Chapman v. Rhoney et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER overruling parties' 31 , 32 & 33 Objections; accepting Magistrate Judge's 29 Memorandum and Recommendations, and granting in part and denying in part Defts' 17 & 19 Motions to Dismiss; Defts shall file their Answers to the Pltf's Complaint within 21 days of the entry of this Order. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 5/30/12. (ejb)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:10cv258
GLEN EDWARD CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS ALVIN RHONEY, in his
individual capacity, ROBERT A.
MULLINAX, as Public Administrator
of the ESTATE OF MARK
RICHARDSON SAMS, in his
individual capacity, and CITY OF
HICKORY,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss [Docs. 17 and 19]; the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and
Recommendation [Doc. 29] regarding the disposition of those motions; and
the parties’ Objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation [Docs. 31,
32, 33].
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff brings this action against the City of Hickory (the “City”) and
two of its former police officers in their individual capacities (“Rhoney” and
“Sams”). In the First Claim for Relief, the Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Rhoney and Sams in their individual
capacity based on their alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the
Plaintiff contends that by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence in bad
faith, Officers Rhoney and Sams deprived the Plaintiff of his liberty without
due process of law. In the Second Claim for Relief, the Plaintiff alleges that
the City is liable pursuant to § 1983 because it condoned a custom of allowing
its police officers to withhold exculpatory evidence from the prosecution in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Third Claim for Relief, the
Plaintiff asserts claims under North Carolina law against all of the Defendants
for obstruction of justice.
The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety on a
variety of grounds. [Docs. 17, 19]. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the
standing Orders of Designation of this Court, the Honorable Dennis L. Howell,
United States Magistrate Judge, was designated to consider the Defendants’
motions and to submit to this Court a recommendation for their disposition.
On August 3, 2011, the Magistrate Judge filed a Memorandum and
Recommendation, recommending that the Defendants’ motion be denied with
respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and granted with respect to his obstruction
of justice claim. [Doc. 29]. With respect to the § 1983 claims, the Magistrate
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Judge concluded that: (1) such claims are not time-barred, as he brought this
action within three years of the termination of the criminal proceedings in his
favor; (2) Defendants Rhoney and Sams are not entitled to qualified immunity,
because the Complaint sets forth factual allegations stating a claim for the
deprivation of Plaintiff’s due process rights and such right was clearly
established at the time the alleged wrongs occurred; and (3) the Complaint
states a valid claim for relief against the City based on a theory of condoning
a custom of allowing police officers to withhold exculpatory evidence from the
prosecution. With respect to the Plaintiff’s state law claims for obstruction of
justice, the Magistrate Judge concluded that such claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. The Defendants now object to the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation regarding the § 1983 claims. [Docs. 31, 32]. The
Plaintiff objects to the recommendation that his state law claims be dismissed.
[Docs. 33].
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Standard of Review Applicable to Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommendation
The Federal Magistrate Act requires a district court to “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In
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order “to preserve for appeal an issue in a magistrate judge’s report, a party
must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with sufficient
specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the
objection.” United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007). The
Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the
factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge to which no objections
have been raised. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88
L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Additionally, the Court need not conduct a de novo
review where a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do
not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings
and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
B.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). To
be “plausible on its face,” a plaintiff must demonstrate more than “a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S.Ct. 1937. Rather, a plaintiff must “articulate facts, when accepted as true,
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that ‘show’ that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling [it] to relief, i.e., the
‘plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193
(4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
As the Fourth Circuit has explained:
The Supreme Court has held that a complaint must
contain more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do. To discount such unadorned
conclusory allegations, a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are not more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.
This approach recognizes that naked
assertions of wrongdoing necessitate some factual
enhancement within the complaint to cross the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 and Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the Background section of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the Magistrate Judge recited the factual allegations set forth in the Complaint.
[Doc. 29 at 2-12]. Defendants Rhoney and Sams object to the Magistrate
Judge’s statement that paragraphs 138 through 140 of the Complaint allege
that Defendant Rhoney withheld the report of Officer Wiles’s interview from
the prosecution. [Doc. 29 at 6]. The Defendants argue that the Complaint in
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fact alleges that Defendant Rhoney withheld SBI Agent Beuker’s fire
investigation report from the prosecution, not the officer’s report, as stated by
the Magistrate Judge. [Doc. 31 at 3]. The Plaintiff concurs that the Magistrate
Judge’s characterization of these allegations was in error. [See Doc. 36 at 2].
The Plaintiff further points out that pages 7 and 8 of the Memorandum and
Recommendation inadvertently refer to Mike Cosby as Mike “Crosby.” [Doc.
33 at 8].
