WOODS v. GUILFORD COUNTY DSS, ET AL.
Filing
4
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD signed on 11/13/2019. It is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED for the limited pur pose of considering this recommendation of dismissal. It is RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), or alternatively pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2)(B)(ii), as to Judge Brown and Judge Jones. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (B)(ii) as to all remaining Defendants. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ZALONDA WOODS
Plaintiff,
v.
GUILFORD COUNTY DSS, et al.,
Defendant(s).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:19cv334
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter
comes
before
the
undersigned
United
States
Magistrate Judge on the Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (the “Application”) (Docket Entry
1) filed in conjunction with Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (Docket
Entry 2).
The undersigned will grant the Application for the
limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failing to state a claim and as barred by
immunity doctrines.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
Cir.
1995)
(en
banc)
(internal
“Dispensing
with
filing
fees,
quotation
however,
[is]
marks
not
omitted).
without
its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).
To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .
the action . . .(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As to the first ground, a plaintiff “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when
the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis
added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
“Where
a
complaint
pleads
facts
that
are
‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the
line
between
relief.”’”
possibility
and
plausibility
of
“entitlement
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
to
This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”
Id.
In other words, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.
2
Threadbare recitals of the
elements of
a
cause
of
action, supported
statements, do not suffice.”
by
mere
conclusory
Id.1
The next ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
generally applies to situations in which doctrines established by
the United States Constitution or at common law immunize government
entities and/or government personnel from liability for damages.
See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (discussing eleventh-amendment immunity of states and state
officials);
Pierson
v.
Ray,
386
U.S.
547
(1967)
(describing
interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law immunity
doctrines); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982)
(noting that, even where “damages are theoretically available under
[certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and
special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or
1
Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
3
severely
limit
the
damage
remedy”
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
BACKGROUND
Asserting claims under the 4th, 6th, and 14th Amendments, “42
C.F.R. Part 489” and “HIPPA” (Docket Entry 2 at 2-3),2 Plaintiff
initiated
this
action
against
22
defendants:
(1) “Guilford Co. DSS,” (2) “Guilford Co. Police Dept,” (3) “Moses
Cone Women’s Hospital” (“Defendant Hospital”), (4) “Judge Betty
Brown” (“Judge Brown”), (5) “Judge Jarrall Jones” (“Judge Jones”),
(6) “Guilford Co. G[ua]rdian [ad] litem program attorney office,”
(7)
“Randleman
(9)
“Heather
Co.
Skeens,”
Schools,”
(10)
(8)
“Kim
“Guilford
Miles”
Co.
(“Defendant
Schools,”
Miles”),
(11) “Sarah Fitzgerald” (“Defendant Fitzgerald”), (12) “Officer
Bowen,” (13) “Chief Wayne Scott,” (14) “Unknown Officer [1],”
(15) “Unknown Officer [2],” (16) “Unknown Officer Supervisor,”
(17) “Ashley Triplett,” (18) “Dr. Jacob Stinson,” (19) “Dr. John
Allagen,” (20) “Lisa Thompson,” (21) “Archdale Elementary School,”
and (22) “Gal Attorney Donna Michelle Wright” (“Attorney Wright”).
(Id. at 1-2.)
In that regard, the Complaint alleges under its
“Statement of Claim” the following:
2
Under “Nature of Suit” on the Civil Cover Sheet (see Docket
Entry 3 at 1), Plaintiff checked and circled the box for “Amer.
w/Disabilities-Other” (see id.). The Complaint, however, makes no
allegations that Plaintiff suffers from any disability or that
Defendants otherwise discriminated against her based on any
disability. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-4.)
