ULTRA-MEK, INC. v. UNITED FURNITURE INDUSTRIES, INC. et al
Filing
243
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR. on 8/17/2022; that Defendants' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of No Literal Infringement, (Doc. 237 ), is GRANTED. (Hicks, Samantha)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ULTRA-MEK, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Counter Defendant,
v.
UNITED FURNITURE INDUSTRIES,
INC., OISEYS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., MAN WAH HOLDINGS LTD.,
JIANGSU YULONG SMART
TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
REMACRO MACHINERY
TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
TAIZHOU CHENGUANG VEHICLE CO.,
LTD., and MAN WAH (USA), INC.,
Defendants and
Counter Claimants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:18CV281
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Presently before this court is a Renewed Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment of No Literal Infringement filed by United
Furniture Industries, Inc., Oiseys International, Inc., Man Wah
Holdings Ltd., Jiangsu Yulong Smart Technology Co., Ltd., Remacro
Machinery Technology Co., Ltd., Taizhou Chenguang Vehicle Co.,
Ltd., and Man Wah (USA), Inc. (together, “Defendants”).
(Doc. 237.) This court will grant the motion.
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 1 of 17
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ultra-Mek, Inc. is the owner of two patents that
each describe a reclining chair. (First Am. Compl. (Doc. 31)
¶¶ 22–25.) The patents are U.S. Patent Number 8,016,348 (the
“‘348 patent”) and U.S. Patent Number 8,297,693 (the “‘693
patent”). (Ex. A (“‘348 patent”) (Doc. 31-1); Ex. B (“‘693
patent”) (Doc. 31-2).)
Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging multiple of their
mechanisms (together, “accused mechanisms”) infringed Plaintiff’s
patents. (First Am. Compl. (Doc. 31) ¶¶ 73–88.) The case
proceeded to claim construction, and this court construed
disputed claim terms. (Doc. 124.) This court did not construe the
phrase “opposed first and second ends,” as used in claims 7 and
13 of the ‘348 patent and claim 1 of the ‘693 patent. (See id.)
The case progressed to the summary judgment stage, and this
court denied the parties’ summary judgment motions. (Doc. 174 at
40.)1 However, the summary judgment opinion included language
that was dismissive of Plaintiff’s literal infringement theory
because the allegedly infringing mechanisms do “not have literal
opposed ends in the format envisioned by the patent.” (Id. at
1
All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
documents filed with the court refer to the page numbers located
at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear
on CM/ECF.
- 2 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 2 of 17
25.) Based on this language, Defendants filed a motion in limine
to exclude any trial “testimony asserting that claims 7, 13, and
14 of the ’348 patent and claims 1, 2, and 4-7 of the ’693 patent
are literally infringed.” (Doc. 180 at 3.)
This court denied that motion as unripe, (Doc. 214 at 15),
and the parties agreed to file supplemental claim construction
briefs regarding the meaning of the phrase “opposed first and
second ends,” (Doc. 211 at 32). After carefully reviewing that
briefing, this court construed “opposed first and second ends” as
referring to “the lengthwise extremities of the [power actuating
unit/actuating unit/linear actuating unit], wherein length is
defined by the axis in which the [power actuating unit/actuating
unit/linear actuating unit] moves forwardly and rearwardly .”
(Doc. 234 at 14.)
Relying on that construction, Defendants filed a renewed
motion for partial summary judgment of no literal infringement of
claims 7 and 13 of the ’348 patent and claim 1 of the ’693 patent
(and their dependent claims). (Doc. 237.) Those three claims
contain the following language, with minor differences reflected
in brackets:
wherein the [power actuating unit/actuating unit/linear
actuating unit] includes opposed first and second ends,
and wherein the first end of the [power actuating
unit/actuating unit/linear actuating unit] moves
forwardly as the seating unit moves from the upright
position to the TV position, and wherein the second end
- 3 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 3 of 17
of the [power actuating unit/actuating unit/linear
actuating unit]2 moves rearwardly when the seating unit
moves from the TV position to the fully reclined
position.