Upon careful review, the Court finds that, subject to the minor
corrections noted above, the Magistrate Judge’s recitation of the relevant
factual allegations is correct. Accordingly, the factual background as set forth
in the Memorandum and Recommendation is accepted and incorporated
herein, subject to the above-noted corrections. In short, Plaintiff alleges that
Officers Rhoney and Sams intentionally withheld substantial exculpatory
evidence when Plaintiff was being prosecuted for two murders. Plaintiff was
convicted and sentenced to death. After spending several years on death
row, Plaintiff was released after the Defendants’ misconduct was discovered
and Plaintiff’s convictions were vacated.
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IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Section 1983 Claims
1.
The Statute of Limitations
The Defendants first object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are not time-barred. Specifically, the Defendants
argue that the three-year statute of limitations period began to run when the
Plaintiff learned of the alleged constitutional violation, which was in 2003.
Since the Plaintiff did not bring this action 2010, the Defendants argue, the
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are time barred. [Doc. 31 at 3; Doc. 32 at 6].
The Defendants’ objections are without merit. As the Magistrate Judge
correctly concluded [Doc. 29 at 14-16], a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for damages arising from an unconstitutional conviction or sentence
does not accrue until such conviction or sentence has been invalidated. See
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383
(1994). Under Heck, the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims accrued on November 6,
2007, when the state court issued an order vacating his convictions. [Doc. 1
at ¶¶ 7-8]. The Defendants concede that the applicable limitations period is
three years. The Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on November 3, 2010,
within the applicable three-year statute of limitations.
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The Defendants’
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion regarding the applicability of
the statute of limitations is therefore overruled.
2.
The Statute of Repose
The Defendants next object to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to address
their argument that the § 1983 claims are barred by the North Carolina statute
of repose. [Doc. 31 at 3-4; Doc. 32 at 6-7].
The North Carolina statute of repose cited by the Defendants provides
that no action for personal injury “shall accrue more than 10 years from the
last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). Because the Complaint alleges that the Defendants’
wrongful conduct allegedly occurred between June 1992 and November 1994,
and the Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed until November 2010, nearly fifteen
years later, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred
by the statute of repose. [Id.].
The Defendants offer no precedent or other legal authority to support
the application of a state statute of repose to a federal civil rights action. It is
well-established that the “applicability of a state law to federal civil rights
litigation … must be made in light of the purpose and nature of the federal
right.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123
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(1988). “The goals of the federal [civil rights] statutes are compensation of
persons whose civil rights have been violated, and prevention of the abuse of
state power.” Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 53, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 82 L.Ed.2d
36 (1984). Consequently, the Supreme Court has rejected the application of
state laws which would undermine the goals of the civil rights statutes. See,
e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 533, 62 L.Ed.2d 481
(1980) (declining to apply state immunity statute to suit under § 1983);
Burnett, 468 U.S. at 55, 104 S.Ct. 2924 (holding that a six-month limitations
period was “manifestly inconsistent with the central objective(s) of the
Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes….”); Felder, 487 U.S. at 141, 108 S.Ct.
2302 (holding that a notice of claim statute could not be applied to § 1983
action). In light of this Supreme Court precedent, federal courts have declined
to apply statutes of repose to civil rights actions.
See Moore v. Liberty
National Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Alabama’s common-law rule of repose did not apply to claims under § 1981
and § 1982); Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 18 F.Supp.2d 786, 798 (M.D. Tenn.
1998) (holding that Tennessee’s statute of repose did not apply to claims
under § 1983 and § 1985); Lowery v. County of Riley, No. 04-3101-JTM, 2005
WL 1242376, at *4 (D. Kan. May 25, 2005) (holding that a Kansas statute of
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repose did not apply to a § 1983 claim arising from a wrongful conviction).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that application of the statute of
repose in this case to defeat the Plaintiff’s claims would be “manifestly
inconsistent with the central objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights
statutes, which is to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or
statutory rights are abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive relief.”
Burnett, 468 U.S. at 55, 104 S.Ct. 2924. The Defendants’ objection to the
Memorandum and Recommendation on the issue of the statute of repose is
therefore overruled.
3.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants Rhoney and Sams next object to the Magistrate Judge’s
determination that they are not entitled to qualified immunity as to the
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Specifically, they argue that the Magistrate Judge’s
analysis failed to focus on the specific constitutional right alleged to have been
violated, namely, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when a law
enforcement officer withholds exculpatory evidence from the prosecution, and
instead relied upon precedent involving dissimilar factual scenarios of alleged
constitutional violations. The Defendants further argue that the Magistrate
Judge erroneously determined that such right was clearly established at the
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time of the alleged wrongs by relying on case law that established the claimed
constitutional right after the alleged wrongs in this matter. [Doc. 31 at 5-13].