4
4/2016 - seizure of Plaintiff’s 3 children w[as] unlawful
and violated the 4th and [14th] amendment rights of
Plaintiff by [D]SS and reps[;]
4/14/2016 - violation of [6th] amendment [ ] rights of
[P]laintiff was violated by Judge [] Brown and social
workers [Defendant] Miles and [Defendant] Fitzgerald[;]
3/25/2016 - violation of [Defendant H]ospital and
representatives in regards to 42 CFR Part 489 whereas
doctors put creating a case ahead of health and
stabilization of [Plaintiff;]
4/14/2016 - violation of due process rights of
[P]laintiff by Judge [] Brown and Judge [] Jones who did
not a[c]knowledge procedural safeguards to protect rights
which included 14[th amendment] rights[;]
3/25/2016 - police dept and representatives unlawfully
entered home and removed children to speak to social
workers and threatened [P]laintiff by sep[a]rating mother
from her children and placing oneself on door with hand
on gun and assisted in coer[c]ion of [P]laintiff[;]
[ ] Attorney [ ] Wright helped Randleman Co[.] schools
get a judge’s order after [P]laintiff expressed it
violated federal law[;]
Randleman Co. Schools representatives violated federal
law by allowing DSS representative to act as a parent
after objections from [P]laintiff whose rights were
intact[;]
Guilford Co[.] schools representatives did not demand to
see a warrant when they [ ] removed from their schools
juveniles of [P]laintiff[;]
[Defendant] Hospital violated federal rights that are
outlined in 42 CFR Part 489 and HIPAA rights as their
claims were not true and the information provided
exceeded the scope of a A/N/D investigation that they
started.
(Id. at 2-3.)
Finally, the Complaint requests as relief “damages
. . . in the form of pain and suffering [ ] due to the unlawful
seizure
of
[Plaintiff’s]
children
5
by
[Defendants]
who
took
advantage of the situation and further violated [Plaintiff’s]
federal rights through the lack of due process.”
(Id. at 4.)3
DISCUSSION
Presented in a conclusory and sometimes incoherent fashion,
the Complaint’s allegations apparently relate to events surrounding
the removal
of
Plaintiff’s
generally id. at 1-4.)
full
burden
of
children
from
her
custody.
(See
Although the Court “cannot shoulder the
fashioning
a
viable
complaint
for
a
pro
se
plaintiff,” Simon v. Shawnee Corr. Ctr., Civ. No. 13-521, 2013 WL
3463595, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 9, 2013) (unpublished), based upon
the references in the Complaint to deprivation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights under the 4th, 6th, and 14th Amendments and
federal rights under “42 CFR Part 489” (Docket Entry 2 at 2-3), and
“HIPPA” (id. at 3), this action conceivably could fall under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 868 (4th Cir.
3
The undersigned Magistrate Judge previously “deferr[ed]
ruling on [Plaintiff’s instant] Application [ ] and requir[ed her]
to file an amended complaint . . . .” (Text Order dated Apr. 16,
2019; see also id. (setting deadline of May 17, 2019, for filing of
amended complaint).) That Text Order advised Plaintiff that her
“Complaint consist[ed] of conclusory allegations,” that it
“lack[ed] sufficient supporting factual allegations to proceed,”
that it did “not include even conclusory allegations as to some
defendants and other purported defendants do not exist,” and that
judges enjoy absolute immunity for “actions taken in their judicial
capacity.” (Id. (internal parenthetical omitted).) Despite the
opportunity “to file an amended complaint that contains properly
supported claims against proper defendants,” as well as a warning
that failure to do so “will result in dismissal” (id.), Plaintiff
did not file an amended complaint (see Docket Entries dated Apr.
16, 2019, to present).
6
1988) (explaining that courts must “construe [pro se complaints]
liberally to assert any and all legal claims that its factual
allegations can fairly be thought to support” (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)).
However, even liberally construed,
the Complaint fails to plead a viable Section 1983 claim.
Section 1983 Claim
As an initial matter, to state a claim for relief under
Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege factual matter showing “that
[she was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of
the
United
States,
and
that
committed under color of state law.”
the
alleged
deprivation
was
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).4
Moreover, Plaintiff must
raise her Section 1983 claims “against a ‘person’” capable of
committing a violation of her constitutional rights.
Conley v.
Ryan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 502, 519 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 13, 2015) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
4
Specifically, Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
7
A. Judge Brown and Judge Jones
Turning
to
specific
allegations
against
Defendants,
the
Complaint appears to allege that both Judge Brown and Judge Jones
presided, as judges, over matters involving Plaintiff. (See Docket
Entry 2 at 2-3.)
