RAHMAN v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. et al

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 3/5/2025, that the Sealing Motion (Docket Entry 40 ) is DENIED. The Clerk shall unseal the Unredacted Response (Docket Entry 41 ). (cb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

AMIR A. RAHMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
et al.,
Defendants.

1:24cv333

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Motion To
Seal” (Docket Entry 40) (the “Sealing Motion”).

For the reasons

that follow, the Court will deny the Sealing Motion.
BACKGROUND
Alleging various violations of rights during his employment
with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), Amir A. Rahman (the
“Plaintiff”)

sued

Wells

Fargo,

Wells

Fargo

&

Company,

associated entities (collectively, the “Defendants”).
Entry 1.)
fundamental

and

(See Docket

Thereafter, Plaintiff and his counsel developed “a
disagreement

regarding

how

the

litigation

of

Plaintiff’s claims should proceed,” prompting counsel to move to
withdraw from representation.

(Docket Entry 32 (the “Motion to

Withdraw”) at 1.)1

1 Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF
footer’s pagination.

Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Withdraw, explaining that he
“learned

information

during

discovery

that

[he]

believe[d]

substantially alter[ed] the nature of [his] claims and open[ed] up
the possibility of raising new serious claims[,] . . .
attorneys we]re unwilling to pursue those claims.”
40 at 2.)

[but his

(Docket Entry

The information in question, however, “was marked

confidential [by Defendants] pursuant to [the Parties’] protective
order [(see Docket Entry 29 (the “Protective Order”))].”
Entry 40 at 2.)

(Docket

Accordingly, to comply with the Protective Order,

“believ[ing] the Court need[ed] to understand more context about
the nature of the breakdown of [the] attorney-client relationship,”
and “[t]o ensure that the Court ha[d] all necessary information to
evaluate [Plaintiff’s] response to [the Motion to Withdraw]” (id.),
Plaintiff filed the instant Sealing Motion with redacted and
unredacted versions of his response to the Motion to Withdraw (see
Docket Entry 39 (the “Redacted Response”); Docket Entry 41 (the
“Unredacted Response”); see also Docket Entry 40 at 2 (explaining
that “the Court need[ed the confidential] information to understand
[Plaintiff’s] reasoning for opposing [the Motion to Withdraw]”)).
As relevant here, the Redacted Response states:
1. [Plaintiff] agree[s] that there has been a breakdown
in the attorney-client relationship.
2. During discovery, [Plaintiff] learned for the first
time that [REDACTED].
3. [Plaintiff] understand[s] this to be a significant
discovery in [his] case, [REDACTED].

2

4. [Plaintiff] requested to amend [the] complaint to
pursue this newly discovered claim but [his] attorneys
declined.
(Docket Entry 39 at 1-2.)
As described in the Sealing Motion:
The first redaction in Paragraph 2 describes the
nature of the document [Plaintiff] received in discovery.
The second redaction is a portion of Paragraph 3
that gives context for why [Plaintiff] believe[s] the
document might lead to new claims for relief. Although
Paragraph 3 contains information about public reporting,
[Plaintiff] do[es] not believe that the redacted portion
of Paragraph 3 can be disclosed in this case without
disclosing the nature of the confidential discovery
document referenced in Paragraph 2.
(Docket Entry 40 at 2 (paragraph numbering omitted).)
The Court then conducted a hearing on the Motion to Withdraw.
(See Minute Entry dated Dec. 10, 2024.)

After hearing testimony

from Plaintiff, his counsel, and Defendants (see Docket Entry 43),
the Court granted the Motion to Withdraw (see Text Order dated
Dec. 11, 2024).
In accordance with this Court’s Local Rules, see M.D.N.C
LR 5.4(c)(4) (requiring the party claiming confidentiality to file
a response in support of sealing, even when that party did not file
the motion to seal), Defendants filed a memorandum in support of
the

Sealing

Memorandum”)).

