Pitrolo v. County of Buncombe, et al.
Filing
110
ORDER denying 89 Motion for Declaratory Relief, Attorneys Fees and Costs. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 10/1/12. (ejb)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:06cv199
MELANIE PITROLO,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF BUNCOMBE,
NORTH CAROLINA, et. al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Declaratory Relief, Attorney’s Fees and Costs [Doc. 89].
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2006, the Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that the
Defendants failed to promote her to the position of Interim Director and
Director of the Western North Carolina Regional Air Quality Agency (Agency)
because of her gender. [Doc. 1].
At the conclusion of discovery, the
Defendants moved for summary judgment. [Doc. 19]. While that motion was
pending, the parties attended mediation but reached an impasse. [Doc. 24].
The presiding Court1 found that the Plaintiff’s principal evidence came
from her affidavit in which she recounted a statement made to her by Bob
Camby, the retiring Director of the Agency. [Doc. 47 at 7]. According to the
Plaintiff, Camby told her that she opposed for this promotion because, among
other reasons, she was a young woman. [Id.].
During his deposition,
however, Camby denied making any such statement and testified that he
actually told the Plaintiff the opposition to her was based on her youth and
lack of experience. [Id.]. Camby did not identify the person or persons who
were opposed to her promotion. [Id.].
The presiding judge noted the
conflicting evidence and found that the purported statement by Camby was
“hearsay on hearsay.” [Id. at 14]. Finding that this constituted inadmissible
hearsay, the presiding judge granted summary judgment to the Defendants
because there was no other evidence in the record, either direct or
circumstantial, that gender was a motivating factor in the decision not to
promote the Plaintiff.2 [Id. at 14-16].
The Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her case. [Doc. 49]. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that Camby’s
1
Hon. Lacy H. Thornburg was the presiding judge over this case until his
retirement in 2009. The case was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned.
2
The Court also granted summary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s other six claims
alleged in the Complaint. [Doc. 47].
2
statement was admissible as an admission of a party opponent pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). Pitrolo v. County of Buncombe, et. al.,
2009 WL 1010634 (4 th Cir. 2009). Because the statement constituted direct
evidence of gender discrimination, the Circuit vacated the grant of summary
judgment as to the gender discrimination claim and remanded that claim for
trial. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to
the retaliation claim.3 Id.
After remand, the Defendants renewed their motion for summary
judgment as to certain claims. [Doc. 57]. On June 29, 2009, the trial court
dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims for individual liability under Title VII and denied
the Defendants’ claim that the gender discrimination claim should also be
dismissed. [Doc. 62]. The case proceeded to trial on July 20, 2009. At the
close of evidence, the trial court found as a matter of law that no issue
concerning the position of Director, as opposed to Interim Director, of the
Agency had been alleged and thus dismissed such claim. The jury returned
their verdict on July 22, 2009. [Doc. 82]. The jury found the following: (1) the
Plaintiff was denied the promotion to Interim Director because of her gender;
(2) gender was a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision not to promote
3
The Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of the other five claims.
3
her to that position; and (3) the Defendants would have denied the Plaintiff the
promotion even in the absence of consideration of her gender. [Id.]. The jury
declined to award any damages to the Plaintiff, even nominal damages. [Id.].
The parties filed post-trial motions. [Doc. 86, Doc. 89]. The trial court
denied the Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and costs
and granted the Defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
[Doc. 94]. The Plaintiff’s action was dismissed with prejudice. [Doc. 95]. The
Plaintiff appealed again. [Doc. 96].
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the trial court’s order granting the
Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. Pitrolo v. County of
Buncombe, et. al., 407 F. App’x. 657 (4 th Cir. 2011). The Circuit reinstated the
jury verdict and judgment in the Plaintiff’s favor. Id. The Circuit also held that
“with the reinstatement of the jury’s verdict, Pitrolo is now the prevailing party
... [and] [a]s such, she is entitled to seek declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable to her
mixed-motive claim.” Id. The case was therefore remanded to this Court for
reconsideration of the Plaintiff’s post-trial motion for declaratory relief and
attorney’s fees. Id. Upon receipt of the mandate, the undersigned provided
the parties with an opportunity to supplement their past filings. [Doc. 107].
