ROBINSON v. THE PROCTER & GAMBLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR. on 3/1/2019. Defendant Scott Spillmann's Answer with Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31 ) is DENIED AS MOOT, in light of the amended document filed b y Defendant Spillmann. (See Doc. 38 ). FURTHER that Defendant Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Company's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 28 ) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that Defendant P&G's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 wrongful termination claims, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143422.2 claim, and civil conspiracy claim is GRANTED, and Defendant P&G's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 pay disparity and retaliation claims is DENIED. FURTHER that Defendant Candy Wright's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 33 ) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that Defendant Wright's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's defamation and civil conspiracy claims is GRANTED, and Defendant Wright's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract claim is DENIED. FURTHER that Defendant Scott Spillmann's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38 ) is GRANTED. (Daniel, J)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DOROTHEA ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE PROCTER & GAMBLE
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, SCOTT
SPILLMANN, M.D., and CANDY
WRIGHT,
Defendants.

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1:18CV133

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Currently before this court are motions to dismiss filed by
each of the following Defendants: (1) The Procter & Gamble
Manufacturing Company (“P&G”), (Doc. 28); (2) Scott Spillmann,
M.D. (“Spillmann”), (Docs. 31, 38); and (3) Candy Wright
(“Wright”), (Doc. 33.) Each Defendant moves to dismiss the
relevant claims in Plaintiff’s complaint, (Amended Complaint
(“Am. Compl.”) (Doc. 26)), for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, this
court finds that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Spillmann should be granted. This court further finds that the
motions to dismiss filed by Defendants P&G and Wright should

each be granted in part and denied in part, as described more
fully herein.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A concise summary of the factual allegations in the

complaint follows. Plaintiff Dorothea Robinson is black and
worked for Defendant P&G from 1989 to 2017, first as a
technician and later as a registered nurse. (Am. Compl. (Doc.
26) ¶¶ 1, 8, 40.) Plaintiff’s claims are based on events that
occurred between 2013 and 2017, when she was working as a
registered nurse at P&G’s Greensboro/Browns Summit facility.
(Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff worked under the medical license of
Defendant Spillmann, a contract physician but not a direct P&G
employee, with Spillmann’s permission. (Id. ¶¶ 16–18.)
Plaintiff’s duties included reviewing the sufficiency of
invoices submitted to P&G by Spillmann. (Id. ¶ 19.)
In July 2013, Plaintiff applied for a promotion to an open
Nurse Manager position. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that P&G
failed to follow its own hiring procedures and that she
complained to P&G supervisors; approximately one year after
applying, Plaintiff received the promotion. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) P&G
then hired Defendant Wright, who is white and had less
experience than Plaintiff, as a second Nurse Manager at the
Greensboro/Browns Summit facility. (Id. ¶ 14.) Wright had the
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same title and responsibilities as Plaintiff and both were fulltime P&E employees working under Spillmann’s medical license.
(Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) In 2017, Plaintiff learned that Wright was paid
a higher salary than Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff inquired
within P&G about the salary differential but did not receive a
satisfactory answer. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.)
Plaintiff subsequently applied for a position on the P&G
disability board and requested additional training to advance
her career; however, Plaintiff did not receive necessary support
for her application and was denied training. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.)
Plaintiff made official complaints within P&G about racial
discrimination around this time. (Id. ¶¶ 25–28.) Plaintiff, who
was responsible for reviewing Spillmann’s invoices, also raised
concerns with the P&G Finance Manager because she believed that
Spillmann was submitting inaccurate and incomplete invoices.
(Id. ¶ 33.)
In mid-2017, Plaintiff contends that Spillmann and Wright
began a campaign to discredit her by raising concerns about her
job performance. (Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) In September 2017, Wright
submitted a complaint to the North Carolina Board of Nursing
alleging that Plaintiff had violated professional standards of
conduct in patient care. (Id. ¶¶ 36–37.) Plaintiff alleges that
Wright made false and defamatory statements about her job
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performance, both to Spillmann and to the Board. (Id. ¶¶ 66–73.)
In August 2017, Spillmann filed an internal complaint against
Plaintiff and revoked her ability to practice as a nurse under
his medical license. (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff was suspended pending
an investigation into her performance and ultimately terminated
by P&G in late 2017. (Id. ¶¶ 38–40.)
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on November 21, 2017.
(Id. ¶ 41, Ex. A) Plaintiff then timely filed her initial
complaint in Guilford County Superior Court on January 24, 2018,
(see Doc. 1-1 at 23), and P&G removed the case to this court on
February 23, 2018. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint. (Am.
Compl. (Doc. 26).) Each Defendant then moved to dismiss the
amended complaint and filed a memorandum in support of its
respective motion: P&G, (Doc. 29); Spillmann, (Doc. 32); and
Wright, (Doc. 34). Defendants P&G and Wright separately filed
answers to the amended complaint. (Docs. 30, 35, respectively.)
P&G then filed an amended answer, (Doc. 37). Spillmann filed an
amended consolidated answer and motion to dismiss, (Doc. 38),
and a memorandum in support thereof, (Doc. 39). These amendments
were permitted as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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Plaintiff responded opposing each motion to dismiss. (Docs.
40, 41, 43). Each Defendant filed a reply. (Docs. 42, 45, 46.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must
plead facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable” and must demonstrate
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556–57).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court must accept
the complaint’s factual allegations as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Further, “the complaint, including all reasonable
inferences therefrom, [is] liberally construed in the
plaintiff’s favor.” Estate of Williams-Moore v. All. One
Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (citation omitted). Despite this deferential standard, a
court will not accept mere legal conclusions as true, and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Employment discrimination complaints must meet the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard; however, the plaintiff is
not required to make out a prima facie case or satisfy any
heightened pleading requirements at the motion to dismiss stage.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); McClearyEvans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d
582, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff is, however, required
to plead facts that permit the court to reasonably infer each
element of the prima facie case, including less favorable
treatment than similarly-situated employees outside of the
protected class. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585; see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682–83 (plaintiff must plead facts supporting
reasonable inference of discriminatory intent); Coleman v. Md.
Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that
a complaint must “assert facts establishing the plausibility”
that plaintiff was terminated based on race).
“A plaintiff may prove that an employer took action with
discriminatory or retaliatory intent through direct evidence or
through the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green.” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 327 (4th
Cir. 2018). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once the
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plaintiff has made a plausible showing of each element, the
claim will survive a motion to dismiss and the burden then
shifts to the defendant to provide “some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the disparate treatment. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Employment Discrimination

