IN RE: GRAND JURY MATTER

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 12/16/2022; that the Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena (Docket Entry 1 ) is DENIED. FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall unseal this case and shall publicly docket this Memorandum Opinion, but shall maintain under seal all other filings in this case. (Hicks, Samantha)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN RE GRAND JURY MATTER

)

No. 1:22MC30

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on a Motion to Quash Grand
Jury Subpoena (Docket Entry 1), brought pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17(c) and properly filed by the subpoenaed North
Carolina official under seal – along with a supporting memorandum
(Docket Entry 2) and affidavit (Docket Entry 3) – under Local Rule
5.4(d)(1) (as incorporated into Local Criminal Rule 57.1) and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6).1

For the reasons that

follow, the Court will deny the instant Motion.2

1

In an effort to balance the public’s interest in disclosure
of the activities of the federal courts and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6)’s mandate of grand jury secrecy, the
Court has drafted this Memorandum Opinion in a manner that does not
reveal the substance of matters occurring before the Grand Jury
(including by refraining from naming the subpoena recipient) and
has directed the Clerk to publicly docket this Memorandum Opinion.
2

Motions to quash under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(c) constitute pretrial matters as to which a United States
Magistrate Judge may enter an order. See United States v. Mayes,
No. 18CR154, 2020 WL 7388440, at *2-3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2020);
United States v. Pistotnik, No. 18-10099, 2019 WL 2233310, at *2
(D. Kan. May 23, 2019); United States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp.
2d 609, 610-11 (W.D. Va. 2001); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)
(authorizing “magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial
matter pending before the court, except” eight specified motions,
not including motions to quash subpoenas).

Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 1 of 16

INTRODUCTION
According to the instant Motion, the Grand Jury for this
District issued a subpoena to a North Carolina official demanding
production of certain records pertaining to the activities of her
office.

(See Docket Entry 1 at 1-2.)

The subpoenaed North

Carolina official has moved to quash that subpoena as “oppressive
and unreasonable because it seeks production of [her office’s]
papers that are made confidential by [a North Carolina statute].”
(Id. at 2; see also id. at 3-4 (arguing for adoption of federal
common law privilege against disclosure of subpoenaed records based
on state statute); Docket Entry 2 at 4-6 (same).)

Alternatively,

the instant Motion asserts that “much of the documentation sought
in the subpoena is protected by federal law, and the subpoena
should be quashed on that basis.”

(Docket Entry 1 at 4; see also

id. at 4-5 (“Some of the [subpoenaed] papers . . . are tax records
of [a business’s] employees.

Tax returns and return information

are confidential and protected from disclosure under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6103(a)(2). . . .

Additionally, many of the documents sought

. . . are [] protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (‘FERPA’).” (internal citation omitted)); Docket Entry 2 at 7-8
(making arguments premised on Section 6103 and FERPA).) The United
States has responded (properly under seal) (Docket Entry 4) and the
subpoenaed North Carolina official has replied (again properly
under seal) (Docket Entry 5).
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DISCUSSION
“The [federal] grand jury occupies a unique role in our
criminal justice system.

It is an investigatory body charged with

the responsibility of determining whether or not a [federal] crime
has been committed.”

United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.

292, 297 (1991); see also United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463
U.S. 418, 423 (1983) (“The [federal] grand jury has always occupied
a high place as an instrument of justice in our system of criminal
law – so much so that it is enshrined in the Constitution.”);
Branzburg

v.

Hayes,

408

U.S.

665,

687

(1972)

(“Grand

jury

proceedings are constitutionally mandated for the institution of
federal criminal prosecutions for capital or other serious crimes,
and its constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long centuries of
Anglo-American history.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The
investigative power of [a federal] grand jury is necessarily broad
if its public responsibility is to be adequately discharged.”
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 700; see also Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 423
(“[Federal grand juries] ha[ve] always been extended extraordinary
powers of investigation . . . .”).

“To this end[, a federal grand

jury] must call witnesses, in the manner best suited to perform its
task.”

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701.3

3

“Although [a federal] grand jury may itself decide . . . to
seek certain evidence, it depends largely on the [federal]
prosecutor’s office to secure the evidence . . . require[d].”
(continued...)
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Accordingly, “[a federal] grand jury’s authority to subpoena
witnesses is . . . essential to its task.”

