National Alliance for Accessibility, Inc. et al v. Bhuna Corporation

Filing 34

ORDER denying 28 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis Howell on 04/10/2012. (thh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:11cv79
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR
ACCESSIBILITY, INC., a Florida
Non-Profit Corporation; and
DENISE PAYNE, individually,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
BHUNA CORPORATION, a North
Carolina Corporation,
Defendant.
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ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees [# 28].
Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (“ADA”). The Court
then recommended that the District Court grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss
this case for lack of standing. The District Court adopted the Memorandum and
Recommendation of this Court and dismissed this case. Defendant now moves for
an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion [# 28].

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I.

Analysis

That ADA provides that “[i]n any action . . . commenced pursuant to this
chapter, the court . . . in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. An award of fees under
Section 12205 is subject to the discretion of the trial court. See Dillery v. City of
Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 569 (6th Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Unlike a
prevailing plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover its fees in an ADA case
only where the plaintiff’s claim “was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . .
the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S. Ct. 694 (1978); see also Goldstein
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 337 F. Supp. 2d 771, 774 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that
Christiansburg standard applies to Section 12205). Accordingly, Defendant may
recover its fees in this case only if: (1) it is a prevailing party within the meaning of
Section 12205, and (2) the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless. Assuming Defendant can satisfy these two threshold
requirements, then the Court must determine what amount of fees is reasonable
under the circumstances. See Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 286 F. Supp. 2d 532, 541 (D.
Md. 2003).
As a threshold matter, Defendant has not demonstrated that it is a prevailing

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party within the meaning of Section 12205. See generally Buckhannon Bd. & Care
home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S. Ct.
1835 (2001) (explaining that the term “prevailing party” is a term of legal art and
discussing the context in which a party is the prevailing party under the ADA);
Hutchinson v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (addressing whether a party is a
prevailing party under the ADA). Defendant does not even address this threshold
requirement in its motion. Simply because the Court granted its motion to dismiss
and dismissed this action for lack of standing, does not necessarily render
Defendant a prevailing party. See e.g., Davis v. Jackson, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1314,
1318 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that a dismissal for lack of standing under the
Clean Water Act does not make a defendant a prevailing party justifying an award
of fees); Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F.3d 410, 414 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing circuit
split as to whether a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction allows for an
award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Because Defendant has not met its initial
burden of demonstrating that it is a prevailing party within the meaning of Section
12205, the Court DENIES the motion [# 28].1
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Moreover, even assuming that Defendant was a prevailing party, an award
of fees is not warranted in this case because the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs’
claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S.
at 422. Although this Court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this
action because the Complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating an actual or
imminent injury sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing, the
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II.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees [# 28].

Signed: April 10, 2012

Court cannot say that the underlying claims brought by Plaintiffs are groundless or
frivolous. In fact, Plaintiffs may be correct in their assertion that Defendant’s
facility violates the ADA; Plaintiffs, however, are simply the incorrect parties to
bring these issues before the Court.
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