WATSON v. DANIELS
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD signed on 12/21/2018. RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Docket Entry 2 ) be denied as moot or, in the alternative, as meritless, that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 9 ) be granted, that Petitioner's Motion to Amend Pleading (Docket Entry 20 ) be denied as futile, and that Judgment be entered dismissing this action, without issuance of a certificate of appealability. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TRAVIS LASHAUN WATSON,
Petitioner,
v.
DENNIS DANIELS,
Respondent.
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1:18CV451
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, seeks
a
writ
of
“Petition”).
Support).)
habeas
corpus
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§
2254
(the
(Docket Entry 2; see also Docket Entry 3 (Brief in
Respondent has moved for summary judgment on the
merits, as well as on grounds of mootness, harmlessness, lack of
federally cognizable relief, and non-exhaustion.
9, 10.)
(Docket Entries
Petitioner also has moved to amend his Petition.
Entry 20.)
(Docket
For the reasons explained more fully below, the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge will recommend that the
Court deny the instant Petition as moot or, in the alternative, on
its merits, and deny the proposed amendment as futile.
I.
Background
On September 7, 2005, in Guilford County Superior Court,
Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of felony second degree
rape, conspiracy to commit second degree rape, second degree
kidnapping, and possession of a stolen vehicle in cases 04 CRS
78728, 04 CRS 78731, and 04 CRS 69837, respectively. (Docket Entry
2, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4-6; see also Docket Entry 10-2 at 2-5.)1
After
consolidating the rape offenses and consolidating the kidnapping
and possession of a stolen vehicle offenses, the trial court
imposed consecutive prison sentences of 96 to 125 months and 27 to
42 months, respectively. (See Docket Entry 2, ¶ 3; see also Docket
Entry 10-2 at 2-5.)
Petitioner also received a five-year term of
post-release supervision (“PRS”).
did not appeal.
(See Docket Entry 2, ¶ 3.)
He
(See id., ¶ 8.)
Petitioner began his five-year term of PRS on April 16, 2015.
(See Docket Entry 13-4 at 1.)
On January 3, 2017, while Petitioner
remained on PRS, the Post Release Supervision and Parole Commission
(“PRSPC”)
arrested
Petitioner
on
a
warrant
for
post-release
violations based on new, pending felony charges (id.), and detained
Petitioner in the Guilford County jail “where the revocation
proceeding for [PRS] was begun” (Docket Entry 3 at 1).
Petitioner
appeared before the PRSPC on January 13, 2017, and signed a waiver
which provided as follows:
I do hereby waive my right to a Preliminary Hearing and
[PRSPC] Hearing until pending North Carolina criminal
charges have been disposed of by the [c]ourts.
I do
understand the purpose of these hearings is to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that I have
violated the condition(s) of my Parole/Conditional
Release/[PRS] heretofore granted by the North Carolina
Post Release Supervision and Parole Commission.
I do
also understand that I can request the Preliminary
1
Throughout this Recommendation, pin citations to page numbers refer to
the page numbers in the footer appended to those materials at the time of their
docketing in the CM/ECF system.
-2-
Hearing to be held prior to the pending charges
disposition by contacting my Probation/Parole Officer in
writing.
(Docket Entry 13-8 (emphasis in original).)
Petitioner alleges that, on May 22, 2017, the PRSPC revoked
his PRS, and transferred him from the Guilford County jail to the
Craven Correctional Institution.
(See Docket Entry 3 at 1; see
also Docket Entry 13 at 2 (“Petitioner’s PRS was revoked and he was
imprisoned in a [s]tate facility without cause . . . .”); Docket
Entry 13-1 at 1 (“On May 22, 2017[,] I was imprisoned in . . .
Craven Corr[ectional] Inst[itution] as a pretrial and prerevocation
detainee.”).)
Petitioner pursued a grievance challenging his
imprisonment for PRS violations (see Docket Entry 13-6), which the
Inmate Grievance Resolution Board ultimately denied on August 4,
2017 (see Docket Entry 13-7).
On November 1, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se “Application
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” with the trial court challenging the
revocation of his PRS without a hearing, which that court denied on
November 22, 2017.
Entry 2 at 16.)
