JEFFERIES v. UNC REGIONAL PHYSICIANS PEDIATRICS et al
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by CHIEF JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 8/14/2019; that Regional's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22 ) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Sheets, Jamie)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SHANNON ORANDA JEFFERIES,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
UNC REGIONAL PHYSICIANS
PEDIATRICS and ERIC WELCH,
Defendants.
1:18-cv-00223
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.
This is an employment discrimination action by Plaintiff
Shannon Jefferies, proceeding pro se.
Jefferies’s sole remaining
claim is one of retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (“Title VII”) because UNC Regional Physicians Pediatrics
(“Regional”) terminated her employment.
Before the court is
Regional’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22.)
fully briefed and ready for decision.
The motion is
For the reasons discussed
below, Regional’s motion will be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
Viewed
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
Jefferies
as
the
nonmoving party, the facts reflect the following:
Jefferies is a black woman who worked as a Certified Medical
Assistant (“CMA”) at Regional from September 2014 to June 19, 2017.
(Doc. 5-1 at 1.) During the summer of 2016, Cornerstone Healthcare
(“Cornerstone”),
Jefferies’s
former
employer,
merged
Regional, resulting in tension between the two staffs.
with
(Doc. 23-
1 at 2-3; Doc. 23-3 at 3.)
Under
disciplined
the
attendance
after
the
policy
at
occurrence
Regional,
of
a
employees
specific
were
number
of
unscheduled absences and tardies, with each tardy counting as half
an occurrence.
(Doc. 23-1 at 3.)
employees received an oral reminder.
After three occurrences,
(Id. at 18).
occurrences, employees received a written reminder.
After five
(Id.)
six occurrences, employees received a final reminder.
after seven occurrences, employees would be terminated.
After
(Id.)
(Id.)
And
In
January 2017, Regional’s Practice Manager, Eric Welch, who was
Jefferies’s immediate supervisor, gave all employees a “clean
slate” with respect to attendance, meaning that each employee began
2017 with zero occurrences.
(Doc. 23-1 at 4; Doc. 23-2 ¶ 6.)
Between January and June 2017, Jefferies received several
disciplinary actions from Welch.
On March 20, 2017, Welch issued
Jefferies an oral reminder based on three unscheduled absences,
which Jefferies signed on March 21, 2017.
25-7 at 2.)
(Doc. 23-1 ¶ 15; Doc.
Jefferies later became suspicious that Welch was not
equally enforcing the attendance policy against former Cornerstone
employees and complained to Welch’s supervisor, Becca Wohlgemuth.
(Doc. 23-7 at 2.)
During this time Allison Skeen, CMA, who is
2
white, informed Jefferies that she had also received an oral
reminder for attendance policy violations.
(Doc. 23-4 at 29.)
On May 11, 2017, Welch issued Jefferies a second oral reminder
based on complaints from coworkers and a patient’s mother.
23-1 ¶ 16; Doc. 23-2 at 8.)
(Doc.
The coworkers had complained that
Jefferies had slammed down a clipboard at the registration desk
and stated that “someone was ‘being a bitch.’”
9.)
that
(Doc. 23-2 at 8-
On May 10, 2017, a patient’s mother told an office manager
she
had
an
exchange
with
Jefferies
that
was
“very
inappropriate” when Jefferies accused her of “[having] an attitude
problem this morning” and Jefferies “was rude to her the rest of
the visit and just made her feel uncomfortable.” 1
8–10; Doc. 25-12 at 4.)
(Doc. 23-2 at
Welch signed the oral reminder on May 23,
2017, but Jefferies refused to sign and instead submitted two
written rebuttals disputing the accuracy of these complaints. 2
(Doc.
23-1
¶¶ 16–17;
Doc.
23-2
at
11-15.)
Later
that
day,
Jefferies emailed Welch and Wohlgemuth stating that she felt she
was “being singled out” and “targeted” due to her race, ethnicity,
internal complaints about the attendance policy, and past issues
1
While Jefferies now asserts that these complaints were entirely
fabricated by Welch, she offers no evidence to support this claim aside
from text messages between herself and coworkers criticizing Welch and
his job performance. (Doc. 25 at 8; Doc. 25-8 at 3-5.)
