CONNOR v. UNC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM ORDER signed by JUDGE THOMAS D. SCHROEDER on 3/6/2025, the court therefore adopts the Recommendation except as set out herein. IT IS ORDERED that UNC's objections (Doc. 21 ) are SUSTAINED IN PART a nd OVERRULED IN PART and that: UNC's motion to dismiss (Doc. 11 ) Connor's claims for a race-based hostile work environment based on allegations of co-worker harassment (to the extent alleged in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims for Rel ief), for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, is GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED; UNC's motion to dismiss Connor's hostile work environment claim based on sex discrimination (Third Claim for Relief) is DENIED; UNC's m otion to dismiss Connor's Title VII discrimination claims (Third and Fifth Claims for Relief) is DENIED; FURTHER ORDERED that Connor's partial objection (Doc. 22 ) is OVERRULED and that: UNC's motion to dismiss Connor's Title VII retaliation claim (Fourth Claim for Relief) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is GRANTED and that claim is DISMISSED. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
YAMICIA CONNOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM,
Defendant.

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1:23CV1044

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the “Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint” by UNC Health Care System (“UNC”).
The United States Magistrate Judge

(Doc. 11.)

filed a Recommendation

in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and served it on the parties.
(Docs. 19, 20.)

UNC timely objected to the Recommendation (Doc.

21), as did Plaintiff Yamicia Connor (Doc. 22).
responded to the other’s objection.

Each party has

(Docs. 23, 24.)

For the

reasons set forth below, UNC’s objection will be sustained in part
and overruled in part, Connor’s objection will be overruled, and
the Recommendation as modified will be adopted.
I.

BACKGROUND
The facts alleged in the 188-paragraph amended complaint

(hereinafter the “complaint”) are set forth in the Recommendation
and need not be repeated here.

In short, Connor alleges that as

a black, Hispanic first-and-second-year female fellow in UNC’s
gynecology-oncology

fellowship

program

in

2022,

she

was

discriminated against based on race, sex, and disability.
8 ¶¶ 6, 9, 100; see generally Doc. 8, Doc. 8-1.)

(Doc.

After her

employment was terminated in November 2022, she filed a charge
with

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

Commission

(“EEOC”)

in

December 2022 alleging discrimination by two of her supervisors
based on race, sex, disability, and “parental status.”
at 2, 3.)

(Doc. 8-1

After receiving her right to sue letter (Doc. 8 ¶ 135),

this lawsuit followed. Connor asserts claims for retaliation under
the

Family

Medical

Leave

Act

(First

Claim

for

Relief),

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Second
Claim for Relief), sex discrimination under Title VII (Third Claim
for Relief), retaliation based on her complaints of sex and race
discrimination,

in

violation

of

Title

VII

(Fourth

Claim

for

Relief), race discrimination under Title VII (Fifth Claim for
Relief), and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Sixth
Claim for Relief).1
II.

ANALYSIS
A.

UNC’s Objections

UNC asserts the Recommendation errs in three ways: (1) in
concluding

that

Connor

exhausted

her

administrative

remedies

related to her Title VII claims based on co-worker harassment (Doc.
21 at 2); (2) in concluding that Connor had sufficiently alleged

1

Connor has voluntarily dismissed her § 1981 claim.
2

(Doc. 15.)

a hostile work environment claim based on race or sex (id. at 11);
and

(3)

in

concluding

that

Connor

had

sufficiently

pleaded

“disparate treatment based [on] a protected characteristic under
Title VII,” (id. at 15).
1.

Each ground will be addressed in turn.

Co-worker Harassment and Administrative Exhaustion

UNC argues first that the complaint’s claims based on racial
comments by Connor’s co-workers are not properly before the court
because they were neither set out in the EEOC charge nor reasonably
related to the claims made in the charge, which referenced only
supervisory wrongdoing.

(Id. at 2-3.)

UNC focuses on Connor’s

claim for a hostile work environment based on race, see id., which
the complaint includes within her claim for race discrimination
more broadly, see Doc. 8 at 36-37. Connor responds that any claims
based on co-worker harassment are properly before the court because
they are “reasonably related” to the EEOC charge and/or would have
been developed by a reasonable investigation of the charge.

