JEFFERIES v. UNC REGIONAL PHYSICIANS PEDIATRICS et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM ORDER signed by CHIEF JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 6/14/2018; that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 7 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: The motion to dismiss all claims against Welch is GRANTED, and all claims ag ainst Welch are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion to dismiss the Title VII race discrimination claim against Regional is GRANTED, and the claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The motion to dismiss the Title VII retaliation claim against Regional is DENIED. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SHANNON ORANDA JEFFERIES,

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)
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)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
UNC REGIONAL PHYSICIANS
PEDIATRICS and ERIC WELCH,
Defendants.

1:18cv223

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This is an employment discrimination action by Plaintiff
Shannon Jefferies, proceeding pro se, alleging race discrimination
and

retaliation

arising

out

of

her

alleged

discipline

and

termination by UNC Regional Physicians Pediatrics (“Regional”).
Before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
Regional

and

Eric

Welch,

Jefferies’s

Jefferies has not filed a response.

supervisor.

(Doc.

7.)

For the reasons discussed

below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.

BACKGROUND
The

complaint,

viewed

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

Jefferies, provides only the following short statement:
For charges that are stated on EEOC files that are
attached, also for loss of wages, stressful and
disrupted lifestyle due to lack of employment.
(Doc. 5 at 1.)

However, “to determine whether the claim of a pro

se plaintiff can withstand a motion to dismiss, it is appropriate

to look beyond the face of the complaint to allegations made in
any additional materials filled by the plaintiff.”

Armstrong v.

Rolm A. Siemeans Co., 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).

Jefferies has attached

two Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charges and
related paperwork to her complaint, which include the following
facts and allegations:
Jefferies is a black woman who worked as a Certified Medical
Assistant (“CMA”) at Regional since September 2014. (Doc. 5-1 at
1.)

Welch was Jefferies’s supervisor.

(Id.)

In an EEOC charge

filed on June 19, 2017, Jefferies alleged that on March 21, 2017,
she was disciplined for attendance issues, including arriving
late, leaving early, and “routinely calling-out.”

(Id.)

On May

23, 2017, she was disciplined again “for unrelated reasons” and
“submitted a rebuttal stating [her] belief that [she] was being
singled out due to [her] race.”

(Id.)

Jefferies was disciplined

again on June 15, 2017, “for attendance related issues.”

(Id.)

She alleged that she was the only CMA being held to the attendance
standards and claimed she had been discriminated against “due to
my race (Black) and in retaliation for my complaint of being
singled out due to my race in violation of Title VII.”

(Id.)

On June 20, 2017, Jefferies filed a second EEOC charge.
at 2.)

(Id.

In it, she alleged that on June 19, 2017, she was “abruptly

discharged under the guise that [she] had been ‘witnessed going
2

through

another

employee’s

drawer

and

retriev[ing]

personal

information and then shar[ing] it with other employees.’”

(Id.)

Jefferies denies this accusation and claims that she was terminated
in retaliation for her having filed the prior EEOC charge.
On

March

5,

2018,

Jefferies

filed

this

lawsuit

(Id.)

against

Regional in the General Court of Justice, Guilford County, District
Court Division-Small Claims court.
removed

the

jurisdiction.

action

to

this

(Doc. 1-1.)

court

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

based

(Doc. 1.)

on

Regional timely
federal

question

Regional then filed

the pending motion to dismiss on March 27, 2018.

(Doc. 7.)

On

March 28, a Roseboro letter1 was sent to Jefferies, advising her
of her right to respond and the likelihood that her failure to do
so may result in her case being dismissed.

(Doc. 10.)

Jefferies

has failed to respond.
II.

ANALYSIS
A.

Legal Standard

Even though Defendants’ motion to dismiss is unopposed and
can ordinarily be granted on that basis, see Local Rule 7.3(k),
the court nevertheless must satisfy itself that the motion is
merited.

Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd., 230

F.R.D. 438, 449 (M.D.N.C. 2005).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain a short and plain

See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Wright
v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846 (4th Cir. 1985).
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3

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible “when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct

alleged.”

Id.

(citing

Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

556).

Jefferies is proceeding pro se and is entitled to a liberal
construction of her pleading; however, this liberal construction
does not require the court to ignore clear defects in pleading,
Bustos v. Chamberlain, No. 3:09-1760-HMH-JRM, 2009 WL 2782238, at
*2 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009), or to “conjure up questions never
squarely presented in the complaint,” Brice v. Jenkins, 489 F.
Supp. 2d 538, 541 (E.D. Va. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
B.

Jefferies’s Claims Against Welch

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), authorizes claims against an
employer, but not against non-employers or supervisors.

Id.