(‘348 patent (Doc. 31-1) at 10:9–15, 11:14–12:3; ‘693 patent
(Doc. 31-2) at 9:45–51.) Defendants’ motion is accompanied by a
brief. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
of No Literal Infringement (“Defs.’ Br.”) (Doc. 238).) Plaintiff
responded in opposition to the motion, (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’
Mot. for Partial Summ. J. of No Literal Infringement (“Pl.’s
Resp.”) (Doc. 239)), and Defendants replied, (Defs.’ Reply Br. in
Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Partial Summ. J. of No Literal
Infringement (“Defs.’ Reply”) (Doc. 242)). Both parties have
submitted supplemental expert reports to support their respective
positions. (Ex. 1, Suppl. Expert Report of Rufus Brown
Responding to Ct.’s Claim Construction Order (“Brown Report”)
(Doc. 238-2); Ex. 2, Suppl. Expert Report of Dr. Kimberly
Cameron Regarding Noninfringement (“Cameron Report”) (Doc. 2383).) Defendants’ partial summary judgment motion is now ripe for
adjudication.
2
For ease of reference, this court will hereinafter use the
term “actuating unit” as shorthand to collectively refer to the
power actuating unit, actuating unit, and linear actuating unit.
- 4 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 4 of 17
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322—23 (1986). This
court’s summary judgment inquiry is whether the evidence “is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating “that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the “moving party discharges
its burden . . . , the nonmoving party then must come forward
with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” McLean v. Patten Cmtys., Inc., 332 F.3d 714, 718—19 (4th
Cir. 2003). Summary judgment should be granted “unless a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on
the evidence presented.” Id. at 719; see also TechSearch, L.L.C.
v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“To support
a summary judgment of noninfringement it must be shown that, on
the correct claim construction, no reasonable jury could have
found infringement on the undisputed facts . . . .”). “[M]ere
allegations” in support of a party’s pleadings without “any
significant probative evidence” to support those allegations do
- 5 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 5 of 17
not provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to
resolve a dispute in favor of that party. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
at 248–49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l
Bank of Ariz. V. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288, 290
(1968)); see also Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs.
Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The mere existence
in the record of dueling expert testimony does not necessarily
raise a genuine issue of material fact.”).
Put another way, simply showing “some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts” is not sufficient to establish a genuine
dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In considering whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, the court must be careful not to weigh the
evidence or make credibility determinations. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 255. Instead, the court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants’ principal argument is that partial summary
judgement of no literal infringement is warranted because the
relevant patent claims require that the actuating unit’s second
end “move[] rearwardly when the seating unit moves from the TV
position to the fully reclined position,” but the accused
- 6 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 6 of 17
mechanisms’ second ends never move rearwardly. (Defs.’ Br.
(Doc. 238) at 6–13.) In making this argument, Defendants start
by pointing to video evidence that they claim show that the
accused mechanisms’ second ends only move forwardly during the
entirety of the motion cycle. (Id. at 8–9.) This video evidence
is sufficient to demonstrate that there is an absence of
evidence supporting Plaintiff’s literal infringement claim on
the patent claims at issue, and thus Defendants have discharged
their initial summary judgment burden. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325. Plaintiff in response advances specific facts that it
claims show that whether the second ends move rearwardly remains
a genuine issue for trial. (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 239) at 7–11.)
Those facts Plaintiff has put forward to show the second
ends move rearwardly are from its expert’s supplemental report.
(See, e.g., id. at 8–9 (discussing Brown Report (Doc. 238-2)).)
That report is by Mr. Brown and states:
Claims 7 and 13 of the ’348 Patent and claim 1 of
the ’693 Patent further require that the “second end
of the [power actuating unit/actuating unit/linear
actuating unit] moves rearwardly when the seating unit
moves from the TV position to the fully reclined
position.” As construed by the Court, this element
requires that the second “lengthwise extremity” of the
actuator moves rearwardly as the seating unit moves
from the TV position to the fully reclined position.