(Doc.

24 at 9-10.)
“[T]he scope of the plaintiff’s right to file a federal
lawsuit is determined by the [EEOC] charge’s contents.”

Sydnor v.

Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).

“Thus, ‘a plaintiff fails to exhaust his

administrative

where . . . his

reference

remedies

different

time

frames,

administrative

actors,

and

charges

discriminatory

conduct than the central factual allegations in his formal suit.’”
3

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chacko v. Patuxent Inst.,
429 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 2005)).
plaintiff's

claims

in

her

Nevertheless, “so long as ‘a

judicial

complaint

are

reasonably

related to her EEOC charge and can be expected to follow from a
reasonable administrative investigation,’ she ‘may advance such
claims in her subsequent civil suit.’” Id. at 594 (emphasis added)
(quoting Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th
Cir. 2000)).2
Connor’s EEOC charge begins with this statement: “I believe
that I was subject to discrimination by my mentor, Dr. Wendy
Brewster, Professor, Gynecologic Oncology & Director, UNC Center
for Women’s Health Research, and Fellowship Director Dr. Victoria
Bae-Jump.”

(Doc. 8-1 at 3.)

It describes the birth of Connor’s

twin children on June 2, 2021, and states that she took two weeks
off in February 2022 for one child’s surgery.

“Upon returning

[from leave for her son’s surgery],” she states, “I began to notice
subtle changes in the behavior of my senior co-fellows towards me.
For example, they began to obsessively check my work and accused
me of doing things that I had not done.”

(Id.)

She further states

that three months later, “I did notice that my co-fellows and
others were very standoffish and cold towards me.”

(Id. at 4.)

The Recommendation correctly states and analyzes the exhaustion
contention under the well-known standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), although the footnote misstates the standard in the
parenthetical to EEOC v. 1618 Concepts, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 595, 601
(M.D.N.C. 2020), as applying Rule 12(b)(1). (Doc. 19 at 9 n.2.)
2

4

The remainder of the three and one-quarter page rendition of her
allegations makes no reference to any conduct by her co-fellows.
(See id. at 3-6.)

Rather, the EEOC Charge is specifically limited

to allegations involving conduct of, and treatment by, her two
supervisors.
The

complaint,

in

contrast,

includes

eight

paragraphs

detailing the wrongdoing of Connor’s “white and non-disabled cofellows.”
fellows

(Doc. 8 ¶¶ 35-40, 46, 48.)3
“obsessively

check[ed]

It alleges that these co-

[Connor’s]

work

and

accuse[d] [Connor] of doing things that were untrue.”
The complaint goes further, however.
race-related

communications

¶¶ 36-40, 46.)

by

falsely

(Id. ¶ 35.)

It includes allegations of

Connor’s

co-fellows.

(Doc.

8

According to these allegations, the co-fellows

made derogatory comments about black physicians, such as text
messages referring to black female physicians as “undeserving,”
concluding that a black physician “hasn’t learned the job, but she
has done a ton of DEI” and “has totally skated by bc she does all
this diversity work and founded white coats black doctors so it[’]s
like no one realizes she sucks,” describing a black physician as
“special” in a pejorative sense and another as “woof,” a black
male colleague as “ass,” “big dick,” “bro,” and “the worst,” and

The complaint’s ADA claim rests on claims of failure to accommodate;
there is no allegation of hostile work environment based on disability.
(Doc. 8 ¶¶ 151-62.)
3

5

a black female department head as “bizarre,” “embarrassing,” “an
idiot,” and “clueless.”

(Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.)

UNC is correct that the complaint’s claim for a racially
hostile work environment is not reasonably related to the EEOC
charge,

nor

would

it

have

been

developed

by

a

reasonable

investigation into the charge.
First, the wrongdoers are different.

The complaint includes

eight paragraphs of alleged misconduct by Connor’s “white and nondisabled co-fellows” (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 35-40, 46, 48).

The EEOC charge,

by contrast, contains no allegations that can be construed to even
suggest that

the

co-workers

were engaging

environment based on a protected ground.

in

a

hostile

work

As its first paragraph

foreshadows, it details “discrimination by [her] mentor, Dr. Wendy
Brewster . . . and Fellowship Director Dr. Victoria Bae-Jump.”
(Doc. 8-1 at 3-6.)
fellows.