A Title VII employment discrimination claim includes the
following elements: “(1) membership in a protected class; (2)
satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and
(4) different treatment from similarly situated employees
outside the protected class.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190.
Plaintiff has alleged race-based employment discrimination
against P&G pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 1
Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim is premised on two
allegations: (1) that P&G paid Plaintiff less than Wright due to
race and (2) that P&G terminated Plaintiff due to her race.
This court finds that Plaintiff has met her 12(b)(6) burden
on the first three elements of the Title VII prima facie case:
Plaintiff is African-American and thus a member of a protected

1

As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “[t]he elements an
employee must prove are the same under either provision.” Pryor
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 495 (4th Cir. 2015).
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class. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 787 (4th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff has alleged that she performed her job satisfactorily,
and both the alleged pay disparity and Plaintiff’s termination
are adverse employment actions. See Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d
227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that hiring and firing are
ultimate employment decisions cognizable under Title VII);
Williams v. Westwood One Radio Networks, Inc., No. 96-1666, 1997
WL 90656, at *3 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a pay disparity
is an adverse employment action).
Plaintiff first alleges that she was paid less than Wright,
who is white, despite having more extensive experience and
holding the same title and position. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶¶ 5,
14, 20.) Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged less favorable
treatment than a similarly-situated non-minority employee. The
Fourth Circuit has explicitly instructed that “evidentiary
determinations regarding whether the comparators’ features are
sufficiently similar to constitute appropriate comparisons
generally should not be made at” the motion to dismiss stage.
Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 650 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., City of Greensboro v. BNT Ad Agency, LLC, ____
U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 558 (2017). Plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient at this stage to state a claim for race-based
discrimination and move to the next step of the burden-shifting
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framework. P&G’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s pay-disparitybased race discrimination claim will be denied.
This court will next evaluate Plaintiff’s wrongful
termination claim. To prove wrongful termination discrimination
under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that “the position remained
open or was filled by similarly qualified applicants outside the
protected class.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds
by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
Plaintiff has not alleged that the nurse manager job either
remained open or was filled by a non-minority replacement
following Plaintiff’s termination. Further, it appears to this
court far more plausible that Plaintiff’s termination was due to
her internal complaints and Spillmann’s ultimate decision to
revoke his license authorization as opposed to racial
discrimination. Plaintiff specifically alleges that “Spillmann
did not want [Plaintiff] to work under his license after she
refused to approve his untimely invoices and after making such
assertions about him to” P&G administrators. (Am. Compl. (Doc.
26) ¶ 43.) Plaintiff also acknowledges that “if [Spillmann]
refused to allow the Plaintiff to work under his license, the[n]
Defendant P&G would have to terminate [Plaintiff’s] employment.”
(Id. ¶ 45.) In the absence of any disparate treatment
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allegations, this claim will be considered and analyzed as a
retaliation claim, not a discrimination claim. Therefore, P&G’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim
based on wrongful termination will be granted.
Plaintiff also brings an employment discrimination claim
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143–422.2. This provision adopts
the legal and evidentiary standards of Title VII, and therefore
the analysis of Plaintiff’s state law claim is identical to that
set forth above. See N.C. Dep’t of Correction v. Gibson, 308
N.C. 131, 136–37, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82–83 (1983) (“[W]e look to
federal decisions for guidance in establishing evidentiary
standards and principles of law to be applied in discrimination
cases.”). However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 was not intended
“to provide aggrieved employees with a private right of action
beyond that already afforded by federal discrimination
statutes.” 2 Percell v. Int’l Bus. Machines, Inc., 765 F. Supp.
297, 300 (E.D.N.C. 1991); see also Smith v. First Union Nat’l

