MELVIN v. KIJAKAZI

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERsigned by JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, JR on 03/26/2024, that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability is AFFIRMED, and that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A Judgment dismissing this action will be filed contemporaneously herewith. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DEMARCUS M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY,1
Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1:22-cv-1054

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Demarcus M., brought this action pursuant to
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of
Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security (the
“Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s claims for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”). (Doc. 1.) The court has before it the certified
administrative record, (Doc. 4 (cited herein as “Tr. __”)), as

On December 20, 2023, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
appointed Martin J. O’Malley as Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin J. O’Malley should substitute
for Kilolo Kijakazi as Defendant in this suit. Neither the Court
nor the parties need take any further action to continue this
suit by reason of the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
1

well as the parties’ dispositive briefs, (Docs. 8, 9). For the
reasons that follow, the court will enter judgment for the
Commissioner.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI (Tr. 227-37), alleging a
disability onset date of December 31, 2014 (see Tr. 228, 232).
Upon denial of those applications initially (Tr. 75-101, 119-26)
and on reconsideration (Tr. 102-18, 135-42), Plaintiff requested
a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
(Tr. 143-44). Plaintiff, his attorney, and a vocational expert
(“VE”) attended the hearing. (Tr. 39-74.) The ALJ subsequently
ruled Plaintiff not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 12-37.) The
Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for review
(Tr. 1-6, 224-26), making the ALJ’s ruling the Commissioner’s
final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made
the following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1.
[Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements
of the . . . Act through March 31, 2018.
2.
[Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since December 31, 2014, the alleged
onset date.
. . .
3.
[Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the cervical spine
status-post anterior cervical discectomy and fusion
- 2 -

(ACDF); DDD lumbar spine status-post laminectomy;
hypertension (HTN); obesity; and obstructive sleep
apnea (OSA).
. . .
4.
[Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
5.
. . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional
capacity to perform sedentary work . . ., except while
he can sit for six hours, he must be able to alternate
position to standing for five minutes after every 30
min[ute]s of sitting. He can occasionally climb ramps
and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds;
and can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl. He must avoid concentrated exposure to
unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts.
. . .
6.
[Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past
relevant work.
. . .
10. Considering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that [he] can perform.
. . .
11. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as
defined in the . . . Act, from December 31, 2014,
through the date of this decision.
(Tr. 18-32 (bold font, internal parenthetical citations, and
footnote omitted).)

- 3 -

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In cases such as this one, where the matter was previously
adjudicated by an ALJ, review of the ALJ’s ruling is limited to
the following two issues: (1) whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision; and (2) whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hays v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). The question is
not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding
that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial
evidence and based upon a correct application of the relevant
law. See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996);
Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). If a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate the evidence in support
of the ALJ’s decision, the court should not reweigh the evidence
or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays, 907 F.2d
at 1456.
“To regularize the adjudicative process, the Social
Security Administration [(‘SSA’)] has . . . promulgated . . .
detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medicalvocational evaluation policies that take into account a
claimant’s age, education, and work experience in addition to
[the claimant’s] medical condition.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d
260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). “These regulations establish a
- 4 -

‘sequential evaluation process’ [(‘SEP’)] to determine whether a
claimant is disabled.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The SEP
has up to five steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in
‘substantial gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2)
must have a ‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the
‘listings’ of specified impairments, or is otherwise
incapacitating to the extent that the claimant does not possess
the residual functional capacity [(‘RFC’)] to (4) perform [the
claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.” Albright v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1999). “Through the fourth step, the burden of production
and proof is on the claimant. If the claimant reaches step five,
the burden shifts to the [government] . . . .” Hunter v.

- 5 -

Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citations
omitted).2
III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability on these grounds:
1) “[t]he ALJ violated Radford[v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295
(4th Cir. 2013),] in failing to adequately analyze Listing 1.16
for lumbar spinal stenosis,” (Doc. 8 at 4);
2) “[t]he ALJ erred by failing to account for Plaintiff’s
walker usage in the RFC,” (id. at 8); and
3) “[t]he ALJ erred in failing to address Plaintiff’s need
to lie down during the day to relieve pain in the RFC,” (id. at
9).

“RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do
despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453
F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that administrative
regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do
sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work
setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule”
(internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The RFC
includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation”
that assesses the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light,
medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional
limitations (mental, sensory, or skin impairments).” Hall, 658
F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the
ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments
and any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 56263.
2

- 6 -

The Commissioner contends otherwise and seeks affirmance of
the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 9 at 4-17.)
A.

Listing 1.16
In Plaintiff’s first issue on review, he asserts that

“[t]he ALJ violated Radford in failing to adequately analyze
Listing 1.16 for lumbar spinal stenosis.” (Doc. 8 at 4.) More
specifically, Plaintiff maintains that, “[a]t Step Three of the
[sequential evaluation process], the ALJ merely summarized the
criteria of Listing 1.16 and stated that it was not met without
engaging in any analysis of the facts of the case,” which “is
not permissible” under Radford. (Id. at 5 (referencing Tr. 2021); see also id. at 5-6 (quoting Radford, 734 F.3d at 295
(holding that ALJ’s insufficient listing analysis “ma[de] it
impossible for a reviewing court to evaluate whether substantial
evidence support[ed] the ALJ’s findings”)).) According to
Plaintiff, “all of the criteria of Listing 1.16 were present in
the record and in a four-month period as the listing preamble
requires” (id. at 7 (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1
§ 1.00C(7)(c))), and “‘the medical evidence related to
Plaintiff’s [] condition is not so one-sided that one could
clearly decide, without analysis, that [the] Listing [] is not
implicated’” (id. at 8 (quoting Dial v. Colvin, No. 1:16CV70,
2016 WL 6997502, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2016) (unpublished),
- 7 -

recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2016))).
Plaintiff’s contentions do not warrant relief.
“Under Step 3 [of the SEP], the [applicable] regulation
states that a claimant will be found disabled if he or she has
an impairment that ‘meets or equals one of [the] listings in
[A]ppendix 1 of [20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P] and meets the
duration requirement.’” Radford, 734 F.3d at 293 (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii)) (internal bracketed numbers
omitted). “The listings . . . are descriptions of various
physical and mental illnesses and abnormalities, most of which
are categorized by the body system they affect. Each impairment
is defined in terms of several specific medical signs, symptoms,
or laboratory test results.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,
529-30 (1990) (internal footnote and parentheticals omitted).
“In order to satisfy a listing and qualify for benefits, a
person must meet all of the medical criteria in a particular
listing.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1990)
(citing Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530, and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a));
see also Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530 (“An impairment that manifests
only some of th[e] criteria [in a listing], no matter how
severely, does not qualify.”). “[A]n ALJ . . . must provide
sufficient explanation and analysis to allow meaningful judicial
review of his step three determination where the ‘medical record
- 8 -

includes a fair amount of evidence’ that a claimant’s impairment
meets a disability listing.” Ollice v. Colvin, No. 1:15CV927,
2016 WL 7046807, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2016) (unpublished)
(emphasis added) (quoting Radford, 734 F.3d at 295),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2017).
In order to meet the requirements of Listing 1.16,
Plaintiff must show evidence of the following:
A.
as:

Symptom(s) of neurological compromise manifested
1.
Nonradicular distribution of pain in
one or both lower extremities; or
2.
Nonradicular distribution of sensory
loss in one or both lower extremities; or
3.

Neurogenic claudication.

AND
B.
Nonradicular neurological signs present during
physical examination or on a diagnostic test and
evidenced by 1 and either 2 or 3:
1.

Muscle weakness.

2.

Sensory changes evidenced by:
a.

Decreased sensation; or

b.
Sensory nerve deficit
(abnormal sensory nerve latency)
on electrodiagnostic testing; or
c.
Areflexia, trophic
ulceration, or bladder or bowel
incontinence.