2
Jefferies admitted verbally and in writing that there had been incidents
with a patient’s mother and the registration desk staff. (Doc. 23-1
¶ 17.)
3
with Cornerstone staff.
(Doc. 23-1 ¶ 19: Doc. 23-2 at 17; Doc 25-
13 at 2.)
On May 24, 2017, Jefferies was contacted by Paul Earring of
Regional’s Human Resources department in response to her May 23
email.
(Doc. 25 at 9.) 3
On June 13, 2017, Jefferies requested
and received permission for a scheduled tardy for the morning of
June 19, 2017, due to a “family issue” involving her son.
23-2 at 30.)
(Doc.
During this scheduled tardy, Jefferies filed an EEOC
charge stating that she was the only CMA being held to the
attendance standards and that she had been discriminated against
“due to [her] race (Black) and in retaliation for [her] complaint
of being singled out due to my race in violation of Title VII.”
(Doc. 25-18 at 2.)
When Jefferies returned to the office on June 19, 2017, she
was immediately terminated by Wohlgemuth.
(Doc. 23-3 ¶ 22.)
Wohlgemuth told Jefferies she was being terminated based on emails
Wohlgemuth
had
received
from
other
Jefferies violated company policy.
25-18 at 5.)
employees
alleging
that
(Id. ¶¶ 12, 15–18, 22; Doc.
These emails described Jefferies rummaging through
a coworker’s drawer, retrieving personal information (including a
coworker’s
disciplinary
action),
3
and
sharing
it
with
other
Though Jefferies states in her brief that during this call she suggested
to Earring that if her complaints did not get handled she would like “a
neutral party such as EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]
come in,” she provides no record evidence for this statement. (Doc. 25
at 9.)
4
employees in violation of both Regional’s employee code of conduct
and its confidentiality policy.
(Doc. 23-3 ¶¶ 12, 15–17; Doc. 25-
22 at 4; Doc. 23-1 at 14-15; Doc. 23-2 at 34.)
There is no
indication in the record that Wohlgemuth knew that Jefferies had
filed an EEOC charge; to the contrary, Wohlgemuth states in her
affidavit that she was not aware that Jefferies had filed or
planned to file a charge with the EEOC at the time she made the
decision to terminate Jefferies’s employment.
On
June
20,
2017,
Jefferies
filed
a
(Doc. 23-3 ¶ 25.)
second
EEOC
charge
claiming she was terminated in retaliation for having filed the
previous EEOC charge.
On
March
5,
(Doc. 25-18 at 5.)
2018,
Jefferies
filed
this
lawsuit
against
Regional in the General Court of Justice, Guilford County, District
Court Division-Small Claims court.
removed
the
action
jurisdiction.
to
this
(Doc. 1.)
(Doc. 1-1.)
court
based
on
Regional timely
federal
question
Regional then moved to dismiss the
complaint, and the court granted the motion as to all claims
against
Welch
and
all
claims
against
Regional
Jefferies’s retaliation claim now before the court.
11.)
except
for
(Doc. 7; Doc.
The court issued Jefferies a Roseboro letter, 4 notifying her
of her obligation to respond, her ability to file evidence in
support of her claim, and the consequence of likely judgment in
4
See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
5
favor of the Defendant for failure to do so.
(Doc. 24.)
has filed a response with multiple attachments.
Jefferies
(Doc. 25.)
The
motion is therefore ready for decision.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where evidence in the record
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–
25 (1986).
A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.”
242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
In a motion for summary judgment the moving party
satisfies its burden by showing an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case.
Id. at 325.
In analyzing a summary judgment motion, the court “tak[es]
the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Henry v. Purnell,
In other words, the
nonmoving “party is entitled ‘to have the credibility of his
evidence as forecast assumed, his version of all that is in dispute
accepted, [and] all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to
him.’”
Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (brackets in original) (quoting Charbonnages de France
6
v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)).
If, applying this
standard, the court “find[s] that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for [the nonmoving party], then a genuine factual dispute
exists and summary judgment is improper.”
Evans v. Technologies
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, “[a] party
asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including . . . affidavits or declarations . . . .”
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Fed.
The responding party “may not rest upon
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ‘must come forward
with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’”
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986)); see also Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818
F.2d
1126,
1128
(4th
affirmative
duty
for
unsupported
claims
Cir.