“Judges performing judicial acts within their
jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability
claims,” In re Mills, 287 F. App’x. 273, 279 (4th Cir. 2008), “even
if such acts were allegedly done either maliciously or corruptly,”
King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
See also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11 (1991) (stating that “judicial immunity is an immunity from
suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”). To determine
whether
an
action
constitutes
a
“judicial
act”
protected
by
judicial immunity, the Court must consider “whether the function is
one normally performed by a judge, and whether the parties dealt
with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.”
King, 973 F.2d at
357. Thus, a plaintiff can overcome the judicial immunity bar only
if the judge’s “actions were non-judicial or the actions were
judicial but were taken without jurisdiction.”
Evans v. Downey,
No. 1:15-CV-117, 2016 WL 3562102, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 24, 2016)
(unpublished) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13).
Here, the Complaint provides no information to suggest that
Judge Brown or Judge Jones acted in a non-judicial capacity or
otherwise
lacked
jurisdiction
in
8
any
actions
challenged
by
Plaintiff.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 1-4.)
only that Judge Brown “violated [
The Complaint alleges
6th] amendment [] rights of
[P]laintiff” (id.), and that both Judge Brown and Judge Jones
“violat[ed
]
due
process
rights
of
[P]laintiff”
by
“not
a[c]knowledg[ing] procedural safeguards to protect [Plaintiff’s
14th amendment] rights” (id.).
Under these circumstances, both
Judge Brown and Judge Jones enjoy absolute judicial immunity from
Plaintiff’s
damages
claims.
In
addition,
the
Complaint’s
conclusory allegations of wrongdoing by Judge Brown and Judge Jones
lack “sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”
quotation marks omitted).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
As such, the Court should dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Brown and Judge Jones.
B. Randleman
Department
County
Schools
and
Guilford
County
Police
Neither Randleman County Schools nor Guilford County Police
Department exists and, therefore, neither constitutes a proper
legal entity capable of being sued. In addition, even if Plaintiff
had named an actual school system or law enforcement office, any
such entity likely would not qualify as a “person” under Section
1983. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marion Police Dep’t, No. 1:19cv53, 2019
WL 1028012, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2019) (unpublished) (finding
that, “police departments and sheriff’s departments lack the legal
capacity to be sued”), aff’d, 771 F. App’x 289 (4th Cir. June 24,
2019); McDaniel on behalf of A.M. v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Sch.,
9
No. 3:18cv127, 2018 WL 1863068, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 18, 2018)
(unpublished) (finding that defendant school system was “not a
distinct legal entity capable of being sued, nor [was] it a person
within the meaning of [Section] 1983” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Mobley v. Guilford Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 1:17cv115,
2017 WL 1409579, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2017) (unpublished)
(finding that “the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office [ ] does not
qualify as a legal entity capable of being sued under [Section]
1983”), recommendation adopted, slip. op. (M.D.N.C. May 24, 2017).
The Court therefore should dismiss all claims against Randleman
County Schools and Guilford County Police Department.
C. Defendant Hospital
Regarding Defendant Hospital, the Complaint appears to assert
a
violation
of
federal
rights
under
federal
administrative
regulations and, in that regard, its claims must fail.
“For
[ P]laintiff to bring a claim pursuant to [Section] 1983 to enforce
a federal law, the Court must discern whether that federal law
created
a
private
individual
right;
the
inquiry
requires
a
determination as to whether or not Congress intended to confer
individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.” Shirley v. South
Carolina Family Ct., Civ. No. 9:10-2632, 2010 WL 5390123, at *3
(D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2010) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks
omitted), recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 5387606, at *1 (D.S.C.
Dec. 22, 2010) (unpublished).
In this regard, the Complaint does
10
not show that a private cause of action exists under 42 C.F.R. §
489.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 1-4.)
Further, the Complaint fails to provide sufficient allegations
to support any claim against Defendant Hospital, see Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678, alleging only that Defendant Hospital “put creating a
case ahead of health and stabilization of [Plaintiff]” (Docket
Entry 2 at 2), and made “claims [which] were not true and [ ]
information provided exceeded the scope of a A/N/D investigation
that
they
started”
(id.
at
3).
Therefore,
“even
if
this
[administrative] regulation and the statutory provision to which it
may be traced give rise to private substantive and procedural
rights, the [
C]omplaint lacks factual allegations that would
support a claim for violation of the right.”