- 9 -

3.
Decreased deep tendon reflexes in one
or both lower extremities.
AND
C.
Findings on imaging or in an operative report
consistent with compromise of the cauda equina with
lumbar spinal stenosis.
AND
D.
Impairment-related physical limitation of
musculoskeletal functioning that has lasted, or is
expected to last, for a continuous period of at least
12 months, and medical documentation of at least one
of the following:
1.
A documented medical need for a walker,
bilateral canes, or bilateral crutches or a
wheeled and seated mobility device involving
the use of both hands; or
2.
An inability to use one upper extremity
to independently initiate, sustain, and
complete work-related activities involving
fine and gross movements, and a documented
medical need for a one-handed, hand-held
assistive device that requires the use of
the other upper extremity or a wheeled and
seated mobility device involving the use of
one hand.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.16 (internal
parenthetical citations omitted).
As an initial matter, although Plaintiff correctly observed
that the ALJ did not expressly compare the criteria of Listing
1.16 to the record evidence in her step three analysis (see Doc.
8 at 5 (referencing Tr. 20-21)), the court “must read the ALJ’s
decision as a whole,” because “an ALJ’s step-three conclusion
- 10 -

that the claimant did not meet the listing at issue can be
upheld based on the ALJ’s findings at subsequent steps in the
analysis,” Keene v. Berryhill, 732 F. App’x 174, 177 (4th Cir.
2018) (citing Fischer–Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 734 (10th
Cir. 2005) (deeming “remand for a more thorough discussion of
the listings [not required] when confirmed or unchallenged
findings made elsewhere in the ALJ’s decision confirm the step
three determination under review”)). Here, the ALJ noted at the
outset of her step three listings analysis that, “[b]ased upon
the evidentiary discussion under Finding 5 [regarding
Plaintiff’s RFC], the [ALJ] finds that [Plaintiff’s]
impairments, singly or in combination, based upon a review of
the medical evidence, do not meet Listing-level severity, and no
acceptable medical source has mentioned findings equivalent in
severity to the criteria of any listed impairment,” and
thereafter found that “[t]he record fail[ed] to support
[Listing] 1.16.” (Tr. 20 (emphasis added).) Because the ALJ
expressly incorporated her RFC discussion into her step three
analysis, the ALJ’s lack of analysis at step three does not,
standing alone, require the court to remand the case. Compare
Dial, 2016 WL 6997502, at *5 (“[T]he ALJ’s decision does not
mention or address Listing 4.04 or the underlying requirements
for that Listing at all.” (emphasis added)).
- 11 -

Although Plaintiff asserts that “all the criteria of
Listing 1.16 were present in the record and in a four-month
period as the listing preamble requires” (Doc. 8 at 7 (citing 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.00C(7)(c))), he has
failed to produce evidence meeting the paragraph (D) criteria of
Listing 1.16, i.e., “[a] documented medical need for a walker,”
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.16D(1). “[D]ocumented
medical need for a walker” means “evidence from a medical source
that supports [the claimant’s] medical need for an assistive
device for a continuous period of at least 12 months.” 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.00C(6)(a) (emphasis added).
Moreover, that “evidence must describe the circumstances for
which [a claimant] need[s] to use the assistive device.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that “[h]e was prescribed a front
wheeled walker (‘FWW’) for ambulation due to decreased strength,
decreased endurance, impaired balance, and impaired mobility”
(id. (citing Tr. 1180)), and that, “at his hearing, [Plaintiff]
testified that he was still using the walker” (id. (citing Tr.
62)). Plaintiff further notes that “the ALJ acknowledged th[ose
facts] and did not counter [them], noting ‘[h]e was given [a]
walker and bedside commode after his lumbar surgery, which he
testified to still using at the hearing.’” (Id. (quoting Tr.
29).) That argument fails for two reasons.
- 12 -

First, the evidence relied on by Plaintiff does not show a
“documented medical need for a walker” as required by Listing
1.16D. At most, that evidence shows that a physical therapist at
the hospital issued Plaintiff a FWW and a bedside commode, along
with restrictions of no bending, lifting, or twisting, the day
after his lumbar surgery in connection with his discharge home.
(See Tr. 1180, 1481.) Thus, that evidence demonstrates neither
that Plaintiff required an FWW “for a continuous period of at
least 12 months” nor “the circumstances for which [Plaintiff]
need[ed]” the FWW, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1,
§ 1.00C(6)(a). Moreover, none of the evidence following
Plaintiff’s discharge from his lumbar surgery, including
physical therapy sessions and follow-ups with his primary care
physician and spinal surgeon, reflected that he needed (or even
used) a walker. (See Tr. 1160-1206, 1356, 1446-49.)
Second, although the ALJ did not expressly reject
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his walker usage, the ALJ did
discount the bending/lifting/twisting restrictions issued at the
same time as the FWW, noting those restrictions were “temporary
in nature and not intended to limit [Plaintiff] for more than a
short period, as [they were] offered [] at the time of discharge
after lumbar spine surgery” and “d[id] not reflect a complete
picture of [Plaintiff]’s functional capacity throughout the
- 13 -