(See Docket Entry 2, ¶ 11(a); see also Docket
Petitioner did not appeal that ruling to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals.2
On December 11, 2017, the PRSPC entered an order with regard
to Petitioner’s PRS which provided as follows:
2
Although the Petition reflects that Petitioner “appeal[ed] to the highest
state court having jurisdiction over the action taken on [his] petition,
application, or motion” (Docket Entry 2, ¶ 11(d)), Petitioner has provided no
details or documentation to support that assertion. Petitioner further contends
that, “on or about January 19, 2018,” he filed a “Motion to Dismiss” with the
trial court again challenging the revocation of his PRS without a hearing (id.,
¶ 11(c)(1)-(5)), but that court did not hear his Motion (see id., ¶ 11(c)(6),
(7)).
-3-
In reference to [Petitioner], convicted September 7, 2005
in Guilford County Superior Court, docket number
04CRS078728, two counts of Second Degree Rape, Conspiracy
to Commit Second Degree Rape, 96 to 125 months active.
He was released on five years post-release supervision on
April 16, 2015 and was arrested January 3, 2017 by
[PRSPC] warrant for reported post-release violations.
The [PRSPC] finds that [Petitioner] is currently
incarcerated for the [PRSPC’s] January 3, 2017 warrant
for which he has pending felony charges against him. The
[PRSPC] further finds a preliminary hearing was postponed
on January 13, 2017 until these pending charges have been
resolved.
Upon further review of his case, the [PRSPC] finds that
[Petitioner] has completed service of his maximum term in
[his 96 to 125 month] sentence as required by N.C. [Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1368.3(c)(1)] and therefore orders he be
released from custody effective immediately. This order
does not resolve [Petitioner] of any other legal
obligations such as for the pending charges in Guilford
County or for the registration requirement for [his 96 to
125 month] sentence.
(Docket Entry 13-3 at 1 (emphasis added).)
In response to an inquiry from Petitioner, Mary Stevens, Chief
Administrator of the PRSPC, wrote Petitioner a letter enclosing and
explaining the above-quoted order of the PRSPC, which provided, in
pertinent part, as follows:
This
will
acknowledge
receipt
of
your
recent
correspondence dated May 27, 2018 to Governor Roy Cooper.
In answer to your concerns, the [PRSPC] did not revoke
your [PRS] for your previously-incarcerated [96 to 125
month] sentence. In December 2017, the [PRSPC] rescinded
or stopped further [PRS] proceedings in your case and
ordered that you be released from the [PRS] requirement
of [your 96 to 125 month] sentence. Enclosed is a copy
of that order. This means that the five (5) year [PRS]
requirement for [that sentence] was completed effective
December 11, 2017 because you had served your maximum
sentence term.
(Docket Entry 13-3 at 2 (emphasis added).)
On March 1, 2018, a jury convicted Petitioner of felony
robbery with a dangerous weapon (offense date December 22, 2016),
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possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (offense date December
29, 2016), and attaining habitual felon status (offense date
December 29, 2016) in cases 16 CRS 92606, 16 CRS 92616, and 17 CRS
24032, respectively.
(See Docket Entry 10-3 at 2-5.)
The trial
court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of 96 to 128 months
and 97 to 129 months in prison.
(See id.)
Petitioner subsequently filed the instant Petition on May 18,
2018 (see Docket Entry 2 at 15),3 along with a Brief in Support
(see Docket Entry 3 at 3).
Respondent then filed the instant
Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting Brief (Docket Entries 9,
10) and Petitioner responded in opposition (Docket Entry 13).
He
also filed a “Notification of Ongoing Pattern of Abuse” (Docket
Entry
15),
“Notice
to
the
Court
of
Continuous
and
Ongoing
Retalliations [sic]” (Docket Entry 16), and “Notice of Erroneous
Response to Grievance” (Docket Entry 18), as well as Motion to
Amend Pleading (Docket Entry 20) and supporting Declaration (Docket
Entry 21). Respondent timely opposed the Motion to Amend Pleading.
(Docket Entry 22.)
Petitioner did not file a reply (see Docket
Entries dated Nov. 21, 2018, to present), but did file a “Notice of
Additional Violations of Petitioner’s Rights” (Docket Entry 23) and
“Notice of Harassment Using the Disciplinary Proceeding” (Docket
Entry 24).
3
Under Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United
States District Courts, the Court should deem the instant Petition filed on May
18, 2018, the date Petitioner signed the Petition (under penalty of perjury) as
submitted to prison authorities (see Docket Entry 2 at 15).