Contrary to the Defendants’ contention, the Magistrate Judge correctly
focused his analysis on the specific constitutional right alleged. First, the
Magistrate Judge correctly noted that the Fourth Circuit recognized as early
as 1964 that a prosecutor’s failure to turn over exculpatory evidence violated
a criminal defendant’s due process rights, even where the prosecutor had no
knowledge of the evidence because the investigating officers failed to disclose
it to the prosecution.
[Doc. 29 at 19 (citing Barbee v. W arden, Md.
Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964)]. The Magistrate Judge went
on to analyze the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent treatment of due process claims
arising from an investigating officer’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.
[Id. at 19-20]. As correctly noted by the Magistrate Judge, the Fourth Circuit
has recognized that a police officer who withholds exculpatory information
from a prosecutor can be liable under § 1983 because the non-disclosure
deprives a criminal defendant of the right to a fair trial.1 Goodwin v. Metts,
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As the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, this aspect of the Goodwin holding
remains unaffected by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). See Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 436 n.5
(4th Cir. 1996).
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885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 264
(4th Cir. 1994).
The Defendants contend that “[t]he controlling law in this circuit dictates
that as late as 2010, the law remained unclear regarding [the] constitutional
right to Due Process when police failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the prosecution.” [Doc. 31 at 9]. The Defendants’ position, however, is not
supported by the cases that they cite. For example, in Jean v. Collins, 221
F.3d 656, 663 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Jean II”), the twelve judges of the
Court of Appeals unanimously concluded that a police officer who deliberately
withholds exculpatory evidence, and thus prevents the prosecution from
complying with Brady, violates a criminal defendant’s right to due process.
The en banc Court was equally divided, however, as to whether a viable due
process claim requires evidence of bad faith by the officer. In the present
case, the Plaintiff has properly pled the bad faith element required by the Jean
II concurrence and therefore, regardless of which standard is applicable, has
stated a valid due process claim under § 1983.
Since the decision in Jean II, the Fourth Circuit has not affirmatively
resolved whether bad faith is a necessary element of a due process claim
under § 1983 for the withholding of exculpatory evidence by a police officer.
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In Lynn v. Tarney, the Fourth Circuit recognized the uncertainty of the issue
but elected to not address it because the Court concluded that under no
potentially applicable standard could the plaintiff make out a Brady-type claim
against the defendants. 405 F. App’x 753, 761 n.4 (4th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S.Ct. 241, 181 L.Ed.2d 137 (2011).
Thus, contrary to the
Defendants’ contention, the footnote in Lynn does not stand for the
proposition that the Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a fair trial
through the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
The Magistrate Judge further did not err in concluding that the
constitutional right claimed by the Plaintiff was clearly established at the time
of the alleged wrongs.
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that
Goodwin and Carter gave the Defendants fair warning that the withholding of
exculpatory evidence from the prosecution could subject them to civil liability.
W hile the Defendants argue that Jean II and the footnote in Lynn v. Tarney,
discussed above, show that the constitutional right was not clearly
established, the Defendants fail to acknowledge that neither opinion
addressed the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
Both Jean II and Lynn merely held that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to
establish a genuine issue of material fact that the officers had committed a
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due process violation. See Jean II, 221 F.3d at 663 (Wilkinson, J., et al.,
concurring in the judgment); Lynn, 405 F. App’x at 760-63.
The Defendants further argue that the unpublished opinion in Walker v.
Sopher, Nos. 95-2248, 96-1088, 1998 WL 682283 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1998)
“is still good law [and that] it was erroneous for the Magistrate to have failed
to follow that precedent.” [Doc. 31 at 12]. As an unpublished decision,
however, W alker is not binding Circuit precedent.
Nor is it persuasive
authority, as noted by the Magistrate Judge. [Doc. 29 at 20]. The majority of
the challenged conduct in Walker occurred before Goodwin; furthermore, the
qualified immunity analysis was based extensively upon Jean I, a decision
which is no longer controlling law. Accordingly, Walker does not direct a
different result in this case.
In sum, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge properly
analyzed Defendants’ qualified immunity defense and correctly concluded that
the Plaintiff stated a valid due process claim and that the right was clearly
established at the time of the violations. The Defendants’ objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion regarding qualified immunity are therefore
overruled.
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4.
Claim Against the City of Hickory
The City objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the
Court deny the City’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, arguing
that the Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show the existence of a
municipal custom or that the custom was the proximate cause of the
deprivation of his rights. [Doc. 32 at 7-13].
The City’s primary argument is that the Plaintiff failed to allege multiple
instances of police misconduct by City officers sufficient to support a showing
of a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct. Contrary to the City’s
argument, the Plaintiff is not required to allege multiple instances of police
misconduct in order to state a claim for relief against the City under § 1983.
See Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that a plaintiff
is not required to “plead the multiple incidents of constitutional violations that
may be necessary at later stages to establish the existence of an official policy
or custom and causation”). Rather, the Plaintiff has to allege a “persistent and
widespread” practice among municipal employees, along with enough facts
to permit the reasonable inference that the City had actual or constructive
knowledge of such practice. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th
Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff did so in this case, as correctly determined by the
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Magistrate Judge. [Doc. 29 at 23-24]. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that
the City had an official policy that required officers to provide only typewritten
reports to the prosecution, thereby implicitly allowing its officers to withhold
from the prosecution handwritten notes, telephone memos, pending lab work,
and case reports from other cases.
[Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 282-86]. This policy,
according to the Plaintiff, fostered a custom in which City police officers would
withhold these materials from the prosecution, even when they contained
exculpatory information, and allowed City officers to keep clandestine files
with exculpatory materials away from the prosecution and therefore, criminal
defendants. The Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Rhoney and Sams, as well
as other officers, withheld exculpatory evidence on multiple occasions in
accordance with this custom. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a valid § 1983 claim against the
City. The City’s objection in this regard is therefore overruled.
Next, the City argues that the Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts
to show that the City’s custom was the proximate cause of his constitutional
deprivation in that the actions by Defendants Rhoney and Sams “would not
have been permissible under the policy promulgated by the Police
Department.” [Doc. 32 at 12]. This argument, however, ignores the express
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allegations in the Complaint that the City’s written policy, which required
officers to provide prosecutors with only final typewritten reports, implicitly
condoned the retention or destruction of all handwritten notes, phone
memoranda, and pending lab work. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 282, 285]. The Plaintiff
specifically alleges that Defendants Rhoney and Sams acted in accordance
with this custom when they intentionally withheld the material exculpatory
evidence from the prosecution and that this custom was a cause of, and the
moving force in, the Plaintiff’s wrongful convictions. [Id. at ¶¶ 289-91]. The
Plaintiff properly alleged that the City’s custom was a proximate cause of the
due process violations by Rhoney and Sams. The City’s objection in this
regard, therefore, is overruled.
B.
The Obstruction of Justice Claims
In their pleadings, the parties agree that the three-year statute of
limitations found in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5) applies to the Plaintiff’s common
law claims for obstruction of justice, but they disagree on the date that those
claims accrued. The Magistrate Judge, applying the reasoning of Self v.
Yelton, 201 N.C. App. 653, 688 S.E.2d 34 (2010), reasoned that the Plaintiff’s
obstruction of justice claims accrued in 2003, when the Plaintiff became aware
or reasonably should have become aware of the harm, and therefore
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recommended that these claims be dismissed as time-barred the claims were
not timely. [Doc. 29 at 26]. The Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. [Doc. 33 at 12-23].
In Self, the North Carolina Court of Appeals expressly articulated the
accrual standard for an obstruction of justice claim to be “when a Plaintiff
becomes aware or reasonably should have become aware of the harm.” 201
N.C. App. at 600, 688 S.E2d at 39. In this case, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff did not discover, and could not have reasonably discovered, that he
was injured by the Defendants’ alleged obstruction of justice until 2007, when
his Motion for Appropriate Relief was granted and his convictions were
vacated. See Dail v. City of Goldsboro, No. 5:10-CV-00451-BO, 2011 WL
2837067, at *7-8 (E.D.N.C. July 14, 2011) (holding that plaintiff’s obstruction
of justice claim did not accrue until he was exonerated and released from
prison). The Plaintiff filed the present action within three years of the state
court’s order vacating his convictions. Accordingly, his claims are not barred
by the statute of limitations.
While the statute of limitations does not preclude the Plaintiff’s claims,
the Court concludes that the statute of repose prevents these claims from
going forward. As noted previously, the North Carolina statute of repose
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provides that “no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 years from the
last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). Here, the last acts of the Defendants giving rise to the
Plaintiff’s causes of action occurred in 1994. The Plaintiff, however, did not
assert his obstruction of justice claims until 2010. As such, these state law
claims are barred by this state law statute of repose. See Self, 201 N.C. App.
at 660, 688 S.E.2d at 38-39.
Therefore, the Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
that the Plaintiff’s obstruction of justice claims be dismissed, although for
reasons other than those articulated by the Magistrate Judge. Because the
Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s obstruction of justice claims are timebarred, the Court need not address the other issues raised by the parties as
to these state law claims.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the parties’ Objections [Doc. 31,
32, 33] are OVERRULED; the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation [Doc. 29]
is ACCEPTED, and the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 17 and 19] are
hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
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Specifically, the
Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED to the extent that the Plaintiff’s
obstruction of justice claims are DISMISSED.
In all other respects, the
Defendants’ Motions are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants shall file their Answers
to the Plaintiff’s Complaint within 21 days of the entry of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: May 30, 2012
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