4
That having been accomplished, the matter is ripe for disposition. [Doc. 108,
Doc. 109].
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Concerning the Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-5 provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the [Defendants] ha[ve] intentionally
engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may ... order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, ...
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(1) (emphasis provided).
The statute also provides that when a defendant demonstrates that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor, the court “may grant declaratory relief ... and attorney’s fees
and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim” based on gender discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
(emphasis provided).4
“The word ‘may’ means just what it says: that a court has discretion to
award (or not to award) attorney’s fees.” Sheppard, 88 F.3d at 1335. In
4
The statute contains no prevailing party requirement. Sheppard v. Riverview
Nursing Center, Inc., 88 F.3d 1332, 1336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 519 U.S. 993, 117 S.Ct.
483, 136 L.Ed.2d 377 (1996). The Fourth Circuit, however, made such a finding in the
second appeal. Pitrolo, 407 F. App’x. 657.
5
exercising this discretion,
a court must then decide whether considerations of proportionality
warrant the award of a fee. If the victory is technical or de
minimis, this is relevant to the reasonableness of the fee awarded.
Indeed, the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness
of a fee award is the degree of success obtained. In considering
the reasonableness of a fee request, a district court must give
primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as
compared to the amount sought. Often, a plaintiff who sought
compensatory damages and is awarded only nominal damages
is one who formally prevails, but who should receive no attorney’s
fee award.5 When the recovery of nominal damages is caused by
the plaintiff’s failure to prove an essential element of [her] claim
for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.
Zeuner v. Rare Hospitality Intern., Inc., 386 F.Supp.2d 635, 638 (M.D.N.C.
2005) (citing Sheppard, 88 F.3d at 1335; quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103, 114-15, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)).
The Fourth Circuit has instructed that in considering whether an award
of attorney’s fees is warranted, the court should consider these factors: (1) the
extent of relief; (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff
prevailed; and (3) the public purpose served by the litigation. Mercer v. Duke
University, 401 F.3d 199 (4 th Cir. 2005).
5
Here, the Plaintiff did not receive nominal damages; she received no damages
at all.
6
DISCUSSION
Declaratory relief.
In the Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Relief, Attorney’s Fees and
Costs, she requested
a declaration that defendants’ failure to promote her to the
position of Interim Director of the Agency was motivated by her
gender in violation of Title VII. Pitrolo seeks relief requiring
defendants to place a copy of the aforementioned declaratory
judgment in her Buncombe County personnel file.
[Doc. 89 at 1-2]. She argued in her brief that such relief is authorized by 42
U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). [Doc. 90 at 3]. Indeed, it was on this basis that
the Fourth Circuit instructed that on remand the Plaintiff was entitled to seek
such relief. The Court of Appeals did not hold, however, that the Plaintiff was
entitled to declaratory relief. In her supplemental filing, the Plaintiff merely
referred to the original filing and made no factual or legal argument in support
of the request.
The Plaintiff, however, did not request declaratory relief in her
Complaint. [Doc. 1-1 at 15]. She requested judgment “for actual damages,
liquidated damages and punitive damages[.]” [Id.]. Moreover, at no point in
the Complaint did the Plaintiff reference §2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the statutory
authority for declaratory relief.
Cobetto v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, 619
7
F.Supp.2d 142, 158 n.10 (W.D.Pa. 2007) (noting that although the statute
provides for declaratory or injunctive relief, the plaintiff sought only
compensatory damages). “Plaintiff did not request declaratory ... relief in the
... Complaint. Plaintiff’s relief is therefore limited to attorney’s fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of [her] mixedmotive claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).”
