IN RE: KARAM SALAH AL DIN AWNI AL SADEQ et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 03/18/2022, that the Motion (Docket Entry 14 ) is DENIED as set out herein. (Taylor, Abby)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

In re Application of KARAM SALAH
AL DIN AWNI AL SADEQ and
STOKOE PARTNERSHIP SOLICITORS
for an Order Under
28 U.S.C. § 1782 to Conduct
Discovery for Use in Foreign
Proceedings.

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1:21mc6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on “Nicholas Del Rosso and
Vital

Management

Services,

Inc.’s

Motion

to

Quash

Protective Order” (Docket Entry 14) (the “Motion”).

or

for

a

For the

reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Motion.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural Background
In early 2021, Karam Salah Al Din Awni Al Sadeq (“Al Sadeq”)
and Stokoe Partnership Solicitors (“Stokoe” and, collectively with
Al Sadeq, the “Applicants”) moved, “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45” (Docket Entry 1
(the “Application”) at 1),1 for leave to serve two subpoenas on
Nicholas Del Rosso (“Del Rosso”) (Docket Entry 3-1 at 2) and Vital
Management Services Inc. (“Vital Management” and, collectively with
Del Rosso, the “Movants”) (Docket Entry 3-2 at 2) in connection
with ongoing litigation in the United Kingdom (at times, the “UK”).

1 Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF
footer’s pagination. Quotations in this Memorandum Opinion use
standardized capitalization, but retain any British spelling and
punctuation.

(See Docket Entry 1 at 1-6.)2

Finding that Applicants satisfied

Section 1782’s mandatory and discretionary factors, the Court (per
the

undersigned

United

States

Magistrate

Judge)

granted

the

Application, without prejudice to Movants’ right to contest the
subpoenas.

(See Docket Entry 7 (the “Order”) at 1-42.)3

In lieu of objecting to the Order, Movants moved to quash or
modify the subpoenas.
present.)
Magistrate

(See Docket Entries dated Oct. 18, 2021, to

In particular, Movants assert that (i) the undersigned
Judge

lacked

authority

to

grant

the

Application,

(ii) “Applicants improperly filed a joint application arising from
separate lawsuits” (Docket Entry 14 at 2), (iii) “the requested
discovery is not ‘for use’ in proceedings pending in England and is
unduly burdensome” (id. at 1), and, alternatively, (iv) the Court
should narrow the subpoenas.

(See id. at 1-2.)

In support of the

Motion, Movants filed the “Amended Particulars of Claim” in Karam
Salah Al Din Awni Al Sadeq v. Dechert, LLP, Neil Gerrard, David
Hughes, and Caroline Black, Claim No. QB-2020-000322 (Docket Entry
16-1 (the “Amended Al Sadeq Claim”) at 2) and the “Re-Amended
Particulars of Claim” in Stokoe Partnership Solicitors v. Mr

2 Applicants assert that, “[u]pon information and belief, Del
Rosso is the owner and president of Vital Management.” (Docket
Entry 2 at 4 n.2; see also Docket Entry 4-4, ¶ 1 (Del Rosso witness
statement characterizing Del Rosso as “President and owner of Vital
Management”).)
3 The Order also determined that the undersigned Magistrate
Judge could grant the Application and need not issue a
recommendation thereon. (See id. at 1 n.2.)
2

Patrick Tristram Finucane Grayson, Grayson + Co Limited, Mr Stuart
Robert Page, Page Corporate Investigations Limited, Dechert LLP,
and Mr David Neil Gerrard, Claim No. QB-2020-002492 (Docket Entry
16-2 (the “Amended Grayson Claim”) at 2).

Applicants filed a

memorandum in opposition to the Motion (see Docket Entry 17),
supported by an affidavit from Paul Robinson (see Docket Entries 18
to 18-9), to which Movants replied (see Docket Entry 19).
II. Factual Background
A. Original Record
As this Court previously explained (see Docket Entry 7 at 329), the record reflects the following:
According to Applicants:
Haralambos Tsiattalou (“Tsiattalou”), “a partner at
[Stokoe, a] UK-based law firm,” serves as Al Sadeq’s
lawyer “in civil proceedings pending in the High Court of
Justice of England and Wales, Queen’s Bench Division
captioned Karam Salah Al Din Awni Al Sadeq v. Dechert,
LLP, Neil Gerrard, David Hughes, and Caroline Black,
Claim No. QB-2020-000322 (the ‘Al Sadeq Litigation[’)].”
(Docket Entry 4 [(the “Tsiattalou Declaration”)], ¶ 1.)
In turn, Stokoe “is the Claimant in civil proceedings
pending in the High Court of Justice of England and
Wales, Queen’s Bench Division captioned:
Stokoe
Partnership Solicitors v. Mr. Patrick Tristram Finucane
Grayson, Grayson + Co Limited, Mr. Stuart Robert Page,
and Page Corporate Investigations Limited, Claim No.[]
QB-2020-002492
(the
‘Grayson
Proceeding[,]’”
and
collectively with the Al Sadeq Litigation, the “Foreign
Proceedings”). (Id.) “Stokoe was also the claimant in
concluded High Court proceedings captioned:
Stokoe
Partnership Solicitors v. Mr. Paul Robinson, Company
Documents Limited, and Mr. Oliver Moon, Claim No.
QB-2020-002218
(the
‘Robinson
Proceeding[,’
and
collectively] with the Grayson Proceeding[,] . . . the
‘Hacking Claims’).” (Id.)
3

The Al Sadeq Litigation concerns alleged violations
of international and United Arab Emirates (the “UAE”)
law, as well as of Al Sadeq’s human rights, committed “by
Neil Gerrard (‘Gerrard’), a solicitor and partner in
Dechert UK [(‘Dechert’)], and [two other current or
former Dechert partners, David Hughes (‘Hughes’) and
Caroline Black (‘Black’) (collectively with Dechert and
Gerrard, the ‘Dechert Defendants’),] in connection with
their investigation of fraud allegedly perpetrated
against the RAK Investment Authority ([the] ‘RAKIA’)”
(id., ¶ 4).
(See id., ¶ 2, 4.)4
Al Sadeq denies
involvement in the alleged fraud and “maintains that the
charges against him were politically motivated . . . and
that he was convicted on the basis of false confessions
obtained from him under duress by [Dechert] Defendants.”
(Docket Entry 4-1, ¶ 1.)
Al Sadeq served as legal adviser, Group Legal
Director, and, ultimately, Deputy Chief Executive Officer
of RAKIA between 2008 and 2012. (Id., ¶ 35.) In this
capacity, he worked with Dr. Khater Massaad (“Dr.
Massaad”) (see id.), RAKIA’s former Chief Executive
Officer (the “CEO”) (see id., ¶ 8), and also “had regular
interactions with,” and was well known to (id., ¶ 36),
Sheikh Saud Bin Saqr Al-Qasimi, who, beginning in 2003,
held the title of “Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler of RAK”
(id., ¶ 12; see also id., ¶ 19 (discussing timing of that
appointment)), before, “in October 2010, . . .
succeed[ing] his father as Emir of RAK” (id., ¶ 22).5
From at least 2003 until 2010, “Dr Massaad was the
Ruler’s close friend and confidant, in his presence on a
daily, or almost daily, basis.” (Id., ¶ 12.)
In 2005, “RAKIA was established” (id., ¶ 14), and,
from that time until approximately 2012, Dr. Massaad
served as RAKIA’s CEO, controlling the “day to day
management
of
RAKIA”
and
“developing
investment
strategies and taking investment decisions with the
knowledge, approval, and instructions of the Ruler” (id.,

4 “‘RAK’ signifies Ras Al Khaimah, ‘one of the constituent
Emirates of the UAE’ (Docket Entry 2 at 5).
(See id. at 6.)”
(Docket Entry 7 at 4 n.4.)
5 “Despite the change in title during the relevant period,
for ease of reference, this Memorandum Opinion refers to the abovereferenced individual as ‘the Ruler.’” (Docket Entry 7 at 5 n.5.)
4

¶ 15).
“[B]y around 2010 RAKIA had, with the full
knowledge and approval of the Ruler, very significant
investment interests outside RAK, particularly in Georgia
. . . .” (Id., ¶ 17.) For various political, familial,
and economic reasons beginning around 2008, the Ruler
directed that RAKIA should “divest itself of its foreign
investments” (id., ¶ 21), a sudden change in investment
policy that adversely affected the return on certain
RAKIA investments (see id.), after which a rift developed
between the Ruler and Dr. Massaad. (See id., ¶¶ 15-25.)
Dr. Massaad “left RAK in around June 2012, on good
terms and without any suggestion of wrongdoing,” and
“returned to the UAE on several occasions thereafter
until August 2014, including for meetings with the
Ruler.” (Id., ¶ 25.) However, in approximately 2014,
the Ruler learned that one of his brothers, Sheikh
Faisal, whom the Ruler had denied appointment as Crown
Prince following the Ruler’s succession in October 2010
(id., ¶ 23), “causing animosity between them” (id.,
¶ 26), served as an investor in a business that Dr.
Massaad founded in Lebanon in 2012. (See id., ¶¶ 26-27.)
“As a result, the Ruler became concerned that Dr Massaad
was working with Sheikh Faisal and / or Sheikh Khaled[6]
in order to destabilise the Ruler, and that Sheikh Faisal
and / or Sheikh Khaled were plotting to remove the Ruler
with the assistance of Abu Dhabi” (id., ¶ 27), “the most
powerful of the Emirates” (id., ¶ 20).
In particular:
Since finding out about Dr Massaad’s business
relationship with Sheikh Faisal in 2014 and
following on from the fall-out between Dr Massaad
and the Ruler, and the Ruler’s concerns about Dr
Massaad’s involvement in suspected moves to oust
him by Sheikh Khaled and Sheikh Faisal, the Ruler
with the assistance of [Dechert] Defendants has
pursued a vendetta against Dr Massaad and alleged

6 “‘Sheikh Khaled was the Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler [of
RAK] between around 1958 until around June 2003 when the [Ruler’s
father] removed [Sheikh Khaled] and replaced him with the Ruler.
This was an unpopular move in some quarters leading to street
protests in favour of Sheikh Khaled in RAK, and he retained
significant support in the Emirate to succeed the [Ruler’s
father].’ (Id., ¶ 19.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 6 n.6.)
5

co-conspirators such as . . . [Gela] Mikadze[ (at
times, “Mikadze”)7] and [Farhad] Azima [(“Azima”)8]
(including by recent proceedings in the English
High Court [(the “Azima Litigation”)9]).
The background set out above . . . is the
context in which wrongs have been committed against
[Al Sadeq] who has become collateral damage in the
vendetta pursued by the Ruler against Dr Massaad,
against whom RAKIA allegedly seeks to recover over
USD 2 billion. The Ruler’s motive in pursuing his
vendetta is both to punish Dr Massaad for his
supposed disloyalty by destroying his reputation
and discrediting him, and also to attempt to
conceal the Ruler’s own personal knowledge and
direction of RAKIA’s foreign investments for his
own personal and political benefit in the years
before his accession.
In this regard, it is a
matter of public record that Mr Gerrard was
appointed by the Ruler in order to investigate and
pursue Dr Massaad; and Mr Al Sadeq and his wife
were told both by Mr Gerrard and Mr Hughes that the
“Big
Bastard”
Dr
Massaad,
and
his
alleged
co-conspirators, were the people they were really
after, and that they merely wanted Mr Al Sadeq’s
“cooperation” to help them build that case.
Despite several criminal sentences having been

7 “Mikadze formerly served as ‘General Manager of RAKIA’s
Georgia operations.’ (Id., ¶ 9.5.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 6 n.7.)
8 “‘[A] US-Iranian businessman,’ Azima ‘had dealings with
RAKIA’ (id., ¶ 9.5) and has engaged in litigation with RAKIA in the
UK courts (see id., ¶ 62).” (Docket Entry 7 at 6 n.8.)
9
“In the Azima Litigation, RAKIA sued Azima for alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and breach of warranty
(see, e.g., Docket Entry 4-2, ¶¶ 5-10), relating in part to an
allegedly sham referral agreement connected to the sale of a
Georgian hotel, the creation of which involved Al Sadeq (see, e.g.,
id., ¶¶ 168-181.6).
In response, Azima ‘contend[ed] that the
claims should be struck out or dismissed on the ground that, in
bringing the claims, RAKIA [wa]s relying on confidential emails
that RAKIA obtained through its unlawful hacking of his email
accounts.’ (Id., ¶ 10.) Azima also ‘counterclaim[ed] for damages
resulting from what he allege[d] was RAKIA’s hacking of his
emails.’ (Id.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 7 n.9.)
6

pronounced against Dr Massaad by the RAK courts in
absentia, Dr Massaad maintains his innocence and
presently lives and works in Saudi Arabia, an
Interpol notice which had been lodged against him
by RAK now having been removed, and an extradition
request from RAK having been dismissed by the Saudi
court.
(Id., ¶¶ 28-29 (internal paragraph numbering omitted).)
“RAK is regarded by international observers as
having a record of human rights abuses including
arbitrary detention, forced confessions, unfair trials,
and mistreatment in detention.” (Id., ¶ 30.) Per the
“Particulars of Claim” in the Al Sadeq Litigation (id. at
2) (at times, the “Al Sadeq Claim”):
Al Sadeq’s treatment follows a similar pattern to
the examples [of human rights violations specified
in a 2014 Amnesty International report detailed in
the Al Sadeq Claim] in that, inter alia, he was
kidnapped, arbitrarily detained for over five
years, subjected to torture and inhumane treatment
while incarcerated in solitary confinement for
around
560
days,
denied
access
to
legal
representation, only occasionally allowed to see
his family, his family was denied information about
his whereabouts at all material times until April
2016, his family was threatened and he was forced
to sign false confessions under duress which were
used in order to convict him and to implicate
others including Dr Massaad. [Dechert] Defendants
were aware of the abuse to which Mr Al Sadeq was
subjected, which [as] pleaded [in the Al Sadeq
Claim] was orchestrated by Mr Gerrard with the
assistance of the other [Dechert] Defendants, at
the behest of the Ruler.
(Id., ¶ 33.)
“In
summary,”
according
to
Declaration, the Al Sadeq Claim
Defendants’ involvement in:

the
Tsiattalou
alleges Dechert

a. The kidnap and extraordinary rendition of Mr. Al
Sadeq from Dubai to RAK (see paragraphs 40 to 47 of
the Al Sadeq Claim);

7

b. Mr. Al Sadeq’s unlawful detention without arrest
or charge, including a period of detention in
solitary confinement, under a false name, with no
access to legal representation (see paragraphs 105
to 109 of the Al Sadeq Claim);
c. The interrogation of Mr. Al Sadeq.
In
particular, Mr. Al Sadeq contends that during the
first of his interrogations by Mr. Gerrard, he was
blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back and
had no lawyer present (see paragraph 64 of the Al
Sadeq Claim);
d. Threats and unlawful pressure made to Mr. Al
Sadeq, his wife, and children, including a promise
by Mr. Gerrard and Ms. Black that Mr. Al Sadeq’s
prison
conditions
could
be
improved
if
he
“cooperated” with them (see paragraphs 65 to 67, 89
to 98, and 120 to 130 of the Al Sadeq Claim);
and
e. The procurement of false confessions signed by
Mr. Al Sadeq, but drafted by Mr. Gerrard and Mr.
Hughes, in circumstances where Mr. Al Sadeq was
detained in the above conditions, did not have
access to legal representation, and had made it
clear that the confessions were untrue (see
paragraphs 183 to 184 of the Al Sadeq Claim).
(Docket Entry 4, ¶ 5.)
Given the “extremely serious nature” of Al Sadeq’s
allegations “against senior lawyers and a global law firm
of international repute[,] . . . . the Al Sadeq
Litigation has generated a significant degree of
publicity in the UK.” (Id., ¶ 6.)
“Stokoe was first retained to act in the Al Sadeq
Litigation in October 2019. Since that time, there has
been a correlation between the progress of the Al Sadeq
Litigation
and
attempts
to
obtain
confidential
information from Stokoe and others in relation to those
proceedings.” (Id., ¶ 7.) On January 28, 2020, “[t]he
Claim Form in the Al Sadeq Litigation was issued” and,
although Stokoe did not serve it at that time, its
“allegations were made public in a press release
published by Detained in Dubai on the date of issue.”
8

(Id., ¶ 8.)10 “The Claim Form, which was made available
online, was much more detailed than the amended version
ultimately served with the Particulars of Claim and
contained details of Mr. Al Sadeq’s claim and the nature
of the allegations made against the Al Sadeq Litigation
defendants.” (Id.)11 The Claim Form also disclosed that
“Stokoe was acting on behalf of Mr. Al Sadeq.” (Id.)
In February and March 2020, Tsiattalou and other
members of “Al Sadeq’s Legal and Support Team” (id.,
¶ 3)12 traveled to Dubai to meet with Al Sadeq’s local
counsel and Al Sadeq, although they ultimately did not
receive permission to visit Al Sadeq (who remained
incarcerated in the RAK Central Prison as of March 31,
2020 (see Docket Entry 4-1, ¶ 214; see also id. at 65)).
(Docket Entry 4, ¶ 10.) During these trips, Tsiattalou
and other members of Al Sadeq’s Legal and Support Team
were the subject of surveillance activities,
including an apparent break-in to [Tsiattalou’s]
hotel room, the presence of surveillance agents at
[Tsiattalou’s] hotel (where [Tsiattalou] attended
privileged meetings in relation to the conduct of
the Al Sadeq Litigation), and an attempt to follow
[Tsiattalou] to a privileged meeting at a different
location.
[Tsiattalou] believe[s] these matters
were also connected to the Al Sadeq [L]itigation
and that they were intended to disrupt [his]
ability to obtain instructions (as they in fact
did).

10 “An employee of ‘the London-based human rights advocacy
organization “Detained in Dubai,”’ Radha Stirling, has assisted Al
Sadeq. (Id., ¶ 14.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 9 n.10.)
11 “‘Al Sadeq’s Amended Claim Form and Particulars of Claim
were served on March 31, 2020 and April 1, 2020.’ (Id., ¶ 9.) The
Amended Claim Form details ‘various ways’ that Stokoe’s ‘ability to
take instructions from Mr. Al Sadeq has been impeded . . . since
the Al Sadeq Litigation was issued.’ (Id.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 10
n.11.)
12 “Stokoe, 4 Stone Buildings (another UK law firm), Detained
in Dubai, and Maltin Litigation Support Group collectively comprise
‘Al Sadeq’s Legal and Support Team.’ (Id.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 10
n.12.)
9

(Id.; see also Docket Entry 4-1, ¶¶ 215-215.10 (detailing
surveillance and interference allegations).) During a
visit in March 2020, Tsiattalou and his colleagues “were
subject to intimidation and surveillance” and “an
obviously frightened hotel employee” warned Tsiattalou:
“You’re
being
followed/watched
by
security
services. They are very serious people.
Nobody
can stand in their way.”
(Docket Entry 4, ¶ 11.) Tsiattalou believes that Mr.
Stuart
Page
(at
times,
“Page”),
who
Tsiattalou
“personally witnessed” on March 6, 2020, “whilst staying
at the One and Only on the Palm Hotel in Dubai” (id.,
¶ 21), and who admitted his presence at Tsiattalou’s
Dubai hotel on that date, conducted this surveillance,
along with other individuals. (Id., ¶ 12.)
According to the opinion of Judge Lenon, “sitting as
a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division” (Docket Entry 42 (the “Azima Judgment”) at 2 (emphasis omitted)), issued
in the Azima Litigation, “[i]n January 2015 Stuart Page,
a private investigator, was engaged by the Ruler to
investigate what the Ruler feared was a plot between a
member of his family and Dr Massaad aimed at
destabilising his rulership.” (Id., ¶ 31.)13
The Azima Judgment further explained:
In March 2015 Mr Page provided the Ruler with
a report entitled RAK Project Update (“the Project
Update”) which was mainly concerned with Dr
Massaad’s activities but which also described how
Mr Azima was managing a team of advisers in the US,
hired by Dr Massaad, who were planning to spread
allegations about human rights issues in RAK;[14]
13 “‘Mr Page’s initial engagement in RAK was between 2008 and
2010 when he undertook surveillance work on the behalf of the Ruler
who was at the time the Crown Prince. His remit was to try to
ascertain through surveillance what plans Sheikh Khalid, the
Ruler’s brother, had to try to destabilise the Crown Prince’s
position.’ (Id., ¶ 260.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 12 n.13.)
14 “These stories involved the alleged mistreatment of Al
Sadeq and his wife, including the involvement of Dechert and/or
Gerrard in Al Sadeq’s interrogations and detention. (See, e.g.,
(continued...)
10

their campaign had not yet been made public. Mr
Page’s agents who compiled the report said that
they would be able to gather intelligence on the
campaign team in order to monitor their progress
and “attempt to contain or ruin their plans”.
*****
Neil Gerrard is a former policeman and a
partner in the firm of Dechert LLP which was
instructed to assist with the investigation into Dr
Massaad’s alleged fraudulent activities which it
has continued to work on to the present time. His
witness statement dealt with his engagement by RAK,
the meeting he had with Mr Azima in July 2016 and
the
events
in
August
2016
surrounding
the
downloading of [Azima’s] hacked material. He was
cross-examined about his involvement with the
questioning of detainees within RAK, in particular
Karam Al Sadeq and Shahab Izadpanah. Allegations
that Mr Gerrard had attempted, on behalf of RAK, to
extort money from Mr Izadpanah and had offered Mr
Izadpanah and Mr Al Sadeq to drop all charges
against
them
if
they
confessed
to
charges
implicating Dr Massaad were put to Mr Gerrard who

14(...continued)
Docket Entry 4-2, ¶¶ 197-201.8.)