[] This element is literally met by the 4152
mechanism. At my request and direction, videos,
photographs, and measurements were taken of the 4152
mechanism (which was fixed in place in front of and
pointed away from a wall) as the mechanism was cycled
- 7 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 7 of 17
between the TV position and the fully reclined
position. In each position, a measurement was taken
from a fixed point behind the rear of the mechanism to
the rearmost extremity of the actuator—what Dr.
Cameron and I agree is the claimed “second end.” When
the 4152 mechanism was in the TV position, the
rearmost extremity of the actuator (the “second end,”
as construed by the Court) was approximately 19 3/8”
(nineteen and three-eighths inches) away from the wall
behind the mechanism. When the 4152 mechanism was in
the fully reclined position, the rearmost extremity of
the actuator (the “second end,” as construed by the
Court) was approximately 18 3/4” (eighteen and threequarters inches) away from the wall behind the
mechanism . . . .
[] The rearmost extremity (the “second end,” as
construed by the Court) thus moves rearwardly when the
mechanism and seating unit move from the TV position
to the fully reclined position, as required by claims
7 and 13 of the ’348 Patent and claim 1 of the ’693
Patent. The amount of rearward movement of the “second
end” is approximately 5/8” (five-eighths of an inch).
(Brown Report (Doc. 238-2) ¶¶ 11–13.) Mr. Brown came to a
similar conclusion regarding the 5151 mechanism by conducting
the same testing. (Id. ¶¶ 18–20 (concluding that the second end
of the 5151 mechanism moved rearwardly by approximately threequarters of an inch).)
Defendants argue that this evidence is insufficient to
create a genuine issue for trial because the evidence is (1) too
unreliable and, (2) fails to show “rearwardly” motion as defined
by the patent. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 238) at 10–13; see also Defs.’
Reply (Doc. 242) at 5–10.) This court is unconvinced by
Defendants’ first argument but persuaded by the second. Each is
addressed in turn.
- 8 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 8 of 17
A.
The Measurements’ Reliability
Defendants argue the measurements Mr. Brown relied upon
“should be disregarded for purposes of summary judgment. ”
(Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 242) at 10.) They contend the measurements
are inaccurate, thus rendering Mr. Brown’s conclusions
unreliable. (See id. at 8–10; Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 238) at 10 n.2.)
Specifically, Defendants insist that: the measurements
themselves do not comport with the scientific method; Mr. Brown
did not adequately supervise or verify the measurements; and ,
the measurements are self-serving, and thus suspect, because
they were recorded by Plaintiff’s counsel and a co-inventor of
the patents. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 238) at 10 n.2; Defs.’ Reply
(Doc. 242) at 8–10.)
Despite these challenges, this court will not disregard the
measurements Mr. Brown relied upon for purposes of adjudicating
the instant summary judgment motion. A different record might
permit an analysis of facts to suggest his measurements are not
scientifically valid. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). However, here, Defendants’
arguments largely concern the credibility and weight to give the
measurement evidence, and those arguments may not be considered
by this court on summary judgment. Indeed, longstanding Supreme
Court precedent holds that “[c]redibility determinations, [and]
- 9 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 9 of 17
the weighing of the evidence . . . are jury functions, not those
of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . .
The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed.” Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. This court must view the measurement
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff because it is
the non-moving party. Id. Thus, this court accepts as accurate
the measurements Mr. Brown’s report relied upon. The problem for
Plaintiff, however, is that those measurements do not show
“rearwardly” motion, as defined by the patents, rendering Mr.
Brown’s conclusions unsupported.
B.
“Rearwardly” Motion
Defendants point out that Mr. Brown’s supplemental report
and conclusions ignore the definition of “rearwardly” as defined
in the patents’ shared specification.3 (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 238) at
10–13; see also Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 242).) The patents’
specification states that:
As used herein, the terms “forward,” “forwardly,” and
“front” and derivatives thereof refer to the direction
defined by a vector extending from the backrest toward
the seat parallel to the underlying surface.