relevant period of alleged disability.” (Tr. 29 (citing Tr.
1481).) The ALJ also rejected Plaintiff’s testimony that he used
a cane prior to his back surgery, noting that such usage “[wa]s
not indicated in any medical evidence.” (Id.) Consistent with
the ALJ’s discounting of Plaintiff’s discharge restrictions and
his alleged cane usage, the ALJ did not include the need to use
either a cane or an FWW in the RFC. (See Tr. 22.) Accordingly,
the ALJ’s decision makes clear that she did not find that
Plaintiff’s lumbar impairment necessitated an FWW, and, as such,
the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s impairment
failed to meet or equal the criteria of Listing 1.16. See Rivera
v. Astrue, No. CV-10-0315, 2012 WL 553137, at *4 (E.D. Wash.
Feb. 21, 2012) (unpublished) (upholding ALJ’s finding the
plaintiff’s impairment did not meet spinal listing where “the
need for a walker w[as] observed or reported . . . immediately
after surgery,” and “[t]here [wa]s no indication symptoms of
this severity persisted”).
In sum, Plaintiff’s first issue on review fails to entitle
him to relief.
B.

Need for a Walker
In Plaintiff’s second assignment of error, he alleges that

“[t]he ALJ erred by failing to account for Plaintiff’s walker
usage in the RFC.” (Doc. 8 at 8.) Plaintiff reiterates “that he
- 14 -

was prescribed a walker after his lumbar surgery which he
[testified that] he still used.” (Id. at 9 (citing Tr. 62).) The
court’s finding in connection with Plaintiff’s first assignment
of error that the ALJ did not err by finding that Plaintiff’s
lumbar impairments failed to meet Listing 1.16, because
Plaintiff did not show “a documented medical need for a walker,”
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.16D(1), also
forecloses relief on this issue on review.
C.

Need to Lie Down
Finally, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ erred in failing

to address Plaintiff’s need to lie down during the day to
relieve pain in the RFC.” (Doc. 8 at 9.) In particular,
Plaintiff notes that the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony
“that he spent most of his time sitting propped up in his
recliner or bed and laying [sic] down, which was definitely his
most comfortable position” (id. at 9-10 (citing Tr. 22-23, 63)),
as well as that Plaintiff “‘reported only moderate pain relief
with injections and pain medication’” (id. at 10 (quoting Tr.
29)). Plaintiff additionally points out that the ALJ asked the
VE whether a person needing to take at least one break per
workday for up to an hour to lie down could be accommodated in
competitive employment, and that the VE responded in the
negative. (Id. (citing Tr. 69).)

According to Plaintiff,

- 15 -

“[d]espite its outcome determinative importance, the ALJ did not
explain why she did not include such an accommodation in the
RFC” (id.), and “[w]here an ALJ’s ‘analysis is incomplete and
precludes meaningful review,’ remand is appropriate” (id. at 11
(quoting Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 191 (4th Cir. 2016)).)
Plaintiff’s argument provides no basis for relief.
To begin, the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective
symptom reporting helps to explain the ALJ’s omission of a need
to lie down in the RFC. In that regard, the ALJ acknowledged
Plaintiff’s testimony “that most days, he sits in a recliner or
in the bed, sitting up against the headboard,” and that “laying
[sic] down is his most comfortable position” (Tr. 22-23
(referencing Tr. 63).) The ALJ thereafter found that Plaintiff’s
“medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected
to cause the alleged symptoms,” but that his “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
th[o]se symptoms [we]re not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons
explained in th[e ALJ’s] decision.” (Tr. 23.) Notably,
Plaintiff did not specifically challenge that analysis by the
ALJ. (See Doc. 8.)
In addition, none of Plaintiff’s treatment providers opined
that Plaintiff’s lumbar symptoms required him to lie down during
- 16 -