Carter v. Diamondback Golf Club, Inc., 2006 WL 229304 **7 n.15 (M.D.Fla.
2006) (internal quotation omitted); Marsal v. East Carolina University, 2012
WL 3283435 *9 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff had sought
declaratory relief in her complaint but finding that her request “does little more
than simply affirm the jury’s verdict”); 5 Federal Practice & Procedure Civil
§§1238, 1256 (3d ed.) (complaint must include a demand for declaratory
relief).6
The Court would, in any event, deny declaratory relief for the reasons
stated in the second portion of this opinion. Although relief in the form of
declaratory judgment may be given pursuant to §2000e-5(g)(2)(B) in the
6
The Plaintiff cited various cases in support of her request for declaratory relief.
In those cases, it was not disputed that the plaintiff had originally sought such relief.
One case cited by the Plaintiff has been reversed and remanded. Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc., 583 F.Supp. 2d 994 (E.D.Wis.), reversed and remanded 591 F.3d 957
(7th Cir. 2010).
8
absence of an award of damages, such relief is available only when the
plaintiff has succeeded in serving an important public purpose. Gudenkauf v.
Stauffer Communications, Inc., 158 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (10 th Cir. 1998) (citing
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103). As discussed below, the Court does not find
that the Plaintiff’s litigation here has done so. Indeed, in this case, where the
Plaintiff has not been in the Defendants’ employment since 2005, a
declaratory judgment would “do[ ] little more than simply affirm the jury’s
verdict.” Marsal, 2012 WL 3283435 *9; Richardson v. Tricom Pictures &
Productions, Inc., 334 F.Supp.2d 1303 (S.D.Fla.), affirmed 183 F. App’x. 872
(11 th Cir. 2006) (declaratory relief moot where plaintiff had no present or future
connection with the defendants and had never sought reinstatement).
Attorney’s fees.
Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides that this Court has the discretion to
determine whether an award of attorney’s fees is warranted in this case. Thus,
the first consideration is whether such an award is warranted, not whether the
amount sought by the Plaintiff is appropriate. Sheppard, 88 F.3d at 1335;
Marsal, 2012 WL 3283435. In both the original motion and the supplement
thereto, the Plaintiff discusses why she is entitled to the full amount sought,
$210,265.00. At no point, however, in either filing has she addressed whether
9
or not an award is warranted in this case.7 For this reason alone, the Court
finds that the Plaintiff has failed to show that an award of attorney’s fees is
warranted.
The Court nonetheless will make an initial determination as to whether,
in the exercise of its discretion, an award of attorney’s fees is warranted.
Zeuner v. Rare Hospitality International, Inc., 386 F.Supp.2d 635, 638
(M.D.N.C. 2005) (once a plaintiff is deemed eligible for attorney’s fees, the
court must then consider whether an award is warranted).
The Court first considers the extent of the relief obtained. Mercer, 401
F.3d at 204. Here, the Plaintiff’s primary goal was an award of damages. She
sought damages in the form of lost wages in the amount of $26,000.00 to
$28,000.00 per year for a three year period (approximately $84,000.00) as
well compensatory and punitive damages.8 [Doc. 92 at 3]. The jury awarded
no damages; not even nominal damages. Moreover, the Plaintiff did no seek
7
In the Plaintiff’s Brief in support of the original motion, counsel stated that
“Pitrolo will first address the appropriate lodestar amount ... and will then discuss how
... an award of the lodestar amount ... is proper in this case.” [Doc. 90 at 6]. Although
the Plaintiff did discuss the lodestar factors, at no point did she address the issue of
whether an award of attorney’s fees is warranted in a mixed motive case in which no
award of damages was given. The issue was likewise not addressed in her
Supplemental Filing. [Doc. 109].