-5-
II.
The
Petition’s
Ground for Relief
sole
ground
for
relief
contends
that
Petitioner’s “[PRS] was revoked and [he was] returned to prison
without a revocation hearing and without any official determination
of wrongdoing.”
(Docket Entry 2, ¶ 12(GROUND ONE).)
The instant
Motion to Amend Pleading proposes to alter the Petition’s requested
relief to seek not just Petitioner’s release from custody but “also
$11,950,000 in damages relating to imprisonment in the Dept. of
Public Safety.”
(Docket Entry 20 at 1.)
III. Discussion
A. Mootness
The Court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see also Maleng v. Cook, 490
U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989) (holding that Section 2254 petitioner must,
at the time he or she files petition, remain “in custody” pursuant
to
state
conviction
or
sentence
at
issue
(citing
Carafas
v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968))). The “in custody” requirement
raises a threshold jurisdictional question.
Maleng, 490 U.S. at
490 (stating that “[t]he federal habeas statute gives the United
States district courts jurisdiction to entertain petitions for
habeas relief only from persons who are ‘in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States’”)
(emphasis in original).
To meet the jurisdictional “in custody”
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requirement, a petitioner need not remain in actual physical
custody of state authorities, as well-settled law holds that an
ongoing term of probation or parole constitutes a sufficient
restraint on a petitioner’s liberty to allow the petitioner to
challenge a state sentence under Section 2254.
See Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963) (deeming prisoner on parole
still
“in
custody”
for
habeas
purposes
because
release
from
physical confinement remains conditional and “the custody and
control of the Parole Board involves significant restraints on
petitioner’s liberty”). However, where a petitioner “elect[s] only
to attack [his or her] sentences, and . . . those sentences expired
during the course of the[] proceedings, th[e] case is moot.”
Lane
v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982); see also North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 248 (1971) (“Nullification of a conviction may
have important benefits for a defendant . . . but urging in a
habeas corpus proceeding the correction of a sentence already
served is another matter.”); Gutierrez-Mondragon v. United States,
No. 1:09CR99-1, 2017 WL 9480145, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 29,
2017) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.) (“To the extent Petitioner has
completed his federal sentence, his motion, which only attacks the
length
of
his
period
of
imprisonment,
is
.
.
.
moot.”),
recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 9480146 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2017)
(unpublished) (Tilley, S.J.).
Here, Petitioner’s sole ground for relief contends that his
“[PRS] was revoked and [P]etitioner returned to prison without a
revocation
hearing
and
without
any
-7-
official
determination
of
wrongdoing.”
(Docket Entry 2, ¶ 12 (GROUND ONE).)
As a corollary
to that argument, Petitioner also has asserted that:
The alleged [PRS] violator ought not to be treated
differently from other detainees, since the charges of
the PRS violation standing against them are unproven, and
in many instances, involve the same charges as those for
which they are substantively detained. . . .
[A]
supervisee arrested for a subsequent crime has a due
process right to be free from punishment for the
subsequent crime until convicted of the subsequent crime.
Under the due process clause, pretrial detainees cannot
be punished. [Bell v. Wolfish], 441 U.S. 520, 537 .16
(1979).
They can only be detained to ensure their
presence at trial, and subjected to rules and
restrictions that are reasonably related to jail
management and security. . . . [Petitioner] should have
continued to be detained in the Guilford County Jail
under the conditional revocation of the PRS warrant.
(Docket Entry 13 at 3-4 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).)
However, the record before the Court conclusively establishes
that Petitioner’s active prison sentences for his 2005 convictions
expired on April 16, 2015 (see Docket Entry 13-4 at 1), and that
the
PRSPC
terminated
Petitioner’s
PRS
arising
from
convictions on December 11, 2017 (see Docket Entry 13-3).
the
Petition
attacks
only
the
procedures
and
his
2005
Because
conditions
of
Petitioner’s expired term of PRS, Petitioner “urg[es] . . . the
correction of a sentence already served,” Rice, 404 U.S. at 248,
and the Court should deny the Petition as moot.4
4
In the demand for relief, Petitioner requests that “the Court [] provide
immediate release from the custody which he is held.” (Docket Entry 2 at 15.)