According to Judge Lenon:

In order to make good its case that Mr Azima
procured and promoted false stories in the media, it was
incumbent on RAKIA to establish that the stories which it
was intended to publish about human rights violations
were untrue.
It has not done so.
It appears that
Project Clay[, which RAKIA described as “a coordinated
programme designed to frustrate RAKIA’s attempts to
pursue legal remedies against Dr Massaad by procuring and
promoting the widespread publication of damaging false
stories in the international media” (id., ¶ 198.1),]
intended to draw attention to actual cases of detention
and illegality, not fabricated cases. The 2014 Amnesty
International Report indicates that there were real
grounds for concern about detention procedures in RAK.
None of RAKIA’s witnesses were in a position to refute
the findings in that report.
(Id., ¶ 202.)”

(Docket Entry 7 at 12 n.14.)
11

denied them in forthright terms. On the basis of
the material before [Judge Lenon, he was] not in a
position to make any findings in relation to those
allegations or other allegations of misconduct
extraneous to the events in issue in these
proceedings that were put to Mr Gerrard.[15]
Counsel for Mr Azima submitted that Mr Gerrard
gave dishonest evidence on key issues. He was also
criticised for not referring to Mr Page and the
Project Update in his witness statement. In [Judge
Lenon’s] view, Mr Gerrard’s witness statement
should have dealt with the Project Update which was
a clearly relevant document and one which, as he
accepted in cross-examination, was of concern to
him when it was produced because it referred to the
threat of a press campaign to smear RAK and its
Ruler with human rights allegations. [Judge Lenon]
do[es] not, however, regard the omission to deal
with the Project Update, or the other criticisms
made of his evidence, as leading to the conclusion
that [Judge Lenon] should treat Mr Gerrard as
dishonest.
Stuart Page, also a former policeman and now
the Chairman and majority shareholder of a business

15 “Following entry of the Azima Judgement, and prompted by
the Al Sadeq Litigation, Gerrard disclosed that he provided false
testimony in the Azima Litigation regarding the nature and extent
of his interactions with Al Sadeq and his wife.
See generally
Azima, Docket Entry 22-2. As relevant here, Judge Lenon ‘agree[d]
with Mr Azima’s submission that the corrected evidence cumulatively
creates a materially different impression of the extent and nature
of Mr Gerrard’s dealings with Mr Al Sadeq.’ Id., Docket Entry 222, ¶ 14. Judge Lenon further rejected ‘RAKIA’s submission that the
erroneous evidence goes to peripheral matters which were of no
relevance to the substantive issues. There was a pleaded issue on
RAKIA’s own case in the proceedings as to whether the stories about
human rights abuses and Dechert’s involvement in those abuses were
false . . . .’ Id., Docket Entry 22-2, ¶ 15 (citing Docket Entry
4-2, ¶¶ 197-198).
However, Judge Lenon declined to reopen the
Azima Judgment because, inter alia, he found that disclosure of
Gerrard’s false testimony and his subsequent revisions thereto did
not alter ‘[Judge Lenon’s] conclusions on any of the substantive
issues.’ Id., Docket Entry 22-2, ¶ 22.” (Docket Entry 7 at 13
n.15.)
12

providing security and surveillance services, dealt
in his witness statement with his engagement in RAK
to assist with the investigations into Dr Massaad
and the discovery of the hacked material. Counsel
for Mr Azima submitted that Mr Page was a dishonest
witness who lied about a number of matters. [Judge
Lenon]
consider[s]
that
Mr
Page
was
an
unsatisfactory and unreliable witness. As set out
in greater detail in the context of the [Azima]
hacking claim, his witness statement was misleading
in relation to two significant matters. First, his
witness statement implied that he did not produce
written reports for the Ruler on his investigations
whereas in fact he did so on a regular basis.
Second, his witness statement said that he first
came across the name of Mr Azima in early 2016
whereas . . . it was in fact a year earlier. His
evidence in connection with the discovery of the
hacked material was both internally inconsistent
and at odds with the contemporary documents.
[Judge Lenon] ha[s] concluded that it would be
unsafe to rely on any evidence from Mr Page that
was not corroborated by some other source.
*****
[Three referenced cases involving Page and
illegally obtained information] highlight the fact
that Mr Page operates in a world of covert
surveillance in which agents acquire confidential
information unlawfully and that Mr Page has
dealings with such agents.
It would be a
reasonable inference to draw from these incidents
that Mr Page has access to agents with the capacity
to hack emails. However these other incidents do
not establish that Mr Page ever personally carried
out or authorised the unlawful obtaining of
confidential information and therefore do not
affect [Judge Lenon’s] assessment of the inherent
likelihood of Mr Page acting unlawfully in this
case.
Mr Azima also relied on the level of Mr
Page’s remuneration of between $100,000 and
$300,000 per month as being “consistent with Mr
Page obtaining information by illicit means and of
seeking a premium for such nefarious activity.” Mr
Page was certainly generously remunerated but

13

[Judge Lenon] do[es] not consider that his rate of
remuneration can sensibly be taken as a sign of
illicit activity.
(Id., ¶¶ 32, 62-64, 369 (internal paragraph numbering
omitted).)
In the Azima Litigation, RAKIA maintained that Page
innocently discovered websites containing Azima’s hacked
emails, which Gerrard then enlisted Del Rosso to
download, a task Del Rosso achieved with the help of
Northern Technology Inc. (“NTi”).
(See, e.g., id.,
¶¶ 51-53, 336-343.11.)16 Judge Lenon “conclude[d] from
the unexplained contradictions, inconsistences and
implausible elements that RAKIA’s case that Mr Page
discovered the blogging websites linked to the BitTorrent
sites [containing Azima’s hacked data] innocently via [an
Israeli journalist] and another unidentified informer is
not true and that the true facts as to how RAKIA came to
know about the hacked material have not been disclosed.”
(Id., ¶ 355; see also id., ¶¶ 342-54 (examining evidence
and assertions).) Per Judge Lenon, though, “[i]t does
not of course necessarily follow from this conclusion
that RAKIA was responsible for the hacking.”
(Id.,
¶ 356.)
As to Azima’s hacking claim, Judge Lenon ultimately
accept[ed] that the hypothesis advanced on behalf
of Mr Azima that Mr Page, acting with the express
or implied authority of the Ruler, arranged for Mr
Azima’s emails to be hacked . . . and that it was
decided to deploy the hacked material in August
2016 once [a] ceasefire with Dr Massaad was over,

16 “In support of this contention, RAKIA submitted a witness
statement from Del Rosso that attributes the discovery of all but
one batch of data to Page and the discovery of the final data batch
to an NTi employee. (See generally Docket Entry 4-4.) Del Rosso’s
witness statement further indicates that, in August 2014, Dechert
engaged Vital Management ‘to investigate assets potentially stolen
from the Government of [RAK]. Pursuant to its engagement[, Vital
Management] examined potential frauds committed by, amongst others,
[Dr.] Massaad.’ (Id., ¶ 4.) Del Rosso ‘took [his] instructions
from Dechert LLP, and had limited direct contact with Jamie
Buchanan and other representatives of the RAK government.’ (Id.)”
(Docket Entry 7 at 15 n.16.)
14

is not impossible. It would provide an explanation
for the fact that the hacked material came to light
when it did and for RAKIA’s failure to provide a
convincing account of its innocent discovery of the
hacked material. It is equally not impossible that
Mr Page arranged for Mr Azima’s emails to be hacked
without the knowledge of Mr Gerrard or [James]
Buchanan [(“Buchanan”)17] or the Ruler’s advisers so
that the instigation of these proceedings did not
entail a conspiracy between them, even though the
witnesses may have harboured suspicions about Mr
Page’s role.
It is, however, not enough for Mr Azima to
advance a case that is not impossible. Based on
all of the documentary and witness evidence, [Judge
Lenon] was not satisfied on the balance of
probabilities that RAKIA was responsible for the
hacking of Mr Azima’s emails. The facts supporting
the inference that RAKIA was responsible for the
hacking are far from conclusive and the improbable
features of Mr Azima’s case can only be explained
away on the basis of speculative assumptions for
which there is no sufficiently firm evidence.
(Id., ¶¶ 380-381 (internal paragraph numbering omitted).)
Accordingly,
Judge
Lenon
denied
Azima’s
hacking
counterclaim. (See id., ¶¶ 382-84.)

17 “Buchanan served as a representative of RAK and the CEO of
Ras Al Khaimah Development LLC (see, e.g., Docket Entry 4-1, ¶ 143;
Docket Entry 4-4, ¶ 4), an entity ‘which holds and manages assets
and liability previously owned by [RAKIA], and is thus intimately
tied to the Al Sadeq Litigation’ (Docket Entry 6, ¶ 15). Per the
Azima Judgment:
In around April 2015, the Ruler told Mr Buchanan that he
wanted Mr Buchanan and other assistants to ‘target’ Mr
Azima.
The Ruler directed his associates to bring
charges against Mr Azima.
The Ruler’s associates
discussed meeting to ‘coordinate our attack’ on Mr Azima
and Dr Massaad but persuaded the Ruler not to pursue this
plan at that time.
(Docket Entry 4-2, ¶ 33.)”

(Docket Entry 7 at 16 n.17.)
15

On appeal, Azima sought to introduce new evidence
relevant to his hacking claims.
As the UK appellate
court explained:
A tip-off from Thomson Reuters after the trial led
Mr Azima to conclude that he had not been the only
victim of spear-phishing[18] emails but that others
who had been named in the Project Update had also
been targets. Linked with the tip-off was a report
by The Citizen Lab released on 9 June 2020 which
claimed to have uncovered a “massive hack-for-hire
operation” said to be linked to an Indian company
called BellTrox.
The information provided by Thomson Reuters
consisted of email addresses (both recipients and
senders) together with dates and times of sending,
beginning in March 2015. The recipients included
not only Mr Azima but also others who had been
named in the Project Update.
Following the
information provided by Thomson Reuters Mr Azima’s
computer expert (who had given evidence at trial)
produced a further report in which he said that
certain features of the material demonstrated that
these emails were spear-phishing emails.
This
evidence was said to show that Mr Azima had been
the target of phishing emails which began at the
same time as the Project Update was provided to
RAKIA:
that is to say in March 2015.
RAKIA’s
computer expert (who had also given evidence at
trial) made a number of sustained criticisms of
that report. RAKIA also took the point that since
one of the allegations at trial was that Mr Azima’s
emails had been hacked because he was named in the
Project Update, it would have been open to him to
have asked the others also named in that report to
allow access to their email accounts.
Indeed,

18
“Tsiattalou explained that phishing and spear-phishing
communications ‘seek to trick the recipient into clicking on a link
to a website which itself contains malicious software which is
downloaded onto the recipient’s device. Spear-phishing is a more
sophisticated form of phishing where the communication contains
specific information, targeted at the recipient, which makes it
more likely that the recipient will click on the link.’ (Docket
Entry 4, ¶ 43.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 17 n.18.)
16

RAKIA had applied for disclosure from at least
three of those individuals, which Mr Azima refused.
Mr Azima subsequently instructed Mr Rey, a
security consultant based in Switzerland, to
investigate. Mr Rey’s investigations into BellTrox
led him to another Indian company called CyberRoot.
He spoke to a Mr Vikash Kumar Pandey, a former
employee of CyberRoot. Mr Pandey told him that he
and four of his colleagues had worked on the hack
of Mr Azima on the instructions of Mr Del Rosso
(who had given evidence for RAKIA at trial,[19] but
had not mentioned CyberRoot).
Mr Pandey began
working on the hack in June or July 2015; that is
to say some three to four months after the date of
the Project Update.
Mr Pandey described the
methods that he and his colleagues had used.
CyberRoot’s efforts to hack Mr Azima’s emails were
initially unsuccessful; but they gained access to
them in March 2016.
He also described how
CyberRoot had disseminated Mr Azima’s information
on the internet. CyberRoot had been paid about $1
million for this work.
In response to this evidence Mr Del Rosso made
another witness statement. He accepted that he had
engaged CyberRoot to carry out work on RAKIA’s
behalf; and had arranged the payment to CyberRoot
of the $1 million. But he said that that was for
different work which had nothing to do with Mr
Azima.
Whether RAKIA was involved in the hacking is
hotly in dispute. Moreover, Mr Panday’s account of
how the hacking began is at variance both with Mr
Azima’s case and also with what the first tranche
of fresh evidence is said to demonstrate.
His
evidence is that CyberRoot only gained access to Mr
Azima’s email accounts in March 2016, whereas Mr
Azima’s case was that the hacking had taken place

19 “In his witness statement in the Azima Litigation trial,
Del Rosso maintained that he ‘did not hack Mr Azima’s computers,
cause him to be hacked or know who hacked him. [Del Rosso] did not
upload his data to the internet, cause his data to be uploaded or
know who did upload his data.’ (Docket Entry 4-4, ¶ 20.)” (Docket
Entry 7 at 18 n.19.)
17

many months earlier. If RAKIA had already obtained
access to Mr Azima’s email accounts many months
earlier, it is difficult to see why CyberRoot would
have been instructed to replicate the hacking.
Nevertheless, if Mr Panday’s account is true, it
seems to [the appellate court] that it will support
Mr Azima’s allegation that RAKIA was responsible
for the hacking (although not the way in which it
was put at trial); and that RAKIA’s defence to the
counterclaim was dishonestly advanced. That will
in [the appellate court’s] judgment require a
complete re-evaluation of the evidence in support
of the hacking claim.
Azima v. Del Rosso, No. 1:20cv954, Docket Entry 49-1,
¶¶ 130-34 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2021) (internal paragraph
numbering omitted); see also id., ¶ 134 (describing
“judgment for RAKIA on [Azima’s hacking] counterclaim” as
“procured by fraud”)).
Accordingly, on March 12, 2021, see id., Docket
Entry 49-1 at 1, the UK appellate court remanded Azima’s
hacking counterclaim for retrial before a different
chancery judge, noting as it did so that “neither the
parties nor the judge who hears the remitted issues will
be bound by any of the findings of fact made by the
[original] judge on the hacking [counter]claim,” id.,
Docket Entry 49-1, ¶ 146. See id., Docket Entry 49-1,
¶¶ 145-46. The appellate court further noted that, on
remand, “it would be necessary” for Del Rosso to testify.
Id., Docket Entry 49-1, ¶ 143.
Against this backdrop, Tsiattalou avers:
In
late
March
2020,
Mr.
Oliver
Moon
[(“Moon”)],
a
private
investigator,
turned
whistleblower,
informed
Mr.
Alexander
Sawyer
[(“Sawyer”)] (who works in corporate intelligence
via a company called Quaestio), that he had been
instructed by a “Source A2”, as he was described in
the Robinson Proceeding (and who was later revealed
to be a Mr. John Gunning[ (“Gunning”)]), to make
attempts to gain access to Stokoe’s confidential
information.
These
instructions
continued
throughout April 2020 and included hacking Stokoe’s
bank accounts, including its client account.
It
was subsequently discovered that Source A2’s
instructions had in turn derived from a Mr. Paul
18

Robinson[
(“Robinson”)],
investigator.
(Docket Entry 4, ¶ 13.)20
continues:

another

private

The Tsiattalou Declaration

As he has since confirmed in an affidavit, Mr.
Moon was also instructed to procure confidential
information — including accessing their bank
accounts — about others assisting Mr. Al Sadeq,
namely, Maltin Litigation Support Group[, a legal
public relations firm whose employee traveled to
Dubai with Tsiattalou in March 2020 (id., ¶ 11),
and Radha Stirling (at times, “Stirling”) of
Detained in Dubai]. The timing and coordination of
this hacking demonstrates that it is designed to
interfere with the Al Sadeq Litigation, and to
undermine
the
sanctity
of
the
confidential
relationship between solicitor and client.
For
instance, just after the claim form and Particulars
of Claim were served in the Al Sadeq Litigation and
a couple of weeks before Dechert’s solicitors made
enquiries of Stokoe as to who was funding that
litigation, Mr. Moon was instructed to obtain
Stokoe’s banking co-ordinates.
On April 21, 2020, Mr. Gunning was instructed
to ascertain [Tsiattalou’s] movements “in and out
of Dubai — for Feb 2020.”
As mentioned above,
[Tsiattalou] was in Dubai in February 2020
obtaining instructions in relation to the Al Sadeq
Litigation, and became aware that [he] was the
subject of surveillance and an unlawful break in.
(Id., ¶¶ 14-15 (internal paragraph numbering omitted).)
In Tsiattalou’s view, “[t]here can be no doubt that
the attempted hacking of Stokoe was motivated by, and
relates to, its retainer by Mr. Al Sadeq.” (Id., ¶ 16.)
Tsiattalou further avers:
As mentioned above, in late March 2020, Mr. Moon
informed Mr. Sawyer of Quaestio that he had been

20 “Sawyer had previously engaged Moon to conduct work on
Stokoe’s behalf, which presumably motivated Moon to disclose this
situation to Sawyer. (Id.)” (Docket Entry 7 at 20 n.20.)
19

instructed to obtain confidential information from
Stokoe. Mr. Moon agreed to work with Stoke [sic]
and Mr. Sawyer to establish the nature and origin
of the requests.
[Tsiattalou] was informed by Quaestio (and Mr.
Moon has in an affidavit dated July 2, 2020
confirmed) that, pursuant to the arrangement, Mr.
Moon received the following instructions from
“Source A2” (an individual Stokoe eventually
identified as [Gunning]):
a. On April 2, 2020, Mr Moon was instructed to
obtain, amongst other things, the Stokoe’s
banking coordinates.
b. On April 9, 2020, Mr. Moon was instructed
to access Stokoe’s trading bank account and
transactional data for the business bank
account for the last three months.
This
period broadly coincides with the period that
had elapsed since the issue of the Claim Form
in the Al Sadeq Litigation.
c. On April 21, 2020, Mr. Moon was instructed
to
provide
information
relating
to
[Tsiattalou’s] movements in and out of Dubai
in February 2020.
This period broadly
coincides with the period that [Tsiattalou]
attempted to visit Mr. Al Sadeq in the [UAE].
As . . . detailed above, when [Tsiattalou]
visited Dubai during this time, [he] was
subjected to covert surveillance.
d. On April 22, 2020, Mr. Moon was instructed
to provide information relating to Stokoe’s
client
account,
including
transactional
information for the month of March 2020. Mr.
Moon was told that it was likely information
would also be sought for the period November
2019 to February 2020, a period overlapping
almost exactly with the period of Mr. Al
Sadeq’s retainment of Stokoe.
Mr. Sawyer liaised with Stokoe to provide Mr.
Moon with Stokoe’s bank account documents in a
format which allowed covert tracking, to identify
the recipients of those documents.
In this way,
20

Quaestio established that Mr. Moon was instructed
by [Gunning], who was in tu[rn] instructed by
[Robinson]. Quaestio’s findings are set out in a
report, dated June 27, 2020, which is annexed [to
the
Tsiattalou
Declaration
(“the
Quaestio
Report”)21].
Based on this information, Stokoe initiated
the Robinson Proceeding in the High Court of
Justice of England and Wales, Queen’s Bench
Division seeking, inter alia, to enjoin, and to
obtain affidavits from, Mr. Moon, Mr. Gunning, and
Mr. Robinson. . . .
Proceedings against Mr. Robinson were stayed
by a consent order sealed by Justice Chamberlain,
(the “Chamberlain Order”). . . . Pursuant to the
Chamberlain Order, Mr. Robinson undertook to “swear
an affidavit stating on oath . . . the identity of
any person who has requested” that he “obtain
Confidential Information from” Stokoe.
Mr.
Robinson swore an affidavit wherein he stated that
Mr. Patrick Grayson was the source of these
instructions. . . .
By letter dated November 30, 2020, Mr. Page’s
attorney, Stephenson Harwood, sent a letter to
Stokoe with invoices for the corporate research
undertaken by Company Documents Limited, Mr.
Robinson’s company, on behalf of Page Corporate
Investigations Limited (London) and Page Group ME
JLT (Dubai). One of the invoices from March 19,
2020, showed that the subject of an investigation
was the Brendale Group, a group of companies
associated to Mr. David Haigh who has been closely
associated to Radha Stirling and who are both named
in
a
press
release
attributing
to
their
associations and linked companies. Another invoice
from October 4, 2017, shows that a group of
companies that were involved in RAKIA’s case