the day. See Spradley v. Saul, No. 1:20CV337, 2021 WL 1739013,
at *12 (M.D.N.C. May 3, 2021) (unpublished) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that ALJ erred by failing to include breaks
to lie down in RFC because the “[p]laintiff cannot (and did not)
point to any opinion evidence of record supporting the need for
additional breaks to lie down in the RFC”), recommendation
adopted, 2021 WL 8322621 (M.D.N.C. June 7, 2021) (unpublished).
The ALJ’s discussion of the medical evidence further
elucidates her omission of a need to lie down in the RFC. In
that regard, the ALJ noted that:
•

At a pain
Plaintiff
“said his
“[h]e was
prolonged

•

“In April of 2019, a follow-up primary care record
showed [Plaintiff] reported he was getting ready to fly
to Portland, [Oregon] . . . but there is no indication
he mentioned any issues with his musculoskeletal issues
for flying” and “rated his pain level as 2 out of 10”
(id. (emphasis added));

•

“[I]n July of 2019, . . . [h]e reported he continued to
work as a landscaper” (id. (emphasis added));

•

“On December 31, 2019, [Plaintiff] presented for a new
pain management consultation” and complained of
“radiating pain to the left buttock, left thigh, left
calf, and left foot” but “[h]is exam was essentially
within normal limits” (Tr. 26 (emphasis added));

•

In March of 2020, Plaintiff “was treated for headache[
and] elevated blood pressure” in the emergency room,
“but he had a normal exam” and “[t]here was no complaint

management consultation on March 15, 2019,
“reported that he worked as a landscaper” and
pain was increased with . . . lying down” and
advised to maintain normal activity and avoid
bed rest” (Tr. 25 (emphasis added));

- 17 -

of back or neck pain, no indication on exam of altered
gait, display of pain behaviors, or other indications of
limitations” (id. (emphasis added));
•

“Pain management record in May of 2020 showed
[Plaintiff] reported his pain level as 2-3 out of 10
with medication[ and] 8-9 out of 10 without” (id.
(emphasis added));

•

“On November 21, 2020, [Plaintiff] underwent left
[transforaminal epidural steroid injection]” and “[i]n
December 2020, he reported having 60% pain relief and
indicated injection was ‘still very effective, and he
was very happy with that’” (Tr. 27 (emphasis added)).

Moreover, by pointing to record evidence Plaintiff believed
supported a need to lie down in the RFC (see Doc. 8 at 11-15
(citing Tr. 333, 335, 337-39, 342, 344, 376-80, 385-87, 396,
447, 449-51, 454-56, 476, 480, 489, 492, 501, 525, 532, 635-36,
638-40, 644, 649, 702, 777, 784, 789, 795, 802-03, 902, 907,
1005, 1048-49, 1053-54, 1011, 1168-70, 1180, 1188-1200, 1446)),
he misinterprets this court’s standard of review. The court must
determine whether substantial evidence, i.e., “more than a mere
scintilla of evidence but . . . somewhat less than a
preponderance,” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted), supported the ALJ’s omission of a need
to lie down in the RFC, and not whether other record evidence
weighed against that finding, see Lanier v. Colvin, No. CV414004, 2015 WL 3622619, at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 9, 2015)
(unpublished) (“The fact that [the p]laintiff disagrees with the
ALJ’s decision, or that there is other evidence in the record
- 18 -

that weighs against the ALJ’s decision, does not mean that the
decision is unsupported by substantial evidence.”).
The ALJ’s decision thus provides a “logical bridge,” Woods,
888 F.3d at 694, connecting the evidence to her conclusion that
the exertional and postural restrictions in the RFC adequately
accommodated Plaintiff’s lumbar impairment, and Plaintiff has
not shown a basis for remand.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability is AFFIRMED, and that this action is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A Judgment dismissing this action will be filed
contemporaneously herewith.
This the 26th day of March, 2024.

__________________________________
United States District Judge

- 19 -