However, as Petitioner has not challenged his 2018 convictions and sentences in
the instant Petition (see Docket Entries 2, 3, 13), he has not provided the Court
with any basis to order his release from his 2018 sentences.
-8-
B. Merits
Even if the Court should find that the Petition does not
qualify as moot, the Court should deny the Petition on its merits.
Petitioner’s
contention
that
his
“[PRS]
was
revoked
and
[P]etitioner returned to prison without a revocation hearing and
without any official determination of wrongdoing” (Docket Entry 2,
¶ 12 (GROUND ONE)) fails for two reasons.
First, as discussed
above, the record definitively demonstrates that the PRSPC did not
revoke
(see
Petitioner’s
Docket
Entry
PRS
13-3)
arising
and,
out
thus,
of
the
his
2005
PRSPC
convictions
did
not
deny
Petitioner his due process rights by failing to hold a revocation
hearing or provide him with a “written summary of findings” (Docket
Entry 2, ¶ 12 (GROUND ONE)).
Second, to the extent Petitioner decries the lack of “any
official determination of wrongdoing” (Docket Entry 2, ¶ 12 (GROUND
ONE)) or “probable cause determination” (Docket Entry 13 at 4),
Petitioner glosses over the fact that he “waive[d his] right to a
Preliminary
Hearing
and
[PRSPC]
Hearing
until
pending
North
Carolina criminal charges have been disposed of by the [c]ourts”
(Docket Entry 13-8 (emphasis in original)). Petitioner has not
contested the validity of the wavier and, therefore, cannot fault
the PRSPC for adhering to its terms.
Nor did the PRSPC have any obligation to hold a preliminary
(or probable cause) hearing after resolution of Petitioner’s 2018
offenses.
Because of Petitioner’s waiver, the term of his PRS
continued to run until its termination on December 11, 2017, when
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the PRSPC determined, pursuant to application of its governing
laws, that Petitioner had served his maximum prison term.
(See
Docket Entry 13-3; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1368(a)(5) (“When
a prisoner is serving consecutive prison terms, the maximum imposed
term . . . is the sum of all maximum terms imposed in the court
judgment or judgments, less 12 months for each of the second and
subsequent sentences imposed for Class B through Class E felonies
. . . .”).
Thus, even though Petitioner waived his right to a
preliminary hearing and a PRSPC hearing until after resolution of
his 2018 offenses, before his trial on those offenses could occur,
Petitioner reached the end of his maximum imposed prison term, and
the PRSPC terminated his PRS at that time.
In other words,
Petitioner’s term of PRS did not extend beyond December 11, 2017,
thus mooting any need for a preliminary (or probable cause) hearing
after
that
point.
(“Supervisees
who
See
were
N.C.
Gen.
convicted
Stat.
of
an
§
15A-1368.3(c)(1)
offense
for
which
registration is required [as a sex offender] and supervisees whose
supervision is revoked for a violation of the required controlling
condition [that the supervisee not commit another crime during the
period for which the supervisee remains subject to revocation] will
be returned to prison up to the time remaining on their maximum
imposed
terms.”).
Accordingly,
the
PRSPC
did
not
violate
Petitioner’s due process rights by failing to hold a preliminary
(or probable cause) hearing.
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C. Amendment
As described in Section II, Petitioner’s Motion to Amend
Pleading seeks to add a request for damages.
The Court should deny
that proposed amendment on grounds of futility, see generally
United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000)
(identifying “futility of amendment” as basis for denial of leave
to amend in habeas context), because (as Respondent correctly has
observed) “[m]onetary damages are non-cognizable on federal habeas
review” (Docket Entry 22 at 1).5
The Petition fails on grounds of mootness or for want of
merit.
IV. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Docket Entry 2)
be denied as moot or, in the alternative, as meritless, that
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 9) be
granted, that Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Pleading (Docket Entry
20) be denied as futile, and that Judgment be entered dismissing
this action, without issuance of a certificate of appealability.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
December 21, 2018
5
Similarly, Petitioner’s other filings (catalogued in Section I) do not
alter the conclusion that his Petition fails due to its mootness and lack of
merit; instead, those filings purport to raise claims of other inmates
(see Docket Entry 15) or raise claims related to events that occurred during his
time in custody unrelated to the substance of the claim raised in the Petition
(see Docket Entries 16, 18, 21, 23, 24).
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