Conversely, the terms “rearward,” “rearwardly,” and
derivatives thereof refer to the direction directly
opposite the forward direction; the rearward direction
is defined by a vector that extends from the seat
3
The two patents’ specifications appear identical. (Compare
‘348 patent (Doc. 31-1) at 4–17, with ‘693 patent (Doc. 31-2) at
4–17.)
- 10 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 10 of 17
toward the backrest parallel to the underlying
surface.
(‘348 patent (Doc. 31-1) at 4:19–27 (emphasis added); ‘693 patent
(Doc. 31-2) at 4:23–31 (emphasis added).)
Defendants argue that during the transition from the
alleged intermediate TV position4 to the fully reclined position
the accused mechanisms’ second ends do not move rearwardly, that
is in a direction “defined by a vector that extends from the seat
toward the backrest parallel to the underlying surface.” (E.g.,
Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 238) at 11 (quoting ‘348 patent (Doc. 31-1) at
4:19–27).) Instead, consistent with the finding of its expert,
Defendants argue that the second ends’ motion during this period
in the reclining cycle “is more akin to an upward lift
(perpendicular to the forward and rearward direction) than
movement in the rearward direction as contemplated by the
patents.” (Id.; Cameron Report (Doc. 238-3) ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff responds that even if the patents’ specificati on
definition of rearwardly is applied, “Mr. Brown’s testing
clearly measured the amount of rearward movement of the second
ends of the Accused Mechanisms, i.e., movement parallel to the
4
Defendants do not concede that the accused mechanisms have
an intermediate TV position. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 238) at 7.) The
parties agree, as does this court, that dispute does not need to
be resolved in adjudicating the present motion. (Compare id.,
with Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 239) at 5 n.7.)
- 11 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 11 of 17
underlying surface.” (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 239) at 12.) Plaintiff
does not reject Defendants’ assertion that during the transition
from the alleged intermediate TV position to the fully reclined
position the second ends’ motion could be described as an
“upward lift”; instead, Plaintiff insists that characterization
is irrelevant because the upward lift includes some amount of
rearward motion. (See id. at 13.) Plaintiff argues the inclusion
of only some amount of rearward motion is sufficient because
“[t]he claims at issue are not limited to any precise amount of
rearward movement.” (Id.)
To rule on this issue, this court needs a definition of the
claim term “rearwardly.”5 It can adopt one in this Memorandum
Opinion and Order because the Federal Circuit has held that
“[u]nder our precedent, the district court [i]s well within its
power to clarify, supplement, and even alter its construction of
the [claim] limitations in its summary judgment order.” Level
Sleep LLC v. Sleep No. Corp., No. 2020-1718, 2021 WL 2934816, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021).
This court defines the term “rearwardly,” as used in the
last clause of claims 7 and 13 of the ’348 patent and claim 1 of
5
Plaintiff argues that this court does not need to construe
“rearwardly” to resolve this motion, (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 239) at
11), but Plaintiff has failed to offer this court a viable
alternative route to resolve the motion without such a
construction.
- 12 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 12 of 17
the ’693 patent, consistent with the specification’s definition.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“Claims must be
read in view of the specification, of which they are a part. ”);
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (“[T]he specification ‘ . . . is the single best guide to
the meaning of a disputed term.’” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
Critically, Plaintiff does not dispute this definition nor offer
an alternative definition. (See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 239) at 12.)
Incorporating the patents’ specification definition of
rearwardly, the relevant claim limitations state: “the second
end of the actuating unit moves [in a direction ‘defined by a
vector that extends from the seat toward the backrest parallel
to the underlying surface’] when the seating unit moves from the
TV position to the fully reclined position.” (E.g., ‘348 patent
(Doc. 31-1) at 11:17–12:3.)