2

Further, to the extent that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143–422.2
does give rise to a common law wrongful discharge claim, see
Percell, 765 F. Supp. at 300, Plaintiff needs to allege that her
employer required her to violate the law as a condition of
continued employment. See, e.g., Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C.
App. 331, 342–43, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826–27 (1985), overruled on
other grounds by Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc.,
347 N.C. 329, 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997). Plaintiff has not made this
allegation.

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Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000) (no private right of
action). Therefore, this court will grant P&G’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143–422.2.
B.

Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that P&G retaliated against her for
making complaints about alleged racial discrimination by failing
to support her application to the disability board, failing to
allow her to continue working under Spillmann’s medical license,
paying her less than Wright, and ultimately terminating her.
Title VII 3 prohibits discrimination against any person
“because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This provision covers both opposition to
racially discriminatory employment practices and participation
in an investigation or proceeding regarding such practices. Id.
The bar for what constitutes opposition is not high — any
comment that disapproves of allegedly discriminatory workplace
conduct is considered opposition to an unlawful employment

3

This analysis is identical for Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 retaliation claim. Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp.,
786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015).
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practice. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson
Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009); see also DeMasters v. Carilion
Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 417 (4th Cir. 2015).
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in
contravention of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove (1) that she
engaged in a protected activity, as well as (2) that her
employer took an adverse employment action against her, and (3)
that there was a causal link between the two events.” BoyerLiberto, 786 F.3d at 281 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A plaintiff is not required to know to a certainty
that the opposed practice is unlawful; rather, a plaintiff
engages in protected activity whenever she opposes employer
actions and she “reasonably believed that those actions were in
violation of Title VII.” E.E.O.C. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424
F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005). As to the second element, an
“adverse action” is any action that would have “dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination,” even if the action was not directly tied to
employment. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 62, 66–68 (2006) (stating that “adverse action” as used
in the retaliation context is broader than a Title VII “adverse
employment action”) (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of
Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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To establish a causal link, the third element, the
plaintiff must illustrate close temporal proximity between the
“employer’s knowledge of protected activity” and the alleged
retaliatory action. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S.
268, 273–74 (2001); see also Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181
F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that one and one-half
months is sufficiently short to demonstrate causation, but three
months is too long). However, temporal proximity alone will not
suffice where the passage of time undermines any conclusion that
the events are causally connected. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273–
74 (finding that a twenty-month gap suggested “no causality at
all”; citing cases finding no causal link when the gap was only
three or four months). In that event, the plaintiff may also
establish causation by presenting circumstantial evidence of
retaliatory intent during the intervening period between the
protected conduct and the adverse action. See, e.g., Lettieri v.
Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650–51 (4th Cir. 2007) (intervening
events showing retaliatory animus prior to actual termination
provided a causal link).
A plaintiff may prove a Title VII retaliation claim either
by direct or indirect evidence, or under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787
F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015). Title VII discrimination claims
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can proceed on a mixed-motive theory if the plaintiff shows that
any impermissible consideration was “a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). However, retaliation
claims are subject to a higher standard: the plaintiff must
present “proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have
occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or
actions of the employer.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360; see also
Foster, 787 F.3d at 251–52 (stating that, after Nassar, both
methods of proof require but-for causation).
Here, this court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
each element of a Title VII retaliation claim. Plaintiff’s
complaints regarding the pay and training disparities between
herself and Wright were protected activity because Plaintiff
reasonably believed these disparities violated Title VII’s nondiscrimination mandate. The refusal to support Plaintiff’s
application to the disability board and Plaintiff’s ultimate
termination were each adverse employment actions because they
would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from opposing Title
VII violations. It is well-established that termination is an
adverse action. See, e.g., Strothers, 895 F.3d at 328. Because
Plaintiff alleges that the disability board position “would have
further advanced her career and provided her with excellent