Motion

(see

Docket

Entry

45

(the

“Sealing

In the Sealing Memorandum, Defendants assert the

following:
Defendants have had an opportunity to review the
[Unredacted Response]. The [Redacted] Response contains
3

redactions applied to two partial sentences within
paragraphs 2 and 3, in which Plaintiff discusses
information learned only through the exchange of
documents in discovery following the initiation of his
lawsuit.
Plaintiff testified under oath at the hearing on the
Motion to Withdraw (held December 10, 2024) that the only
way he learned of the redacted information is because he
received documents from Defendants in discovery.
Plaintiff confirmed under oath that he understood that
the documents he described in his [Unredacted Response]
originally belonged to Defendants and that they were
produced to him in discovery and pursuant to a Protective
Order.
*****
In August 2024, the parties jointly moved for an
entry of a Protective Order, which this Court approved.
According to the Protective Order parties may
designate any document or information contained in a
document as confidential if, in good faith, counsel
determines that such designation is necessary to protect
the interests of the client.
The
Protective
Order
defines
“Confidential
Information” as information that constitutes strategic
business records, information about employees, and
information
related
to
private
employment-related
information.
The information contained in unredacted paragraphs
2-3 of Plaintiff’s [Unredacted Response] contains
confidential information related to strategic business
records belonging to defendant [Wells Fargo] and
information about Plaintiff and other employees and their
private employment-related information.
The redacted
information discusses internal actions taken by Wells
Fargo while Plaintiff was a current employee and concerns
interactions between Plaintiff and employee(s) of various
internal department(s) within Wells Fargo. The redacted
information also alludes to actions undertaken by Wells
Fargo regarding Plaintiff and other employees during
Plaintiff’s employment.
*****
4

Here, the significant interest[s supporting sealing
are] the privacy rights of other employees implicated
within the redacted text and the strategic business
records belonging to Wells Fargo. Further, the Court has
a compelling interest in narrowly denying this access
under the First Amendment to protect the privacy rights
of other Wells Fargo employees.
The
sensitive
and
confidential
nature
of
personnel-related documents of non-party employees
warrants the sealing of such materials and outweighs the
presumption of public access.
*****
Wells Fargo has a high interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of this information and the limited
redactions accomplish this task[.]
*****
Upholding these limited redactions and granting
Plaintiff’s [Sealing Motion] protects the privacy rights
of Wells Fargo employees, protects Wells Fargo’s
confidential business and trade information, and honors
the parties’ Protective Order which proactively sought to
prohibit access to this sensitive information by those
without need or connection to this case.
*****
In the alternative . . . Defendants propose that the
Court grant the [Sealing M]otion as to paragraph 2 of
Plaintiff’s [Unredacted Response] and deny the [Sealing
M]otion as to paragraph 3.
(Docket

Entry

45

at

2-6

(citations

and

paragraph

numbering

omitted).)
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Standards
“The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of
judges are matters of utmost public concern,” Landmark Commc’ns,
5

Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978), and “public access [to
judicial records] promotes not only the public’s interest in
monitoring the functioning of the courts but also the integrity of
the judiciary,” Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir.
2014).

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit

has

explained,

“[t]he

value

of

openness

in

judicial

proceedings can hardly be overestimated. The political branches of
government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason.

Any

step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public
view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat, which requires
compelling justification.” United States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App’x
881, 885 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, courts traditionally recognize “a general right
to inspect and copy . . . judicial records and documents.”
v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).

Nixon

“This right

[of public access] ‘derives from two independent sources: the
common law and the First Amendment.’”

United States ex rel. Oberg

v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th 161, 171 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Virginia Dep’t of State Police v. Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567,
575

(4th

Cir.

2004)).

As

relevant

here,

“the

common

law

presumption in favor of access attaches to ‘all judicial records
and documents,’” Stone v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855
F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597), and
“is not insurmountable,” In re Application of the U.S. for an Ord.