21 “As relevant here, the Quaestio Report indicates that, ‘in
addition to requests relating to Stokoe, a number of other targets
have been identified by Mr Robinson including: Maltin PR, Mr Tim
Maltin and, to lesser extent, Hogan Lovells International LLP,
[Azima], and [Stirling].’ (Docket Entry 4-8, ¶ 3.)” (Docket Entry
7 at 22 n.21.)
21

against Mr. Mikadze were the subject of an
investigation
by
Mr.
Robinson’s
company
as
instructed by Mr. Page.
The companies under
investigation were all connected to Gela Mikadze
who was another individual investigated by Gerrard
and RAKIA in connection with Dr. Massaad.
Stokoe therefore brought further proceedings
against Mr. Grayson (amongst others) by Claim Form
dated July 16, 2020. . . . Those proceedings were
brought, inter alia, to compel Mr. Grayson and Mr.
Grayson’s associated company, Grayson + Co Ltd, to
reveal the source of their instructions, any
further wrongdoing, and to obtain injunctive relief
to prevent them from further wrongdoing.
The application against Mr. Grayson and
Grayson + Co Ltd resulted in a consent order made
by Justice Tipples, (the “Tipples Order”). . . .
Pursuant to the Tipples Order, Mr. Grayson and
Grayson[ ]+ Co Ltd undertook to “swear an affidavit
stating on oath . . . the identity of any person
who has requested that he “obtain Confidential
Information from” Stokoe.
Mr.
Grayson’s
affidavit
(the
“Grayson
Affidavit”) was notably brief.
He stated that:
“Nobody requested me to obtain Confidential
Information from or pertaining to [Stokoe],
directly or indirectly.”
(Id., ¶¶ 33-41 (heading, citations, internal paragraph
numbering, and certain parentheticals omitted) (certain
ellipses and brackets in original).)
The Grayson
Affidavit further states that Grayson “never asked Mr
Robinson to obtain Confidential Information relating to
[Stokoe].” (Docket Entry 4-15, ¶ 5.)
However, approximately eight months after submitting
the
Grayson
Affidavit,
Grayson
provided
further
information in the Grayson Proceeding that undermine the
assertions in his affidavit.
In particular, Grayson
admitted that, on January 30, 2020, he informed “Robinson
that he would be interested in any general information as
to how Mr Al Sadeq was funding the Al Sadeq
[L]itigation,” although he maintains that, during this
conversation, he “did not ask Mr Robinson to obtain
confidential information about [Stokoe].” (Docket Entry
22

6-3 at 3-4.) Grayson also acknowledged that, around the
beginning of April 2020, he asked Robinson if “it was
still possible to find out in Dubai if an individual had
entered or left Dubai” and that, in response to
Robinson’s query whether “Grayson was interested in the
travels of anyone in particular,” he “mentioned Mr
Tsiattalou, the senior partner of [Stokoe], as a
potential person of interest” and subsequently sent
Robinson an email containing Tsiattalou’s identifying
information. (Id. at 4.)22
Grayson further admitted that his “interest in how
Mr Al Sadeq might be funding his litigation was prompted
by a general question raised with him in a telephone call
on or shortly after 28 January 2020 with Mr Nicholas del
Rosso of Vital Management,” with whom Grayson “had a
general consulting arrangement . . . (which was not
contained in any written agreement) to provide general
business intelligence services and advice.” (Id. at 5;
see also Docket Entry 6-4 (containing three-year
nondisclosure agreement, dated August 30, 2018, between
Vital Management and Grayson).)
Thereafter, in
approximately “late March/early April 2020,” Grayson and
Del Rosso had another telephone conversation in which Del
Rosso asked “whether it was possible to find out if
someone had travelled into and out of Dubai” and, in
response to Grayson’s query whether “[D]el Rosso was
potentially interested in the movements of anyone in
particular,” he “named Mr Tsiattalou and said he was the
senior partner at [Stokoe].
Shortly after and as a
result of that request, Mr Grayson had the conversation
with Mr Robinson in or around the beginning of April
2020” described above. (Docket Entry 6-3 at 5.)
In addition, on March 22, 2021, Page disclosed in
the Grayson Proceeding a letter, “dated September 16,
2020, from Allen & Overy LLP (a firm representing the
Ruler and Government of [RAK]) to Stephenson Harwood LLP
(the firm representing defendant Page in the Grayson

22 “Nevertheless, Grayson maintains that he ‘did not provide
any instruction to Mr Robinson to investigate Mr Tsiattalou or his
movements; nor did he ask Mr Robinson to obtain confidential
information about [Stokoe] or to obtain information unlawfully,’
and he also ‘never asked Mr Robinson to provide information about
when Mr Tsiattalou entered or left Dubai.’ (Id.)” (Docket Entry
7 at 24 n.22.)
23

Proceeding), wherein a number of statements purportedly
made by defendant Page are referenced.” (Docket Entry 6,
¶ 15.) As relevant here, the letter states:
1.

We understand from Mr Jamie Buchanan that your
client, Mr Stuart Page, has made a number of
statements in communications that he had with
Mr Buchanan in August and September 2020 that
appear to refer to our clients, the Ruler and
the Government of [RAK].
*****

3.

Our clients are concerned to understand what
information your client intended to relay by
his statements to Mr Buchanan. In particular,
we should be grateful if your client would
provide us with his explanation for the
following statements:
(a)

your client referred to English
High Court proceedings that
have been commenced against him
by
Stokoe
Partnership
Solicitors and said: “if I have
to implicate Nick / Patrick,
Decherts, Neil and the boss to
get me out of this I will.” We
understand that your client’s
reference to “the boss” is
intended to be a reference to
the Ruler.
Please can your client explain
what information, facts or
evidence your client had in
mind and how he believes this
implicates or otherwise relates
to the Ruler.
*****

(c)

your client said: “what with
the boss refusing to cover my
costs I wish quite frankly I
took the ENRC offer”.
*****
24

(e)

your client made a number of
statements as to his intended
future conduct including:
*****

(ii)

“regrettably
Jamie I
would have to say you
know Nick and Patrick and
that Nick was retained
long
before
me
and
reported to at least in
part to Neil.”; and

(iii)

“I will stand my ground
if I am supported I will
not if I am quite frankly
treated this way”.

Please can you [sic] client confirm whether
any of the above statements were intended to
relate to the Ruler or the Government of
[RAK]; and, if ‘yes’, please can your client
explain what his intended actions were/are in
respect of each relevant statement.
4. We note that some of your client’s messages to
Mr Buchanan appear to refer to our communications
in respect of your client’s request that our
clients fund his legal costs. As we have discussed
previously (e.g. in the telephone calls between Mr
Francis of our office and Mr Fordham of your office
on 15 and 17 July 2020): our clients rejected your
client’s
request
and
noted
that
the
legal
proceedings against your client have nothing to do
with our clients; and, your client has confirmed
that he has never been instructed by our clients to
do any work in relation to Karam Al Sadeq, nor his
lawyers, nor the proceedings that have been brought
against Neil Gerrard and Dechert (amongst others).
(Docket Entry 6-6 at 2-3 (emphasis in original).)
Finally, Tsiattalou avers:
Since the issue of proceedings in the Al Sadeq
Litigation,
[Tsiattalou],
along
with
others
involved in the Al Sadeq Litigation, have received
25

numerous emails and text messages which appear to
be targeted attempts to access personal data.
[Tsiattalou] believe[s] that these attempts amount
to phishing or spear-phishing; i.e. communications
which seek to trick the recipient into clicking on
a link to a website which itself contains malicious
software which is downloaded onto the recipient’s
device.
Spear-phishing is a more sophisticated
form of phishing where the communication contains
specific information, targeted at the recipient,
which makes it more likely that the recipient will
click on the link.
In particular, Stirling, who has published
articles about the Al Sadeq Litigation and has
aided Mr. Al Sadeq in raising awareness amongst
human
rights
activists
and
non-governmental
organizations about his case, received a phishing
email from a Google Inc. (“Google”) account,
[e-mail]. That same email address
sent a phishing email containing Android Package
files (“APK files”) to Detained in Dubai.
An
analysis conducted of those APK files showed that
the APKs communicated with a number of Ngrok server
addresses.
Stirling was also the subject of
approximately four (4) phishing attempts using
content hosted on Dropbox Inc. (“Dropbox”) sent to
her
email
address
[e-mail].
Approximately twenty-six (26) phishing attempts
were sent to the email addresses of [certain
lawyers involved in the Al Sadeq Litigation] and
Stirling from domains hosted by Cloudflare Inc.
(“Cloudflare”).
In addition, Google Firebase
accounts were used in approximately twenty (20)
phishing attempts targeting the email accounts of
[those lawyers], Stirling, and Tim Maltin, of
Maltin Litigation Support Group.
It is believed
that these hacking attempts were perpetuated by
individuals associated with the defendants in the
Al Sadeq Litigation as part of an attempt to
interfere
with
Mr.
Al
Sadeq’s
legal
representation.
At approximately 5:45 a.m. on November 5,
2020, just days before a hearing in the High Court
was
scheduled
in
the
Robinson
and
Grayson
Proceedings,
hackers
broke
into
Stokoe’s
cloud-based IT system which the firm uses to
26

conduct its day-to-day business. By approximately
8:45 a.m., Stokoe’s IT provider was able to take
measures to protect Stokoe’s data and that of ten
other
law
firms
potentially
affected.
Consequently, Stokoe was unable to gain access to
their IT system until November 9, 2020. During the
time that the IT system was down, Stokoe faced
significant impediments in carrying out their
day-to-day business activities, including the
inability
to
receive
emails
on
their
work
addresses. Stokoe was informed by its IT provider
that after evaluating the password used to
orchestrate the hacking, it determined that the
hacking was linked specifically to Stokoe (rather
than any of the ten other law firms affected) and
that Stokoe’s financial material and banking data
were accessed.
Stokoe has been operating since 1994.
As a
firm, [Stokoe] ha[s] never before 2020 been
affected by such cyberattacks.
[Tsiattalou]
believe[s] that these various attempts to access
Stokoe’s confidential information are linked to its
representation of Mr. Al Sadeq.
Beyond the
confidential information that was sought from
Stokoe as described above, in Mr. Robinson’s
affidavit, he stated that he received the following
requests for information:
a.
Information
about
Ms.
Stirling’s
whereabouts, telephone numbers, and banking
information; and
b. Financial records and monthly transactional
data from the bank account of Maltin PR.
Mr. Al Sadeq’s Legal and Support Team has
been, and remains, a target of a complicated and
coordinated campaign by unknown perpetrators,
within the context of their involvement in the
ongoing Al Sadeq Litigation.
Accordingly, upon information and belief, Del
Rosso and Vital Management have information,
documents, and material which would provide
evidence necessary to establish the identity of the
ultimate perpetrators behind the hacking campaign
targeted against Mr. Al Sadeq’s [l]egal [t]eam, and
27

in turn, aid Mr. Al Sadeq in proving the
defendants’ ongoing pattern of human rights abuses,
their efforts to interfere with Mr. Al Sadeq’s
access
to
legal
representation,
and
their
willingness to go to extreme lengths to conceal
their unlawful conduct.
(Docket Entry 4, ¶¶ 43-48 (headings and internal
paragraph numbering omitted).) Thus, Applicants seek to
depose Del Rosso and Vital Management.
(See Docket
Entries 3-1, 3-2.) In connection with those depositions,
Applicants seek certain documents concerning Del Rosso’s
and Vital Management’s interactions with CyberRoot. (See
id.)
(Docket Entry 7 at 3-29 (emphasis, ellipses, and all but third set
of brackets in original).)
The Order further noted:
[I]n October 2020, Azima sued [Movants] in this
Court for allegedly conspiring with, inter alia, Gerrard,
Page, and Buchanan to hack Azima’s computer data,
including emails (the “Azima/Del Rosso Litigation”). See
generally Azima, Docket Entry 1 (the “Azima Complaint”).
In particular, the Azima Complaint asserts that Gerrard
and Dechert hired [Movants] on RAKIA’s behalf to hack
Azima’s data, which [Movants] accomplished through
CyberRoot Risk Advisory Private Limited (“CyberRoot”), a
company in “India that engages in illegal hacking.” Id.,
Docket Entry 1, ¶ 2.
On February 12, 2021, Azima
(publically) disclosed the existence of the instant
litigation to [Movants]. See, e.g., id., Docket Entry
45, ¶¶ 7-13. On March 5, 2021, [Movants] responded to
this disclosure by stating, in the Azima/Del Rosso
Litigation, the following:
On February 5, a former RAK official filed a
new discovery application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in
this District (the “Al Sadeq 1782 Application”),
which, like Azima’s pending discovery motion, seeks
discovery from [Movants] related to the alleged
hack of Azima’s data.
Although the underlying
foreign proceeding does not appear to have any
relation to [Vital Management], CyberRoot, or
allegations of hacking, in support of that
application, the petitioners there submitted a set
28

of photographed copies of purported Kotak Mahindra
Bank statements (the “Statements”). The Statements
show payments from [Vital Management] to CyberRoot
totaling an amount already alleged in the [Azima]
Complaint.
Id., Docket Entry 47 at 4.
(Docket Entry 7 at 31-32 (certain brackets in original).) “Despite
the Application’s public disclosure, no one — including Dechert
Defendants, [Movants], or RAKIA — . . . sought to oppose the
Application” prior to issuance of the Order.

(Id. at 32 (citing

Docket Entries dated Feb. 5, 2021, to Oct. 18, 2021).)
B. “For Use” Determination
After

granting

Applicants’

request

to

proceed

ex

parte

(see id. at 34-35), the Order analyzed Applicants’ Section 1782
request (see id. at 35-41), stating, as relevant here:
[I]t bears noting that the “for use” factor imposes only
a “de minimis” burden upon a Section 1782 applicant. In
re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d [8,] 18 [(D.D.C. 2010)]
(collecting cases). Here, Applicants assert that “Del
Rosso and Vital Management are in possession of relevant
documents, materials, and information which will aid in
determining the identity of the perpetrators behind the
hacking campaign targeting Mr. Al Sadeq’s Legal and
Support Team and lend support to Mr. Al Sadeq’s claims of
human rights abuses against the defendants.”
(Docket
Entry 2 at 20.)
As support for that contention, the
record reflects that, on Del Rosso’s own admission,
Dechert hired Del Rosso and Vital Management in 2014 “to
investigate assets potentially stolen from [RAK’s]
Government,” a task that included examining “potential
frauds committed by, amongst others, [Dr.] Massaad”
(Docket Entry 4-4, ¶ 4), at the direction of Dechert,
Gerrard,
Buchanan,
and
other
RAK
governmental

29

representatives.
(See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 4-8.)[23]
The
record further reflects that, per RAKIA’s claims in the
Azima Litigation, Al Sadeq participated in these alleged
frauds with Dr. Massaad and Azima. (See, e.g., Docket
Entry 4-2, ¶¶ 8, 168-183.) RAKIA’s evidence in the Azima
Litigation regarding this alleged fraud rested on Azima’s
confidential emails, obtained through hacking.
(See,
e.g., id., ¶ 384.)
RAKIA, Gerrard, and Del Rosso asserted that Page
located Azima’s hacked emails on the Internet, which
material Gerrard then engaged Del Rosso and Vital
Management to download.
(See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 51-53,
336-343.11; Docket Entry 4-4, ¶¶ 5-18.) In the Azima
Litigation, Del Rosso further maintained that he “did not
hack Mr Azima’s computers, cause him to be hacked or know
who hacked him” and also “did not upload his data to the
internet, cause his data to be uploaded or know who did
upload his data.” (Docket Entry 4-4, ¶ 20.) However,
subsequently discovered evidence in the Azima Litigation
indicated that Del Rosso allegedly instructed an Indian
company, CyberRoot, to hack Azima’s data beginning in
June or July of 2015.
See Azima, Docket Entry 49-1,
¶¶ 130, 132. Del Rosso responded to this evidence by
admitting “that he had engaged CyberRoot to carry out
work on RAKIA’s behalf; and had arranged the payment to
CyberRoot of the $1 million. But he said that that was
for different work which had nothing to do with Mr
Azima.” Id., Docket Entry 49-1, ¶ 133.
Like Azima, members of Al Sadeq’s Legal and Support
Team have received multiple spear-phishing and phishing
emails since disclosure of their involvement in the Al
Sadeq Litigation. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 4, ¶¶ 43-44;
Docket Entry 4-2, ¶¶ 295-300.) Around the same time,
private investigators received instructions to, inter
alia, obtain these individuals’ confidential information,
including bank account information, and track at least
some of their travel to Dubai — travel associated with
the Al Sadeq Litigation. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 4,
¶¶ 14-15, 33-38, 46.) Notably, the financial information

23 “In his trial testimony in the Azima Litigation, Del Rosso
indicated that his participation in RAK’s fraud investigation
remained ongoing.
(See Docket Entry 4-5 at 27 (‘[S]ince 2014,
August 2014, I’ve been involved somewhere in this massive
investigation.’).)” (Docket Entry 7 at 36 n.24.)
30

sought from Stokoe overlaps with its engagement in the Al
Sadeq Litigation and addresses information that Dechert
Defendants have sought in the Al Sadeq Litigation, namely
“who was funding that litigation” (id., ¶ 14). (See id.,
¶ 34.) Moreover, Grayson admitted that his inquiries to
Robinson regarding Tsiattalou’s travel to Dubai and the
funding source for the Al Sadeq Litigation originated
with Del Rosso (see Docket Entry 6-3 at 3-5), with whom
Grayson had an ongoing “general consulting arrangement
. . . to provide general business intelligence services
and advice” (id. at 5; see also Docket Entry 6-4
(nondisclosure agreement between Vital Management and
Grayson)). Page has similarly implicated Del Rosso (as
well as Dechert, Gerrard, the Ruler, and Grayson) in the
disputed conduct in the Grayson Proceeding. (See Docket
Entry 6-6 at 2-3.)
Applicants seek production of documents related to
Del Rosso’s and Vital Management’s work with CyberRoot
for the period from July 1, 2015, through September 30,
2017. (Docket Entry 3-1 at 7-8; Docket Entry 3-2 at 78.) This time frame closely correlates to the period in
which Vital Management paid CyberRoot $1 million (see,
e.g., Docket Entry 4-7 at 2-10) for either hacking
Azima’s confidential information, see Azima, Docket Entry
49-1, ¶ 132, or undertaking some other efforts on RAKIA’s
behalf, see id., Docket Entry 49-1, ¶ 133, during Del
Rosso’s
investigation
into
fraudulent
activities
allegedly involving Al Sadeq, an investigation that
continued through at least the initiation of the Al Sadeq
Litigation (see Docket Entry 4, ¶ 25; Docket Entry 4-5 at
27). Applicants further seek to depose Del Rosso and
Vital Management, focusing on their work with CyberRoot
for “the period from January 1, 2015 to the date of [the]
deposition.” (Docket Entry 3-1 at 5; Docket Entry 3-2 at
5.)
Information regarding Del Rosso’s and Vital
Management’s interactions with CyberRoot during this
period bears relevance to Applicants’ claims in the
Foreign Proceedings. For example, the timing and method
by which RAKIA obtained Azima’s confidential emails,
which allegedly implicated Al Sadeq in the asserted
fraud, appear relevant to Al Sadeq’s contention that
RAKIA’s claims stem from political motives. Moreover,
the methods employed in RAK’s “massive investigation”
(Docket Entry 4-5 at 27) into Dr. Massaad, Azima,
Mikadze, and Al Sadeq relate to both Al Sadeq’s claims in
31

the Al Sadeq Litigation and to Stokoe’s Hacking Claims,
particularly because Page (to whom Del Rosso, Gerrard,
and RAKIA attribute the discovery of Azima’s hacked
materials online) has suggested that Del Rosso, Gerrard,
and the Ruler bear responsibility for at least some of
the conduct at issue in the Grayson Proceeding. Further,
given both the direct and circumstantial evidence linking
Del Rosso and the Al Sadeq Litigation with the hacking
attempts, cyberattacks, and illicit investigations
regarding Stokoe and associated individuals, ascertaining
whether Del Rosso and Vital Management enlisted CyberRoot
to hack individuals involved in scrutinizing alleged
human rights violations by RAK and its Ruler — violations
involving both Azima’s alleged co-conspirator and, as in
the Azima Litigation, Dechert Defendants — qualifies as
relevant to both the Al Sadeq Litigation and Grayson
Proceeding. Accordingly, the Court finds that Applicants
have satisfied their burden of establishing that the
requested discovery satisfies the “for use” requirement
of Section 1782(a).
(Docket

Entry

7

at

35-40

(ellipsis

and

certain

brackets

in

original).)
C. Supplemental Record
After the Court issued the Order, the parties submitted
additional materials in connection with the Motion.