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growth opportunity,” (Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶ 23), she has
plausibly alleged that denial of support for her application
“impact[ed] on the terms and conditions of employment.” Adams v.
Anne Arundel Cty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 431 (4th Cir. 2015);
see also White, 548 U.S. at 69 (“[E]xcluding an employee from a
weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the
employee's professional advancement might well deter a
reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.”).
Plaintiff first learned of the alleged pay disparity in
January 2017 and approached both manager Sherry Spencer and
Senior Human Resources Manager Terri Rouleau about the disparity
shortly thereafter. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶¶ 20, 22.) Plaintiff
then applied for the disability board position in February 2017
and was refused support. (Id. ¶ 23.) This temporal proximity is
sufficient to plausibly demonstrate the required causal link.
See, e.g., Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1179. Further, P&G’s alleged
actions in the period between Plaintiff’s initial complaints and
Plaintiff’s ultimate termination in late 2017 — gathering
complaints about Plaintiff’s work performance, instituting a
board investigation, and removing Plaintiff’s work validation —
support at least an inference of retaliatory animus throughout
this period. Finally, whether Plaintiff proceeds by indirect
evidence or under the burden-shifting framework, this court
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finds Plaintiff has at least plausibly alleged that the adverse
actions she allegedly suffered would not have occurred but for
her complaints. 4 Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient
facts to a state a claim for retaliation under Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981, and P&G’s motion to dismiss this claim will be
denied.
C.

Defamation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants P&G (through Wright, its
agent) and Wright are liable to her for defamation. This court
has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s defamation and
other state law claims because they relate to the same factual
nexus as her federal discrimination claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367; see also Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d
611, 616 (4th Cir. 2001) (observing that the district court had
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). A federal
court sitting in diversity or supplemental jurisdiction
generally applies the relevant substantive law of the state in

4

P&G asserts that Plaintiff cannot show but-for causation
because Plaintiff admits she was terminated due to her inability
to continue working under Spillmann’s license. (Doc. 29 at 8–9.)
First, this court notes that it considers the refusal of support
for Plaintiff’s disability board application to plausibly
constitute adverse action and the license withdrawal does not
provide an alternative explanation for this event specifically.
Second, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff is not
required to rebut Defendant’s proffered non-retaliatory
rationale. See, e.g., Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 786–87.
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which the court sits, while applying federal procedural law.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–73, 79–80 (1938);
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465–66 (1965); see also United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding
that federal courts are “bound to apply state law” to pendant
claims); In re Exxon Valdez, 484 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that Erie’s central holding applies to supplemental
jurisdiction cases).
To state a claim for defamation under North Carolina
law, “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant caused injury
to the plaintiff by making false, defamatory statements of or
concerning the plaintiff, which were published to a third
person.” Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 25, 29,
568 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2002). A certain set of statements,
including any statement that tends to “impeach [plaintiff’s]
trade or profession,” are considered defamatory per se and do
not require the plaintiff to prove malicious intent or damages.
Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 384,
387–88, 179 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1971).
Plaintiff alleges that Wright (a P&G employee) made
defamatory statements about Plaintiff’s work performance both to
Spillmann and to the North Carolina Board of Nursing. (Am.
Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶ 54.) Because the alleged statements were made
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during an investigation by the Board of Nursing, North Carolina
law provides that Defendants are “immune from any criminal
prosecution or civil liability resulting [from those statements]
unless such person knew the report was false or acted in
reckless disregard of whether the report was false.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 90-171.47. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Wright’s
state of mind are conclusory, and Plaintiff presents no
allegations that Wright actually knew the statements were false
yet made them anyway. In fact, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest,
at the most, mere negligence. (See Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶ 56
(stating that Wright “had not worked with [Plaintiff] long
enough or closely enough to know about, or verify, the
statements”); id. ¶ 59 (stating that Defendants “knew or should
have known the accusations and statements were false”).)
This court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that
Wright acted with reckless disregard. Wright is therefore
shielded from Plaintiff’s defamation claim under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 90-171.47. Cf Houpe v. City of Statesville, 128 N.C. App. 334,
346, 497 S.E.2d 82, 90 (1998) (“Participants in the judicial
process must be able to testify or otherwise take part without
being hampered by fear of defamation suits.”). Plaintiff alleges
no defamatory statements by P&G agents other than Wright.