“the
and
1987)
trial
(noting
judge
defenses
from
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
to
that
there
prevent
proceeding
is
an
factually
to
trial”
“Nor can the nonmoving party
‘create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation
or the building of one inference upon another.’”
Emmett, 532 F.3d
at 297 (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Jefferies proceeds pro se.
some
generosity
in
Pro se litigants are accorded
construing
their
7
pleadings
and
filings.
Armstrong v. Rolm A. Siemans Co., 129 F.3d 1258, *1 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“When reviewing a pro se complaint, federal courts should examine
carefully
the
plaintiff's
factual
allegations,
no
matter
how
inartfully pleaded, to determine whether they could provide a basis
for relief.”) (citations omitted) (unpublished table opinion).
Yet this does not require the court to ignore clear defects, Bustos
v. Chamberlain, No. 3:09-1760, 2009 WL 2782238, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug.
27, 2009) (pleadings), or to “conjure up questions never squarely
presented in the complaint,” Brice v. Jenkins, 489 F.Supp.2d 538,
541
(E.D.
Va.
omitted).
2007)
(internal
quotation
marks
and
citation
Nor does it require that the court become an advocate
for the unrepresented party.
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901
F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Pro se litigants, like all litigants, are bound by the Federal
Rules
of
Civil
fundamental
Procedure,
requirement
support claims.
of
especially
as
they
relate
presenting
admissible
to
the
evidence
to
In deference to Jefferies’s pro se status, the
court sent her a Roseboro letter on April 2, 2019, informing her
that
“[her]
failure
to
respond,
or
if
appropriate,
to
file
affidavits or evidence in rebuttal within the allowed time may
cause the court to conclude that the defendants’ contentions are
undisputed . . . .”
(Doc.
24.)
A
party’s
brief
does
not
constitute evidence that the court can consider on a motion for
summary judgment.
Similarly, statements such as those submitted
8
by Jefferies that “do[] not subject the author to the penalty of
perjury for any misstatements” (see Doc. 25-19 at 8) cannot by
themselves defeat a summary judgment motion.
Turner v. Godwin,
1:15CV770, 2018 WL 284978, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2018); see also
United
States
v.
White,
366
F.3d
291,
300
(4th
Cir.
2004)
(explaining that courts should not consider unsworn arguments as
evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion). In contrast,
affidavits that are signed under penalty of perjury, such as those
of Jean Michelle Harrell and Rebecca Lynn Benfield (Doc. 25-19),
are proper evidence.
Moreover, although a verified complaint may
serve as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes, see, e.g.,
Smith v. Blue Ridge Reg’l Jail Auth.-Lynchburg, 7:17-CV-00046,
2017 WL 6598124, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Va. Dec. 26, 2017), Jefferies
submitted only an unverified complaint in this case (see Doc. 5).
Much
of
Jefferies’s
remaining
evidence
is
not
authenticated;
however, it will be considered because in many cases it appears to
consist
of
documents
from
Regional’s
file
and
because
it
nevertheless fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
In the end, even where a motion for summary judgment is not
opposed with sufficient admissible evidence to create a dispute of
material
fact,
the
court
will
review
the
motion
to
make
an
independent determination whether the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
Robinson v. Wix Filtration
Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 409 n.8 (4th Cir. 2010).
9
B.
Retaliation Claim
Absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination, claims
under Title VII are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–07 (1973).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must show (1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) a
materially adverse action; and (3) a causal connection between the
protected activity and the asserted materially adverse action.
Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 327 (4th Cir. 2018);
Hinton v. Va. Union Univ., 185 F. Supp. 3d 807, 825–30 (E.D. Va.
2016) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53 (2006)).
Retaliatory actions “need not ‘affect the terms and
conditions of employment’” but must be “‘materially adverse’ []
such that they ‘might have dissuaded a reasonable worker’ from
engaging in protected activity.”
Strothers, 895 F.3d at 327
(quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64, 68).
Once an employee makes
out a prima facie case, the employer bears the burden of producing
a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the materially adverse
action.
See id. at 328.
The employee then bears the burden of
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's
stated rationale is a pretext for retaliation.
Id.