(See Docket

Entries

part,

16

to

16-2,

18

to

18-9.)

In

relevant

this

supplemental record reflects:
Dated January 29, 2021 (see Docket Entry 16-1 at 2), the
Amended Al Sadeq Claim includes additional allegations of attempts
to obtain confidential information regarding Stokoe (see, e.g.,
id., ¶ 215A).

In this regard, the Amended Al Sadeq Claim alleges:

215A. Attempts have been made by persons connected to one
or more of [Dechert] Defendants to unlawfully obtain
confidential and/or privileged information from Mr Al
Sadeq’s solicitors, [Stokoe], in connection with its

32

representation of Mr Al Sadeq in these proceedings.
particular:

In

215A.1 In June 2020, Stokoe commenced a claim with
Claim No. QB-2020-002218 against Oliver Moon, Paul
Robinson and Company Documents Ltd seeking (inter
alia) Norwich Pharmacal relief,[24] alleging that
those persons had been involved in unlawful
attempts to obtain confidential banking information
from Stokoe in connection with these proceedings.
Although [Dechert] Defendants were not party to
those proceedings, nonetheless their solicitors,
Enyo Law, attended a remote hearing on 7 July 2020
in those proceedings. It is to be inferred that
Enyo Law became aware of those proceedings (which
at that stage had not been publicised) through one
or more of [Dechert] Defendants, who in turn became
aware of them through a pre-existing connection
with one or more of the [d]efendants to those
proceedings (i.e. the persons alleged to have
sought to obtain the confidential information).
215A.2
On
16
July
2020,
Stokoe
commenced
proceedings with Claim No. QB-2020-002492 against
Mr Patrick Grayson, Grayson & Co, Stuart Page and
Page Corporate Investigations Ltd.
In those
proceedings, Stokoe alleges that the defendants,
each of whom are private investigators and the
corporate entities through which they carry out
investigative work, were involved in attempts to
obtain confidential information in connection with
Stokoe’s instruction by Mr Al Sadeq.
216. It is apparent that all of the steps taken against
Mr Al Sadeq as pleaded at paragraphs 215 and 215A were
taken in order to impede the preparation of this claim

24 “[A] Norwich Pharmacal proceeding [i]s a vehicle by which
[litigants may] . . . obtain[] an order in the English High Court
of Justice[] requiring [certain persons or entities] to disclose
documents . . . .” First Union Nat’l Bank v. Paribas, 135 F. Supp.
2d 443, 449 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d sub nom., First Union Nat’l
Bank v. ARAB African Int’l Bank, 48 F. App’x 801 (2d Cir. 2002);
see also In re Application of Braga, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1306
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (discussing “orders under the Norwich Pharmacal
doctrine applicable in British practice” and citing Norwich
Pharmacal Co. v. Customs & Excise Comm’rs, [1974] AC 133 (Eng.)).
33

against, and (it is to be inferred) with the knowledge
and / or at the request of one or more of [Dechert]
Defendants.
(Docket

Entry

16-1,

¶¶

215A-216

(track-changes

formatting

omitted).)
The Amended Al Sadeq Claim further asserts that “[t]he harm
caused to Mr Al Sadeq was the result of a single campaign of
unlawful acts in respect of which each of the [Dechert] Defendants
worked together
Accordingly,

to

bring

[Dechert]

about

and

Defendants

contribute

are

jointly

to
and

that

harm.

severally

responsible for that harm under Article 291 of the Civil Code.”
(Id., ¶ 228B (track-changes formatting omitted).)

Per the Amended

Al Sadeq Claim, Al Sadeq suffered severe physical, psychological,
moral, and financial harm, including the loss of assets valued at
more than AED 75 million, from Dechert Defendants’ actions.

(See,

e.g., id., ¶¶ 294-298.)
Dated September 9, 2021, the Amended Grayson Claim adds
Dechert and Gerrard as defendants in the Grayson Proceeding. (See,
e.g., Docket Entry 16-2 at 2; id., ¶¶ 5A-5C.)
Amended Grayson

Claim,

the

confidential

According to the

information

regarding

Stokoe that “was obtained by, through or at the instigation of
[Grayson, Grayson’s company, Page, and/or Page’s company] was
obtained at the request of and/or passed on to [Gerrard and/or
Dechert].”

(Id., ¶ 15A (track-changes formatting omitted).)

this regard, the Amended Grayson Claim alleges, inter alia:

34

In

6. From about January 2020, [Grayson] instructed Mr
Paul Robinson to investigate [Stokoe] and to obtain
information about [Stokoe] which (as explained below) was
plainly confidential to [Stokoe], for reward.
Mr
Robinson has explained this in his affidavit dated 6 July
2020. In particular:
(1) The first such instructions were given in or
about January 2020 at a meeting at the Goring Hotel
in Belgravia, London. At that meeting, [Grayson]
asked Mr Robinson whether he knew anyone who was
able to investigate [Stokoe] and obtain banking
information.
(2) [Grayson] asked Mr Robinson a number of
follow-up questions from time to time based on the
information
that
Mr
Robinson
obtained,
in
particular by encrypted text messages sent using
the Signal system which [Grayson] set to be
automatically deleted.
7. Mr Robinson in turn requested Mr John Gunning to
obtain such information about [Stokoe]. Mr Gunning and
Mr Robinson have confirmed this in affidavits dated
respectively 2 and 6 July 2020. Mr Gunning in turn made
requests of Mr Oliver Moon, as Mr Moon has confirmed in
an affidavit dated 2 July 2020. In particular:
(1) On or about 2 April 2020, Mr Robinson requested
Mr Gunning to obtain the banking co-ordinates of
[Stokoe].
(2) On or about 9 April 2020, Mr Robinson requested
Mr Gunning to access [Stokoe’s] main bank account
and to obtain transactional data for the past three
months.
(3) On or about 21 April 2020, Mr Robinson
requested Mr Gunning to obtain information as to
the “movements in and out of Dubai – for Feb 2020”
of [Tsiattalou].
(together, the “Example Requests”).
8. The subjects of each of the Example Requests coincided
with the Al Sadeq Litigation in that:

35

(1) As to the first:
Around 2 April 2020,
enquiries were being made in the course of the Al
Sadeq Litigation concerning the source of funding
in those proceedings.
(2) As to the second:
The Claim Form in the Al
Sadeq Litigation was filed on 28 January 2020.
(3) As to the third: Mr Tsiattalou is the partner
of [Stokoe] with conduct of the Al Sadeq
Litigation. He visited Dubai for the purposes of
that litigation in February 2020.
9. The link with the Al Sadeq Litigation and parties
thereto is supported by the following facts, namely that:
(1) On or about 22 April 2020, [Grayson] also
requested Mr Robinson to obtain information
relating to [Stokoe’s] client account, including
transactional information for March 2020, which
request was passed on by Mr Robinson to Mr Gunning.
According to Mr Gunning in his said affidavit, he
was told by Mr Robinson that it was likely that
transactional information of [Stokoe] would also be
sought for the period November 2019 to February
2020.
It is to be inferred that this latter
information came to Mr Robinson from [Grayson].
The period in question overlaps with the period of
[Stokoe’s] instruction by Mr Al Sadeq.
(2) [Grayson] also requested Mr Robinson to obtain
information from other persons connected to the Al
Sadeq Litigation. In particular:
(a) In or about October to December 2019,
[Grayson]
requested
the
obtaining
of
confidential
information
about
Ms
Radha
Stirling of Detained in Dubai, which is a
human rights advocacy organisation assisting
Mr Al Sadeq.
(b) In or about February and March 2020,
[Grayson] requested and obtained financial
records and monthly transactional data from a
bank account held by Maltin PR, which is a
public relations and litigation support entity
assisting
[Stokoe]
with
the
Al
Sadeq
Litigation.
36

(2A) On 12 March 2020, [Grayson] sent an email from
[e-mail] to [e-mail].
The email attached a chart which was described in
the said email as “B-A-E-D Relationship Chart” (the
“Chart”) with a large dramatis personae and alleged
links
between
the
individuals
and
entities
depicted. Those depicted include many connected to
the Al Sadeq Litigation. It is to be inferred that
[Grayson’s] investigation of [Stokoe] was part of a
wider campaign, linked in part to the Al Sadeq
Litigation.
(3) In or about April 2020, [Grayson] requested the
obtaining of three months of corporate banking
transactions of Hogan Lovells, an international
firm of solicitors. Hogan Lovells have no role in
the Al Sadeq Litigation.
However, Hogan Lovells
act on behalf of Eurasian Natural Resources
Corporation (“ENRC”) in court proceedings commenced
by ENRC against Dechert and Mr Gerrard. Dechert
and Mr Gerrard are defendants in the Al Sadeq
Litigation.
9A. The Chart states that Maltin PR “paid RS for raising
profile of KAS”. That information was confidential and
could only have been added by someone party to a breach
of confidence. The Chart’s metadata suggest that it was
created on 24 February 2020 and modified on 11 March
2020.
It is to be inferred that [Grayson] and/or an
associate modified the Chart following receipt of Maltin
PR’s confidential information as a result of [Grayson’s]
requests to Mr Robinson to investigate Maltin PR.
10. The information which was the subject of the Example
Requests was plainly confidential in that:
(1)
A
solicitors’
firm’s
bank
details
and
transactional data are not generally available. A
solicitors’ firm would not wish such information to
be generally available.
(2) The movements of a solicitor while acting for a
client engaged in litigation are not generally in
the public domain. A solicitor would not wish such
information
to
be
generally
available,
in
particular
because
it
is
likely
to
reveal
privileged information.

37

(3) Those considerations would have been obvious to
the reasonable recipient. They were emphasised by
the surreptitious way in which the information was
gathered and conveyed.
11. [Stokoe] cannot be sure if the Example Requests are
the only instances on which its confidential information
was requested and/or obtained, and reserves its right to
supplement the[ Amended Grayson] Claim to the extent that
further instances are discovered.
11A. In particular, in a period between about March 2020
and September 2020, [Stokoe] and others working on the Al
Sadeq Litigation received a heightened number of spearphishing emails. [Stokoe] does not presently know if any
of these were successful and reserves the right to
supplement the[ Amended Grayson] Claim to the extent that
further information is uncovered.
Confidential information
Grayson’s company]

obtained

by

[Grayson

and

12. Mr Robinson provided the confidential information,
including that obtained from the Example Requests, to
[Grayson]. In particular:
(1) In or about April 2020, Mr Robinson met
[Grayson] in Sloane Square, London.
Mr Robinson
provided him with a hard copy print out of the
information, and a USB stick containing the same
information electronically.
(2) On other occasions, Mr Robinson sent the
information using a Proton Mail encrypted email
account to the address [e-mail].
13. [Stokoe] believes that, in requesting and/or
receiving the information, [Grayson] was acting through
[Grayson’s company] (being the company through which he
appears to provide investigation services).
Confidential information obtained by [Page and Page’s
company]
14. [Stokoe] believes and avers that [Page and/or his
company] have accessed some or all of, and have misused,
its confidential information, including that obtained

38

from the Example Requests. [Stokoe] relies in particular
on the following facts and matters:
(1) [Page] is an investigation agent who has
admitted being instructed by the Ruler of the
Emirate in which [Stokoe’s] client Mr Al Sadeq is
detained, meeting the Ruler regularly (sometimes
monthly) and alone. [Page] made such admission in
the course of giving evidence on behalf of [RAKIA]
in High Court proceedings between RAKIA and Mr
Farhad Azima (the “Azima [Litigation]”) tried in
January-February 2020 before Mr Andrew Lenon QC
(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court).
(2) In his judgment in the Azima [Litigation] – Ras
Al Khaimah Investment Authority v. Azima [2020]
EWHC 1327 (Ch) (the “Azima Judgment”) – at
paragraph 369 the Judge held that “Mr Page operates
in a world of covert surveillance in which agents
acquire confidential information unlawfully and
that Mr Page has dealings with such agents.” He
further found that “it would be a reasonable
inference . . . that Mr Page has access to agents
with the capacity to hack emails.”
(3) In the Azima Judgment, it was found that [Page]
was instructed by the Ruler to arrange covert
surveillance
monitoring
and
investigation
of
persons whom the Ruler viewed as adverse to him
and/or RAK and/or RAKIA, and towards whom the Ruler
felt hostile, including Mr Azima (see in particular
paragraph 377 of the Azima Judgment).
[Page]
briefed the Ruler on such projects by way of
“Project Updates”, which briefings were also
provided to Mr Neil Gerrard of the law firm Dechert
(see in particular paragraphs 32, 266 and 273 of
the Azima Judgment).
Mr Gerrard and Dechert are
both defendants in the Al Sadeq Litigation, having
carried out work in relation to Mr Al Sadeq on
behalf of the Ruler and/or RAK and/or RAKIA in
respect of which Mr Al Sadeq claims redress.
(4) [Stokoe] believes that the unlawful accessing
of its confidential information has been caused or
procured by those interested in and/or associated
with the defence of the Al Sadeq Litigation. The
Azima Judgment shows the way in which [Page] has
provided his investigation and monitoring services
39

for or on behalf of persons whom [Stokoe] avers
have an interest in defeating the Al Sadeq claims
or those acting for and/or associated with them.
(5) A public Internet Protocol address used to
access [Stokoe’s] confidential information has been
geolocated to an address in the vicinity of the
premises at 5-8 Sanctuary, London SW1P 3JS which
were at material times the address of both [Page
and his company].
(6) [Page’s company] is a company providing
investigation services of which [Page] is a
director.
(7) [Stokoe’s] lawyers saw [Page] at close quarters
at their hotel in Dubai when they were working on
the Al Sadeq Litigation. They believe that [Page]
and/or his associates were at the time surveilling
them.
(8) According to information provided by [Page]
through solicitors instructed by him (Stephenson
Harwood) in a letter to [Stokoe] dated 28 July
2020, Mr Robinson has worked with [Page] on a
number of investigations and they have allegedly
discussed merging their businesses. It is thereby
to be inferred that Mr Page knows of and approves
of Mr Robinson’s business and methods, and vice
versa.
Mr Robinson’s said business and methods
include the wrongful accessing of [Stokoe’s]
confidential information, to which Mr Robinson has
admitted in his affidavit, as set out above.
(9) Mr Robinson contacted [Page] when Mr Robinson
was served with an application for Norwich
Pharmacal relief and an injunction arising out of
the Example Requests (claim number QB-2020-002218).
(10) [Page] offered to assist Mr Robinson with
funding a lawyer in connection with defending such
claim.
(11) Although, in
on 27 July 2020,
deny
obtaining
[Stokoe], [Page]
true account of

a short affidavit sworn by [Page]
[Page and his company] appear to
confidential
information
from
has previously failed to give a
his discovery of information in
40

High Court litigation, this being the finding in
the Azima Judgment at paragraphs 355 to 356.
******
(13) It is to be inferred that Mr Robinson
contacted [Page] as alleged above because they had
a mutual interest in the proceedings concerning the
Example Requests since [Page] (and through him,
[Page’s company]) was/were involved with, party to
or otherwise complicit in the wrongdoing comprised
within the Example Requests.
15. As providers of investigation services, it is to be
assumed that each of [Grayson, Page, and their companies]
typically obtain information on the instructions of
others, to whom they pass it on, rather than for their
own use.
(Docket Entry 16-2, ¶¶ 6-15 (hyperlinks, track-changes formatting,
and deletions omitted) (emphasis, italicization, and first ellipsis
in original).)

Per the Amended Grayson Claim, “[i]t is to be

inferred from the facts and matters set out in paragraphs 19B and
19C below that such confidential information of [Stokoe] as was
obtained by, through or at the instigation of [Grayson, Page,
and/or their companies] was obtained at the request of and/or
passed on to [Gerrard and/or Dechert].” (Id., ¶ 15A (track-changes
formatting omitted).)
The Amended Grayson Claim further alleges:
[Page and Page’s company]
19A. It is to be inferred that [Page and/or his company]
were party to the underlying conspiracy. This is to be
inferred from:
(1) The matters alleged in paragraph 14 above.

41

(2) On 16 September 2020, Allen & Overy LLP sent a
letter by email to Stephenson Harwood LLP (the
“Allen & Overy Letter”). Allen & Overy LLP state:
“We understand from Mr Jamie Buchanan that your
client, Mr Stuart Page [the Third Defendant], has
made a number of statements in communications that
he had with Mr Buchanan in August and September
2020 that appear to refer to our clients, the Ruler
and the Government of [RAK]”. Mr Jamie Buchanan,
to whom [Page] is said to have conveyed this
message, is the former Chief Executive Officer of
Ras Al Khaimah Development LLC, which holds and
manages assets and liabilities previously owned by
[RAKIA] (an investment entity of RAK). The Allen &
Overy Letter states:
“your client [sc. Mr Stuart Page, the Third
Defendant]
referred
to
English
High
Court
proceedings that have been commenced against him by
Stokoe Partnership Solicitors and said: “if I have
to implicate Nick / Patrick, Decherts, Neil and the
boss to get me out of this I will.” We understand
that your client’s reference to “the boss” is
intended to be a reference to the Ruler.”
(3) It is to be inferred that:
(a) “Nick” is Mr Del Rosso;
(b) “Patrick” is the First Defendant;
(c) “Decherts” is the Fifth Defendant;
(d) “Neil” is the Sixth Defendant;
(e) The Ruler of RAK is (as Allen & Overy LLP
surmise) “the boss”. Mr Al Sadeq alleges in
the Al Sadeq Litigation that charges brought
against him were politically motivated on the
part of the Ruler.
(4) The Allen & Overy Letter demonstrates that
[Page] has knowledge of the underlying wrongdoing
against [Stokoe], sufficient to enable him to
implicate various individuals as wrongdoers. It is
to
be
inferred
that
[Page]
obtained
this
information through his (and/or [his company’s])
42

participation in the underlying
injure [Stokoe] by unlawful means.

conspiracy

to

(5) By a WhatsApp message sent on 29 July 2020 at
1.50pm, [Page] wrote to his colleague Caroline
Timberlake: “Grayson is protecting NDR”. [Page]
thereby
demonstrated
his
knowledge
of
the
background facts and in particular that [Grayson’s]
activities in this matter were connected with
Nicholas Del Rosso. [Grayson] did not refer to Mr
Del Rosso in these proceedings until his Part 18
response dated 19 March 2021. [Page and therefore
his company] were thus privy to the covert
wrongdoing of [Grayson and/or Grayson’s company]
and/or Mr Del Rosso.
[Dechert and Gerrard]
19B. [Grayson] made the Example Requests, and the wider
enquires pleaded at paragraph 9, as part of his work for
Mr Nicholas Del Rosso of [Vital Management]. This is
apparent from the following facts:
(1) [Grayson] was retained by Vital [Management]
from about 2018.
Pursuant to that retainer, he
signed a non-disclosure agreement made on and
effective 30 August 2018 (the “NDA”) for a term of
36 months. The term spans the matters in question
in these proceedings.
(2) [Grayson] has stated in response to a Part 18
Request (and confirmed in his witness statement
dated 14 May 2021) that he was interested in
[Stokoe’s] affairs due to an enquiry from Mr Del
Rosso.
19C. Mr Del Rosso’s instruction of [Grayson] was made
pursuant to an instruction from Dechert and/or Mr
Gerrard.
This is to be inferred from the following
facts:
(1) Mr Del Rosso provides consulting services
through Vital[ Management].
His enquiry is, for
that reason, likely to have been on behalf of a
client.
(2) Vital [Management] was retained by Dechert and
instructed by Mr Gerrard from at least 2014. Mr
43

Del Rosso admits to having paid $1 million to an
Indian company, CyberRoot.
An employee of
CyberRoot admits to having hacked Mr Farhad Azima
to obtain evidence for a civil claim which
Dechert’s client, RAKIA, subsequently brought
against Mr Azima (the Azima [Litigation]). Dechert
and Mr Gerrard therefore have the means and
propensity to order such wrongdoing and rely upon
Mr Del Rosso to carry it out.
(3) Mr Gerrard and Dechert are defendants to the Al
Sadeq
Litigation.
Information
sought
was
associated with and/or relevant to the Al Sadeq
Litigation.
(4) Mr Gerrard gave false evidence in the Azima
[Litigation] about his involvement with Mr Al
Sadeq,
suggesting
that
he
was
involved
in
clandestine and improper activity regarding Mr Al
Sadeq.
(5) Dechert and Mr Gerrard were, at the time
[Grayson] was actively seeking the information,
interested in the funding of the Al Sadeq
Litigation. Solicitors acting for Mr Gerrard and
Dechert wrote to [Stokoe] asking a series of
questions about the same on 16 April 2020.
(6) Parallel attempts were made to access the
private affairs of Radha Stirling, Maltin PR and
Hogan Lovells. Dechert and Mr Gerrard have direct
interest in and links to the group targeted and the
wider group in the Chart. Dechert and Mr Gerrard
also have motive and means to investigate that
group’s private affairs. Paragraphs 9(2A) and 9A
above are repeated.
(7) Matthew Banham is and was at all material times
a Partner at Dechert.
Mr Banham’s areas of
practice overlapped with Mr Gerrard’s. Mr Banham
was personally involved in investigating Radha
Stirling. Mr Banham made his investigations via Ms
Stirling’s former colleague David Haigh up to at
least early 2020.
Ms Stirling is and was an
advocate of the plight of Mr Al Sadeq.
(8) Stuart Leach is a public relations adviser who
worked at material times with Dechert. He was also
44

involved in the process
Stirling via Mr Haigh.

of

investigating

Ms

(9) Mr Page claims to hold information which would
incriminate [Grayson, Dechert, and Gerrard] in
[Stokoe’s] case.
(10) In their response dated 25 May 2021 to letters
before claim dated 10 May 2021, the solicitors to
[Dechert and Gerrard] (Enyo Law) declined to admit
or deny the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (2)
and (5) above, alleging instead that “they appear
to be makeweight points which take matters no
further forwards.”
19D. It is further to be inferred that [Grayson and his
company] took the actions detailed above pursuant to an
agreement with Mr Del Rosso, [Dechert, and/or Gerrard].
In the premises, [Dechert and Gerrard] have committed the
tort of conspiracy.
(Docket Entry 16-2, ¶¶ 19A-19D (track-changes formatting omitted)
(emphasis,

italicization,

and

certain

sets

of

brackets

in

original).)
Finally, Robinson provided an affidavit (Docket Entry 18) (the
“Robinson Declaration”), the purpose of which “is to provide
further details of [Robinson’s] dealings with Mr Grayson and
details of [his] dealings with Mr Nicholas Del Rosso and in
particular the involvement of Mr Del Rosso in the enquiries that Mr
Grayson instructed [Robinson] to carry out.”