Id. at 688; see also

United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (plurality)
(“Indispensable to the exercise of [a federal grand jury’s] power
is the authority . . . to require the production of evidence.”).
Indeed, “[a federal] grand jury investigation is not fully carried
out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses
examined

in

committed.”
quotation

every

proper

way

to

find

if

a

crime

has

been

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701 (emphasis added) (internal

marks

omitted).

As

a

result,

“the

long

standing

principle that the public has a right to every [person’s] evidence
is particularly applicable to [federal] grand jury proceedings.”
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (internal
quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
“Of course, [a federal] grand jury’s subpoena power is not
unlimited.”

Id. at 346.

“In particular, . . . the [C]ourt may

3

(...continued)
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 430. “The [federal] prosecutor in turn
needs to know what transpires before the [federal] grand jury in
order to perform h[er] own duty properly.” Id.; see also United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“United States
Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation’s criminal
laws.
They have this latitude because they are designated by
statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his
constitutional responsibility to ‘take [c]are that the [l]aws be
faithfully executed.’” (internal citation and some quotation marks
omitted) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3)). Federal prosecutors
therefore “take[] an active part in the activities of the [federal]
grand jury . . . .” Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 432.
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Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 4 of 16

quash or modify a subpoena on motion if compliance would be
‘unreasonable or oppressive.’”

Id. at 346 n.4 (emphasis added)

(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)).

“This standard is not self-

explanatory,” R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 299; however, “[c]ourts have
recognized various ways in which a [federal grand jury] subpoena
may be unreasonable or oppressive under [Federal] Rule [of Criminal
Procedure] 17(c),” United States v. Under Seal, 478 F.3d 581, 585
(4th Cir.

2007).

For

example,

“[Federal]

Rule

[of

Criminal

Procedure] 17(c) offers a vehicle for a subpoenaed party to assert
a constitutional, statutory, or common-law privilege.”

Id.

The instant Motion argues that the Court should exercise its
authority under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to recognize a federal
common law privilege based on a state statute that makes the
subpoenaed North Carolina official’s records “confidential except
in two circumstances” (Docket Entry 1 at 2 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 3 (invoking Federal Rule of Evidence 501)), the first
of which expressly allows said official “at [her] discretion . . .
[to]

ma[k]e

[such

records]

available

for

inspection

by

duly

authorized representatives of the . . . federal government who
desire access to and inspection of the records in connection with
some

matter

officially

before

them,

including

criminal

investigations” (id. at 2 (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted)), and the other of which provides for disclosure “upon an

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Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 5 of 16

order issued in [a specified state] Superior Court” (id. (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

The Court rejects that argument.

To begin, the Court agrees with the United States that the
state

statute

in

question

–

which,

at

most,

offers

minimal

confidentiality protections to the records at issue – does not
warrant recognition of a federal common law privilege under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, because said state statute “does not create
any type of evidentiary privilege” (Docket Entry 4 at 6 (emphasis
added)).
(4th

See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 287 n.4

Cir.

2001)

(“There

is

an

important

distinction

between

privilege and protection of documents, the former operating to
shield the documents from production in the first instance, with
the latter operating to preserve confidentiality when produced.”);
Promotional Mktg. Insights, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs.,
Inc., No. 11CV2795, 2012 WL 3292888, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2012)
(“[T]he

relevant

question

is

not

whether

the

documents

are

confidential; the relevant question is whether the documents are
privileged. . . .

[The defendant] has identified numerous state

statutes providing that [the requested] papers are confidential,
but [the defendant] has not contended that any of these statutes
creates an evidentiary privilege. Indeed, a number of the statutes
expressly recognize that the documents may be produced in response
to a court order.

Likewise, although [the defendant] offers

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Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 6 of 16

letters

from

state

officials

opining

that

the

documents

are

confidential, these letters do not assert that the documents are
privileged.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
And, even if North Carolina law actually granted more robust,
evidentiary-privilege-like treatment to the subpoenaed records, the
Court would follow the overwhelming weight of federal authority and
would decline to enshrine any such state law in the federal common
law of privilege.

See, e.g., In the Matter of the Special Apr.