Here, Regional argues that Jefferies has failed to establish
a prima facie case of retaliation, as she has shown neither
protected activity nor causation.
10
Regional also argues that
Jefferies has failed to establish that its nonretaliatory reason
for terminating Jefferies was a pretext for retaliation.
In
response, Jefferies contends that she has established a prima facie
case and that Regional’s reasons for termination were pretextual.
1.
Protected Activities
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect
to
[her]
compensation,
terms,
conditions,
or
privileges
of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”
also
prohibits
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
retaliation
by
a
private
employer
Title VII
against
an
employee because the employee has (1) “made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding,
or
hearing”
“opposed
any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by” Title VII.
42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
clause
and
the
under
Title
VII
or
(2)
These are referred to as the participation
opposition
clause,
respectively.
Under
the
opposition clause, “an employee is protected when she opposes not
only . . . employment actions actually unlawful under Title VII
but
also
unlawful.”
employment
actions
she
reasonably
believes
to
be
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264,
282 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted); Strothers, 895 F.3d at 327.
This opposition
activity, however, is only protected if an employee’s subjective
11
belief is “objectively reasonable in light of the facts.”
Peters
v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Strothers,
895 F.3d at 327.
Jefferies claims that she engaged in three separate protected
activities: (1) warning Regional’s Human Resources department that
she would involve the EEOC if her complaints were not resolved,
(2) sending the May 23, 2017 email to Wohlgemuth and Welch alleging
discrimination, and (3) filing an EEOC complaint on June 19, 2017. 5
(Doc. 25 at 14.)
Each will be addressed in turn.
Jefferies’s first basis for liability appears to refer to her
alleged conversation with Earring, recounted in her brief.
at 9.)
(Id.
Jefferies argues that during this call she suggested to
Earring that if her complaints did not get handled she would like
“a neutral party such as EEOC [to] come in.”
(Id.)
However, she
provides no record evidence for this statement, and because it
lacks evidentiary support it will not be considered by the court.
White,
366
F.3d
at
300
(counseling
against
use
of
unsworn
statements to defeat summary judgment); Felty, 818 F.2d at 1128
5
Though Jefferies also makes generalized attendance complaints and
intimates discrimination against her following the medical practice
merger and discrimination due to general personal animosity, Title VII
only provides protection against discrimination on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1);
see also Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (citing with approval treatise noting
that “personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy and snubbing
by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). As such, Jefferies’s complaints based on non-protected
grounds do not constitute protected activity.
12
(noting that there is an affirmative duty for “the trial judge to
prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding
to trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Jefferies’s second basis for liability — complaints of racial
discrimination made to Wohlgemuth and Welch in her May 23, 2017
email
—
can
constitute
protected
activity
if
Jefferies’s
subjective belief of discrimination was “objectively reasonable in
light of the facts.”
Cuffee v. Tidewater Cmty. Coll., 409 F. Supp.
2d 709, 720 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citing Peters, 327 F.3d at 320–21),
aff’d,
194
Jefferies’s
F.
App’x
subjective
127
(4th
belief
Cir.
was
2006).
not
Here,
objectively
however,
reasonable
because there is “no evidence whatsoever, other than [her] own
self-serving, unsubstantiated opinions” that Regional applied its
disciplinary policies to discriminate against black employees.
Coleman v. Loudoun Cty. Sch. Bd., 294 F. App’x 778, 782 (4th Cir.
2008); see Mann v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 185 F. App’x 242, 248
(4th Cir. 2006). 6
Specifically, the affidavit of former Regional
CMA Jean Harrell, who is black, states that she was “never written
up or given any warnings for [her] attendance or tardies.”
25-19 at 4.)
(Doc.
Jefferies’s own evidence demonstrates that Skeen,
who is white, (Doc. 23-4 at 29) and Mary Beth Sullivan, also white,
6
Unpublished decisions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential and
are generally entitled only to the weight of their persuasive reasoning.
See Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006).
13
(id. at 35), who are both Regional CMAs, also received disciplinary
action for violating the attendance policy.
(Doc. 23-4 at 15, 21–
22,
belief
29,
35.)