The accused mechanisms’ second ends do not move rearwardly,
as defined by the patents’ specification. Instead, Plaintiff’s
own video evidence shows they move in an arc-like motion that is
plainly not “parallel to the underlying surface,” which is the
floor. (See, e.g., Doc. 240-3 at 00:10–00:15.) The measurements
Mr. Brown relied on show that at the conclusion of this arc-like
- 13 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 13 of 17
motion, when the seating unit is in the fully reclined position,
the second ends are further rearward than they were in the
alleged intermediate TV position. (See Brown Report (Doc. 238-2)
¶¶ 12, 19.) But that does not matter. The claim limitation at
issue only concerns the second ends’ directional motion, not
their ultimate location. What matters is the direction the
second ends moved in to arrive at their further rearward
location in the fully reclined position.
Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the second ends move
in a direction “defined by a vector that extends from the seat
toward the backrest parallel to the underlying surface.” (See
‘348 patent (Doc. 31-1) at 4:25–27; ‘693 patent (Doc. 31-2) at
4:25–27.) To reiterate, all Plaintiff has provided are
measurements showing that ultimately the second ends arrive at a
rearward location, (see Brown Report (Doc. 238-2) ¶¶ 12, 19),
but the uncontroverted evidence shows that the motion the second
ends take to get to that location is “arc-like,” (see, e.g.,
Doc. 240-3 at 00:10–00:15). Such nonlinear motion does not fall
within the scope of the relevant patent claims because it is not
“rearwardly,” that is, along a vector parallel to the floor. (See
‘348 patent (Doc. 31-1) at 4:25–27; ‘693 patent (Doc. 31-2) at
4:25–27.)
- 14 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 14 of 17
Mr. Brown’s opinion that the second ends do move rearwardly
does not create a genuine dispute of material fact because he did
not apply, or appear to consider, the patents’ specification
definition of “rearwardly.” (See Brown Report (Doc. 238-2).)
Thus, his finding of rearwardly movement is a “mere
allegation[]” in support of Plaintiff’s opposition brief that is
unsupported by “any significant probative evidence.” Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 288, 290). That
is not enough to allow a reasonable jury, applying the patents’
construction of rearwardly, to find literal infringement on the
relevant claims. Id.; TechSearch, 286 F.3d at 1371. “The mere
existence in the record of dueling expert testimony does not
necessarily raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Mortg.
Grader, 811 F.3d at 1325. “A party does not manufacture more than
a merely colorable dispute simply by submitting an expert
declaration asserting that something is black when the moving
party’s expert says it is white; there must be some foundation or
- 15 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 15 of 17
basis for the opinion.”6 Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Lab’ys,
Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Applying that maxim
here, there must be some foundation or basis for Mr. Brown’s
opinion. But there is no foundation or basis for Mr. Brown’s
opinion because he did not apply the patents’ definition of
rearwardly. Therefore, the statements in his expert report
finding rearward movement fail to create a genuine dispute of
material fact and “do[] not prevent partial summary judgment.”
Id. at 1080–81 (affirming partial literal infringement summary
judgment order, despite contrary expert testimony).
Plaintiff has not “come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial” on literal infringement
of claims 7 and 13 of the ’348 patent and claim 1 of the ’693
patent, along with their dependent claims. McLean, 332 F.3d at
718—19. Due to this “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, no “reasonable jury
could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant on the evidence
presented,” McLean, 332 F.3d at 719; see also TechSearch, 286
6
“That maxim is especially true in cases involving
relatively simple technology, such as this one, because ‘the
technology will be easily understandable without the need for
expert explanatory testimony.’” K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp.,
696 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Centricut, LLC v.
Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004))
(affirming trial court’s summary judgment order in a case
concerning blenders, despite contrary opinion in expert report).
- 16 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 16 of 17
F.3d at 1371. Therefore, summary judgment of no literal
infringement on claims 7 and 13 of the ’348 patent and claim 1
of the ’693 patent, and their dependent claims, will be granted.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of No
Literal Infringement, (Doc. 237), is GRANTED.
This the 17th day of August, 2022.
__________________________________
United States District Judge
- 17 -
Case 1:18-cv-00281-WO-JEP Document 243 Filed 08/17/22 Page 17 of 17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?