(Id., ¶ 5.)

relevant to the Motion, Robinson avers:
[Robinson is] a director of a corporate research and
investigation firm, Company Documents Ltd, which
undertakes standard corporate research and worldwide
document retrieval.
Company Diligence (to which
[Robinson] refer[s] below) is a trading name of Company
Documents Ltd and undertakes more in-depth investigative

45

As

research and due diligence enquiries with a separate
US-facing website.
******
Mr Del Rosso is a private investigator and managing
director of [Vital Management], based in North Carolina,
USA.
[Robinson] was first introduced to [Del Rosso]
through another private investigator in around 2016.
Over the following years Mr Del Rosso instructed
[Robinson] to carry out a number of different open source
intelligence enquiries for which [Robinson] received
payment. Prior to the instructions [Robinson] received
from Mr Grayson between early 2019 and June 2020 (“the
Grayson enquiries”), which [Robinson] detail[s] in [his]
first witness statement, all instructions [Robinson]
received from Mr Del Rosso came directly from Mr Del
Rosso and not through Mr Grayson.
The way in which Mr Del Rosso instructed [Robinson]
changed in respect of the Grayson enquiries. Whereas
prior to Mr Grayson’s involvement, Mr Del Rosso had
instructed [Robinson] directly, when Mr Grayson became
involved, beginning in early 2019, he was the one who
instructed [Robinson] on the Grayson enquiries, which
[Robinson] believe[s] were made on behalf of Mr Del Rosso
as he was paying for them. [Robinson] do[es]n’t know why
these instructions came through Mr Grayson and can only
surmise that it was due to their confidential nature.
Whilst Mr Grayson provided the instructions in respect of
the Grayson enquiries, with the exception of the £5,000
in cash paid to [Robinson] by [Grayson] and the payment
for Project Maxwell (which [Robinson] give[s] further
details of below), Mr Del Rosso / [Vital Management] paid
[Robinson] for all of the Grayson enquiries.
Whilst the Grayson enquiries centred upon what
[Robinson] characterise[s] as “UAE related matters” some
of the prior open source research investigations upon
which [Robinson] was directly instructed by Mr Del Rosso
also concerned UAE matters. An example of this concerns
Mr Farhad Azima, who [Robinson is] aware was involved in
litigation with [RAK].
Mr Del Rosso instructed
[Robinson]
to
carry
out
open
source
research
investigations concerning Mr Azima.
On 28 January 2018, Company Diligence, entered into
a consultancy agreement with [Vital Management] for which
46

[Vital Management] initially made a payment of £500 per
month.
These monthly payments commenced in 2018 and
ended in June 2020. A copy of that consultancy agreement
is annexed hereto and labelled as Exhibit C.
When [Robinson] spoke to Mr Grayson in connection
with the Grayson enquiries, [Grayson] informed [Robinson]
that [Grayson] had only recently returned from visiting
Mr Del Rosso in North Carolina. Mr Grayson also informed
[Robinson] that Mr Del Rosso would be responsible for
paying [Robinson] for the Grayson enquiries. Whilst Mr
Grayson paid [Robinson] £5,000 (half of the sum agreed)
for obtaining certain confidential information in respect
of the Stokoe Partnership (as explained in [Robinson’s]
first witness statement), [Vital Management] made the
remaining payments to cover the cost of the Grayson
enquiries.
[Robinson] also recall[s] one occasion when Mr Del
Rosso contacted [Robinson] by secure message after
[Robinson] had sent him an invoice in relation to the
Grayson enquiries. [Del Rosso] queried what the amount
was for, saying that it was not related to him and
[Robinson] should speak to Mr Grayson regarding this.
[Robinson] believe[s that Robinson] must have spoken to
Mr Grayson at the time to try and resolve the matter and
assume that [Grayson] would have spoken to Mr Del Rosso
to explain any issue, as the invoice was subsequently
settled in full by Mr Del Rosso. [Robinson] can’t recall
exactly which invoice this query was relating to, but
[Robinson] think[s] it was in early 2020.
[Robinson] ha[s] collated a number of invoices which
were issued by both Company Diligence and Company
Documents Ltd to both Mr Del Rosso and [Vital Management]
for work which [Robinson] carried out from January 2016
- April 2020. These documents include invoices for the
work that was carried out as part of the Grayson
enquiries. Copies of these invoices are annexed hereto
and labelled as Exhibit D.[25]

25
The exhibit contains thirty invoices, dated between
January 2016 and June 2020, addressed to “Nick Del Rosso” and/or
“Vital Management Services Inc.,” totaling approximately £170,000.
(Docket Entry 18-5 at 2-31.)
47

Six
invoices
(dated
1/11/2019,
26/02/2020,
16/03/2020, 2/04/2020, 9/04/2020 and 7/06/2020) are not
the original invoices which [Robinson] sent to Mr Del
Rosso. When these invoices were first issued, [Robinson]
sent
them
by
email
to
Mr
Del
Rosso
at
[e-mail] and they were subsequently
paid. Following service of the Claim QB-2020-002218 upon
[Robinson] on 1 July 2020, [Robinson] spoke to Mr Del
Rosso who told [Robinson] not to mention [Del Rosso’s]
name in relation to this work and to keep [Del Rosso’s]
name out of the entire matter. In an effort to distance
[Robinson] from Mr Del Rosso, [Robinson] deleted the six
invoices.
Before [Robinson] deleted the invoices,
[Robinson] made a note of the detail set out therein.
[Robinson] subsequently used this detail to recreate the
six invoices that [he] now exhibit[s].
Whilst the
handwritten note is no longer available, [Robinson] ha[s]
checked [his] bank statements, and confirm[s] that
payment for these invoices entered [his] bank account
within days of the invoice date.
Two further
invoices:

points

of

detail

concerning

the

The narrative on the spreadsheet for the invoice
dated 16 March 2020 refers to “RS” (Radha Stirling) and
to “P” (Patrick Grayson). Ex. D.
The 10 July 2019 invoice contains the following
narrative:
“OP Dotty - Adress (sic) Trace - as
instructed by PG £250”.
The PG referred to is Mr
Grayson. Ex. D.
[Robinson] ha[s] collated a number of relevant
Company Diligence bank statements for the period November
2018 - June 2020. Copies of these statements are annexed
hereto and labelled as Exhibit E.
[Robinson] ha[s]
redacted a number of entries as they are not relevant to
the present matter.
The ones that have been left
unredacted show that payments were received from [Vital
Management]. A proportion of these sums were then paid
to John Gunning (whom [Robinson] had instructed to
undertake the Grayson enquiries) by [Robinson]/Company
Diligence. All of these payments to John Gunning were
for work carried out in relation to the Grayson
enquiries. The one exception is the £750 payment from Mr
Grayson on 23 January 2020. Ex. E. This payment was for
an enquiry Mr Grayson instructed [Robinson] to carry out,
48

which was unconnected to these proceedings.
The
reference on the bank statement is “Project Maxwell”,
this was the name attributed to this particular enquiry.
On 1 July 2020 [Robinson] was served with a letter
from [Stokoe], enclosing among other matters, the claim
form and an application notice seeking Norwich Pharmacal
relief against [Robinson].
On the same date [Robinson] called Mr Del Rosso and
explained what had happened. The conversation was brief
and [Del Rosso] told [Robinson] that his American lawyer
would contact [Robinson] and that if [Robinson] did not
mention [Del Rosso’s] name [Del Rosso] would pay any
legal fees [Robinson] incurred in relation to the
proceedings. A short time later Brandon Neuman, Mr Del
Rosso’s American lawyer, called [Robinson].[26] A number
of emails were exchanged between [Neuman] and [Robinson]
in connection with the matter. This email correspondence
is annexed hereto and labelled as Exhibit F.
In a conversation over Signal, Mr Neuman informed
[Robinson] that as he was based in the USA, he could not
assist [Robinson,] and he advised [Robinson] to contact
a lawyer based in the United Kingdom, which [Robinson]
did.
Mr Del Rosso informed [Robinson] that he would
assist with [Robinson’s] legal fees and he would set up
a loan agreement, which is what happened. On 2 July 2020
Company Documents Ltd entered into a loan agreement with
[Vital Management] for the sum of $25,000. The money was
due to be repaid on 1 July 2021 and the rate of interest
was 8% per annum.
A copy of that loan agreement is
annexed hereto and labelled as Exhibit G.
The loan has not yet been repaid, and [Robinson]
ha[s] not yet been asked to repay it.
However, the
proceedings against [Robinson] were settled shortly after
[Robinson] swore the affidavit.
that

Shortly after 1 July 2020 [Robinson] became aware
[he] was under 24 hour overt and covert

26
Neuman serves as Movants’ lawyer in this matter (see,
e.g., Docket Entry 8 at 1), signing and filing the Motion and
supporting materials on Movants’ behalf (see, e.g., Docket Entry 14
at 3-4; Docket Entry 15 at 30-32; Docket Entry 16 at 1, 3-4; Docket
Entry 19 at 16-18).
49

surveillance.
As [Robinson] felt threatened by the
individuals carrying out the surveillance, [Robinson]
spoke to another private investigator, Gary Lowe (with
whom [Robinson] had a long-standing relationship), as
[Robinson] knew [Lowe] offered personal security
services. [Robinson] knew that Mr Lowe had previously
worked with Mr Del Rosso and [Lowe] told [Robinson] that
[Lowe] would speak to Mr Del Rosso about what [Robinson]
had told [Lowe].
A short time after this, Mr Lowe
reported back to [Robinson] that [Lowe] would offer
[Robinson]
some
security
and
carry
out
counter-surveillance on [Robinson’s] behalf and that
[Robinson] would not have to pay [Lowe] for this. Over
the next three weeks or so, under Mr Lowe’s directions,
a
number
of
individuals
carried
out
24/7
counter-surveillance upon the people watching [Robinson]
and offered security for [Robinson] and [his] family.
Although Mr Lowe never told [Robinson] directly,
[Robinson] assumed that Mr Del Rosso was paying Mr Lowe
for the counter-surveillance, given the circumstances and
the fact of Mr Lowe’s existing relationship with Mr Del
Rosso.
In [Robinson’s] first witness statement [he]
exhibited a number of Signal messages between Mr Grayson
and [Robinson]. These messages mostly covered the period
from January 2020 - June 2020. [Robinson] now exhibit[s]
a number of additional Signal messages between [Robinson]
and Mr Grayson spanning the period June 2019 - January
2020.
These Signal messages are annexed hereto and
labelled as Exhibit H.
With the exception of a number of messages on 9
October 2019 concerning Project Maxwell, all messages
contained in Exhibit H are connected to the Grayson
enquiries. So far as [Robinson] was concerned all the
relevant enquires referred to within those messages were,
in one way or another, connected to investigations in the
UAE.
(Id., ¶¶ 1, 7-23 (emphasis, headings, and internal paragraph
numbering omitted).)
Exhibit F to Robinson’s Declaration contains two email chains,
entitled “Re: invoice” and “RE: Details of claim part 1,” between

50

Robinson and Neuman dated between July 1, 2020, and July 3, 2020.
(See Docket Entry 18-7 at 2-5.)27

The “Re: Details of claim part

1” emails all bear the date of July 1, 2020.

(See id. at 3-4.)

In

the first email exchange between Robinson and Neuman in this chain,
Robinson states, “Dear Brandon, Please see attached the claim.
Regards, Paul” (id. at 4), and Neuman responds, “Dear Paul:
you very much, pleasure to meet you.”
“Dear Brandon, Pleasure to meet you too!

(Id.)

Thank

Robinson replies,

Thank you in advance for

your assistance in this unfortunate matter. I will send details to
you.

All the best, Paul” (id. at 3), and Neuman responds, “Paul:

Thanks again.

Brandon” (id.).

In the “Re: invoice” emails,

Robinson sends a message on July 2, 2020, stating, “Dear Brandon,
I’ve been asked to send an invoice to you to cover this matter and
you will make a payment today.
should be addressed?

Please can you advise to whom it

Thank you Paul” (id. at 2).28

On July 3,

2020, Neuman responds to that email with a message stating, “Paul:
Can you please give me a call?

1-919-749-4444.”

does not contain any of the email attachments.

(Id.)

Exhibit F

(See id. at 1-5.)29

27
Jeff Kelly, another of Movants’ attorneys (see, e.g.,
Docket Entry 11 at 1), appears in the “CC” line of two of these
emails. (See Docket Entry 18-7 at 3.)
28
Also dated July 2, 2020, the Promissory Note for the
$25,000 identifies the borrower as Company Documents Ltd, at a UK
address, and the lender as “Vital Management Services, Inc. c/o
[Movants’ counsel’s then-current firm.]” (Docket Entry 18-8 at 2.)
29

Movants do not address Robinson’s assertions and evidence
(continued...)
51

DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Standards
A. Motion to Quash
Movants filed the Motion pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (at times, the “Rules”).
Docket Entry 14 at 1.)

(See

The scope of discovery under Rule 45

mirrors Rule 26, see Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. ConvaTec Inc., 268
F.R.D. 226, 240 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 Advisory
Committee’s

Note,

1991

Amend.,

Subdiv.

(a)),

which

permits

discovery of
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Under Rule 45, those “responsible for issuing and serving a
subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden
or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.”
45(d)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Further, Rule 45(d)(3) requires the Court to modify or

quash a subpoena that “subjects a person to undue burden.”

Fed. R.

29(...continued)
regarding their attorneys’ involvement in this matter. (See Docket
Entry 19 at 1-18.)
52

Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).30
simply

by

making

proportional.”
Amend.
claiming

This
undue

a

However, one cannot “refuse discovery

boilerplate

objection

that

it

is

not

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Notes, 2015
principle
burden

reflects
or

the

expense

reality

that

ordinarily

has

“[a]
far

party
better

information — perhaps the only information — with respect to that
part of the [proportionality] determination.”

Id.

B. Section 1782
“Section 1782(a) provides that a federal district court ‘may
order’ a person ‘resid[ing]’ or ‘found’ in the district to give
testimony or produce documents ‘for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal . . . upon the application of any
interested person.’”

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,

542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004) (brackets and ellipsis in original); see
also

In

re

Naranjo,

768

F.3d

332,

338

n.4

(4th

Cir.

2014)

(observing that, under Section 1782, “[a]ny ‘interested person’ may
apply to a district court to obtain documents or testimony from
another

person

‘for

use

international tribunal’”).

in

a

proceeding

in

a

foreign

or

“[Section 1782] reflects a long-term —

over 150-year — policy of Congress to facilitate cooperation with
foreign countries

by

‘provid[ing]

federal-court

gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals.’”

assistance

in

Servotronics,

30 Movants raise no arguments regarding the other grounds for
modifying or quashing a subpoena under Rule 45(d)(3). (See Docket
Entry 14 at 1-2.)
53

Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 212–13 (4th Cir. 2020) (brackets
in original) (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 247).
As such, “Section 1782 affords the district courts ‘wide
discretion’ in responding to requests for assistance in proceedings
before foreign tribunals.”

Al Fayed v. United States, 210 F.3d

421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000).

“In exercising its discretion under

§ 1782, the district court should be guided by the statute’s twin
aims of providing efficient means of assistance to participants in
international litigation in our federal courts and encouraging
foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance
to our courts.”
United

States

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Fourth

As the

Circuit

has

explained:
In deciding whether to grant the application and allow a
subpoena to issue under the statute, the district court
considers several factors identified in Intel[,] 542 U.S.
[at] 246 . . . . This initial application process often
occurs ex parte . . . . See, e.g., In re Republic of
Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), 2010 WL 3702427,
at *2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 15, 2010) (listing cases). Once
the application is granted and the subpoena is issued,
the subpoena target can move to quash it. Id.
In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d at 338 n.4.
In the referenced decision, the United States Supreme Court
identified certain “factors that bear consideration in ruling on a
§ 1782(a) request.”
applicant

satisfies

Intel, 542 U.S. at 264.
the

statutory

considers:

54

Accordingly, once an

requirements,

the

Court

(1) whether the person from whom discovery is sought is
a participant in the foreign proceedings, or instead, is
a nonparty outside the foreign tribunal’s jurisdiction
whose evidence is presumably more dependent on the
[C]ourt’s assistance; (2) the nature and character of the
foreign proceedings, and the receptivity of the foreign
body involved to United States judicial assistance;
(3) whether the application attempts to circumvent
foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of
a foreign country or the United States; and (4) whether
the requests are unduly intrusive or burdensome [and thus
should be “trimmed” or rejected outright, id. at 265].
In re Peruvian Sporting Goods S.A.C., No. 18-mc-91220, 2018 WL
7047645, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2018) (citing Intel, 542 U.S. at
264-65).
in

the

“Generally speaking, the standards for discovery set out
[Rules]

§ 1782(a).”

also

apply

when

discovery

is

sought

under

In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 19.

II. Analysis
A. Authority Challenge
As an initial matter, Movants seek to quash the subpoenas on
the grounds that the undersigned Magistrate Judge lacked authority
to grant the Application.
Entry 19 at 10-12.)

(See Docket Entry 15 at 26-28; Docket

In this regard, Movants first assert that “28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) authorizes magistrate judges to decide only
‘pretrial matters,’ and Rule 72(a) similarly provides that a
magistrate judge may decide only ‘a pretrial matter not dispositive
of a party’s claim or defense.’”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)).)31

31

(Docket Entry 15 at 27 (quoting

In Movants’ view, “[a] Section 1782

Contrary to Movants’ contentions, Rule 72(a) does not
(continued...)
55

application is a standalone proceeding that results in an order
granting or denying ultimate relief, so a decision on whether to
grant or deny a Section 1782 application is ‘dispositive’ within
the meaning of Rule 72.”

(Id.)

Movants further contend that,

based on the “analogous context of an enforcement proceeding for an
administrative search warrant,” Section 1782 applications qualify
as “‘dispositive.’”

(Id. (citing “Aluminum Co. of Am., Badin

Works, Badin, N.C. v. EPA, 663 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir. 1981)
(‘ALCOA’)”).)
judge

“plainly

Applicants respond that the undersigned magistrate
had

the

authority

to

issue

the

Order

under

applicable statutory law, the Federal Rules, and Fourth Circuit
precedent.” (Docket Entry 17 at 27.) Applicants’ positions should
prevail.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, a magistrate judge may “hear and
determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except [for

31(...continued)
specify that a magistrate judge can only decide nondispositive
pretrial matters.
Rather, Rule 72(a) states that “[w]hen a
pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense is
referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate
judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when
appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a) (emphasis added). As the Advisory Committee Notes
indicate, Rule 72(a) “addresses court-ordered referrals of
nondispositive matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),” but “does
not restrict experimentation by the district courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(3) involving references of matters other than pretrial
matters.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, Advisory Committee Notes, 1983
Addition, Subdiv. (a).
56

eight specified motions],”32 with any such order subject to review
under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard.

28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Section 636 further authorizes a magistrate
judge to issue “proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
the disposition, by a [district judge], of any [motion specified in
Section 636(b)(1)(A)], of applications for posttrial relief made by
individuals convicted of criminal offenses[,] and of prisoner
petitions

challenging

conditions

of

§ 636(b)(1)(B) (footnote omitted).

confinement.”