No similar assertion is made against the co-

(See generally Doc. 8-1.)

It is difficult to read the

EEOC charge, with its passing references to Connor’s co-fellows
against its extensive discussion of her supervisors’ actions, and
reasonably conclude that Connor accused the co-fellows of any
legally cognizable wrongdoing.
Second, the co-fellows’ actions are different.

Connor’s EEOC

charge references “subtle changes in the behavior of [her] senior
co-fellows

towards

[her],”

states

her

co-fellows

“began

to

excessively check [her] work and accused [her] of doing things
6

that [she] had not done,” and describes them as “standoffish and
cold towards [her].”

(Doc. 8-1 at 3, 4.)

The complaint’s factual

allegations of the hostile work environment repeats the assertion
that the co-fellows “obsessively check[ed] Plaintiff’s work and
falsely accus[ed] Plaintiff of doing things that were untrue” (Doc.
8 ¶ 35), but the basis of her hostile work environment claim
focuses on what she now alleges are racially-charged texts and
comments in violation of law – none of which was even alluded to
in the EEOC charge, (id. ¶¶ 36-40).
Third, the discriminatory motivations of the co-fellows are
different.

The EEOC charge’s reference to co-fellows focuses on

their response to Connor’s medical conditions and parental status.
It explains that her co-fellows began obsessively checking her
work after her leave of absence to care for her son, and later
that they were “standoffish and cold” toward her “because of [her]
medical issues.”
to

the

(Doc. 8-1 at 3, 4.)

co-fellows,

communications.

by

contrast,

The complaint’s references
focus

on

racially-biased

(Doc. 8 ¶¶ 36-40.)

The disjunction between wrongdoer, actions, and motivation
brings this case close to Chacko, 429 F.3d 505, cited by UNC, and
not Sydnor, 681 F.3d 591, and Smith, 202 F.3d 234, as urged by
Connor. The EEOC charge failed to provide UNC with adequate notice
and opportunity to voluntarily correct a hostile work environment
due to race-related comments by Connor’s co-fellows.
7

Nor would

any reasonable agency investigation into the charge’s allegations
have developed that claim.

The charge claimed misconduct by

Connor’s supervisors and leveled absolutely no claim of unlawful
Title VII conduct by the co-fellows.

As such, the charge did not

make it likely that any agency-driven conciliation would resolve
any race-based discrimination by the co-fellows.

See Chacko, 429

F.3d at 510 (noting that the purposes of the exhaustion requirement
are (1) notice and an opportunity for the alleged offender to
voluntarily correct and (2) conciliation through agency-monitored
settlement).
Connor therefore did not exhaust her administrative remedies
as to any claim of hostile work environment based on race-based
discrimination by her co-fellows.

Because such a claim was not

exhausted, it is not properly before the court.
At least at this stage, however, the court is unconvinced
that the allegations of race-based comments by Connor’s co-fellows
cannot be considered in connection with Connor’s exhausted claim
against her two supervisors.

The result of a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is the dismissal of claims.

See Chacko,

429 F.3d at 513 (“We have generally dismissed any claims in which
the plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies before
bringing suit.”).

Yet the underlying factual allegations may

potentially be relevant for exhausted claims.
Companies,

Inc.,

128

F.

Supp.
8

3d

902,

Keener v. Universal

915

(M.D.N.C.

2015)

(“Although this court has found that Plaintiff has not exhausted
her

hostile

work

environment

claim,

these

allegations

could

nonetheless possibly serve as evidence to support her properly
asserted sex discrimination claim.”).

As discussed below, the

court is unable to say at this early stage that those allegations
cannot be relevant to Connor’s plainly exhausted claim of race
discrimination

by

her

supervisors,

which

development of the facts for that claim.

will

depend

on

the

UNC’s first objection is

therefore sustained to the extent that Connor’s race-based hostile
work environment claim will be dismissed.
2.

Sex-Based Hostile Work Environment Claim

UNC argues that Connor has failed to adequately plead a
hostile work

environment claim based

on

sex

because

(1)

any

misconduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to amount to
a hostile work environment and (2) even if there was misconduct,
none was due to Connor’s protected characteristics.
11-14.)