1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[C]ourts
consistently

have

rejected

the

view

that

state

records

are

privileged from disclosure [to a federal grand jury], even in cases
in which state law prohibited the disclosure of the records.”
(internal

citations

omitted));

In

the

Matter

of

Grand

Jury

Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1976) (“It is
not . . . a well-established principle of federal common law that
records required to be filed by state law under assurances of
confidentiality are privileged against use in federal grand jury
proceedings. . . . [A]ny presumed privilege created by [state law]
must

yield

enforcement

here
and

to
in

the

public’s

ensuring

interest

effective

in

[federal]

[federal]

grand

law
jury

proceedings.”); In re Grand Jury Investigation, Misc. No. 17-2587,
2017 WL 11140345, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2017) (“To frustrate
compliance with a federal grand jury subpoena based on state lawafforded confidentiality protections would in effect allow states
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Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 7 of 16

to control federal grand jury proceedings . . . .

Such a result

would

grand

unduly

interfere

with

the

[federal]

jury’s

investigatory function and invert the ordinary relationship of
federal supremacy over state law.” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 607 F. Supp. 2d 803,
806-07 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (“[C]ourts in other circuits have rejected
claims from state officials that compliance with a federal-grandjury

subpoena

would

mean

confidentiality laws . . . .

that

they

would

violate

state

The [c]ourt finds the reasoning of

its sister district courts persuasive.

. . . [A]s a consequence of

the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the [state]
provisions are preempted and must give way to the federal grand
jury’s investigative powers.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 198
F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (D. Alaska 2002) (“[R]ecords custodians of
the [State of] Alaska . . . do not have the power or discretion to
ignore

a

federal

grand

jury

subpoena.

.

.

.

[T]he

state

confidentiality statute is trumped by a federal grand jury subpoena
as a consequence of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.” (internal citation omitted)); In re Grand Jury
Matter, 762 F. Supp. 333, 335 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“[W]here state
nondisclosure statutes have threatened compliance with federal
subpoenas, federal courts have routinely compelled compliance under
the authority of the Supremacy Clause – though doing so violated
the technical provisions of the state statute.”).
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The Court reaches the same conclusion as to the instant
Motion’s “alternative . . . request[]” (Docket Entry 1 at 4):
that the [C]ourt adopt a qualified privilege . . . and
require the [United States] to demonstrate that:
“1) reasonable cause exists to believe a crime has been
committed; 2) reason to believe the information is
probative evidence of a matter in issue concerning the
criminal act; and 3) that [sic] the same information or
equally probative information cannot be obtained
elsewhere through reasonable efforts.”
(Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov.
14, 1989, 728 F. Supp. 368, 374 (W.D. Pa. 1990)).)

As an initial

matter (in the words of a court which refused a similar request),
the case on which the subpoenaed North Carolina official relies is
“not binding on this [C]ourt.

There is no constitutional or

congressionally-created privilege in [these] records; neither the
[United States] Supreme Court nor the [United States] Court of
Appeals

for

the

[Fourth]

Circuit

has

recognized

a

qualified

privilege in [these] records.” United States v. Singleton, Cr. No.
11-76, 2013 WL 3196378, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2013).
Furthermore, contrary to the terms of the qualified privilege
for which the instant Motion advocates, the United States “cannot
be required to justify the issuance of a [federal] grand jury
subpoena by presenting evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause because the very purpose of requesting the information [by
subpoena]

is

to

ascertain

whether

probable

cause

exists.”

R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 297; see also id. (“[A federal] grand jury
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Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 9 of 16

can investigate merely on suspicion that [federal] law is being
violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Likewise (and again at odds

with the proposed qualified privilege), “the existence of an
alternative means of obtaining information is insufficient to
render . . . subpoenaed material irrelevant to a [federal] grand
jury investigation.”

Under Seal, 478 F.3d at 587.

Finally:
[The subpoenaed North Carolina official’s] interest in
preserving the confidentiality of [her] records is more
than outweighed by the necessity of thorough and complete
[federal] grand jury investigations into federal crimes.
Because [federal] grand jury proceedings are secret,
compliance with [a federal] grand jury subpoena will by
and large not defeat [state confidentiality interests],
whereas noncompliance with a federal grand jury subpoena
would essentially undermine the [federal] grand jury
process and the Fifth Amendment.
Grand Jury Subpoena, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; see also In re Grand
Jury Subpoena dated Dec. 17, 1996, 148 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir.
1998) (“[D]ue to the secrecy of [federal] grand jury proceedings,
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), the confidentiality of the [subpoenaed
information]

.