28

U.S.C.

“[S]uch proposed findings and

recommendations” remain subject to de novo review.

28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).
As the Order noted, “‘[c]ourts disagree over whether a Section
1782 proceeding, or a motion thereunder, is a dispositive motion
requiring

the

magistrate

judge

to

issue

a

report

and

recommendation.’” (Docket Entry 7 at 1 n.2 (quoting In re Peruvian
Sporting Goods, 2018 WL 7047645, at *3).)
majority

of

courts

to

address

the

However, “[t]he great

issue

have

found

that

a

magistrate judge has jurisdiction to issue an order on . . .
Section 1782 discovery motions.”

In re: Pons, No. 19-23236-MC,

2020 WL 1860908, at *3, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13,

32 Section 636(b)(1) identifies the exempted motions as “a
motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information
made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to
involuntarily dismiss an action.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
57

2020) (collecting cases), aff’d sub nom. Pons v. AMKE Registered
Agents, LLC, 835 F. App’x 465 (11th Cir. 2020); see also, e.g., In
re Hulley Enters. Ltd., 400 F. Supp. 3d 62, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(“Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court appears to have
squarely addressed this issue.

Most lower courts, however, have

found that such rulings are not dispositive and are therefore
subject to review only for clear error.”) (collecting cases).
“The Court sees no reason to deviate from this majority view
or to treat this matter differently from other discovery disputes.”
Luxshare, LTD. v. ZF Auto. US, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 3d 682, 687 (E.D.
Mich. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-2736 (6th Cir. July 21, 2021).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
explained:
[I]n a § 1782 proceeding, there is nothing to be done “on
the merits.” Section 1782 empowers a district court to
order a person residing within its district to “give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The only
issue before the district court is discovery; the
underlying litigation rests before a foreign tribunal.
Republic of Ecuador v. For Issuance of a Subpoena Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a), 735 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2013).
Thus, “Section 1782 petitions are a special creature in the
law, because they necessarily contemplate that there is or may be
some other proceeding outside the control of the court addressing
the application.”

In re Plowiecki, No. CV 21-23, 2021 WL 4973762,

at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2021).

“While ruling on a § 1782 subpoena
58

may resolve the entire action before the court to which the
application is addressed, the court’s ruling will not resolve the
entire litigation because a related civil action is pending or in
reasonable contemplation in another country.

This renders an

administrative subpoena duces tecum,” id., as well as an ex parte
administrative search warrant such as in ALCOA, see ALCOA, 663 F.2d
at 500 & n.1, “distinguishable from a § 1782 subpoena because in
the former there is not necessarily a ‘related civil action,’ while
a § 1782 subpoena requires a related proceeding at least ‘in
reasonable contemplation,’” In re Plowiecki, 2021 WL 4973762, at *5
(citation

omitted).

As

such,

“[j]ust

like

rulings

on

most

discovery matters, a § 1782 subpoena is not dispositive on the
claims or defenses of a party.

Because a magistrate judge’s order

on a § 1782 subpoena is nondispositive, it warrants only clear
error review like most other nondispositive orders.”

Id.

Notably, the majority view aligns with the Fourth Circuit’s
treatment of decisions by magistrate judges authorizing discovery
in aid of foreign proceedings.

See In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332; In

re Letter of Request from Amtsgericht Ingolstadt, Fed. Republic of
Ger., 82 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1996).

As the Order explained:

[In the former decision, the Fourth Circuit] affirmed,
under an abuse of discretion standard, a district court
judge’s affirmation, under the clearly erroneous or
contrary to law standard, of a magistrate judge’s grant
of a Section 1782 application.
See generally In re
Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332 . . . (explaining that, in ruling
on Section 1782 application, “the magistrate judge
ordered [certain individuals] to turn over the documents
59

that they possessed” and, “[o]ver objection, the district
court affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision in a July
16, 2013 order,” id. at 341-42; analyzing substantive
challenges to magistrate judge’s rulings, see id. at 34751; and “affirm[ing] the district court’s order in the
§ 1782 proceeding,” id. at 351, under “the familiar
abuse-of-discretion standard,” id. at 347); see also
Chevron Corp. v. Page, No. 8:11cv395, Docket Entry 74 at
1 (D. Md. July 16, 2013) (overruling objections to
magistrate judge’s Section 1782 order, “the [c]ourt
concluding that the challenged [o]rder was neither
clearly erroneous nor contrary to law”), affirmed In re
Naranjo, 768 F.3d at 351; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (applying
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard to
magistrate judge orders on “any pretrial matter” not
specifically exempted under Section 636(b)(1)(A), and
applying
de
novo
standard
to
magistrate
judge
recommendations
on
eight
“motion[s]
excepted
in
subparagraph (A),” none of which involve Section 1782
applications).
(Docket Entry 7 at 1 n. 2 (certain brackets in original).)

In

addition, nearly twenty years before In re Naranjo, the Fourth
Circuit similarly affirmed, under an abuse of discretion standard,
a “district court[’s] affirm[ation of a] magistrate’s order” that
“direct[ed an individual] to provide [a] blood sample [requested
for use in a foreign proceeding].”

In re Amtsgericht Ingolstadt,

82 F.3d at 592.
“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law . . . .”

Highmark

Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2
(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States ex
rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015) (“By
definition, a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an
error of law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
60

Such an abuse

of discretion would arise if a district court applied an incorrect
standard of review to an appeal from a magistrate judge’s order.
See ALCOA, 663 F.2d at 501-02 (analyzing whether district judge
applied “[]correct standard of review to the magistrate’s report”
and remanding matter where record did not “clearly indicate that
[the district judge] afforded the parties a de novo determination”
rather than applying “‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law’
standard of review” on objections to magistrate judge’s report).
Accordingly, although, as Movants note (see, e.g., Docket Entry 15
at 27 n.9), the Fourth Circuit has not explicitly held that Section
1782 applications qualify as matters which magistrate judges may
determine, it has repeatedly acted consistently with the majority
view that magistrate judges may determine such matters.
Under the circumstances, Movants’ challenge to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge’s authority to grant the Application does not
warrant any relief.
B. Joinder Challenge
Movants

further

assert

that

the

Court

should

quash

the

subpoenas “because the Application improperly joined parties” under
Rule 20, on the theory that “Al Sadeq’s claimed right to relief
arises from his litigation, and Stokoe’s from its; those are not
the same transaction or occurrence.”

(Docket Entry 15 at 28.)

According to Movants, “Applicants do not try to link their claims
[as arising from the same transaction or occurrence], and they

61

cannot, because the requests arise from different litigations, and
those litigations arise from different, years-apart events.

The

Court should not have considered their applications together.”
(Docket Entry 19 at 14.)

As such, Movants assert that “[t]he

subpoenas should not have been authorized in a joint proceeding;
they should be quashed, the proceedings severed under Rule 21, and
new separate applications considered afresh.”

(Docket Entry 15 at

29.)

Applicants respond that they properly joined their Section

1782

requests

because

“[t]he

relief

[they]

sought

in

the

Application arose out of the same ‘series of transactions or
occurrences’” (Docket Entry 17 at 28 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20)).
(See id. at 27-28.)

Applicants’ position possesses merit.

As relevant here, Rule 20 authorizes joinder of parties “as
plaintiffs if . . . they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).33

For

its part, Rule “21 governs misjoinder of parties[;]” however, “[i]n
determining whether parties are misjoined, the joinder standards of
Rule 20 apply.”

Hanley v. First Invs. Corp., 151 F.R.D. 76, 77-78

(E.D. Tex. 1993).

33 Movants do not dispute that “a[] question of law or fact
common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(1)(B). (See Docket Entry 15 at 28-29; Docket Entry 19 at 1314.)
62

“The
liberal.”

joinder

provisions

of

the

Federal

Rules

are

very

Kedra v. City of Phila., 454 F. Supp. 652, 661 (E.D. Pa.

1978). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[u]nder the Rules, the
impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims,
parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”
of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).34
20]

is

to

promote

trial

convenience

and

United Mine Workers

“The purpose of [Rule
expedite

the

final

determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.”
Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir.
1974); see also Kedra, 454 F. Supp. at 661 (“The reason for the
liberality [of joinder] is that unification of claims in a single
action is more convenient and less expensive and time-consuming for
the parties and the court.”).
Accordingly, “Rule 20 permits joinder of ‘all reasonably
related claims for relief by or against different parties.’”
Courthouse News Serv. v. Schaefer, 2 F.4th 318, 325 (4th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333); see also id. (explaining that
“absolute identity of all events is unnecessary for joinder”
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). Under this test,
“two claims arise from the same transaction — and therefore can be

34 Thus, “the scope of the civil action is made a matter for
the discretion of the district court, and a determination on the
question of joinder of parties will be reversed on appeal only upon
a showing of abuse of that discretion.” Mosley v. General Motors
Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1974).
63

joined in the same action — when there is a ‘logical relationship’
between

them.”

Id.;

see

also

Mosley,

497

(“‘“Transaction” is a word of flexible meaning.

F.2d

at

1333

It may comprehend

a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the
immediateness

of

their

connection

as

upon

their

logical

relationship.’” (quoting Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S.
593, 610 (1926))).
The requisite “logical relationship” exists here.

The Al

Sadeq Litigation alleges that Gerrard and Dechert conspired with
the Ruler and Page (among others) to, inter alia, interfere with Al
Sadeq’s access to legal representation.

(See, e.g., Docket Entry

4, ¶¶ 5, 9-12; Docket Entry 16-1, ¶¶ 60-67, 207-16, 228B, 232-33,
239.)

The Amended Al Sadeq Claim specifically alleges that, as

part of this conspiracy, those individuals interfered with Stokoe’s
ability to represent Al Sadeq in the Al Sadeq Litigation, including
by overt and covert surveillance of Stokoe and attempts to obtain
Stokoe’s confidential information. (See Docket Entry 16-1, ¶¶ 215216 (discussing, inter alia, Stokoe’s Hacking Claims).)

In turn,

the Grayson Proceeding seeks recourse against Page, Gerrard, and
Dechert (among others) for this overt and covert surveillance and
attempts

to

obtain

Stokoe’s

generally Docket Entry 16-2.)

confidential

information.

(See

Accordingly, a logical relationship

exists between Applicants’ claims, rendering joinder appropriate.
See, e.g., Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1094,

64

1100 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding joinder of claims by plaintiff NorTek against defendant Jones, by plaintiff Riley against defendants
Jones and Owen, and by defendant Owen against defendant Jones,
explaining that “Jones’s scheme to defraud Nor-Tex was only one
chapter in a larger plot to also defraud Riley and Owen”); Kedra,
454

F.

Supp.

at

662

(“Although

the

events

giving

rise

to

plaintiffs’ claims in this case occurred over a lengthy time
period, they all are ‘reasonably related.’

The complaint sets

forth a series of alleged unlawful detentions, searches, beatings
and similar occurrences and charges defendants with ‘engag(ing) in
a systematic pattern of harassment, threats and coercion with the
intention of . . . depriving plaintiffs of (their) rights’; each of
the incidents set forth is encompassed within the ‘systematic
pattern.’” (ellipsis in original)).

As such, Movants’ joinder-

related arguments do not justify quashing the subpoenas.
C. “For Use” Challenge
Movants additionally contend that “Applicants should not be
allowed to compel the discovery they seek here because it is
speculative and not relevant to either of the underlying foreign
litigations.”

(Docket

Entry

15

at

10.)

Therefore,

Movants

maintain, the requested discovery “does not satisfy either Section

65

1782’s ‘for use’ requirement or Intel’s burden analysis.”

(Id.)35

Movants’ arguments fall short.
As an initial matter, Movants raise a number of evidentiary
objections in connection with this challenge to the subpoenas.
Movants first assert:
Applicants’ reliance on the English appellate
court’s description of evidence submitted in unconnected
proceedings in Azima’s appeal was improper, and that
material does not and cannot support granting the
discovery that Applicants seek. Contra Order at 17-19.
The appellate court’s description of that declaration is
not evidence with respect to Movants. Movants are not
parties to that litigation, and the appellate court’s
(threshold) decision has zero res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect as to them. The declaration itself is
not before the Court, because Applicants did not submit
it. If that declaration had been submitted in connection
with a U.S. proceeding (let alone in a U.S. appeal), it
would have been rejected because it is the self-serving
hearsay statement of a paid investigator for Azima
reporting the double-hearsay account of an anonymous
source accusing Movants of wrongdoing.

35 As to their latter assertion, Movants state that, under
the final Intel factor,
[o]verbreadth and burden are determined by applying the
familiar standards of Rule 26, which permits only
discovery that is “proportional to the needs of the
case.” The discovery must be important enough to the
claims or defenses at issue in the underlying foreign
proceeding that the burden and expense of discovery are
justified. A request that is “only marginally relevant”
should be denied.
(Id. at 12 (citations omitted); see also id. at 11.) Movants do
not otherwise distinguish between their Section 1782 “for use” and
Intel relevance-related arguments. (See id. at 10-23; Docket Entry
19 at 4-10.)
66

(Docket Entry 15 at 18-19.)
for

the

proposition

Notably, Movants provide no authority

that

consideration

of

the

UK

“court’s

description of evidence submitted” to that court “was improper”
(id. at 18).
of

the

(See id. at 18-19.)

Order

anonymous

contains

sources

no

In any event, the cited portion

mention

accusing

Movants

of

a

of

declaration
anything,

involving

let

alone

a

“self-serving hearsay statement of a paid investigator for Azima
reporting

the

double-hearsay

account

of

an

accusing Movants of wrongdoing” (id. at 19).
at 17-19.)

anonymous

source

(See Docket Entry 7

Accordingly, this evidentiary challenge lacks merit.

Movants next object to the Court’s consideration of Page’s
threat

to

implicate

Del

Rosso,

as

recounted

in

the

Ruler’s

attorney’s letter, in ascertaining whether the requested discovery
from Del Rosso bears relevance to Applicants’ lawsuit against Page.
(See Docket Entry 15 at 20.)

However, the Court need not resolve

Movants’ challenge to consideration of the letter, as the Amended
Grayson Claim contains allegations regarding Page’s threat to
implicate Del Rosso, Gerrard, the Ruler, and Dechert in the Grayson
Proceeding (see Docket Entry 16-2, ¶¶ 19A, 19C(9)), and Movants
have not suggested that the Court must refrain from considering the
Amended Grayson Claim in determining the relevance of the requested
discovery to, inter alia, the Grayson Proceeding (see Docket Entry
15 at 20; see also Docket Entry 19 at 6-7).
challenge entitles Movants to no relief.

67

Thus, this evidentiary

Movants also challenge the Robinson materials that Applicants
submitted in opposition to the Motion. (See Docket Entry 19 at 1415.)

In this regard, Movants first assert that “the new Robinson

material submitted is irrelevant because it deals with 2020 events
and fails to support Applicants’ position that the 2015-2017
material sought is relevant to their proceedings.”

(Id. at 14.)

This assertion depends on a faulty premise underlying many of
Movants’ arguments, namely that the subpoenas seek only discovery
from 2015 to 2017.

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 15 at 20-21 (arguing

that “even if” Page’s threat to implicate Del Rosso “did credibly
suggest that Movants had some involvement in the 2020 conduct that
Stokoe complains of, it still would not support the 2015-to-2017
discovery Applicants seek here, because Applicants do not seek
discovery

related

to

that

2020

conduct,”

but

instead

“seek

historical information from years ago involving Movants’ dealings
with CyberRoot”).)
The subpoenas command Movants to participate in depositions
and produce certain documents.
3-2.)

(See generally Docket Entries 3-1,

The document requests span the period from “July 1, 2015

through September 30, 2017” (Docket Entry 3-1 at 7; Docket Entry 32 at 7) and relate to Movants’ interactions with CyberRoot during
that period (see Docket Entry 3-1 at 7-8; Docket Entry 3-2 at 7-8).
However, the depositions span “the period from January 1, 2015 to
the date of [Movants’] deposition” (Docket Entry 3-1 at 5; Docket

68

Entry 3-2 at 5) and, although they focus on Movants’ work with
CyberRoot, they do not limit permissible deposition subjects solely
to such work (see generally Docket Entries 3-1, 3-2).

Thus, for

instance, Applicants could solicit Del Rosso’s testimony “as to who
he was receiving his instructions from when he was instructing
Robinson through Grayson in 2019 and 2020,” as well as regarding
“what he paid CyberRoot $1 million for in or about 2015” (Docket
Entry 17 at 23).

Accordingly, to the extent that Movants’ various

arguments depend on construing the subpoenas to seek only discovery
regarding Movants’ interactions with CyberRoot between 2015 and
2017, they fail.36
Movants
Declaration
hearsay.

further
and

contend

supporting

that

portions

exhibits

of

constitute

the

Robinson

inadmissible

For instance, they assert that Robinson’s “foreign-sworn

affidavit” attached as Exhibit A to the Robinson Declaration “is
hearsay not within any exception” because “[i]t is not apostilled
as required for foreign affidavits to be recognized under the Hague

36 This includes, inter alia, Movants’ relevance objection to
the Robinson Declaration materials (see Docket Entry 19 at 14) and
their contention that Page’s alleged threat to implicate Del Rosso
does not support the requested discovery (see, e.g., Docket Entry
15 at 21 (“Neither Stuart Page’s putative comments, nor any other
evidence in any other proceeding, links CyberRoot to any 2020
conduct having to do with Stokoe.
So Stuart Page’s reported
threats do nothing to suggest that the discovery actually sought
here could potentially be relevant to the conduct of which Stokoe
complains. Without a link between Page’s reported comment and the
discovery that is sought, that comment does not support the
Application.”)).
69

Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign
Public Documents, and does not otherwise subject the signatory to
U.S. perjury

penalties

as

required

under

28

U.S.C.

§ 1746.”

(Docket Entry 19 at 14.) The referenced Hague Convention addresses
procedures

for

certifying

the

authenticity

of

foreign

public

documents, see T.I.A.S. No. 10072, 33 U.S.T. 883, 1981 WL 375769,
and

Movants

do

not

challenge

the

authenticity

affidavit (see Docket Entry 19 at 14).

of

Robinson’s

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1746

requires only unsworn foreign documents to subject the signatory to
U.S. perjury penalties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1746(1), and the affidavit
reflects that Robinson made the affidavit under oath (see Docket
Entry 18-2 at 2, 9). Accordingly, Movants’ hearsay challenges fail
to justify exclusion of the Robinson affidavit.37
Next,

Movants

object

to

certain

“out-of-court

asserted for their truth” in Robinson’s Declaration.

statements

(Id. at 14.)

Specifically, Movants assail as hearsay Robinson’s assertion that
Grayson informed Robinson “that he had only recently returned from
visiting Mr Del Rosso in North Carolina” and “that Mr Del Rosso
would

be

responsible

for

paying

enquiries” (Docket Entry 18, ¶ 11).

[Robinson]

for

the

Grayson

(See Docket Entry 19 at 14

37 Movants also assert that the witness statement attached as
Exhibit B to the Robinson Declaration (see Docket Entry 18-3) “is
unsworn” and does not subject Robinson to penalty of perjury under
U.S. law, rendering it “hearsay not within any exception.” (Docket
Entry 19 at 15.) As this Memorandum Opinion does not cite to that
exhibit, the Court need not resolve this hearsay issue.
70

(challenging “Dkt. 18 ¶ 11 (statements by Patrick Grayson)”).)
They also challenge Robinson’s description of the narratives in the
July 10, 2019, and March 16, 2020, invoices that Robinson avers he
submitted to Del Rosso (see Docket Entry 18, ¶ 15; Docket Entry 19
at

14

(challenging

portions of

Exhibit

Docket
D)”)),

Entry
as

18,

well

Ҧ
as

15

(reciting

consideration

hearsay
of

“the

purported invoices dated November 1, 2019 and February 26, March
16, April 2, April 9 and June 7, 2020” in Exhibit D to the Robinson
Declaration (see Docket Entry 19 at 15).

Finally, Movants assert

that the Court cannot consider Lowe’s statements to Robinson that
Lowe would speak with Del Rosso and would offer Robinson security
and conduct counter-surveillance on Robinson’s behalf, for which
Robinson “would not have to pay” (Docket Entry 18, ¶ 21).

(See

Docket Entry 19 at 14 (challenging “Mr. Lowe’s statements” (citing
Docket Entry 18, ¶ 21)).)

The Court need not resolve these hearsay

challenges, for, as shown below, exclusion of the challenged
materials does not impact resolution of the Motion.
Turning to their substantive objections, Movants assert that
the requested discovery does not satisfy Section 1782’s “for use”
requirement and lacks relevance to the Foreign Proceedings.
Docket Entry 15 at 10-23; Docket Entry 19 at 4-10.)