Bush v. Frazier,
2:18cv732, 2019 WL 3305145, at *11 (N.D. Ala. July 23, 2019)
(unpublished).
The Complaint also alleges that Defendant Hospital “violated
[Plaintiff’s] federal rights that are outlined [under] . . . HIPAA
. . . .”
(Docket Entry 2 at 3.)
cause of action under HIPAA.”
However, “there is no private
Regan v. U.S. Dept. Of Veterans
Affairs, No. 5:11CV422, 2012 WL 4866360, at 2 n.3 (E.D.N.C. July
25, 2012) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d,
518 F. App’x 160 (4th Cir. 2013); see also id. (noting that,
although “HIPAA does provide for civil and criminal penalties, such
penalties can only be enforced by authorized state agencies or the
11
Secretary of Health and Human Services” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Accordingly,
the
Court
should
dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Hospital.
D. Guilford Co. DSS, Defendant Miles, Defendant Fitzgerald,
Attorney Wright, and Guilford Co. Schools
As to Guilford Co. DSS, Defendant Miles, Defendant Fitzgerald,
Attorney Wright, and Guilford Co. Schools, even permitting a
finding that any of the entities could qualify as proper for suit,
the Complaint inevitably fails to state a viable Section 1983
claim.
theories
Liberally construed, any such claims appear to rest on
that
(i)
Guilford
Co.
DSS
“seiz[ed
]Plaintiff’s
3
children” (Docket Entry 2 at 2), (ii) Defendant Miles and Defendant
Fitzgerald “violat[ed] [] sixth amendment [] rights of [P]laintiff”
(id.), (iii) Attorney Wright “helped . . . get a judge’s order
after [P]laintiff expressed it violated federal law” (id. at 3),
and (iv) “Guilford Co[.] schools representatives did not demand to
see a warrant when [Plaintiff’s children] were removed from their
schools . . .” (id.).
In this regard, the Complaint’s vague
assertions do not plausibly establish that Defendants unlawfully
deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights.
The Complaint’s
allegations qualify as the type of conclusory “the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that
fail to support a Section 1983 claim.
12
As such, the Court should
dismiss all claims against Guilford Co. DSS, Defendant Miles,
Defendant Fitzgerald, Attorney Wright, and Guilford Co. Schools.
E. Remaining Defendants
Lastly, the Complaint fails to specifically assert any factual
allegations against Guilford County Guardian ad litem program
attorney’s office, Heather Skeens, Officer Bowen, Chief Wayne
Scott, Unknown Officer 1, Unknown Officer 2, Unknown Officer
Supervisor, Ashley Triplett, Dr. Jacob Stinson, Dr. John Allagen,
Lisa Thompson, and Archdale Elementary Schools (see Docket Entry 2
at 1-4), and, as such, its claims against these Defendants fail as
a matter of law.
See Sain v. Quinn, No. 5:10CV505, 2011 WL
6780828, at * 1 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 27, 2011) (unpublished) (“[A] review
of the complaint reveals that [the defendants’ names] appear[] only
in the caption of the complaint.
There are no specific factual
allegations against [the defendants]. [The p]laintiff has not
alleged in his complaint that [the defendants unlawfully deprived
the
plaintiff
of
constitutional
or
other
federal
rights].
Therefore, [the] plaintiff’s claims fail against [the defendants]”
(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
Accordingly, this Court should
dismiss all claims against Guilford County Guardian ad litem
program attorney’s office, Heather Skeens, Officer Bowen, Chief
Wayne Scott, Unknown Officer 1, Unknown Officer 2, Unknown Officer
Supervisor, Ashley Triplett, Dr. Jacob Stinson, Dr. John Allagen,
Lisa Thompson, and Archdale Elementary Schools.
13
CONCLUSION
The Complaint fails to state a claim against any Defendant and
judicial immunity bars the purported claims against Judge Brown and
Judge Jones.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket
Entry 1) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of considering this
recommendation of dismissal.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii),
or
alternatively
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as to Judge Brown and
Judge Jones.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as to
all remaining Defendants.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
November 13, 2019
14
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