8
This calculation was based on her initial claim that she was discriminated
against in the failure to promote her to the position of Director. This claim was
dismissed and the Plaintiff never appealed that dismissal.
10
either injunctive or declaratory relief in her Complaint and has obtained
neither. [Doc. 1-1 at 15]. Her success, therefore, was extremely limited. The
“substantial difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery
sought suggests that the victory is in fact purely technical.” Farrar, 506 U.S.
at 121. Indeed, to the extent that she obtained a victory, it was pyrrhic.
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 117 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Moreover, because the jury found that the Defendants would have taken
the same action absent any discriminatory animus, the Plaintiff failed to prove
an essential element of her claim for monetary relief; that is, that any
damages were warranted. Western Insulation, LP v. Moore, 362 F. App’x.
375, 379 (4 th Cir. 2010) (discussing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115). In such a
situation, “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all,” a decision which
may be reached without reciting the twelve factors which bear on the
reasonableness of the fee sought. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114-15; Velius v.
Township of Hamilton, 466 F. App’x. 133, 138 (3 rd Cir. 2012) (remanding to
district court which did not appear to recognize the presumption of no fees in
nominal damages cases); Doe v. Chao, 435 F.3d 492, 505 (4 th Cir. 2006) (the
most critical factor is the degree of success obtained); Carter v. Burch, 34
F.3d 257 (4 th Cir.), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1150, 115 S.Ct. 1101, 130 L.Ed.2d
11
1068 (1995) (no award in case involving nominal damages and “no broad civil
rights issues”). “This is because when the recovery of monetary damages is
the purpose of the claim, a plaintiff who receives only nominal damages has
succeeded in only a technical sense.” Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333,
338 (4 th Cir. 2002).
The second factor for consideration “is concerned with the general legal
importance of the issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.” 9 Mercer, 401 F.3d
at 206. Five of the seven claims raised by the Plaintiff in her Complaint were
dismissed at the summary judgment stage. Although she appealed the
dismissal of her claims for gender discrimination and retaliation, she did not
appeal the dismissal of those other claims. On appeal, the Plaintiff had limited
success since the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation claim
but reinstated the gender discrimination claim. Nonetheless, that claim was
further limited by the trial court’s ruling at the close of evidence during the
trial.10 Most importantly, the jury rejected her claim for damages in any event.
In other words, she “won on appeal only to lose at trial.” Id. at 207.
9
To a certain extent, the discussion of the legal significance of the Plaintiff’s case
meshes and is intertwined with considerations of the value of the case to the public
good. Thus, at times both factors are considered simultaneously.
10
The trial court granted judgment as a matter of law to the Defendants as to the
Plaintiff’s claim that she had been denied the position of Director and limited her claim
to the position of Interim Director.
12
Nor was this a case that was legally significant to the law of gender
discrimination.
It was a “typical civil rights action in which Plaintiff was
seeking to vindicate her personal rights.” Zeuner, 386 F.Supp.2d at 639.
The vast majority of civil rights litigation does not result in groundbreaking conclusions of law, and therefore, will only be
appropriate candidates for fee awards if a plaintiff recovers some
significant measure of damages or other meaningful relief.
Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2 nd Cir. 1996). Indeed, the Plaintiff’s
case was remanded solely on an evidentiary point, not a matter of gender
discrimination law.
This is not a case in which a “civil rights plaintiff ...
obtain[ed] meaningful relief [which] corrected a violation of federal law, and,
in so doing, ... vindicated Congress’s statutory purposes.” Fox v. Vice,
U.S.
, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2214, (2011).
After the jury verdict, the Defendants moved for judgment as a matter
of law and the Plaintiff moved for an award of attorney’s fees. [Doc. 86, Doc.
89]. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion and denied the Plaintiff’s
motion for attorney’s fees. [Doc. 94]. The Plaintiff appealed again. [Doc. 96].