6

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 293 (4th Cir.
2013); instead, “access may be denied if certain substantive and
procedural preconditions are satisfied,” id.2
Substantively, to “overcome the common law presumption of
access . . . a court must find that there is a significant
countervailing interest in support of sealing that outweighs the
public’s interest in openness.”
omitted).

Id. (internal quotation marks

“The burden of establishing that a particular document

should be sealed rests on the party promoting the denial of
access.”

Moussaoui, 65 F. App’x at 889; see also id. (applying

this burden to proposed redactions, i.e. documents sealed in part).
The factors a court may consider in this balancing test include
“whether the records are sought for improper purposes, such as
. . . unfairly gaining a business advantage,” as well as “whether
the public has already had access to the information contained in
the records.”

In re Application, 707 F.3d at 293 (internal

quotation marks omitted).
Procedurally, a court must “provide public notice of the
sealing request and a reasonable opportunity for the public to
voice objections . . . .”
satisfy

that

obligation

Doe, 749 F.3d at 272.
by

“docketing

[the

The Court may

sealing

reasonably in advance of deciding the issue . . . .”

request]

In re Knight

2 As discussed below, Defendants fail to overcome the right
of public access under the common law, rendering unnecessary any
consideration of access rights under the First Amendment.
7

Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).

Further, if a court

grants the sealing request, it must “state the reasons for its
decision to seal supported by specific findings[] and the reasons
for rejecting alternatives to sealing.”

Id.

II. Analysis
The Sealing Motion has appeared on the Court’s public docket
since November 27, 2024.
Court

finds

all

(See Docket Entry 40.)

procedural

prerequisites

Accordingly, the

satisfied,

as

any

interested persons have received “notice of the request to seal and
a reasonable opportunity to challenge [it].”

Washington Post, 386

F.3d at 576.

The docket does not show any objections to the

Sealing

(see

Motion

present),

Docket

nevertheless,

as

Entries

dated

explained

Nov.

below,

27,

sealing

2024,

to

remains

inappropriate.
As an initial matter, Defendants marking information Plaintiff
received in discovery as confidential “pursuant to the [P]rotective
[O]rder” (Docket Entry 40 at 2), does not itself justify the
redactions.

As this Court already explained, “the mere fact that

a party has designated material as confidential does not entitle
the party to file such material under seal.”

(Text Order dated

Aug. 26, 2024 (declining to adopt paragraph in Protective Order
providing for automatic sealing).)
In addition, Plaintiff’s purported “elect[ion] to withdraw the
underlying [Unredacted Response] if the [Sealing Motion] is denied”

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(Docket Entry 40 at 3), misses the mark. Under this Court’s Local
Rules, “[w]hen the party filing a motion to seal is also the party
claiming confidentiality, that party may elect to withdraw the
documents for which sealing is sought if . . . no other party has
relied upon the documents . . . .” M.D.N.C. LR 5.4(c)(7).

Here,

however, Defendants claim confidentiality in the relevant material,
not Plaintiff, and Plaintiff relied on that material in opposing
the Motion to Withdraw.
For their part, Defendants raise “the privacy rights of other
employees implicated within the redacted text” (Docket Entry 45 at
4) and contend that “[t]he sensitive and confidential nature of
personnel-related documents of non-party employees warrants the
sealing of
question

such

materials”

(id.).

However,

the

neither

reveals

non-party

personnel

information

identifies any non-party employees.

material

in
nor

(See Docket Entry 41 at 1-2.)

Moreover, the scope of information in jeopardy of disclosure
appears in both a New York Times article (see Docket Entry 48 at 23 (unredacted portions identifying the article and “fake interview”
practices);

Docket

describing

the

Entry

“fake

48-1

at

interview”

8-11

(unredacted

practices

in

portions

relation

to

Plaintiff’s claims)) and in other non-sealed court filings (see
Docket Entry 51 at 18-19 (describing the internal action taken by
Defendants in the redacted portion of Paragraph 2)).

