HILL v. RANDOLPH COUNTY SHERIFF DEPT. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, signed by JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR on 02/22/2019, that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, (Doc. 8 ), is GRANTED. FURTHER that the claims contained in th e Complaint, (Doc. 2 ), are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As no further claims remain in this matter, a judgment for Defendants shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.(Taylor, Abby)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLES BURTON ROBERTS HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
RANDOLPH COUNTY SHERIFF DEPT.,
RANDOLPH COUNTY JAIL, and
SHERIFF ROBERT GRAVES,
Defendants.
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1:18CV148
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Currently before this court is Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, (Doc. 8), Plaintiff Charles Hill’s complaint alleging a
violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Complaint (“Compl.”) Doc. 2.) Pro se Plaintiff is incarcerated
at the Randolph County Jail and alleges that he was improperly
refused medical treatment and injured during several
confrontations with prison staff and other inmates. (Id. at 5.)
Defendants move to dismiss these claims, arguing first that
neither Defendant Randolph County Sheriff Dept. nor Defendant
Randolph County Jail are entities capable of being sued. (Defs.’
Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 9) at 4-5.) Defendants
further assert that Plaintiff fails to state a claim as to
Defendant Graves. (Id. at 6.) Because this court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to plead a viable claim against any named
Defendant, this court with grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must
plead facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable” and must demonstrate
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556–57).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court must accept
the complaint’s factual allegations as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Further, “the complaint, including all reasonable
inferences therefrom, [is] liberally construed in the
plaintiff’s favor.” Estate of Williams-Moore v. All. One
Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (citation omitted). Despite this deferential standard, a
court will not accept mere legal conclusions as true, and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
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supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Pro se plaintiffs are subject to a relaxed pleading
standard. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)
(stating that pro se complaints must be “liberally construed”);
see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). However,
these plaintiffs must still plead facts that fairly put the
defendant on notice of the nature of the claims and “contain
more than labels and conclusions.” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521
F.3d 298, 304 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Randolph County Sheriff Dept. and Randolph County Jail
Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. (Doc. 2) at
3.) It is well-established that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 generally
permits suits only against state officials in their individual
capacities, not against “States or governmental entities that
are considered arms of the State.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). While a governmental entity may
be liable under § 1983 for instituting an official policy to
commit ongoing constitutional injury, “‘a municipality cannot be
held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
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respondeat superior theory.’” Avery v. Burke Cty., 660 F.2d 111,
114 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
Further, “[s]tate law dictates whether a governmental
agency has the capacity to be sued in federal court. . . . [and]
[t]here is no North Carolina statute authorizing suit against a
county's sheriff's department.” Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d
413, 419–20 (M.D.N.C. 2004). North Carolina federal courts have
also repeatedly held that county jails are not subject to suit
under § 1983. See, e.g., Tate v. Franklin, No. 1:09CV230, 2010
WL 2266995, at *1, *2 (M.D.N.C. June 3, 2010); Flores v.
Henderson Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:07CV120-01-MU, 2007 WL 1062973,
at *1 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2007).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to challenge an
organization-wide policy of inflicting constitutional injury on
prison inmates, the correct defendant is Randolph County itself.
See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Post v. City of Ft.
Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (collecting
cases demonstrating that the city or county itself is the proper
defendant, and that a police or sheriff’s department is “merely
the vehicle through which the city government fulfills its
policing functions”). For a § 1983 claim based on Plaintiff’s
individualized grievances, the proper defendant is Sheriff
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Graves in his individual capacity. Plaintiff’s allegations fail
to state a proper § 1983 claim against either Defendant Randolph
County Sheriff Dept. or Defendant Randolph County Jail.
Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims will be
granted.
B.
Sheriff Graves
A prison official is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only
when he both “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). In
other words, the prison official must have subjective knowledge
of the risk of harm to a prisoner and “consciously disregard”
that known risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839 (the inquiry is
“focus[ed] on what a defendant's mental attitude actually was
(or is), rather than what it should have been (or should be)”);
see also Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 546 (4th Cir. 2017)
(applying the deliberate indifference standard in the context of
a § 1983 claim).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that suggest
Defendant Graves had subjective knowledge of Plaintiff’s
injuries or alleged mistreatment. Plaintiff does not mention any
actions by Defendant Graves in either his initial complaint,
(see Compl. (Doc. 2)), or in his response to Defendants’ motion
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to dismiss. (See Doc. 11.) In a supplemental filing, Plaintiff
again fails to identify any facts suggesting that Defendant
Graves had knowledge of these issues. Plaintiff instead alleges
in a conclusory fashion that Graves must have known about the
incidents because he “was the boss of ALL the staff of the jail
and Sheriff Dept.” (Doc. 13 at 1.) Such statements are
insufficient to plausibly allege the requisite mens rea for a
§ 1983 claim. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this
claim will be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted and that all
claims against the Defendants should be dismissed. The dismissal
shall be without prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. 8), is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims contained in the
Complaint, (Doc. 2), are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
As no further claims remain in this matter, a judgment for
Defendants shall be entered contemporaneously with this
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
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This the 22nd day of February, 2019.
____________________________________
United States District Judge
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