§ 2000e-(2)(a)(1) (“[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect
to

[her]

compensation,

terms,

conditions,
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or

privileges

of

employment, because of such individual’s race); Lissau v. S. Food
Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998).

Jefferies alleges

that she was employed by Regional, not Welch.

(Doc. 5-1 at 1.)

As such, Welch is not an employer, and the Title VII claims against
him will be dismissed.
C.

Jefferies’s Claims Against Regional
a.

A
factual

Title

Race Discrimination Claim
VII

discrimination

allegations

to

claim

support

a

discriminated” because of race.

must

claim

“include

that

the

adequate

[employer]

McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of

Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct.

1162

(2016).

discrimination,

In

a

the

absence

of

direct

can

raise

an

plaintiff

evidence
inference

of
of

discrimination that an adverse employment action was the product
of discrimination via the burden-shifting framework set out in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

The

elements of a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination are:
“(1)

membership

in

a

protected

class;

(2)

satisfactory

job

performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different
treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected
class.”

Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th

Cir. 2010).

An employee need not allege specific facts to make

out a prima facie case.
506, 508 (2002).

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

However, she must allege sufficient facts “to
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raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555; McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 586-87.
Jefferies contends that she was disciplined three times and
eventually

terminated

due

to

her

race.

(Doc.

5-1

at

1–2.)

Regional argues that disciplining Jefferies does not constitute an
adverse employment action, though it concedes that her termination
does.

Regional additionally argues that Jefferies provides no

factual basis to infer race as a motivating factor in any of the
claimed adverse actions.

(Doc. 8 at 5–6.)

Regional is correct that

Jefferies’s

race

discrimination

claim fails because the complaint, including attachments, does not
offer sufficient factual allegations supporting an inference that
Jefferies was disciplined because of race.
858 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 2017).

See Martin v. Duffy,

While Jefferies does allege

she was held to a higher standard than the other CMAs, there is no
allegation of the race of the other CMAs or how they received
favorable

treatment.

It

is

not

enough

to

make

conclusory

allegations that an employment action was taken because of race.
See id.; Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190-191; McKissick-Melton v. N.C.
Cent. Univ., No. 1:16-CV-605, 2016 WL 6806234, at *2 (M.D.N.C.
Nov. 17, 2016).
due

to

race

Here, Jefferies’s claim that she was disciplined

lacks

sufficient

facts

to

raise

it

above

the

speculative level, and Regional’s motion to dismiss will therefore
be granted as to it.

See McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 588.
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b.

Retaliation Claim

Title VII prohibits an employer from “retaliating against an
employee for complaining about prior discrimination.”

Foster v.

Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015).

To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, “a plaintiff must
prove (1) that she engaged in a protected activity, as well as (2)
that her employer took an adverse employment action against her,
and (3) that there was a causal link between the two events.”
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp, 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir.
2015) (quotations omitted).
activity.

Filing an EEOC charge is a protected

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

Title VII retaliation claims

require a showing that the action would not have happened but for
the plaintiff’s protected activity.

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.

V. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
Regional argues that Jefferies has failed to allege specific
facts supporting a claim of retaliatory discrimination.
at 9.)

(Doc. 8

It also contends that Jefferies’s rebuttal is not a

protected activity.

(Id. at 8.)

Jefferies alleges that Regional

discharged her in retaliation for her filing an EEOC charge and
for

her

having

discrimination.

filed

prior

internal

(Doc. 5-1 at 1–2.)

complaints

of

race

Jefferies also alleges that

she was terminated just hours after she filed her EEOC charge.
(Id. at 2.)
Jefferies has stated sufficient facts to make out a claim for
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retaliation.

Even if Regional were correct that Jefferies’s

rebuttal did not constitute protected activity (an argument the
court need resolve at this stage), her filing of the June 19, 2017
EEOC charge

did constitute a protected activity.

§ 2000e-3(a).

42 U.S.C.

Moreover, a plaintiff can allege a causal link

through temporal proximity, provided that an employer’s knowledge
of protected activity and the adverse employment action that
follows are closely related in time.

Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001).

Given that Jefferies was

discharged the same day she filed her first EEOC charge and she
denies having engaged in the conduct alleged to have been the basis
of her dismissal, she has plausibly alleged that her discharge was
causally linked to a protected activity.

Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.,

532 U.S. at 273.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1.

The

motion

to

dismiss

all

claims

against

Welch

is

GRANTED, and all claims against Welch are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
2.

The motion to dismiss the Title VII race discrimination
claim against Regional is GRANTED, and the claim is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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3.

The motion to dismiss the Title VII retaliation claim
against Regional is DENIED.

/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
June 14, 2018

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