For example,

echoing the redacted portion of Paragraph 3, one publicly available

9

document

proclaims

that

a

proposed

amended

pleading

“places

Plaintiff’s complaint in the broader context of Wells Fargo’s
company-wide ‘fake interview’ practices, and further describe[s]
details of adverse actions against Plaintiff following his internal
complaint.”

(Docket Entry 48 at 3.)

The Court cannot seal “information [that] has already become
a matter of public knowledge because . . . once information is
announced to the world, [it loses] its secret characteristic.”
Washington Post, 386 F.3d at 579; see also In re Knight, 743 F.2d
at 235 (explaining one factor in the common law analysis as
“whether the public has already had access to the information
contained in the records”); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec
Inc., No. 1:08CV918, 2010 WL 1418312 at *10 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 2, 2010)
(unpublished) (noting that, if information subject to sealing
remains available elsewhere, “any restriction on public access to
that same information . . . would serve no purpose”).
Defendants
“confidential

also

rely

information

records . . . .”

on

their

related

interest
to

in

protecting

strategic

business

(Docket Entry 45 at 3; see also id. at 4

(claiming “significant interest [in] . . . strategic business
records”).)

However, to justify sealing, “it is not enough simply

to assert this general principle [of protection for confidential
business information] without providing specific underlying reasons
for the district court to understand how [Defendants’ interests]

10

reasonably could be affected by the release of such information.”
Washington Post, 386 F.3d at 579.
Importantly, although the Supporting Memorandum references
“strategic business records belonging to Wells Fargo” (Docket Entry
45 at 4), the redacted statements neither reflect such records, nor
any apparently competitively sensitive information (see Docket
Entry 41 at 1-2), unlike cases where courts have ordered sealing,
see Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v. Willowood, LLC, No. 1:15CV274, 2016
WL 6783691 at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2016) (unpublished) (sealing
competitively sensitive information that revealed “[defendant’s]
source of [fungicide], as well as formula statements, registration
numbers, chemical formulas, and the like”); Silicon Knights, Inc.
v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-275-D, 2011 WL 901958 at *1-2
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2011) (unpublished) (describing competitively
sensitive information as “trade secrets; discussions of those
alleged trade secrets; highly sensitive financial information; and
details of [] proprietary projects and licensing programs”); Bon
Vivant Catering, Inc. v. Duke Univ., No. 1:13CV728, 2016 WL 7638284
at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 14, 2016) (unpublished) (describing the
protected documents as tax records and “a detailed outline of
proposed strategies for cost reduction and [budget information],
including specific dollar figures”).
Put

another

information

way,

discusses

the

mere

internal

fact

that

“[t]he

actions

taken

by

11

redacted

Wells

Fargo”

(Docket Entry 45 at 3), does not establish that disclosure of this
information would competitively harm Defendants, as necessary to
warrant sealing, see, e.g., Sims v. BB&T Corp., No. 1:15-CV-732,
2018 WL 3466945 at *4-5 (M.D.N.C. July 18, 2018) (unpublished)
(denying motion to seal internal meeting minutes where “defendants
ha[d]

not

offered

any

evidence

explaining

what

[internal

information] is competitively sensitive or evidence of the type of
harm that would occur from disclosure”).

In any event, even if

this information qualified as competitively sensitive, the prior
public disclosure (as discussed above) precludes sealing.

See

Hatch v. Demayo, No. 1:16CV925, 2020 WL 6161533 at *13 (M.D.N.C.
Oct. 21, 2020) (unpublished) (stating the proposed redactions
“encompass[ed]

publicly

disclosed

information,

negating

the

justification for sealing”).
CONCLUSION
Defendants

have

not

justified

sealing

the

redacted

information.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Sealing Motion (Docket Entry
40) is DENIED. The Clerk shall unseal the Unredacted Response
(Docket Entry 41).
This 5th day of March, 2025.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

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