Jefferies’s
subjective
of
racially
discriminatory enforcement of the attendance policy against her is
not
objectively
reasonable
because
there
is
no
evidence
of
discriminatory or unequal enforcement, or that anyone else at
Regional
believed
the
discriminatory manner.
that
plaintiff’s
attendance
policy
was
enforced
in
a
See Coleman, 294 F. App’x at 782 (finding
belief
that
African-American
candidates
were
being discriminated against was not objectively reasonable because
there was “no evidence whatsoever, other than [the plaintiff’s]
own self-serving, unsubstantiated opinions, which is insufficient
to stave off summary judgment, that the panel members discriminated
against the African-American candidates”); Koenig v. McHugh, No.
3:11CV00060, 2013 WL 317584, at *10 (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2013)
(finding that the plaintiff failed to show that her belief that
she
was
being
disciplined
due
to
her
race
was
objectively
reasonable because the plaintiff provided no evidence other than
her own bare assertions).
In the absence of evidentiary support,
Jefferies’s subjective belief of discriminatory practices cannot
be
objectively
activity.
reasonable
and
fails
to
qualify
as
protected
Perry v. Kappos, 776 F. Supp. 2d 182, 196 (E.D. Va.
2011) (finding that, where the plaintiff did not offer any examples
of
how
other
employees
in
similar
14
situations
were
treated
differently or any other evidence corroborating his allegations,
the plaintiff’s own conclusory statements were insufficient to
establish
that
the
plaintiff’s
subjective
belief
that
discrimination occurred was objectively reasonable.)
As to the third basis for liability, it is well established
that filing an EEOC discrimination charge constitutes protected
activity under the participation clause of Title VII.
See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in
Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 656 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that
plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC discrimination charge constituted
protected activity), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington, 548
U.S. 53 (2006); Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994)
(filing a complaint with the EEOC is protected activity).
2.
Materially Adverse Action
To establish a materially adverse action, “a plaintiff must
show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse, which . . . means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.”
omitted).
Regional
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (quotation marks
does
materially adverse action.
not
dispute
that
termination
is
a
See Strothers, 895 F.3d at 328 (“[I]t
is patently obvious and undisputed that termination is a materially
adverse action”); Hinton, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 830.
Therefore, the
court finds that Jefferies’s termination constitutes a materially
15
adverse action. 7
3.
Causal Connection
Finally, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation a
plaintiff must prove that a causal connection existed between a
plaintiff’s
protected
adverse action.
activity
and
a
defendant’s
Strothers, 895 F.3d at 336.
materially
Here, Jefferies
cannot establish any such connection between her filing an EEOC
charge and her termination.
To establish a causal connection, Jefferies must show that
(1) the protected activity preceded the materially adverse action
and (2) that the employer knew the employee engaged in a protected
activity.
(stating
Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir. 1998)
that
“[k]nowledge
of
a
charge
is
essential
to
a
retaliation claim”); see also Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657 (explaining
that “[s]ince, by definition, an employer cannot take action
because
of
a
factor
of
which
it
is
unaware,
the
employer’s
knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity is
absolutely necessary to establish the third element of the prima
facie case”).
Jefferies
meets
the
first
7
element.
She
engaged
in
the
Jefferies also argues that Welch’s enforcement of the attendance policy
against her constitutes a materially adverse action. The court need not
decide whether this is so because Jefferies cannot establish a causal
connection on this ground as each enforcement of the attendance policy
against Jefferies preceded her protected activity of filing the EEOC
charge. See Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir. 1998).
16
protected activity of filing an EEOC charge hours before her
termination.
failed
to
As to the second element, however, Jefferies has
establish
that
Regional
knew
of
her
engagement
protected activity at the time of her termination.
in
Though she
argues that Welch, not Wohlgemuth, was the decisionmaker in her
termination, she submits no evidence that either of them knew she
had filed an EEOC complaint just hours earlier that day before her
termination.
See Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc., 824 F.3d 103, 108
(4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the “knowledge” relevant for a
retaliation claim “must be tied to the decision-maker involved in
the unfavorable personnel action”).
While Jefferies has produced
a text message where she informed Skeen of her intent to file an
EEOC charge (Doc. 25-8 at 7), this does not provide any indication
that either Wohlgemuth or Welch knew of Jefferies’s EEOC charge,
nor is there any other evidence to support a reasonable inference
that they did.
