LEAK v. DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 02/05/24, that Plaintiff's Application (Docket Entry 6 ) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL. IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim. (al)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

BRADLEY LEAK,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVISON COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, )
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

1:23CV439

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This

case

comes

before

the

undersigned

United

States

Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District
Court Without

Prepaying

Fees

or

Costs

(Docket

Entry

6)

(the

“Application”), filed in conjunction with his pro se Complaint
(Docket Entry 1).

For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

will grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending
dismissal of this action.
RELEVANT STANDARDS
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”
Cir.

Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

1995)

(en

banc)

(internal

“Dispensing

with

filing

fees,

quotation

however,

[is]

marks
not

omitted).

without

its

problems. . . .

In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).

To

address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that
“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt
determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” id., when the complaint does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Where a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

This standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”

Id.1

1

Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
(continued...)
2

BACKGROUND
Asserting claims (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) under the First,
Eighth,

and

Fourteenth

Amendments

of

the

United

States

Constitution, as well as Title VI (presumably of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964) (see Docket Entry 1 at 6),2 Plaintiff initiated this
action

against

six

defendants:

(1)

Davidson

County

Sheriff’s

Department, (2) Davidson Medical Department, (3) Davidson County
Detention Center, (4) Nurse Madison, (5) Doctor E, and (6) Sgt.
Watson

(collectively,

the

“Defendants”)

(see

id.

at

2-3).

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint (and attachments thereto):
At an earlier, unspecified date, “[Plaintiff] was diagnosed
[with] psychosis[].”

(Id. at 19.)

On April 23, 2023, during

Plaintiff’s detention at the Davidson County Detention Center,
“Nurse Madison had Doctor E [] stop[ Plaintiff’s] mental health
medications[.]

Officer W[atson ] had his camera on[] when Nurse

Madison said that she would never give [Plaintiff his] mental

1

(...continued)
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
2

Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
3

health [medication] ever again. [Defendants] stopped [Plaintiff’s]
mental health medication.”

(Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff has characterized this denial of medication as “a
prima fac[ie] case [of] discrimination” (id. at 15), for which he
seeks

“summary

judgment,

damages,

injunction,

[and]

punitive

damages” (id. at 5).
DISCUSSION
I. Discrimination Claim
To begin, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants engaged in
“discrimination” which violated his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment (and presumably Title VI) (id. at 13; see also id. at 6
(invoking Title VI)), as well as “[r]etaliation [in violation] of
[the] 1st Amendment” (id. at 6).

However, simply using the terms

“discrimination” or “retaliation,” and even asserting in conclusory
fashion that Defendants’ conduct constituted a “prima fac[ie] case
[of] discrimination” (id. at 15), does not suffice to state a
viable claim.

See, e.g., Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (observing that

“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions” and
that

a

viable

complaint

“demands

more

than

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”).
lacks

any

factual

allegations

establishing

an

unadorned,

The Complaint

discrimination

or

retaliation or identifying the motivating bias for any alleged
discrimination or retaliation.

(See Docket Entry 1 at 1-27.)

4

Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination and
retaliation claim(s) for failure to state a plausible claim.

See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II. Claims Against Institutional Defendants
Additionally, the Complaint names Davidson County Sheriff’s
Department,

Davidson

Medical

Department,

and

Davidson

County

Detention Center as the first three defendants. (Docket Entry 1 at
2-3.)

However, Davidson County Sheriff’s Department, Davidson

Medical Department, and Davidson County Detention Center do not
qualify as legal entities subject to suit and/or persons within the
meaning of Section 1983.
“State law dictates whether a governmental agency has the
capacity to be sued in federal court.

There is no North Carolina

statute authorizing suit against a county’s sheriff’s department.”
Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419-20 (M.D.N.C. 2004)
(internal citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Jail
Sheriff’s Dept., No. 1:15cv91, 2016 WL 5417399, at *2 (M.D.N.C.
Aug. 19, 2016) (concluding that Orange County Jail and Orange
County Sheriff’s Department do not qualify as “entit[ies] capable
of being sued in federal court”), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL
5415755 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2016); Capers v. Durham Cnty. Sheriff
Dept., No. 1:07cv825, 2009 WL 798924, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 23,
2009) (holding that “Durham County Sheriff Department is not a
legal entity capable of being sued”); Parker v. Bladen Cty., 583 F.

5

Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (dismissing Section 1983 claims
against Bladen County Sheriff’s Department because it “lacks legal
capacity to be sued,” as no North Carolina “statute authoriz[es]
suit against a North Carolina county’s sheriff’s department”).

To

remedy that issue, Plaintiff could potentially name the Sheriff of
Davidson County as a defendant, but any such claim would still fail
to state any claim for relief. The Complaint describes no personal
involvement by the Sheriff in the alleged violations and theories
of

respondeat

superior

or

liability

predicated

solely

on

a

defendant’s identity as a supervisor do not exist under Section
1983.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

Claims against Davidson Medical Center and Davidson County
Detention Center suffer from a similar flaw.

