SILVA v. WALT DISNEY WORLD

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 9/29/2022; that the Application (Docket Entry 1 ) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL. IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Complaint (Docket Entry 2 ) be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous for want of subject matter jurisdiction. (Carter, Alexus)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DANIEL JAMES SILVA,
Plaintiff,
v.
WALT DISNEY WORLD,
Defendant.

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1:21CV912

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket
Entry 1 (the “Application”)), filed in conjunction with his pro se
Verified Personal Injury Premises Liability Complaint (Docket Entry
2 (the “Complaint”)). The Court will grant the Application for the
limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.

Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

1995)

(en

banc)

(internal

“Dispensing

with

filing

fees,

problems. . . .

quotation

however,

[is]

marks
not

omitted).

without

its

In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

Case 1:21-cv-00912-UA-LPA Document 3 Filed 09/29/22 Page 1 of 8

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).

To address this

concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . .
the

action

.

.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

.

is

frivolous

.

.

.

.”

28

U.S.C.

The United States Supreme Court has explained

that “a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations
and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989); see also Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256 (“The word
frivolous is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical
definition.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).
ANALYSIS

As its title indicates, the Complaint asserts a cause of
action

for

premises-liability-based,

personal

injury

against

Defendant, apparently under Florida law. (See Docket Entry 2 at 220.)

More specifically, the Complaint alleges that “[Plaintiff]

was on the Liberty Square Riverboat ride . . . [and] was standing
under one of the steam stacks on the ride when all of a sudden [he]
was burned by 3 or 4 very hot water droplets that emerged from the
steam stack . . . .”

(Id. at 2; see also id. at 2-3 (“[T]he steam

droplets burned my right forearm . . . .

[I] also suffered from an

aggravation in my PTSD because the rest of my day was ruined from

2

Case 1:21-cv-00912-UA-LPA Document 3 Filed 09/29/22 Page 2 of 8

the burn [as] the last time I remember being that [sic] was with my
dearly departed mother, so the burns ruined the renewed experience
of going to the [M]agic [K]ingdom . . . .”).)

The Complaint

purports to rest this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction on
diversity of citizenship.

(See id. at 4.)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

The

burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction falls on the
party asserting it. See id. Federal courts possess subject matter
jurisdiction

over

citizenship

exists

civil

actions

between

controversy exceeds $75,000.

the

where

complete

parties

and

diversity

the

amount

of
in

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Here, the Complaint states that Plaintiff “seek[s] more the
[sic] 75,000 in damages [and that he is] a resident of a different
state then [sic] Florida (citizenship of diversity).”

(Docket

Entry 2 at 4; see also id. at 2 (giving location of injury as
Orlando, Florida), 3 (alleging Plaintiff “was on the premises of
Walt Disney [W]orld” at time of injury), 11 (listing “[m]onetary
relief requested” as “100 dollars for the money spent as an
admission fee and food and drinks [Plaintiff] ate and drank at the
park, 5,000 usd for the physical burned [sic] suffered[, and]
70,000 for pain and suffering for the burn aggravating [his]
PTSD”), 13 (“ask[ing] for punitive damages in the sum of 2,000,000

3

Case 1:21-cv-00912-UA-LPA Document 3 Filed 09/29/22 Page 3 of 8

million [sic] dollars”).)1

The Complaint’s allegations do not

satisfy either of the two basic requirements of Section 1332.
First,

the

Complaint

does

not

adequately

identify

the

citizenship of Defendant, an artificial entity not denominated as
a corporation.

(See id. at 1, 2.)

“As [Defendant] is not a

corporation, it possesses its members’ citizenship. Nothing in the
record designates who [Defendant’s] members are.” Americold Realty
Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 382 (2016).
the

undersigned

Magistrate

Judge

located

any

Nor has

applicable

“law

[which] provides an answer,” id.; see also Muchler v. Greenwald,
624 F. App’x 794, 798 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[R]eliance on the
parties’ residency [i]s improper. . . .

[A]verments that parties

are ‘residents’ of their respective states, rather than ‘citizens’
or ‘domiciliaries’ of those states are jurisdictionally inadequate
for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”
(some internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff

has not carried his burden of establishing complete diversity of
citizenship between the parties.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Second, the Complaint does not meet Section 1332’s monetary
threshold.

“In most cases, the ‘sum claimed by the plaintiff

controls’ the amount in controversy determination.”

JTH Tax, Inc.

v. Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting St. Paul

1

Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings omit emphasis, including
bold or enlarged font and underscoring, as well as extra spaces
between letters and lines of text.
4

Case 1:21-cv-00912-UA-LPA Document 3 Filed 09/29/22 Page 4 of 8

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938)); see
also Gordon v. National Bus. Consultants, Inc., No. 87-2676, 856
F.2d

186

(table),

1988

WL

86618,

at

*1

(4th

Cir.

1998)

(unpublished) (“[P]unitive damages may be included in determining
whether

a

plaintiff

requirement.”).

has

satisfied

the

amount

in

controversy

However, the general practice of deferring to a

plaintiff’s damages allegations in this context gives way if “it
appears or is shown that the amount is not claimed in good faith.
. . .

A court would be remiss in its obligations if it accepted

every claim of damages at face value, no matter how trivial the
underlying injury.”