Rather, Wohlgemuth’s statement in her affidavit
indicates that she was the decisionmaker and she had no knowledge
of Jefferies’s EEOC complaint prior to making the decision to
terminate
her
or
her
termination.
(Doc.
23-3
¶¶ 18,
25.)
Therefore, because Jefferies has failed to establish a causal
connection between her protected activity and materially adverse
action,
she
has
failed
to
establish
retaliation.
17
a
prima
facie
case
of
4.
Legitimate Nonretaliatory Reason
Even if Jefferies could establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden would then shift to Regional to produce a
legitimate nonretaliatory reason for her termination.
895 F.3d at 328.
Strothers,
Once an employer articulates a legitimate
nonretaliatory reason, an employee must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the reason proffered by the employer was
actually a pretext for retaliation.
Id.
Regional has offered a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for
terminating Jefferies.
It explains it terminated Jefferies based
on reports from three separate employees that she had rummaged
through
the
drawer
information,
violation
then
of
of
another
shared
Regional’s
confidentiality pledge.
that
employee,
information
code
of
she
was
provided
conduct
with
and
confidential
coworkers
in
Jefferies’s
(Doc. 23-3 ¶¶ 12, 15–18, 22; id. at 10;
Doc. 23-2 at 27-28; Doc. 25-22 at 4.)
that
removed
with
this
Jefferies does not contest
reason
at
the
time
of
her
termination.
The violation of company policy is recognized as a legitimate
reason for terminating an employee.
See Laing v. Fed. Express
Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding violation of
company
conduct
policy
to
be
a
legitimate
nondiscriminatory
reason); Brantley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. RDB-07-1322,
2008 WL 2900953, at *11 (D. Md. July 22, 2008) (“Noncompliance
18
with company policy is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
firing someone”).
legitimate
Here, Regional’s given reason qualifies as a
nonretaliatory
reason
for
terminating
Jefferies’s
employment.
5.
Pretext
Because Regional has produced a legitimate nonretaliatory reason
for the materially adverse action, the burden shifts to Jefferies
to produce evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude
that “the employer’s purported nonretaliatory reasons were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”
895 F.3d at 328.
Strothers,
To carry this burden, a plaintiff must offer
direct or circumstantial evidence that calls into question the
employer's explanation.
See Walker v. Mod–U–Kraf Homes, LLC, 775
F.3d 202, 211 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding no reasonable inference of
pretext
in
evidence).
the
absence
of
either
direct
or
circumstantial
In evaluating a plaintiff's allegation of pretext,
courts are mindful that “it is not our province to decide whether
the reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as
it truly was the reason for the plaintiff's termination.”
Hawkins
v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting
DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Though
Jefferies
argues
that
the
emails
received
by
Wohlgemuth were falsified by Welch in furtherance of a conspiracy
to end her employment, she provides no evidence to support these
19
allegations. 8
That is, she provides no evidence to demonstrate
“that the [employer’s] proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision” or that she “has been the victim of
intentional discrimination.”
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see Hoyle
v. Freightliner, 650 F.3d 321, 338 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding pretext
not established where plaintiff “presents no evidence that she was
not
terminated
for
[employer’s
proffered
nondiscriminatory
reason]”); Gibson v. Marjack Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 649, 658 (D. Md.
2010)
(finding
insufficient
evidence).
to
plaintiff’s
establish
“unsubstantiated
pretext
by
a
speculations”
preponderance
of
the
Jefferies’s conclusory contention fails to create a
genuine dispute of material fact.
Felty, 818 F.2d at 1128 (4th
Cir. 1987) (“Unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat
a summary judgment motion.”).
Therefore, even if Jefferies could establish a prima facie
case
of
retaliation,
she
cannot
demonstrate
that
Regional’s
proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual, and she has
thus
failed
to
meet
her
burden
under
McDonnell
Douglas.
Accordingly, Regional is entitled to summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
8
Although Jefferies submits text messages attached to her brief in
support of her claims, these messages make no reference to the emails
or the allegations resulting in Jefferies’s termination and thus provide
no support for her claims. (Doc. 25-17 at 2-23.)
20
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Regional’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 22) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
August 14, 2019
21
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