(Doc. 21 at

Connor responds that the mistreatment alleged, especially

mistreatment from superiors, was sufficiently severe to state a
hostile work environment claim.

(Doc. 24 at 14-16.)

She further

responds that she has alleged misconduct based on a protected
characteristic — her sex — because she has been discriminated
against based on her status as a mother.
To adequately plead

(Id. at 17-18.)

a hostile work environment claim, a

plaintiff must allege “(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on
9

the

plaintiff’s

sufficiently

[protected

severe

or

characteristic];

pervasive

to

alter

(3)
the

which

is

plaintiff's

conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment;
and (4) which is imputable to the employer.”

Boyer-Liberto v.

Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(citation

omitted).

Whether

the

environment

is

sufficiently

severe or pervasive is based on the totality of the circumstances,
including

“the

frequency

of

the

discriminatory

conduct;

its

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance.”

Id. (citation omitted).

The court agrees with Connor that she has pleaded a plausible
hostile work environment claim as part of her claim for sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII (Third Claim for Relief).
Connor alleges a deterioration in the workplace due to her status
as a new mother.

(Doc. 8 ¶¶ 33-35, 41-44, 46, 48, 49-50, 53, 54.)

Connor

her

alleges

mentor

scolded

her

for

not

having

the

“bandwidth” for the job given her status as a new mother (id.
¶ 41), and that she later was restricted from using the bathroom
until certain tasks were completed, which resulted in her soiling
her clothes with menstrual blood such that her husband had to bring
her new clothing, (id. ¶ 54).

See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 284

(explaining that “an employee will have a reasonable belief that
a hostile work environment is occurring based on an isolated
10

incident

if

that

harassment

is

physically

threatening

or

humiliating”).
UNC argues that Connor has not linked any misconduct to a
protected characteristic and contends that allegations regarding
UNC’s responses to Connor’s need to care for her son do not amount
to sex-based discrimination.

(Doc. 21 at 12 (citing Piantanida v.

Wyman Ctr., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997).) The out-of-circuit
precedent cited in support, however, answered a different, “narrow
question”: “whether being discriminated against because of one's
status as a new parent is ‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions,’ . . . and therefore
violative of the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act].”

Piantanida, 116

F.3d

more

at

342.

In

any

event,

Connor

alleges

discrimination based on her status as a parent.

than

just

She alleges her

mentor told her she did not have the “bandwidth” for the fellowship
because “she was a new mom with twins under a year old.”
¶ 41 (emphasis added).)

(Doc. 8

At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the court is

obliged to “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained
in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam), and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving
party’s favor, Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th
Cir. 1997).

Under this standard, the complaint plausibly alleges

that Connor was subjected to a hostile work environment because of
her status as a mother rather than simply as a parent, and thus
11

ties the allegations of mistreatment to her sex.

Cf. Phillips v.

Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971) (per curiam)
(concluding that a corporation’s use of one hiring policy for women
with

preschool-age

preschool-age

children

children

and

would

another

violate

policy

for

men

with

antidiscrimination

law).

UNC’s second objection will therefore be overruled.
3.

Race and Sex Discrimination Claims

UNC argues next that Connor has failed to adequately plead
any claim for discrimination based on a protected characteristic
under Title VII.

(Doc. 21 at 15-18.)

It argues that Connor’s

discrimination claims are based on disparate treatment between her
and her non-black, male co-workers and that her alleged co-workers
cannot serve as appropriate comparators because they did not commit
the same or sufficiently similar infractions as Connor.

(Id.)

Connor responds that she has listed specific examples of white and
male co-workers “engag[ing] in the same actions” as her but being
treated more favorably, and points to comments regarding race and
sex she overheard or received.
84.)
mentor

(Doc. 24 at 18-22; Doc. 8 ¶¶ 81-

Connor notes she has also alleged (1) she was informed her
has

a

reputation

for

singling

out

black

fellows

for

discipline; (2) that she was disciplined and ultimately terminated
based on false accusations against her; and (3) that she was
subject to racially hostile comments by her co-workers.
at 20-21.)
12

(Doc. 24

In order to state a claim for discrimination based on a
protected characteristic in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff
must “allege facts to satisfy the elements of the cause of action
created by that statute.”

McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Dep’t of

Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015).

Title VII makes it

unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any

individual,

or

otherwise

to

discriminate

against

any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges

of

employment,

because

of

such

color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

individual's

race,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a)(1).
The court concludes that, when considering the allegations in
the light most favorable to her, Connor has sufficiently alleged
racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.

In particular,

she alleges that “[i]n discussions with program leadership about
this hostility, Plaintiff was informed by a supervising physician
that her mentor had a reputation for targeting and singling out
black fellows for discipline.” (Doc. 8 ¶ 45.) She further alleges
the

assertions

against

her

in

the

letter of

deficiency

were

demonstrably false, and that her supervisors refused to consider
any of her evidence contrary to those assertions.
70, 72-75.)

(Id. at ¶¶ 68-

Connor also alleges that she told her supervisors

about the “hostile work environment” created by her co-workers,
including their racialized comments.
13

(Id. ¶ 48-50, 53.)

Her

supervisors shortly thereafter allegedly relied on the accusations
of those coworkers in drafting the letter of deficiency, id. ¶ 72,
despite being on notice of their possible race-based animus toward
Connor.4
UNC’s objection asserts only that the race discrimination
claim

fails

appropriate

because

Connor

comparators,

failed

without

to

sufficiently

addressing

Connor’s

allege
other

allegations supporting a race discrimination claim more broadly.
(See Doc. 21 at 15-18.)

Because the court concludes that Connor

has met her burden to “allege a plausible claim for relief,”
McCleary, 780 F.3d at 587 (emphasis in original), it need not
address

whether

her

allegations

of

co-fellow

comparators

are

sufficient at this stage.
UNC’s objection will therefore be overruled as it relates to
Connor’s claim for racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
(Fifth Claim for Relief).

For the reasons given in the court’s

discussion of the sex-based hostile work environment allegations,
the objection will also be overruled as to her claim for sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII (Third Claim for Relief).5

As noted earlier, although the allegations regarding Connor’s cofellow’s racialized remarks cannot support an unexhausted hostile work
environment claim, they may be considered for the exhausted claim of
race discrimination by her supervisors. Keener, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 915.
4

UNC is correct that Title VII does not protect against discrimination
based on disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). (Doc. 21 at 15
n.1.)
In considering the viability of any Title VII claims, the
5

14

B.

Connor’s Objection

Connor argues that the Recommendation erred in concluding
that

she

had

failed

to

exhaust

her

administrative

remedies

regarding her Title VII retaliation claim (Fourth Claim for Relief)
before filing this lawsuit.

(See generally Doc. 22.)

Having

considered the parties’ arguments on this point and conducted a de
novo review, the court agrees with the Recommendation.
19 at 11-13.)

(See Doc.

Connor’s objection is therefore overruled.

III. CONCLUSION
The court has conducted a de novo review of the portions of
the Recommendation to which objections have been made and is in
partial

accord

with

it.

The

court

therefore

adopts

the

Recommendation except as set out herein.
IT IS ORDERED that UNC’s objections (Doc. 21) are SUSTAINED
IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART and that:
UNC’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) Connor’s claims for a racebased hostile work environment based on allegations of co-worker
harassment (to the extent alleged in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Claims

for

Relief),

for

failure

to

exhaust

administrative

remedies, is GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED;
UNC’s motion to dismiss Connor’s hostile work environment

Recommendation incorrectly stated that “Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
she is a member of two protected groups based on her race and disability.”
(Doc. 19 at 16.) Therefore, the court did not consider disability status
in its de novo consideration of Connor’s Title VII discrimination claims.
15

claim based on sex discrimination (Third Claim for Relief) is
DENIED;
UNC’s motion to dismiss Connor’s Title VII discrimination
claims (Third and Fifth Claims for Relief) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Connor’s partial objection (Doc.
22) is OVERRULED and that:
UNC’s motion to dismiss Connor’s Title VII retaliation claim
(Fourth Claim for Relief) for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is GRANTED and that claim is DISMISSED.

/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
March 6, 2025

16