.

.

will

not

be

severely

compromised

by

the

disclosure of [such] information . . . to the [federal] grand jury.
Of course, if the [federal] grand jury returns an indictment, such
information

may

become

however, a

[federal]

public.

grand

jury

In

returning

indicates

that

an
it

indictment,
has

found

probable cause to believe that a [federal] criminal offense has
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Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 10 of 16

occurred.

. . . Thus, if an indictment is returned, any interest

. . . in the confidentiality of [the subpoenaed information] will
have to give way to the public interest in the administration of
criminal justice.”); Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d
at 383 (“[A]ny incidental and speculative effect enforcement of the
[federal grand jury] subpoena would have on voluntary compliance
with the [state’s information gathering activities] is outweighed
by the [federal] grand jury’s need for this evidence in order
effectively to conduct its investigation.”).
In

sum,

“the

foregoing

generic

balancing

of

[state

and

federal] interests . . . favors the Government [of the United
States

and

any

more

granular]

case-by-case

balancing

is

inappropriate.”

Grand Jury Subpoena, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.

More pointedly:

“Case-by-case balancing of interests interjects

the [C]ourt and the [subpoenaed state official] into the federal
grand jury’s investigative prerogatives.

Inquiry into why the

grand jury seeks [the subpoenaed] records will lead to further
inquiry into who is being investigated for what offense.

None of

the foregoing is the business of the [subpoenaed state official] or
this [C]ourt.”

Id.

For all of these reasons, the Court declines

to recognize a federal common law privilege (absolute or qualified)
based on state confidentiality laws or interests which attach to

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the records subpoenaed from the North Carolina official by the
Grand Jury for this District.4
That disposition leaves only the instant Motion’s secondary
argument that, “[e]ven if the [C]ourt elects not to follow the
North

Carolina

confidentiality

protections,

much

of

the

documentation sought in the subpoena is protected by federal law,
and the subpoena should be quashed on that basis.”
1 at 4.)

(Docket Entry

As to particular federal laws allegedly implicated by the

subpoena, the instant Motion first asserts in conclusory fashion
that “[s]ome of the [subpoenaed] documents . . . are tax records of
[a business’s] employees.”

(Id.; see also id. (“Tax returns and

return information are confidential and protected from disclosure
under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(2).”).)

As support for that (otherwise

bald)

Motion

assertion,

specificity)

to

the
a

instant

contemporaneously

points

filed

(without

affidavit

subordinate of the subpoenaed North Carolina official.

from

any
a

(See id.

(citing Docket Entry 3, but not any page or paragraph therein).)
4

That determination adheres to the United States Supreme
Court’s admonition that, “although [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 501
manifests a congressional desire not to freeze the law of privilege
but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules
of privilege on a case-by-case basis, [courts should be]
disinclined to exercise this authority expansively,” University of
Pa. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (“Evidentiary privileges in
litigation are not favored . . . .
[T]hese exceptions to the
demand for every [person’s] evidence are not lightly created
. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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In addition, although the subpoenaed North Carolina official’s
supporting memorandum does give a pin cite to said affidavit for
the same basic proposition (see Docket Entry 2 at 7 (“Some of the
documents [subpoenaed] are tax records of [a business’s] employees.
See

[Docket

Entry

3],

Paragraph

12.”)),

the

cited

affidavit

paragraph simply echoes the undeveloped claim that “[t]his subpoena
seeks . . . tax records . . . of [a business’s] staff” (Docket
Entry 3 at 2).5

Such an approach to litigation will not suffice to

secure relief (particularly not in this context).