(See

In support of

this argument, Movants contend, as relevant here, that (i) “there
is zero evidence, and no allegation, that [Movants] were involved
in the torts at issue [in the Foreign Proceedings]” (Docket Entry

71

15 at 12); (ii) “the requested discovery is not ‘for use’ abroad
because the foreign claims do not involve hacking” (id. at 13
(emphasis omitted)); (iii) “Azima’s fraud and Azima’s emails are
irrelevant to Al Sadeq’s frauds and imprisonment” (id. at 18); and
(iv) “Applicants’ claims of a nefarious nexus between Movants and
their defendants are too vague” (id. at 21 (emphasis omitted)).
Applicants respond that, “[c]ontrary to Movants’ contentions, the
information

sought

by

the

subpoenas

to

Del

Rosso

and

Vital

Management is plainly ‘for use’ in the Foreign Proceedings under
the applicable standard, and is relevant to the claims and defenses
in both the Al Sadeq Litigation and the Grayson Proceeding.”
(Docket Entry 17 at 15.)

Applicants’ position should prevail.

As noted, Section 1782’s “for use” statutory requirement
imposes only a “de minimis” burden upon an applicant.
746 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (collecting cases).

In re Veiga,

In turn, Rule 26 governs

determination of relevance and burden under Intel’s discretionary
factors.

See, e.g., id. at 19 (“Generally speaking, the standards

for discovery set out in the [Rules] also apply when discovery is
sought under § 1782(a)”).38

“Relevancy in this context is broadly

construed and encompasses any material that bears on, or that
reasonably leads to other matters that could bear on, any issue
that is or may be in the case.”

Id. (internal quotation marks

38 Indeed, Movants have acknowledged that “[o]verbreadth and
burden are determined by applying the familiar standards of Rule
26” (Docket Entry 15 at 12).
72

omitted); see also In re Application of Sveaas, 249 F.R.D. 96, 103
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[R]elevance is defined extremely broadly for the
purpose of determining whether to grant a request for discovery in
aid of a foreign proceeding, and a district court should treat
requests for discovery in aid of foreign proceedings, under section
1782, permissively, especially where, as here, the discovery is
sought from a non-party to the foreign actions.”).
Here, the record reflects that, inter alia, Al Sadeq alleges
that Gerrard, Dechert, the Ruler, and others violated UAE and
international law, including Al Sadeq’s human rights, during their
investigation “into the affairs of RAKIA and an alleged fraud
committed by its former [CEO ]Dr. Massaad” (Docket Entry 16-1, ¶ 8)
and other alleged coconspirators, including Al Sadeq, Azima, and
Mikadze (id., ¶ 9.5).

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 4, ¶¶ 2, 4; Docket

Entry 16-1, ¶¶ 1, 8-10; see also Docket Entry 4-2, ¶ 14 (“RAKIA
claims that in around late 2012 it discovered that Dr Massaad had
perpetrated systematic and wide-ranging frauds against RAKIA and
other RAK entities.

Subsequent investigations undertaken by the

Government of RAK are said to have established that between around
2005 and 2012 Dr Massaad and his associates engaged in an unlawful
conspiracy to misappropriate monies and otherwise cause losses
exceeding $2 billion.”).)39

More specifically, Al Sadeq alleges

39 Al Sadeq, Dr. Massaad, and Mikadze all worked for RAKIA,
with Mikadze serving as the “General Manager of RAKIA’s Georgia
(continued...)
73

that Dechert Defendants violated his “rights, including by using
threats and / or mistreatment and / or unlawful methods to force Mr
Al Sadeq to give evidence and / or false evidence, as more
specifically particularised [in the Amended Al Sadeq Claim], in an
attempt

to

build

a

case

against

Dr

Massaad

and

his

co-conspirators at the behest of the [R]uler of RAK.”
Entry 16-1, ¶ 10.)
and

maintains

that

alleged
(Docket

“Al Sadeq denies any involvement in wrongdoing
the

charges

against

him

were

politically

motivated on the part of the Ruler of RAK in an attempt to conceal
the Ruler’s own close involvement in RAKIA’s activities and that he
was convicted on the basis of false confessions obtained from him
under duress by [Dechert] Defendants.”

(Id., ¶ 1.)

In particular, Al Sadeq has alleged the following:
Although RAKIA “was established” by government decree “in
order to promote investment in RAK and to promote various economic
sectors in the Emirate” (id., ¶ 14), “by around 2010 RAKIA had,
with the full knowledge and approval of the Ruler, very significant
investment interests outside RAK, particularly in Georgia” (id.,
¶ 17).

From 2005 until approximately 2012, Dr. Massaad served as

RAKIA’s CEO, controlling the “day to day management of RAKIA” and

39(...continued)
operations” (Docket Entry 16-1, ¶ 9.5), Al Sadeq serving as legal
adviser, Group Legal Director, and, ultimately, Deputy Chief
Executive Officer of RAKIA between 2008 and 2012 (id., ¶ 35), and
Dr. Massaad serving as the CEO (id., ¶ 8). Al Sadeq, Dr. Massaad,
Mikadze, and Azima all worked on the sale of RAKIA assets in
Georgia. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 4-2, ¶¶ 168-171.3.)
74

“developing investment strategies and taking investment decisions
with the knowledge, approval, and instructions of the Ruler” (id.,
¶ 15).

For various political, familial, and economic reasons

beginning around 2008, the Ruler directed that RAKIA should “divest
itself of its foreign investments” (id., ¶ 21), a sudden change in
investment policy that “led to the rushed sale of assets in Georgia
at a premature stage with a detrimental effect on the return
obtained from them” (id.). During his tenure at RAKIA, “Al Sadeq’s
responsibility was mainly to finalise deals to sell assets in order
to return monies that had been invested outside of RAK to the
Emirate, pursuant to th[is] revised strategy required by the Ruler
from around 2008 onwards.”

(Id., ¶ 37.)

“At all material times Mr

Al Sadeq acted on instructions from Dr Massaad which to the best of
his knowledge, in all significant respects, were known to and had
been approved or given by the Ruler himself.”

(Id.)

However, the

Ruler “denied that he ever told Dr Massaad or anyone else to play
any role in the sale of . . . [any] assets owned by any RAK
entity.”

(Docket Entry 4-2, ¶ 173.3.)

Following the Ruler’s revision in investment strategy, a rift
developed between the Ruler and Dr. Massaad (see Docket Entry 16-1,
¶¶ 15-25), who “left RAK in around June 2012, on good terms and
without any suggestion of wrongdoing,” and “returned to the UAE on
several occasions thereafter until August 2014, including for
meetings with the Ruler.”

(Id., ¶ 25.)

75

In approximately 2014, the

Ruler learned that one of his estranged brothers, Sheikh Faisal,
invested in Dr. Massaad’s business.

(See id., ¶¶ 23, 26-27.)

“As

a result, the Ruler became concerned that Dr Massaad was working
with Sheikh Faisal and / or Sheikh Khaled in order to destabilise
the Ruler, and that Sheikh Faisal and / or Sheikh Khaled were
plotting to remove the Ruler with the assistance of Abu Dhabi.”
(Id., ¶ 27.)40

Accordingly, in August 2014, Dechert hired Vital

Management “to investigate assets potentially stolen from the
Government

of

[RAK].

Pursuant

to

its

engagement[,

Vital

Management] examined potential frauds committed by, amongst others,
[Dr.] Massaad.”

(Docket Entry 4-4, ¶ 4.)

“[S]ince 2014, August

2014, [Del Rosso has] been involved somewhere in this massive
investigation,” in a “role [that] was directed by Dechert” (Docket
Entry 4-5 at 27), “[p]rincipally” by Gerrard (id. at 6).
pursuing

this

investigation,

Del

Rosso

has

primarily

In

taken

instruction from Dechert, Gerrard, and, to a lesser extent, Hughes
(id. at 6), but has also had direct contact with “Buchanan and
other representatives of the RAK government” (Docket Entry 4-4,
¶ 4).

(See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 4-7.)

Around 1 a.m. on September 5, 2014, agents with the RAK State
Security Investigations kidnapped Al Sadeq from his home in Dubai

40
Notably, the Ruler first engaged Page to conduct
surveillance on Sheikh Khalid between 2008 and 2010 due to the
Ruler’s concerns that Sheikh Khalid might try to destabilize the
Ruler’s position as Crown Prince. (See Docket Entry 4-2, ¶ 260.)
76

and took him to RAK, where he was initially detained in solitary
confinement at the General Headquarters of State Security in RAK
without access to a lawyer.
50.)

(See Docket Entry 16-1, ¶¶ 9.3, 41-

“During this initial period of detention immediately after

his kidnap from Dubai and rendition to RAK, . . . [Al Sadeq] was
questioned by, inter alios, Mr Gerrard, in an aggressive fashion
and

it

was

made

clear

to

him

that

the

objective

of

the

interrogation was for him to ‘cooperate’ by giving information
falsely to implicate, in particular, Dr Massaad, Mr Quzmar, Mr
Mikadze, Mr Azima and their alleged co-conspirators.” (Id., ¶ 51.)
For months thereafter, Dechert Defendants and others continued
their mistreatment of Al Sadeq, including his arbitrary detention
in inhumane conditions, interference with his access to lawyers,
and abusive interrogations (among other wrongs), attempting to
secure his cooperation in the Ruler’s vendetta against Dr. Massaad
and his alleged coconspirators, including Azima and Mikadze. (See,
e.g., id., ¶¶ 52-154.)41

“The Ruler’s motive in pursuing his

41
As part of this campaign, Gerrard asked Al Sadeq to
provide “false evidence that Mr Azima was manipulating an aviation
firm in RAK called RAK HeavyLift in order to use it [as] a
gun-running vehicle” (id., ¶ 125.1), as well as “false evidence
stating that Dr Massaad, Mr Mikadze and Mr Azima had embezzled
money from the Poti Port project and a shopping centre project in
Georgia, as a cover to hide the fact that the embezzlement had been
carried out by persons known to, and with the knowledge and
approval of, the Ruler (and not by Dr Massaad, Mr Mikadze and Mr
Azima at all)” (id., ¶ 125.2). (See id., ¶¶ 125-125.2.) RAKIA
sued Azima for alleged fraud involving RAK HeavyLift in the Azima
Litigation. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 4-2, ¶¶ 3-7, 18-21.)
77

vendetta is both to punish Dr Massaad for his supposed disloyalty
by destroying his reputation and discrediting him, and also to
attempt to conceal the Ruler’s own personal knowledge and direction
of RAKIA’s foreign investments for his own personal and political
benefit in the years before his accession.”
Following

Al

Sadeq’s

kidnapping,

(Id., ¶ 29.)

Dechert

Defendants,

the

Ruler, and others repeatedly warned Al Sadeq’s wife “not to involve
the press or lawyers in relation to Mr Al Sadeq’s situation.”
(Id., ¶ 60; see also, e.g., id., ¶¶ 72, 101.)

However, by March

2015, the Ruler and Dechert Defendants discovered that a journalist
had contacted

Mrs.

Al

Sadeq,

who

continued

contact

with

the

journalist despite warnings from the Ruler’s assistant and Black.
(See id., ¶¶ 142.2-142.3.) The warnings from the Ruler’s assistant
and Black suggested that they had access to Mrs. Al Sadeq’s emails
with the journalist, causing Mrs. Al Sadeq to “conclude[] that her
email

account

Defendants,”

had
a

been

suspicion

hacked

by

confirmed

or
by

on

behalf

the

of

Ruler’s

[Dechert]
subsequent

discovery that, contrary to her reassurances, “Mrs Al Sadeq had not
in fact broken off all contact with [the journalist], a fact that
Mrs Al Sadeq considered Dechert and the Ruler could only have known
had they had access to her emails.”

(Id.)

Subsequently,

as a result of the treatment, threats and pressure being
applied to him and Mrs Al Sadeq, and as a result of the
promises he would be released and pardoned if he
cooperated, Mr Al Sadeq had finally agreed in principle
by about the third quarter of 2015 that he would
“cooperate” by making a false confession and giving false
78

evidence
against
Dr
Massaad
and
his
alleged
co-conspirators including Mr Quzmar, Mr Mikadze and Mr
Azima so long as he had sufficient binding assurances, in
writing, that he would be released and pardoned, and that
his family would be allowed to continue their lives as
before if he did so.
Mr Al Sadeq had at this time come to accept, as he
had been repeatedly told by Mr Gerrard and Mr Hughes,
that the only possibility for his release and the safety
of his family was to provide them with the “cooperation”
they sought by making false confessions and giving the
evidence [Dechert] Defendants wanted him to give. It was
his intention, once he was released, however, to reveal
how he had been treated and forced to confess, and to
clear his name.
(Id., ¶¶ 154-155 (internal paragraph numbering omitted).)
On or after August 31, 2015, Buchanan “contacted Mrs Al Sadeq
and told her that the Ruler had agreed that Mr Al Sadeq would be
released

and

pardoned,

subject

to

Mr

Al

Sadeq

agreeing

to

‘cooperate,’” but indicated that this “agreement would only be
available orally and could not be put in writing.”

(Id., ¶ 165.)

On September 2, 2015, Buchanan informed Al Sadeq and his wife that
the Ruler, at a meeting with Buchanan and Dechert, had agreed that
“if Mr Al Sadeq ‘cooperated’ in whatever ways Dechert required to
their satisfaction and signed confession statements, he would be
released from prison on bail to a house in RAK in due course, his
family being obliged to surrender their passports, although he
would not be permitted to leave the country until after he had
finished assisting with trials at which point he would be granted
a pardon and permitted to leave RAK” (id., ¶ 168).
¶¶ 167, 169.)

Thereafter,
79

(See id.,

Al Sadeq began to “cooperate” with [Dechert] Defendants,
even in the absence of anything in writing, in the
(ultimately vain) hope that he would be released if he
did so. Mr Al Sadeq, considering that his life was in
danger if he remained at Al Barirat[, the Ruler’s private
militia camp (id., ¶ 105)], felt that he had been left
with no other choice and was no longer able to endure the
torments and torture heaped upon him, directly or
indirectly, by or on the instructions of [Dechert]
Defendants, and Mr Gerrard in particular. In substance,
he therefore agreed to the proposal made by Mr Buchanan
at the 2 September 2015 Meeting, thereby concluding an
agreement on those terms (the “False Confession
Agreement”) with the Ruler via Mr Buchanan. In doing so
Mr Al Sadeq relied upon the promise made by the Ruler and
[Dechert] Defendants and Mr Buchanan inter alia that he
would be released and pardoned.
(Id., ¶ 173 (emphasis omitted).)
The False Confession Agreement required Al Sadeq “to assist
Dechert with their enquiries on an ongoing basis, in particular by
giving false evidence, which evidence [Dechert] Defendants knew to
be false, against Dr Massaad, Mr Quzmar, Mr Mikadze, Mr Azima and
alleged co-conspirators and wrongly distancing the Ruler from any
knowledge about RAKIA’s offshore investment activities, which had
always been done with his knowledge or on his instructions, and
ultimately for his personal benefit in the years before and after
his accession.”

(Id., ¶ 179.)

Consistent with that requirement,

and following several further months of being pressurised
by [Dechert] Defendants for false testimony and without
the benefit of legal advice, Mr Al Sadeq eventually
signed statements confessing to his involvement in
alleged fraud concerning Pioneer Cement Industries LLC,
a company part-owned by RAKIA, and Poti Port in Georgia
(respectively the “False Confession Statements”), and
incriminating, inter alios, Dr Massaad and Mr Mikadze.
Those statements had been drafted by Mr Hughes and
approved by Mr Gerrard. Mr Al Sadeq was not given, or
80

allowed to read, the statements in their entirety at any
point, but parts of the statement were read out to him by
Mr Hughes. Additionally, he was asked to sign at least
ten blank sheets of paper which, it is to be inferred,
was so that those unique signatures could be falsely
applied to additional statements and / or documents.
(Id., ¶ 183 (emphasis omitted).)
Versions of these False Confession Statements produced to an
Italian Court pursuant to an extradition request for another
alleged coconspirator, Shahab Izadpanah, identify these sales as
involving “similar fraud[s]” (id., ¶ 183.2; see also id., ¶ 184A
(noting, in Italian extradition judgment, that “[t]he Supplement to
the extradition request of January 3, 2016 (point 18) provides the
unsettling assumption that ‘it is expected that Al Sadeq’, after
having rendered his statements regarding the ‘PSP case’, ‘shall
release an equivalent statement with respect to a similar instance
of fraud regarding Pioneer Cement’ (italicization and track-change
formatting omitted))).

(See id., ¶¶ 183A-183.4, 184A.)42

Notably:

Al Sadeq had also made clear to, inter alios, Mr Gerrard,
Ms. Black, Mr Hughes and Mr Buchanan that the contents of
th[e False Confession S]tatements were substantially
untrue. As to this, for example, each of the [False]
Confession Statements states:

42 The Italian Court denied the extradition request and noted
both that questions exist regarding “the spontaneity with which Al
Sadeq’s statement [regarding the Pioneer Cement incident] would be
rendered” and that the Supplement’s assertion regarding Al Sadeq’s
release of the False Confession Statement regarding Pioneer Cement
casts “doubt on the manner in which evidence was obtained in the
case in question.” (Id., ¶ 184A (italicization and track-change
formatting omitted).)
81

that Mr Al Sadeq had had the benefit of legal advice
in relation to the statement.
That was untrue and
[Dechert] Defendants knew it to be untrue because they
had refused to allow Mr Al Sadeq’s lawyer, Dr Al Shamsi,
to read the False Confession Statements and had refused
him any access to Mr Al Sadeq in relation to the False
Confession Statements; and they had also at various times
forced Mr Al Sadeq against his will to sign statements
waiving
the
right
to
legal
representation
at
interrogations as described [in the Amended Al Sadeq
Claim]; and on one occasion had forced Mr Al Sadeq to
call Dr Al Shamsi and tell him that he did not require
him to attend court or represent him, even though by that
stage Dr Al Shamsi had ceased to act, or in reality to
attempt to act, for Mr Al Sadeq.
[Similarly, the False Confession Statements state]
that the Ruler was unaware of the arrangements and
transactions said to constitute wrongdoing on the part of
Dr Massaad and Mr Al Sadeq. This was untrue, as Mr Al
Sadeq had told Mr Gerrard, Ms Black, Mr Hughes and Mr
Buchanan repeatedly. The Ruler had had contemporaneous
knowledge of all the relevant aspects of the transactions
about which complaint was made and had approved and/or
directed them. That fact would have provided Mr Al Sadeq
(and Dr Massaad) with a defence to the claims brought
against them which, it is to be inferred, is why it was
important to the Ruler and [Dechert] Defendants that Mr
Al Sadeq give false evidence in this respect.
(Id., ¶¶ 184-184.2 (internal paragraph numbering omitted).)
In accord with the False Confession Agreement, in April 20,
2016, “Al Sadeq was transferred to the second floor of a two-storey
villa in Al Hamrah village in RAK (the ‘Villa Prison’), where he
was detained until around August 2016.

The Villa Prison was

secured with bars on the windows and a security door, and Mr Al
Sadeq was not allowed to leave the Prison Villa.”

(Id., ¶ 199.)

However, around August 16, 2016, following the publication of the
False Confession Statements, as discussed below, “Al Sadeq was

82

returned to RAK Central Prison, where he has remained ever since.”
(Id., ¶¶ 208, 212-213.)

“Since August 2016 Mr Al Sadeq’s access to

legal representation has been severely restricted, and he has only
been allowed to meet with Mr Al Haddad[, his local counsel (id.,
¶ 208),] on a handful of occasions.”

(Id., ¶ 214.)

Between the fall of 2015 and July 2016, Azima represented Dr.
Massaad in negotiations with Buchanan, Gerrard, and Dechert acting
on behalf of RAKIA.

(See Docket Entry 4-2, ¶ 49.)

One such

meeting occurred on July 16, 2016, between Buchanan, Gerrard, and
Azima.

(Id., ¶ 50.)

“This meeting took an acrimonious turn,”

although the participants dispute “precisely what was said.” (Id.)
“According to Mr Azima, Mr Gerrard threatened him that if Dr
Massaad could not be made to agree to a settlement, then RAKIA
would pursue Dr Massaad, and Mr Azima would be rendered ‘collateral
damage’.

This is disputed by RAKIA.”

(Id.)

“[A] few days after

the July 2016 meeting” (id., ¶ 51), at the Ruler and Dechert’s
direction, Buchanan solicited the creation of an Anti-Massaad
Website “as propaganda supporting the Ruler’s continuing vendetta
against Dr

Massaad

and

efforts

to

distance

himself

from

the

investment activities of RAKIA in the years during which Dr Massaad
was its CEO despite his own intimate involvement in these” (Docket
Entry 16-1, ¶ 205).

“On around 29 July 2016 the False Confession

Statements were published on the” Anti-Massaad Website, which
“contained serious allegations made against Dr Massaad, which it

83

claimed were corroborated by the False Confession Statements.”
(Id., ¶ 204.) “The Anti-Massaad Website ceased to be accessible on
the internet on around 11 August 2016.”