Johnson v. Nixon, No. 3:17CV1901, 2018 WL

2031900, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2018) (unpublished) (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted), recommendation adopted, 2018
WL 2017626 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2018) (unpublished); see also Bailey
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 98-60582, 181 F.3d 96
(table), 1999 WL 346942, at *2 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The plaintiff’s
allegation [of the amount in controversy] will not control . . . in
those instances in which it is not made in good faith. . . .
Because the federal judiciary has been too timid to execute the
congressional mandate in tort litigation, we have all contributed
to clogging dockets, monopolizing trial rooms, and committing the
expense and energies of our system to a plethora of cases which do
not belong in federal courts.”

(internal brackets, citations, and

quotation marks omitted)).

5

Case 1:21-cv-00912-UA-LPA Document 3 Filed 09/29/22 Page 5 of 8

In this case, “it is clear that Plaintiff has arbitrarily
alleged an excessive amount in damages to meet the jurisdictional
amount in controversy. Doing so is prohibited and goes against the
limited scope and purpose of diversity jurisdiction . . . .”
Johnson, 2018 WL 2031900, at *2.

Put another way, the Complaint

“offers no facts that support the amount of compensatory and
punitive damages sought,” id. at *3, the sums proposed qualify as
“both fanciful and delusional, and [the Complaint] cannot support
a

finding

that

this

controversy,” id.
establish

that

case

involves

[more

than]

$75,000

in

“[E]ven in the unlikely event [Plaintiff] could

[any

aggravation

of

a

PTSD]

condition

[was]

proximately related to Defendant[’s negligence], [Plaintiff has]
not support[ed] his extraordinary requests for . . . compensatory
damages and . . . punitive damages.
claims lack a good faith basis.”

As such, Plaintiff’s damage

Id.; see also Bailey, 1999 WL

346942, at *2 (“[W]e [have] held to a legal certainty that a
plaintiff’s unliquidated damages tort claim based on a minor injury
. . . could not meet the amount in controversy requirement of
[Section] 1332 . . . .

The instant case is reminiscent of [that

prior case], in that [the plaintiffs’] unliquidated tort damages
claims are patently absurd and devoid of any potentially reasonable
support . . . .

As such, the $75,000 amount in controversy of

[Section] 1332 has not been met, so the district court was without
jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thompson v.

6

Case 1:21-cv-00912-UA-LPA Document 3 Filed 09/29/22 Page 6 of 8

Brown, No. 7:19CV2504, 2019 WL 6255829, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2019)
(unpublished) (“[A] litigant cannot establish federal jurisdiction
by asserting an amount in controversy that is frivolous . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), recommendation adopted, 2019
WL 6255134 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (unpublished).
Because Plaintiff’s invocation of subject matter jurisdiction
under Section 1332 “lacks an arguable basis [both] in law [and] in
fact,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, the Court should dismiss this case
as frivolous, see Overstreet v. Colvin, No. 4:13CV261, 2014 WL
353684, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2014) (unpublished) (holding that
courts

may

consider

subject

matter

jurisdiction

as

part

of

frivolity review); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an independent obligation to determine
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of
a challenge from any party.”).2

2

Additionally, “it is apparent from the face of the
[C]omplaint that this [C]ourt does not have personal jurisdiction
over [ D]efendant[].” Alvarado v. County of Tulare, No. 3:17CV40,
2017 WL 3129821, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 21, 2017) (unpublished). In
particular, “[t]he [C]omplaint makes clear that [Plaintiff’s]
claims are based on acts or omissions that occurred in the State of
[Florida].
None of the acts or omissions is alleged to have
occurred in [North Carolina].
In addition, there are no
allegations suggesting that [Defendant] . . . ha[s] any connection
to [North Carolina].” Id. As a result, the Complaint does not
establish the constitutionally required minimum contacts between
Defendant and North Carolina to support this Court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See id. at *2 (discussing
personal jurisdiction standard). “Because it is apparent from the
face of the [C]omplaint that personal jurisdiction is lacking and
there is no reason to believe that [ D]efendant would waive this
(continued...)
7

Case 1:21-cv-00912-UA-LPA Document 3 Filed 09/29/22 Page 7 of 8

CONCLUSION
The Complaint frivolously fails to establish subject matter
jurisdiction in this Court.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application (Docket Entry 1)
is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO
CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Complaint (Docket Entry 2) be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous for want of
subject matter jurisdiction.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
September 29, 2022

2

(...continued)
basis for dismissal, the [C]ourt [also could] . . . dismiss the
case without prejudice [on that basis].” Id.; see also Greer v.
Safeway, 317 F. App’x 838, 840 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[Courts] have
read § 1915(e)(2) to authorize a district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.”); Alvarado,
2017 WL 3129821, at *1 n.1 (“[T]he United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit [has] explained that the screening authority
afforded to
courts
in
actions
filed
in
forma
pauperis
differentiates such actions from ordinary civil suits and justifies
an exception to the general rule that an affirmative defense should
not be considered sua sponte.”); Barth v. Walt Disney Parks &
Resorts U.S., Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(granting dismissal motion challenging personal jurisdiction filed
by Disney-entity defendants in suit over personal injury alleged to
have occurred on Walt Disney World premises in Florida), aff’d, 697
F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2017).
8

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