It is telling, however, that she did not appeal the jury’s verdict in which it found
that the Defendants would have refused to promote her to the position of
Interim Director in any event. [Id.]. Nor did she appeal the jury’s determination
that she was not entitled to an award of damages of any kind. [Id.]. The
13
appeal was limited to the trial court’s grant to the Defendants of judgment as
a matter of law and, most importantly, the denial of her motion for attorney’s
fees.
[Id.]. While the Plaintiff may claim that both of her appeals were
successful, “success might be considered material if it also accomplished
some public goal other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, court,
and client.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Here, the
only goal was personal to the Plaintiff and to her attorney’s desire for an
award of counsel fees.
[Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)] is not a relief Act for lawyers. Instead,
it is a tool that ensures the vindication of important rights, even
when large sums of money are not at stake, by making attorney’s
fees available under a private attorney general theory. Yet one
searches these facts in vain for the public purpose this litigation
might have served.
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 122 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Thus, to the extent that
the Plaintiff may claim success, it was not material to the public good. In other
words, “[w]hile every case is different, the instant one was not novel, and as
such, this factor does not weigh in favor of attorney’s fees.” Marsal, 2012 WL
3283435 **3. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that the ordinary case
where no damages or nominal damages are awarded “warrants no fee
award.” Mercer, 401 F.3d at 204.
The final factor for consideration is the public purpose of the litigation.
14
Mercer, 401 F.3d at 206.
The Fourth Circuit has held that “refusing a
reasonable offer of settlement promotes few public interests when the plaintiff
ultimately receives a less favorable recovery after trial.” Sheppard, 88 F.3d
at 1337.11 On June 19, 2009, immediately prior to the trial, the Defendants
offered to settle the case for $5,000.00. [Doc. 92-1 at 1]. The counter-offer
from the Plaintiff was to settle the matter for $393,022.00. [Id. at 4]. That
figure included a claim for lost wages and benefits in the amount of
$169,000.00 and compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000.00. [Id.].
It also included attorney’s fees calculated through June 19, 2009 in the
amount of $117,625.00. [Id.]. On July 14, 2009, the Defendants countered
with an offer of $10,000.00. [Id. at 5]. The next day, the Plaintiff rejected that
offer but proposed settling the case for $245,000.00. [Id. at 6]. On that same
day, the Defendants made their final offer to settle for $15,000.00. [Id. at 7].
No response was received. [Id. at 2]. The parties proceeded to trial.
During the trial, it was shown that the Plaintiff had earned $47,000.00
per year in her position with the Agency. [Doc. 92 at 5 n.3].12 The Interim
11
The Fourth Circuit also held in Sheppard that when an offer of settlement is
made and rejected in a mixed-motive case, Rule 68 does not apply to a request for an
award of attorney’s fees pursuant to §2000e-5(g)(2)(B) although the rejection thereof
may be considered. Id.
12
Although the Defendant did not cite to the trial transcript in discussing this
evidence, the Plaintiff has not disputed the evidence.
15
Director position earned $61,000.00 per year. [Id.]. That position, however,
was only for a six month period. [Id.]. Thus, the difference between the
Plaintiff’s salary and the Interim Director’s salary was $14,000.00 per year.
[Id.]. Since the Interim Director position was only for a six month period, the
maximum amount of lost wages would have been $7,000.00. [Id.].
At the close of evidence, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim
based on her denial of the position of Director and limited her claim to the
Interim Director’s position. [Id.]. This ruling of necessity limited her claim for
lost wages to $7,000.00. At that time, the Defendants renewed their offer to
settle the case for $15,000.00, despite the fact that the maximum amount of
lost wages in issue was the sum of $7,000.00. [Id.]. Moriarty v. Svec, 233
F.3d 955, 967 (7 th Cir.), cert. denied 532 U.S. 1066, 121 S.Ct. 2216, 150
L.Ed.2d 209 (2001) (offer is reasonable if it is equal to or more than the total
actually recovered). The Plaintiff’s attorney made no response to this offer.