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Therefore, the motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim
will be granted.
D.

Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants engaged in a
conspiracy to procure her wrongful termination. As an initial
matter, “there is actually no such thing as an [independent]
action for civil conspiracy” in North Carolina, and the claim
covers only damages caused by overt acts that constitute
separate crimes. Fox v. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. 292, 300–01, 354
S.E.2d 737, 743 (1987). “A claim for damages resulting from a
conspiracy exists where there is an agreement between two or
more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an
unlawful way, and, as a result of acts done in furtherance of,
and pursuant to, the agreement, damage occurs to the plaintiff.”
Tuck v. Turoci, No. COA06-1571, 2008 WL 304719, at *6 (N.C. Ct.
App. Feb. 5, 2008).
Crucially, however, the alleged conspiracy must have two or
more members and “[a]lleging that a corporation is conspiring
with its agents, officers or employees is accusing a corporation
of conspiring with itself.” Garlock v Hilliard, No. 00-CVS-1018,
2000 WL 33914616, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2000) (citing
Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1252 (4th Cir. 1985)). “An
exception to the doctrine of intracorporate immunity exists if
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the agent of the corporation has an ‘independent personal stake
in achieving the corporation's illegal objective.’” Garlock,
2000 WL 33914616, at *6 (quoting Buschi, 775 F.2d at 1252).
“There are two essential ingredients in the principal-agent
relationship: (1) authority, either express or implied, of the
agent to act for the principal, and (2) the principal's control
over the agent.” Holcomb v. Colonial Assocs., L.L.C., 358 N.C.
501, 509, 597 S.E.2d 710, 716 (2004). Plaintiff’s allegations
reveal that Spillmann, although technically a third-party
contractor, was controlled by and subject to the authority of
P&G. For example, Plaintiff complained to the P&G Finance
Manager about Spillmann’s inaccurate invoices and argued that
those invoices violated P&G company policy. (See Am. Compl.
(Doc. 26) ¶ 33.) This court finds, based on Plaintiff’s
allegations, that Spillmann was functionally an agent of P&G and
thus could not conspire with either P&G or with Wright (a fullfledged P&G employee) under North Carolina law.
Plaintiff argues, however, that Spillmann is outside the
protection of the intracorporate immunity doctrine because his
actions were driven by a personal financial interest — namely,
the desire to have a different employee review his invoices. (Am
Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶ 91; (Doc. 43) at 7.) Plaintiff appears to
suggest that Spillmann believed Plaintiff’s replacement would
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not audit his submissions as diligently and would refrain from
approaching superiors about inaccurate or incomplete invoices.
However, this court finds no allegations in the complaint to
support this conclusory assertion. Without knowing who would
assume responsibility for reviewing his invoices after
Plaintiff’s departure, this court does not find it plausible
that Spillmann’s actions were driven by any personal motive.
Further, the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not
plausibly establish how Spillmann might have personally profited
from this outcome (as opposed to merely avoiding the burden of
re-doing paperwork), as Plaintiff does not allege that Spillmann
was involved in any scheme to embezzle money from P&G by
improperly doctoring invoices for personal gain. Rather,
Plaintiff suggests only that Spillmann failed to comply with P&G
invoice requirements.
Therefore, the intracorporate immunity doctrine applies.
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy and
Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim will be granted.
E.