See Hensley on

behalf of N.C. v. Price, 876 F.3d 573, 580 n.5 (4th Cir. 2017)
(“[I]t is not [the court’s] job to wade through the record and make
arguments for either party.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hughes v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 1:12CV717, 2014 WL 906220, at *1
n.1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2014) (unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“A
[litigant] should not expect a court to do the work that it elected
not to do.”); see also R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 301 (“[A federal]
grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to
be reasonable, and the burden of showing unreasonableness must be
on the recipient who seeks to avoid compliance.”).
5

The Court’s own (unassisted) review of the affidavit
revealed nothing more of substance on this front.
(See Docket
Entry 3 at 3 (suggesting that subpoenaed documents would encompass
“various analyses including but not limited to . . . tax forms and
other reporting mechanisms submitted to contractors of [a business]
and the Internal Revenue Service”), 5 (cryptically indicating that
materials of the sort which would fall within scope of subpoena
“frequently contain . . . [t]ax [r]ecords”).)
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Moreover, “[w]hile it is true that some [district] courts have
held that § 6103(a)(2), along with 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a), reflects a
public policy against disclosure of tax returns, [the subpoenaed
North Carolina official has] cite[d] no case . . . which has held
that th[ose] section[s] make[ all] copies of tax returns or the
underlying data privileged.”

Heathman v. United States Dist. Ct.

for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974)
(internal citation omitted); see also id. (“[D]istrict courts have
held in numerous cases that tax returns are subject to discovery in
appropriate circumstances.”).
identified

authority

that

disclosure

(except

under

Conversely, the United States has

Section
certain

6103

only

“protects

circumstances)

from

‘return

information’ by ‘employees of the IRS [Internal Revenue Service],
state employees to whom the IRS makes authorized disclosures, and
private persons who obtain return information from the IRS with
strings attached.’

It does not forbid disclosures [of tax return

information] that come from other sources.”

(Docket Entry 4 at 4

(internal citation omitted) (quoting and citing Hrubec v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995)).)

Given

all these considerations, the Court agrees with the United States
that the subpoenaed North Carolina official “cannot attempt to
quash the entire subpoena by citing a statute that, at best, has
limited applicability to some of the requested documents” (id.).

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As a last resort, the instant Motion alleges (once more
without support or development) that “many of the documents sought
contain student information . . . protected by [FERPA].”
Entry 1 at 5; accord Docket Entry 2 at 8.)

(Docket

The instant Motion

further maintains that, because (A) “FERPA requires the [subpoenaed
North Carolina official] to destroy any personally identifiable
student data when no longer needed” (Docket Entry 1 at 5 (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3))), and (B) would bar other North Carolina
institutions from sharing student information with her office for
five years

if

she

“permits

access

to

student

information

in

violation of FERPA” (id. at 6 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B))),
(C) which, in turn, “would preclude [her office] from effectively
complying with its statutory dut[ies]” (id.), the Court should rule
“the Grand Jury [s]ubpoena herein unreasonable” (id.).

This

argument fails because “[Section] 1232g(b)(3) . . . provides that
FERPA’s confidentiality provisions . . . do not preclude access to
student records necessary to enforce federal law.”

C.M. v. Board

of Educ. of Union Cnty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 128 F. App’x 876,
884

(3d

Cir.

2005);

see

also

20

U.S.C.

§

1232g(b)(1)(J)(i)

(allowing disclosure in response to federal grand jury subpoena).6
6

In her reply, the subpoenaed North Carolina official argued
that the federal grand jury subpoena provision cited above applies
to educational institutions and not to other entities (such as her
office) which receive student information from educational
institutions (see Docket Entry 5 at 1); however, the reply offers
(continued...)
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Case 1:22-mc-00030-UA Document 6 Filed 12/16/22 Page 15 of 16

CONCLUSION
The Court finds no justification to adopt a federal common law
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, based on either the
specific state statute highlighted by the subpoenaed North Carolina
official or her general interest in preserving the confidentiality
of records she acquires in the performance of her official duties.
Nor do the provisions of federal tax law and/or FERPA cited by the
subpoenaed North Carolina official render the challenged subpoena
“unreasonable or oppressive,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Quash Grand Jury
Subpoena (Docket Entry 1) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall unseal this case
and shall publicly docket this Memorandum Opinion, but shall
maintain under seal all other filings in this case.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
December 16, 2022

6

(...continued)
no plausible basis to believe that North Carolina educational
institutions would view FERPA as barring them from sharing
information with the subpoenaed North Carolina official’s office
because she disclosed documents demanded by a federal grand jury
subpoena, which those institutions themselves would have had to
disclose if so subpoenaed. (See id. at 1-2.)
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