based arguments at this
stage of the proceedings, the court agrees that Plaintiff’s Interrogatory 4 and his related
requests for production are relevant and proportional to the needs of the case — specifically,
to address whether Biogen intended for Ms. Ney to permanently replace Plaintiff.
Although Plaintiff’s interrogatory No. 4 suggests that he is seeking information on Mr.
Phillips alone, the parties have communicated that Biogen’s answers should include
information on Ms. Ney. In addition, Biogen is aware of Plaintiff’s position that Biogen’s
hiring of Mr. Phillips was allegedly intended to disguise discrimination; Mr. Philips allegedly
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To support its argument, Biogen relies on Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies on an ADEA claim will deprive
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim); Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv.
Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Only those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge,
those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by a reasonable investigation
of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent [ADEA] lawsuit.”); and Chako v. Patuxent
Institution, 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that The Fourth a plaintiff may not expand an
adverse employment action beyond the allegations stated in the original EEOC charge).
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See, e.g. Delvin v. WSI Corp., 853 F. Supp. 69 76 n.6 (D. Mass. 1993) (denying summary judgment
where plaintiff was replaced by someone also within the protected age group, but who was in the
position for only six months, finding a disputed material fact regarding whether the first replacement
was temporary or permanent). See also Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 90-2430, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16729,
at *19 n.5 (4th Cir. 1991) (overruling judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reinstating jury verdict
in favor of ex-employees’ age discrimination suit, where employee introduced evidence contesting
employer’s characterization of a temporary replacement within the protected class as permanent:
“Although Hufziger initially accepted the job, evidence showed that the job was initially only
temporary, that Hufziger had lived in Indiana for twenty-five years and was not looking to move, that
prior to making the permanent offer to Hufziger, Zimmer had begun an outside search for a candidate,
and that the date of the permanent offer to Hufziger appears to have followed a May 12, 1987 letter
from Moran to Davis (although Davis claims he never received it) raising the age discrimination
issue.”)
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anticipated moving to Europe before or around the time he filled Plaintiff’s position; and there
was discussion that HR intended to hire Ms. Ney as Mr. Philips replacement before all the
interviews were concluded. Jimmy Wagstaff, a former Biogen employee, stated in his
declaration that the “culture of prejudice and bias against older male employees that HR were
creating within Biogen” were one of the reasons he left the company. (Wagstaff Decl. ¶ 20,
August 30, 2017, Docket Entry 26-9.) Mr. Wagstaff stated that he immediately applied for
Plaintiff’s former position when it was posted. (Id. ¶ 18.) In addition, Mr. Wagstaff stated
that before interviews were concluded, he heard that hiring Ms. Ney was a “foregone
conclusion,” which he found to be “highly inappropriate.”
(Id. ¶ 19.) Furthermore, Mr.
Wagstaff found it “odd” that Biogen’s HR director Christy Mabry discouraged him from
seeking the position — despite his 15–plus years of operational leadership experience,
compared to Ms. Ney’s lack of experience in that part of the business. (Wagstaff Decl. ¶ ¶ 1820.) Moreover, shortly after he was informed that he was not selected for the position, Mr.
Wagstaff learned that “[Ms. Mabry] ‘inserted’ herself in the final decision–making process and
ultimately [HR] made her hire [Ms. Ney].” (Id. ¶ 21.) Although Mr. Wagstaff stated in his
deposition that he mistakenly referred to Mr. Philips as an “interim” replacement, (See
Wagstaff Dep. 119:16-19, 23, 120:2-4, Docket Entry 31-12), Mr. Wagstaff also stated that he
and his colleagues thought Mr. Philips would eventually fill the open position in Switzerland,
because Mr. Phillips made several trips to the country while he was in Plaintiff’s former
position. (Wagstaff Dep. 162:20-25, 163:1-6.) In sum, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request.
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2. Documents and ESI
Under the Rules, any party may “serve on any other party a request . . . to produce and
permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample [designated
documents or electronically stored information] in the responding party's possession, custody,
or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “The party to whom the request is directed must respond
in writing within 30 days after being served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). “For each item or
category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted
as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the
reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
Here, Plaintiff seeks additional documents and ESI. (Pl.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Compel at 5,
13-15.) Specifically, Plaintiff asks the Court to compel Biogen to produce documents
reflecting communications between Ms. Ney and any member of Human Resources regarding
the following: Ms. Ney’s interest in or qualifications for a position in Large Scale
Manufacturing; Ms. Ney’s professional development plans and/or any plans to promote Ms.
Ney or advance her career; and/or communications regarding Plaintiff. (Docket Entry 26-4
at 5.) Request No. 6 asked Biogen to produce a copy of Ms. Ney’s personnel file, including
evaluations, positions held at Biogen, hiring documents, career path plans, documents relating
to Biogen’s offer to Ms. Ney of Plaintiff’s former position in Large Scale Manufacturing, and
Ms. Ney’s compensation in Plaintiff’s former position. (Id. at 6.)
To be within the scope of discovery, a fact must be relevant. That is, “‘the fact must
be germane to a claim or defense alleged in the pleading for information concerning it to be a
proper subject of discovery.’” Columbian Chem. Co. v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co., No. 5:14-CV-166,
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2015 WL 12755711, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 18, 2015) (unpublished) (quoting In re PE Corp.