Tortious Interference

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wright and Spillmann
tortuously interfered with Plaintiff’s employment contract by
making false allegations and complaints against Plaintiff and

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inducing P&G to fire her. 5 The elements of a tortious
interference claim are:
(1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third
person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual
right against a third person; (2) the defendant knows
of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally
induces the third person not to perform the contract;
(4) and in doing so acts without justification; (5)
resulting in actual damage to plaintiff.
United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d
375, 387 (1988). A “plaintiff's cause of action for tortious
interference with contract lies even though her employment
contract was terminable at will.” Lenzer v. Flaherty, 106 N.C.
App. 496, 512, 418 S.E.2d 276, 286 (1992). The North Carolina
Court of Appeals has held that, in order to survive a motion to
dismiss, “the complaint must admit of no motive for interference
other than malice.” Filmar Racing, Inc. v. Stewart, 141 N.C.
App. 668, 674, 541 S.E.2d 733, 738 (2001).
A claim for tortious interference with an employment
contract may generally be brought only against a corporate

5

In North Carolina, the tort of interference with business
relations “embraces claims for interference with both existing
contracts and prospective future contracts.” E-Ntech Indep.
Testing Servs., Inc. v. Air Masters, Inc., No. 16 CVS 3092, 2017
WL 73449, at *5–6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2017). Because
Plaintiff’s claim is based on interference with her existing
employment contract, this court will construe Plaintiff’s
allegations as tortious interference with an existing contract
and will use that terminology throughout this order.
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“outsider,” because corporate insiders have “a qualified
privilege to interfere with contractual relations between the
corporation and a third party.” Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C.
121, 133, 136 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1964). This protection, however,
“is lost [when the interference is] exercised for motives other
than reasonable, good faith attempts to protect the nonoutsider’s interests in the contract interfered with.” Lenzer,
106 N.C. App. at 513, 418 S.E.2d at 2.
Here, Defendants Wright and Spillmann assert that they are
protected as non-outsiders with a legitimate interest in
ensuring that Plaintiff provided a satisfactory standard of care
for her patients. (See (Doc. 34) at 21; (Doc. 39) at 16.)
Plaintiff argues, in opposition, that Wright and Spillmann were
motivated by malice related to Plaintiff’s salary and invoicerelated complaints to P&G supervisors. (See (Doc. 41) at 18;
(Doc. 43) at 13.)
As the doctor responsible for overseeing Plaintiff’s
nursing practice, Spillmann had an obvious interest in
monitoring Plaintiff’s job performance and investigating any
potential patient incidents. See, e.g., Privette v. Univ. of
N.C. at Chapel Hill, 96 N.C. App. 124, 134, 385 S.E.2d 185, 191
(1989) (“Janowsky and Resvani had an interest in insuring proper
work procedures at the Center and as such, had a legitimate
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professional interest in the plaintiff's performance of his
duties. Therefore, Privette's complaint on its face admits that
Janowsky and Resvani had a proper motive for their actions.”).
In fact, because Plaintiff was practicing under Spillmann’s
medical license, (Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶ 16), any major
professional violations by Plaintiff may have jeopardized not
only Spillmann’s work with P&G but also his medical career.
Therefore, this court finds that the tortious interference
allegations against Spillmann suggest motives other than malice
and that Spillmann is properly afforded qualified immunity as a
corporate insider. Spillmann’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
tortious interference with contract claim will be granted.
Wright, on the other hand, was not Plaintiff’s supervisor
and had no individual professional interest in verifying or
ensuring Plaintiff’s satisfactory job performance. (Am. Compl.
(Doc. 26) ¶ 15.) Further, Plaintiff has alleged that Wright was
antagonistic toward Plaintiff at work due to Plaintiff’s
comments and complaints regarding their salary differential.
(Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶ 30.) This court finds that Wright is not
a protected insider and that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an
improper motive to interfere with Plaintiff’s employment
contract. Wright’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s tortious
interference claim will be denied
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V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that Defendant

Spillmann’s motion to dismiss should be granted. This court
further finds that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants
P&G and Wright should each be granted in part and denied in
part, as set forth herein.
IT IS THERFORE ORDERED that Defendant Scott Spillmann’s
Answer with Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 31), is DENIED AS MOOT, in
light of the amended document filed by Defendant Spillmann. (See
Doc. 38.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Proctor & Gamble
Manufacturing Company’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 28), is GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that Defendant P&G’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 wrongful
termination claims, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143–422.2 claim, and civil
conspiracy claim is GRANTED, and Defendant P&G’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 pay disparity
and retaliation claims is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Candy Wright’s Motion
to Dismiss, (Doc. 33), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in
that Defendant Wright’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation
and civil conspiracy claims is GRANTED, and Defendant Wright’s

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motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s tortious interference with
contract claim is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Scott Spillmann’s
Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 38), is GRANTED.
This the 1st day of March, 2019.

____________________________________
United States District Judge

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