Section 1983 imposes

liability only on “persons” who violate a plaintiff’s federally
protected

civil

rights,

but

Davidson

County

Detention

Center — including its constituent part, the Davidson Medical
Center — “is a building and not a person.”

Allen v. Correct Care

Sols., No. 1:21cv146, 2021 WL 954624, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 4,
2021), recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 949633 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 12,
2021), aff’d, 853 F. App’x 858 (4th Cir. 2021); see also Allen v.
Durham Cnty. Magistrate Off., No. 1:20cv90, 2021 WL 6755021, at *4
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (“Durham County Detention Facility do[es]
not

qualify

as

[a]

legal

entit[y]

subject

to

suit.”),

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 286817 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 5, 2022),

6

aff’d, No. 22-1088, 2022 WL 2987941 (4th Cir. July 28, 2022).

Even

if Plaintiff substituted the Davidson County Sheriff, as the person
responsible for Davidson County Detention Center and/or its Medical
Center, the Complaint contains no factual matter showing any
conduct

by

the

Sheriff

in

the

operation

of

Davidson

County

Detention Center or its Medical Center which violated Plaintiff’s
federal constitutional or statutory rights.

(See Docket Entry 1

at 1-27.)
Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief
as

to

these

three

Defendants,

warranting

dismissal

under

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III. Claims Against Sgt. Watson
As to claims against Sgt. Watson, the Complaint alleges only
that Sgt. Watson “had his camera on[] when Nurse Madison said that
she would never give [Plaintiff his] mental health [medication]
ever again.”

(Id. at 5.)

However, “[a] successful individual

capacity claim must allege that the defendant was personally
involved in the deprivation of [Plaintiff]’s rights.”

Bunting v.

Cooper, Civ. Action No. 5:17-CT-3098, 2017 WL 5639948, at *3
(E.D.N.C. May 23, 2017) (citing, inter alia, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
676).

The Complaint fails to set out any facts showing Sgt.

Watson’s

personal

Plaintiff’s rights.

involvement

in

the

alleged

(See Docket Entry 1 at 1-27.)

7

violations

of

Thus, the Court

should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Sgt. Watson for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. Claims Regarding Plaintiff’s Medical Care
The Complaint also alleges Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims based on deliberate indifference due to the denial of
medical care as to the remaining two Defendants, Nurse Madison and
Doctor E.

(See id. at 6; see also id. at 13 (accusing Nurse

Madison of violating Plaintiff’s Due Process Clause rights by
denying him medication), 16 (same as to Nurse Madison and Doctor
E), 22 (asserting that denial of medication by Nurse Madison and
Doctor

E

constituted

“deliberate

indifference”),

26

(same).)

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need can state a claim
under Section 1983.
(4th Cir. 2008).

See, e.g., Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241

However, “[d]eliberate indifference is a very

high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).

“Moreover,

mere disagreement with treatment received is not enough to state a
claim for relief.”

Crump v. Yapp, et al., No. 1:22cv474, 2022 WL

21825813, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2022).

The Complaint sets out

no facts establishing Nurse Madison or Doctor E acted in deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s alleged medical need.

(See Docket

Entry 1 at 1-27.)
Further, the Complaint fails to establish that Plaintiff’s
mental health medication qualifies as a serious medical need.

8

A

medical need qualifies as serious if it “has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even
a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.”

Iko, 535 F.2d at 241.

The Complaint apparently

contends that Plaintiff needs medication due to his “diagnos[is] of
psychosis[]” (Docket Entry 1 at 19), but the Complaint does not
provide any factual matter showing the need for the specific
medication at issue or adverse effects from its denial (see id. at
1-27).

Moreover, the Complaint alleges no facts regarding the

timing or source of the alleged diagnosis.

(See id.)

Under these circumstances, the Court should dismiss these
claim(s) against Nurse Madison and/or Doctor E for failure to state
a claim for relief under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
V. Official Capacity Claims
Finally, the Complaint alleges claims against Defendants in
their official capacity.

(See id. at 2-3.)

For reasons stated in

the preceding sections, the Complaint fails to state any claim
against Defendants.

Assuming for the purposes of discussion each

Defendant qualified as a person subject to suit under § 1983, for
official-capacity liability to attach, “it must be shown that the
actions

of

[Defendants]

were

unconstitutional

pursuant to a custom or policy of the entity.”

and

were

taken

Giancola v. State

of W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550 (4th Cir. 1987)
(observing that official capacity suits actually target employing

9

entity); see also Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“[The Supreme Court] ha[s] required a
plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a [local governmental
body] under § 1983 to identify a [local governmental] ‘policy’ or
‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”).
The Complaint does not allege facts which (if accepted as
true) would establish that any constitutional violations occurred
pursuant to a custom or policy of Defendants’ entities.
Docket Entry 1 at 1-27.)

(See

As a result, the Court should dismiss all

claims against Defendants in their official capacity under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
CONCLUSION
This action fails to state a viable claim for relief.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket
Entry 6) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT
TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
February 5, 2024

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