(Id., ¶ 206.)

Following publication of the False Confession Statements on
the Anti-Massaad Website, “in early August 2016, blogging websites
began appearing denigrating Mr Azima as a ‘fraud’ and a ‘scammer’
and linking to websites containing Mr Azima’s confidential emails
which appeared at around the same time.”
¶ 51.)43

(Docket Entry 4-2,

These emails were obtained through hacking and implicate

Al Sadeq in additional instances of alleged fraud regarding the
sale of RAKIA’s Georgian assets.
181.6.)

(See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 10-12, 168-

In the Azima Litigation, RAKIA maintained that Page

innocently discovered websites containing Azima’s hacked emails,
which

Gerrard

enlisted

Del

Rosso

to

download

in

August

and

September 2016. (See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 51-53, 336-343.11.) Del Rosso
admits that, at Gerrard’s direction, he worked on securing the
downloading of these hacked emails, which he provided to Dechert.
(See Docket Entry 4-4, ¶¶ 5-19.) However, Del Rosso maintains that
he “did not hack Mr Azima’s computers, cause him to be hacked or
know who hacked him.

[Del Rosso] did not upload his data to the

internet, cause his data to be uploaded or know who did upload his
data.”

(Id., ¶ 20.)

Yet, a former employee of CyberRoot, an

43
At least one of these websites, which called Azima a
scammer, emphasized Azima’s connections to Dr. Massaad.
(Id.,
¶ 337.)
84

Indian hacking company, reported that, in 2015 and 2016, Del Rosso
employed CyberRoot to hack Azima and disseminate his emails on the
internet, for which work Del Rosso paid CyberRoot $1 million.
Azima, Docket Entry 49-1, ¶ 132.

In the Azima Litigation, Del

Rosso admitted that he engaged CyberRoot on RAKIA’s behalf and
arranged the $1 million payment to CyberRoot, but maintained “that
that was for different work which had nothing to do with Mr Azima,”
id., Docket Entry 49-1, ¶ 133.

(See also Docket Entry 16-2,

¶ 19C(2)).
In approximately 2016, an unidentified private investigator
introduced

Del

investigators.

Rosso

and

Robinson,

who

both

(See Docket Entry 18, ¶¶ 1, 7.)

work

as

private

Thereafter, Del

Rosso enlisted Robinson in various investigations, including UAErelated matters such as investigations of Azima.

(Id., ¶¶ 7, 9.)

In January 2018, Robinson’s company and Vital Management entered
into a consultancy agreement, pursuant to which Vital Management
made monthly payments to Robinson’s company until June 2020. (Id.,
¶ 10.)

Del Rosso also “had a general consulting arrangement” with

Grayson’s

company,

pursuant

to

which

it

business intelligence services and advice.”

“provide[d]

general

(Docket Entry 6-3 at

5; see also Docket Entry 6-4 (containing three-year nondisclosure
agreement, dated August 30, 2018, between Vital Management and
Grayson).)

85

In early 2019, Grayson began enlisting Robinson in various
inquiries, for which, with the exception of an initial £5,000 cash
payment from Grayson to Robinson, Del Rosso and/or Vital Management
paid.

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 18, ¶¶ 8, 11.)

“Whereas prior to

Mr Grayson’s involvement, Mr Del Rosso had instructed [Robinson]
directly, when Mr Grayson became involved, beginning in early 2019,
he was the one who instructed [Robinson] on the Grayson enquiries,
which [Robinson] believe[s] were made on behalf of Mr Del Rosso as
he was paying for them.”
ascertaining

“how

Mr

(Id., ¶ 8.)

Al

Sadeq

These inquiries include

was

funding

the

Al

Sadeq

[L]itigation” (Docket Entry 6-3 at 3), in connection with which
Grayson asked Robinson whether he knew anyone “capable of obtaining
bank records and other information relating to [Stokoe]” (Docket
Entry 6-1, ¶ 10), as well as ascertaining Tsiattalou’s movements in
and out of Dubai (Docket Entry 6-3 at 4-5).
his

query

about

the

funding

of

the

Al

Grayson admits that

Sadeq

Litigation

and

Tsiattalou’s movements originated with Del Rosso, who identified
Tsiattalou “[]as the senior partner at [Stokoe]” (id. at 5).
id.

at

4-5.)

The

inquiries

also

involved

(See

requests,

in

approximately July 2019, to investigate Stirling and Detained in
Dubai.

(Docket Entry 6-1, ¶ 13.)

Since
Litigation,

disclosure
Al

Sadeq’s

of

their

involvement

Litigation

and

in

Support

the
Team

Al
has

Sadeq
been

subjected to overt and covert surveillance, numerous phishing and

86

spear-phishing attacks, and the hacking of Stokoe’s IT system,
rendering Stokoe’s IT system inaccessible for days shortly prior to
a hearing on the Hacking Claims.
¶¶ 10-13, 43-45.)

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 4,

Tsiattalou and other members of Al Sadeq’s

Litigation and Support Team took multiple trips to Dubai between
January 2020 and March 2020 in hopes of visiting Al Sadeq at RAK
Central Prison, but RAK officials refused to allow such visits.
(See id., ¶¶ 10-11; Docket Entry 16-1, ¶¶ 215.3, 215.5.)

During

these trips, RAK security officials and individuals with Page’s
company conducted overt and covert surveillance of Al Sadeq’s
Litigation and Support Team, including breaking into Tsiattalou’s
hotel room; Page personally participated in this surveillance.
(See Docket Entry 4, ¶¶ 10-12; Docket Entry 16-1, ¶¶ 215.3-215.8.)
In January 2015, the Ruler hired Page “to investigate what the
Ruler feared was a plot between a member of his family and Dr
Massaad aimed at destabilising his rulership.”
¶ 31.)

(Docket Entry 4-2,

That engagement followed similar work that Page had

conducted for the Ruler, namely attempting between 2008 and 2010
“to ascertain through surveillance what plans Sheikh Khalid, the
Ruler’s brother, had to try to destabilise the [Ruler’s] position.”
(Id., ¶ 260.)
When

Robinson

received

the

Robinson

Claim,

he

contacted

Grayson, Page, and Del Rosso.

(See Docket Entry 6-1, ¶ 27, 37;

Docket Entry 18, ¶¶ 17-18.)

More specifically, shortly after

87

receiving the claim in the Robinson Proceeding on July 1, 2020,
Robinson called Page, whom he has known and worked with for more
than 20 years, “and informed [Page] that he had been mentioned in
Mr Tsiattalou’s witness statement” (Docket Entry 6-1, ¶ 37), the
first few pages of which Robinson sent to Page.

(Id., ¶¶ 36-37.)

On July 3, 2020, Page called Robinson, “offer[ing] to provide
[Robinson] with a ‘top lawyer’” to fight the Robinson Proceeding
and to assist with funding such endeavor, if necessary.
¶ 38.)

(Id.,

Robinson declined that offer, as he had already secured

legal representation (id.) funded by Del Rosso (see Docket Entry
18, ¶¶ 18-20).
In this regard, Robinson averred that, when he called Del
Rosso upon receiving Stokoe’s claim, Del Rosso said that Movants’
counsel would contact Robinson and Del Rosso “would pay any legal
fees [Robinson] incurred in relation to the proceedings” as long as
Robinson “did not mention his name.”

(Id., ¶ 18.)

Shortly

thereafter, Movants’ counsel called Robinson, and Robinson and
Movants’ counsel exchanged various emails regarding the matter
(id.), including one on July 2, 2020, in which Robinson indicates
that he had “been asked to send an invoice to [Movants’ lawyer] to
cover this matter and [Movants’ lawyer] will make a payment today”
(Docket Entry 18-7 at 2).

That same day, Robinson’s company and

Vital Management, listed as “c/o” Movants’ lawyers’ then-current
firm, entered into a purported loan agreement for $25,000. (Docket

88

Entry 18-8 at 2.)
that

he

would

Aligning with Del Rosso’s promise to Robinson

cover

the

legal

fees

by

establishing

a

loan

agreement, Movants have not requested repayment of the now-overdue
loan nor have Robinson and his company repaid the money.

(Docket

Entry 18, ¶¶ 19-20.)
In addition, shortly after July 1, 2020, Robinson became the
subject of 24-hour surveillance, which he found threatening. (Id.,
¶ 21.)

Robinson alerted Lowe, whom he knew had previously worked

with Del

Rosso,

to

the

situation,

and

Lowe

provided

24-hour

counter-surveillance and security for Robinson and his family for
the next three weeks, without charge to Robinson.

(Id.)

Given the

circumstances, Robinson believes that Del Rosso paid Lowe for this
work.

(Id.)

Finally, on July 16, 2020, Stokoe initiated the Grayson
Proceeding.

(Docket Entry 4, ¶ 39.)

On July 29, 2020, Grayson

issued his original affidavit, in which he denied soliciting any
confidential information regarding Stokoe or being asked to obtain
any confidential information regarding Stokoe.
4-15 at 2-5.)

(See Docket Entry

That same day, Page advised a colleague that Grayson

was protecting Del Rosso.

(Docket Entry 16-2, ¶ 19A(5).)

Unlike

Grayson, according to the Amended Grayson Claim, in August and
September 2020, Page warned Buchanan that Page would implicate Del
Rosso, Grayson, Gerrard, Dechert, and the Ruler if necessary to
resolve the Grayson Proceeding against Page. (Id., ¶¶ 19A(2)-(4).)

89

For his part, in March 2021, Grayson admitted that, prompted by Del
Rosso, he had inquired of Robinson regarding obtaining Stokoe’s
confidential information.

(See Docket Entry 6-3 at 3-5.)

As the foregoing reflects, Movants’ contentions that “there is
zero evidence, and no allegation, that [Movants] were involved in
the torts at issue” in the Foreign Proceedings (Docket Entry 15 at
12)

and

that

Applicants

assert

only

an

insufficiently

vague

“nefarious nexus between Movants and their defendants” (id. at 21
(emphasis omitted)) lack merit.

Ample direct and circumstantial

evidence ties Movants to the defendants in the Foreign Proceedings
and the alleged wrongs against Al Sadeq and Stokoe.

For instance,

Robinson and Grayson directly connect Del Rosso to the attempts to
gain confidential information regarding Stokoe in 2020 that both
the Hacking Claims and the Amended Al Sadeq Claim challenge.

In

turn, a former CyberRoot employee reports that he and his CyberRoot
colleagues hacked Azima’s emails on Del Rosso’s instructions,
emails that allegedly implicate Al Sadeq in the fraudulent sale of
RAKIA assets in Georgia.
Movants maintain that “discovery related to that alleged
incident . . . has no bearing on the truth or falsity of Al Sadeq’s
claim of official misconduct in his criminal proceedings” (id. at
14) because “Azima’s fraud and Azima’s emails are irrelevant to Al
Sadeq’s frauds and imprisonment” (id. at 18). However, as detailed
above,

according

to

Al

Sadeq,

90

his

responsibilities

at

RAKIA

involved finalizing asset sales pursuant to the Ruler’s directive
to sell RAKIA’s foreign assets.

Al Sadeq also asserts that the

Ruler knew and approved of all of Al Sadeq’s (and Dr. Massaad’s)
actions regarding RAKIA.

Further, Al Sadeq alleges that the

charges against him, and his associated mistreatment since his
September 2014 kidnapping and arbitrary detention, arise from
political motivations, including the Ruler’s desire to hide the
Ruler’s involvement in RAKIA’s foreign investments by pursuing a
vendetta against, inter alia, Dr. Massaad.

Per Al Sadeq, this

vendetta includes attempts by Dechert Defendants (among others) to
force Al Sadeq to falsely implicate Dr. Massaad, Azima, and Mikadze
in fraud against RAKIA, attempts that succeeded by late 2015.
Accordingly, determining the circumstances by which the Ruler
obtained Azima’s emails, which implicate Al Sadeq in an alleged
fraud regarding the sale of one of RAKIA’s Georgian assets, remains
relevant to Al Sadeq’s claims regarding the Ruler’s politically
motivated campaign against Al Sadeq, Dr. Massaad, Azima, and
Mikadze,

regardless

of

the

fact

that

the

False

Confession

Statements discuss “similar fraud[s]” (Docket Entry 16-1, ¶ 183.2)
related to different RAKIA assets in Georgia.
That conclusion would not change even if the Court accepted
Del Rosso’s assertion that he engaged CyberRoot to conduct work for
RAKIA unrelated to the hacking of Azima’s emails.

In that regard,

again as documented in the preceding discussion, since August 2014,

91

at Dechert’s instigation and Gerrard’s direction, Del Rosso has
participated in a massive investigation of assets potentially
stolen from RAK’s government, including potential frauds by Dr.
Massaad and others.

Whatever work Del Rosso enlisted CyberRoot to

conduct on RAKIA’s behalf in furtherance of this investigation
bears relevance to Al Sadeq’s claims given Al Sadeq’s contentions,
inter alia, that the Ruler authorized all of Al Sadeq’s and Dr.
Massaad’s actions regarding RAKIA’s assets; that RAK authorities
and Dechert Defendants imprisoned and mistreated Al Sadeq to force
him to provide false evidence regarding Dr. Massaad and his alleged
conspiracy to defraud RAKIA; and that Al Sadeq (and Dr. Massaad)
engaged in no wrongdoing.
Movants additionally argue that the requested discovery does
not qualify as for use in the Foreign Proceedings “because the
Foreign Claims do not involve hacking.”
(emphasis

omitted).)

As

Applicants

(Docket Entry 15 at 13

note,

this

“argument

is

semantic,” resting as it does on the theory “that the subpoenas
should be quashed because the claims in the Foreign Proceedings do
not

use

Movants’

the

word

argument

‘hacking.’”
ignores

the

(Docket
Foreign

Entry

17

at

Proceedings’

20-21.)44
claims

of

illicit surveillance and attempts to gain access to Al Sadeq’s

44 It also depends on an overly narrow view of the discovery
that Applicants seek.
(See, e.g., Docket Entry 15 at 13-18
(failing to acknowledge that requested discovery extends beyond
Movants’ involvement with CyberRoot in 2015-17).)
92

Legal

and

Support

Team’s

confidential

Stokoe’s representation of Al Sadeq.

information

to

impede

Further, to the extent

Movants challenge consideration of incidents in the Tsiattalou
Declaration that “do[] not appear at all in Stokoe’s statement of
the particulars of its claim” (Docket Entry 15 at 15), that
contention lacks merit.
alleges

Dechert

Of note, the Amended Al Sadeq Claim

Defendants’

participation

in

a

conspiracy

to

“unlawfully obtain confidential and/or privileged information from
[Al

Sadeq’s

lawyers,

Stokoe,]

in

connection

with

[Stokoe’s]

representation of Mr Al Sadeq in the[ Al Sadeq Litigation]” (Docket
Entry 16-1, ¶ 215A) and to disrupt Al Sadeq’s access to legal
counsel generally (see, e.g., id., ¶¶ 214-216).

Movants provide

support neither for the notion that the pleadings in the Foreign
Proceedings need to detail every action in furtherance of this
alleged conspiracy nor for the theory that this Court cannot
consider a Section 1782 applicant’s evidence in support of its
foreign

claims

in

determining

whether

qualifies as relevant to such claims.

the

discovery

sought

(See Docket Entry 15 at 15.)

Moreover, the evidence before this Court indicates that what
comprises relevant documentation for the UK litigation extends
beyond the claim form and particulars of claim. (See, e.g., Docket
Entry 6-1, ¶¶ 35-37 (discussing Tsiattalou witness statement served
with

Robinson

Proceeding).)

Accordingly,

Movants’

argument fails to justify quashing the subpoenas.

93

“hacking”

In sum, Movants’ arguments do not alter this Court’s previous
conclusion that the discovery sought here satisfies Section 1782’s
“for use” and relevancy requirements.
40.)

(See Docket Entry 7 at 35-

For instance, the evidence sought could help prove whether,

inter alia, Gerrard and Dechert helped interfere with Al Sadeq’s
access to legal counsel (by interfering with Stokoe’s ability to
represent Al Sadeq), as well as whether the charges and actions
against Al Sadeq arose from political motivations, including the
Ruler’s

desire

involvement

in

to

punish

RAKIA’s

Dr.

Massaad

foreign

and

investment

hide

the

activities.

Ruler’s
The

requested discovery could also help prove whether Grayson and his
codefendants, including Page, Gerrard, and Dechert, engaged in
illicit attempts to obtain Stokoe’s confidential information and to
disrupt its representation of Al Sadeq.

Accordingly, Applicants’

discovery requests meet Section 1782’s “for use” and relevancy
requirements.

See, e.g., In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 19; In re

Application of Sveaas, 249 F.R.D. at 103.
Accordingly, Movants have not established grounds to quash the
subpoenas.
D. Scope Challenge
Movants alternatively assert that the Court should limit the
subpoenas.

(See, e.g., Docket Entry 15 at 23-26.)

In this regard,

Movants first assert that “[n]o deposition testimony should be
allowed” (id. at 23) because “[d]eposition testimony is costly and

94

time-consuming, and should be denied because it is not proportional
to the needs of the case” (id. at 24 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

However, Movants offer no specifics in support of this

generalized

contention.

(See

id.

at

23-26.)

The

Foreign

Proceedings involve allegations of, inter alia, serious human
rights

violations,

attempts

to

obtain

lawyers’

confidential

information and to interfere with their client representation, and
loss of millions of dollars worth of assets.

Movants’ conclusory

complaint about the burden of depositions does not suffice under
the circumstances.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee

Notes, 2015 Amend. (explaining that one cannot “refuse discovery
simply

by

making

a

boilerplate

objection

that

it

is

not

proportional”).
Movants further assert that denial of Applicants’ deposition
request

“is

particularly

appropriate

here

because

pre-trial

deposition testimony is not customary in English proceedings.”
(Docket Entry 15 at 24; see id. at 24-25.)

Section 1782 provides

that, “[t]o the extent that the order [authorizing discovery] does
not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken,
and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).

“As such,

[Section 1782] clearly contemplates depositions being taken in
accordance

with

the

Federal

Rules.”

In

re:

Application

of

Servotronics, Inc., No. 2:18-mc-364, 2021 WL 1521931, at *8 (D.S.C.

95

Apr.

16,

2021).

issuance

of

Therefore,

deposition

“[c]ourts

subpoenas

frequently

when

permit

granting

§

the
1782

applications,” id., including authorizing depositions in connection
with UK proceedings, see, e.g., In re Oak Tr., No. 5:21mc7, 2021 WL
1390014, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2021) (authorizing subpoenas
seeking documents and depositions for use in UK proceeding).
Next,

Movants

assert

that

the

Court

should

limit

the

responsive time period for all discovery “to January through April
2020 — the period after Al Sadeq publicized his claim and in which
Stokoe alleges it witnessed phishing attempts.”
at 25.)

(Docket Entry 15

According to Movants, “Applicants’ request for material

from 2015 to 2017 does not target relevant material.”

(Id.)

Movants also insist that “the Court should limit the subpoenas to
[Vital Management’s] work with CyberRoot — if any — relating to
Stokoe or Al Sadeq.”

(Id. (challenging specifically document

request 5 (compare id. at 25-26, with Docket Entry 3-1 at 8, and
Docket Entry 3-2 at 8)).)

For the reasons discussed previously,

Movants’ work with CyberRoot from 2015 to 2017, which Del Rosso
admits involved RAKIA, remains relevant to, inter alia, Al Sadeq’s
claims regarding the politically motivated nature of the actions
against him. In addition, no justification exists for the proposed
time limitation. The events that the Foreign Proceedings challenge
begin long before January 2020, continue after April 2020, and
extend beyond phishing attempts targeting Stokoe.

96

(See generally

Docket Entry 16-1 (challenging conduct beginning in 2014 and
continuing through issuance of Amended Al Sadeq Claim on January
29, 2021); see also, e.g., Docket Entry 16-2, ¶¶ 11A, 19C(10)
(asserting that phisphing attempts continued through September 2020
and detailing conduct on May 25, 2021); Docket Entry 18, ¶¶ 11, 14,
16-19 (asserting that Robinson engaged in work relevant to Robinson
Proceeding for which Movants paid through June 2020 and that, in
July 2020, Movants funded Robinson’s defense to Robinson Proceeding
on condition that Robinson not disclose Del Rosso’s involvement in
challenged conduct).)

Under the circumstances, the Court declines

to impose the requested limitations on the authorized discovery.
CONCLUSION
Under Rule 20, Applicants appropriately pursued their Section
1782 requests through a joint Application, which the undersigned
Magistrate Judge could grant. In addition, the requested discovery
satisfies Section 1782’s “for use” requirement and does not impose
an undue burden under Intel’s discretionary factors.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion (Docket Entry 14) is
DENIED.
This 18th day of March, 2022.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

97