[Id.]. As previously noted, the jury did not award the Plaintiff any sum.
Ten days after the jury’s verdict, the Plaintiff moved for an award of
attorney’s fees in the amount of $169,222.50. [Doc. 90 at 19]. In support of
that motion, Plaintiff’s counsel stated:
From the inception of this lawsuit we believed that Mrs. Pitrolo
would successfully prosecute her case, and have expected to be
16
compensated on an hourly basis for all hours billed. We have
also expected that if the defendants were found to have violated
Title VII, that plaintiff would receive a fee award from the Court.
[Doc. 89-4 at 9]. At the time that counsel made this statement, the Plaintiff
had already obtained a jury verdict on the mixed-motive claim which had
rejected her claim for damages. She did not appeal that verdict. When the
trial court denied the motion for an award of attorney’s fees, counsel appealed
that denial.
Counsel’s statement thus is an implicit admission that the
purpose of the second appeal was simply to pursue an award of attorney’s
fees. Therefore, the legal services rendered in connection with that appeal
are not “directly attributable only to the pursuit of a [mixed-motive] claim.” 42
U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Moriarty, 233 F.3d at 967 (attorney’s fees
accumulated after a party rejects a settlement offer provide minimal benefit to
the plaintiff).
It is also telling that even while the case was on appeal for the second
time, a mediated settlement conference with a mediator for the Fourth Circuit
failed. [Doc. 108-1]. The Defendants offered to waive the costs’ award which
the trial court had given to them and to settle for the sum of $10,000.00, even
though the Plaintiff had failed to appeal the jury’s award of no damages.13
13
Again, this figure was in excess of the actual lost wages of $7,000.00.
17
[Id.]. The Plaintiff’s only counter-offer was the sum of $173,000.00. [Id.]. The
mediator declared an impasse. [Id.].
That Rule 68 may not require [a] plaintiff[] to bear [her] own postoffer attorney’s fees in §2000e-5(g)(2)(B) cases does not,
however, prohibit courts from considering a plaintiff’s rejection of
a settlement offer as one factor affecting its decision whether to
award fees or in what amount. In fact, such a consideration
seems a sensible one in light of Farrar’s concerns with the degree
of success achieved by the plaintiff and the public purposes
served by the litigation.
Sheppard, 88 F.3d at 1337.
In other words, did “the litigation serve[ ] a public purpose, as opposed
to simply vindicating the plaintiff’s individual rights.”
Marsal, 2012 WL
3283435 **3. This case involved the claim of a single individual and has had
and will have no “profound influence on the development of the law and on
society.” Mercer, 401 F.3d at 208. The jury found that, while the Defendants
improperly considered her gender in connection with a promotion, they would
not have promoted her in any event. This is the essence of the mixed-motive
scheme and was certainly not “the first of its kind.” Id. Nor did the Plaintiff
seek “broad equitable relief that would have reached beyond her individual
claim.” Id. There were therefore no “public purposes served by resolving the
dispute [which] justifies the recovery of fees.”
Norwood v. Bain, 215 F.3d
1320 **3 (4 th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sheppard, 88 F.3d at 1336).
18
The Court has carefully considered the history of this case, the personal
nature of the relief sought and the extremely limited success achieved. The
Court cannot find this litigation served any public purpose. In sum, an award
of attorney’s fees is not warranted in this matter.14 Because the Court finds
that no award is warranted, it will not proceed to examine the reasonableness
of the fee sought.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court also determines in its discretion
that the partial victory of the Plaintiff is so limited in nature as to warrant
requiring each party to bear her/his/its own costs.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory
Relief, Attorney’s Fees and Costs [Doc. 89] is hereby DENIED.
Signed: October 1, 2012
14
The Court of Appeals granted to the Plaintiff an award of costs which the
Defendants have paid. [Doc. 108-1].
19
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