SYLVESTER v. INMAN
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR on 07/09/2019, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 11 ), is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims contained in the Complaint, (Doc. 2 ), are DISMISSED. A judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith. (Garland, Leah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
PATRICK SHAWN SYLVESTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONNIE INMAN,
Defendant.
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1:18CV262
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Donnie Inman’s
motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 11.) Pro se Plaintiff Patrick
Sean Sylvester was arrested by Defendant, an officer with the
Denton Police Department, on February 3, 2016, pursuant to a
warrant for statutory rape, indecent liberties, and contributing
to the delinquency of a minor. (Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 2) at
1; Affidavit of Donnie Inman (“Inman Aff.”) (Doc. 11-1) ¶¶ 1,
6-7.) Plaintiff alleges that this arrest violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because Defendant lacked probable cause to make
an arrest and because Defendant “assaulted” Plaintiff while
conducting the arrest. (See Compl. (Doc. 2) at 1.) Plaintiff
further alleges that, while imprisoned, he suffered injuries due
to (1) the conditions of his confinement and (2) an assault by
another inmate, allegedly caused by a correctional officer
revealing information about the nature of Plaintiff’s criminal
charges. (Id.)
Defendant has moved for summary judgment, (Doc. 11),
submitted a memorandum in support of this motion, (Doc. 12), and
attached an affidavit and other supporting documents. Plaintiff
has not responded opposing the motion. Because this court finds
that Plaintiff has failed to raise any genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether his arrest was constitutional,
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court must
determine whether there remains a “genuine dispute as to any
material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Once a defendant makes a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v.
Calvert Cty., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). “On summary
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). If there is no genuine
dispute about any fact material to the moving party’s claim,
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then “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A factual dispute is genuine when “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986); see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,
391 U.S. 253, 289–90 (1968) (stating that a dispute is not
genuine for summary judgment purposes when one party rests
solely on allegations in the pleadings and does not produce any
evidence to refute alternative arguments). This court must look
to substantive law to determine which facts are material — only
those facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
In addition, “the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247-48.
“[T]he non-moving party must do more than present a ‘scintilla’
of evidence in its favor.” Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 818.
Ultimately, “there is no issue for trial unless there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
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II.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK & ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff claims a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.1 The Fourth Amendment protects the right “to be
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
Whether [an] arrest was constitutionally valid depends
. . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made,
the officers had probable cause to make it — whether
at that moment the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the petitioner had
committed or was committing an offense.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (“[W]hen an officer has probable
cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his
presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not
While Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he still must “give
the defendant fair notice of what [his] claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957),
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
The complaint refers only to the Fourth Amendment. While
Plaintiff may wish to bring an Eighth Amendment claim based on
allegations regarding his treatment in prison, this court finds
the complaint wholly insufficient to provide fair notice of such
a claim because Plaintiff does not articulate any legal basis
for that claim. This court declines to independently plead new
claims on Plaintiff’s behalf. See, e.g., Peloza v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We
agree with the dissent that a complaint must be read charitably
at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. However, a reviewing court need not
go so far as to invent claims not within the reasonable
intendment of the complaint.”).
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in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.”); Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
The default rule is that probable cause establishes
constitutionality; the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions
only when “searches or seizures [are] conducted in an
extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual’s
privacy or even physical interests.” Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 818 (1996). Such extreme cases include bodily
penetration incident to arrest, which is evaluated under a more
flexible balancing test. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760–
63 (1985) (surgery to remove bullet lodged inside arrestee);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59, 771 (1966)
(extraction of blood to measure blood alcohol content). The
Supreme Court has not, however, held that allegations of assault
or excessive force alone abrogate the default probable-cause
rule.
The use of excessive force during an arrest violates the
Fourth Amendment only when it is not objectively reasonable. In
other words, “the question is whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
Relevant factors include “the severity of the crime at issue,
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whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.
An officer is shielded by qualified immunity “as long as
their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with
the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); see also Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243–44 (2009) (“An officer conducting a
search is entitled to qualified immunity where clearly
established law does not show that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment.”).
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff fails to plead a
Fourth Amendment violation because Defendant acted “pursuant to
a facially valid arrest warrant” and the arrest was thus
reasonable as a matter of law. (Doc. 12 at 6.) Defendant further
asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because “his
conduct did not violate any clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” (Id. at 7.)
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff fails to put forward any evidence to support the
allegation that he was arrested without probable cause.
Therefore, this court finds no reason to doubt the affidavit and
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warrant submitted by Defendant, both of which demonstrate that
Defendant had probable cause for the February 3, 2016 arrest.
(See Inman Aff. (Doc. 11-1) ¶ 6; Warrant for Arrest, Ex. B.
(Doc. 11-3).) This court finds the evidence sufficient to
establish that probable cause existed for the arrest. The court
also does not consider Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
physical force to be anywhere near the level of intrusiveness
necessary to take this case outside the realm of the default
probable-cause rule. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354–55. Plaintiff
has therefore failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the arrest itself violated the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 571 (4th Cir.
1998) (“Because the search of Porterfield was effected pursuant
to a valid warrant supported by probable cause, the search did
not run afoul of Porterfield’s Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches.”).
This court further finds that Plaintiff has not raised a
genuine dispute as to whether the force used during the arrest
was objectively reasonable. Plaintiff alleges only that “OFFICER
Donnie Inman assaulted [him] wile [sic] [he] was in handcuffs,
and that is Police Brutality.” (Compl. (Doc. 2) at 1.) Plaintiff
has not provided sufficient factual allegations for this court
to determine the reasonableness of any force allegedly used
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during the arrest. For example, Plaintiff does not indicate
which part of his body (if any) was harmed during the arrest,
nor does he mention medical treatment that he received for any
such injury. As far as this court can discern, Plaintiff may be
referring to the simple act of placing him in handcuffs.
Plaintiff may not rely on an unsupported allegation to survive
summary judgment. See Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. at 288–89.
Because this court has determined that summary judgment
should be granted to Defendant on all claims, it does not reach
the question of whether Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 11), is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims contained in the
Complaint, (Doc. 2), are DISMISSED.
A judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This the 9th day of July, 2019.
____________________________________
United States District Judge
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