Sec. Litig., 221 F.R.D. 20, 24 (D. Conn. 2003). A plaintiff’s allegations “define the extent of
[her] claims in [a] case, and, therefore, the appropriate scope of discovery.” Novak v. Pearlstein,
No. 13-CV-8861, 2016 WL 3586899, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2016) (unpublished); see also, e.g.,
Shanen v. Assurity Life Ins. Co., No. 11-80273-CIV, 2011 WL 13228103, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 7,
2011) (unpublished) (“[T]he allegations of the pleadings and the issues in the case determine
the scope of discovery.”). However, “counsel should be forewarned against taking an overly
rigid view of the narrowed scope of discovery. While the pleadings will be important, it would
be a mistake to argue that no fact may be discovered unless it directly correlates with a factual
allegation in the complaint or answer.” Thompson v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D.
168, 172 (D. Md. 2001).
Here, the Court is not prepared to conclude that the information sought is not germane
to Plaintiff’s claims (or to Biogen’s defenses) and therefore beyond outside the scope of
permissible discovery. Nevertheless, “[e]ven assuming that th[e] information is relevant (in
the broadest sense), the simple fact that requested information is discoverable . . . does not
mean that discovery must be had. On its own initiative or in response to a motion for
protective order under Rule 26(c), a district court may limit [discovery] . . . .” Nicholas v.
Wyndham Int'l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 543 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a]s a
general rule, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)'s proportionality analysis, ‘the
court must limit the frequency and extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules . . . if
it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
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benefit.’” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Peirce, No. 5:05-CV-202, 2012 WL 12892735, at *5 (N.D.W.
Va. July 18, 2012) (unpublished) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff argues that his request does not impose an undue burden because Plaintiff has
requested information “only about the individual he claims was his comparator, Ms. Ney, and
the individual Biogen claims to be Plaintiff’s comparator, Mr. Phillips.” (Pl.’s Br. Supp. Mot.
Compel at 7, Docket Entry 26 at 7.) Plaintiff argues that “at a minimum, the dispute over
whether and which employee temporarily or permanently replaced Plaintiff is material to the
legal questions presented in this case, and thus [Biogen] must produce discovery that would
shed light on the issue.” (Id. at 8.) Biogen argues that production of Ms. Ney’s personnel file
and communications Plaintiff seeks will only “subject [Ms. Ney] to annoyance, embarrassment
and oppression and subject Biogen to annoyance, oppression and undue burden and expense.”
(Def’s Resp. Mot. Compel, Docket Entry 30 at 8.)
The court agrees with Plaintiff’s
contentions.
In Cason v. Builders FirstSource–Southeast Group, Inc., the court noted that there is a strong
public policy against the public disclosure of personnel files, although not covered by a per se
privilege. 159 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247-248 (W.D.N.C. 2001) (citing Blount v. Wake Elec. Membership
Corp., 162 F.R.D. 102, 105-06 (E.D.N.C.1993) (“It cannot be denied that personal privacy and
accurate employee evaluations are important public policy concerns.”)) However, where the
files sought are those of employees whose action or inaction has a direct bearing on the
plaintiff's claims or defendant's affirmative defenses and especially where, as here, the court
has issued an appropriate confidentiality order, personnel files are subject to discovery. See id.,
Accord Johnson v. Morris, 903 F.2d 996, 998 (4th Cir. 1990) (pursuant to a protective order,
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defendant's investigative file and the personnel files of all employees, who supplied
information during the investigation, were produced); and Blount, 162 F.R.D. at 105-06
(ordering production of personnel files of employees directly implicated by plaintiff because
the files contained information which was “clearly relevant” and not otherwise readily
available).
As to the personnel files of Ms. Ney — who Plaintiff asserts is his comparator, and
who Biogen maintains is not Plaintiff’s comparator — in addition to any communications that
would be germane to any claim or defense in this matter, the Plaintiff's right to conduct
meaningful discovery outweighs the public policy against the general disclosure of personnel
files. Therefore, the undersigned will grant Plaintiff's request as to Document Nos. 3 and 6.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion
(Docket Entry 25) is GRANTED, and Defendant’s motion (Docket Entry 20) is DENIED.
As set forth above, Biogen shall produce to Plaintiff:
(1) on or before February 2, 2019, any detailed information regarding the process
utilized to hire for Plaintiff’s position once it was posted, pursuant to Biogen’s
company policy; including, but not limited to:
a) the date when Biogen commenced recruiting activities to fill the Associate
Director position after Mr. Phillips accepted the promotion in Switzerland;
b) the date the position was filled by Ms. Rachel Ney; and
c) Ms. Ney’s age and starting salary.
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(2) on or before February 2, 2019, A copy of Ms. Ney’s personnel file, including
evaluations, positions held at Biogen, hiring documents, career path plans,
documents relating to Biogen’s offer to Ms. Ney of Plaintiff’s former position in
Large Scale Manufacturing, and Ms. Ney’s compensation in Plaintiff’s former
position; and
(3) on or before February 2, 2019, any documents and ESI of communications
between Ms. Ney and any member of Human Resources regarding: Ms. Ney’s
interest in or qualifications for a position in Large Scale Manufacturing; Ms. Ney’s
professional development plans and/or any plans to promote Ms. Ney or advance
her career; and/or communications regarding Plaintiff.
________________________
Joe L. Webster
United States Magistrate Judge
January 2, 2019
Durham, North Carolina
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