Bleynat v. Trans Union, LLC et al

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER denying 51 Motion for Entry of Final Judgment under Rule 54(b). Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 8/28/12. (ejb)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:11cv218

EDWARD L. BLEYNAT, JR.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
TRANS UNION, LLC; EQUIFAX )
INFORMATION SERVICES,
)
INC.; EXPERIAN INFORMATION )
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Rule 54(b) Motion
to Direct Entry of Final Judgment [Doc. 51].
The Plaintiff brought this action against Trans Union, LLC (“Trans
Union”) and other credit reporting agencies seeking monetary damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681, et seq. (“FCRA”). Defendant Trans Union moved for dismissal of the
Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that individual
plaintiffs do not have the right to seek such relief under the FCRA. [Doc. 34].
On March 19, 2012, the Magistrate Judge entered a Memorandum and
Recommendation in which he recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be

granted.

[Doc. 44].

The Plaintiff objected to the Memorandum and

Recommendation. [Doc. 45]. In a Memorandum of Decision and Order
entered on July 3, 2012, the Court overruled the Plaintiff’s objection and
accepted the Memorandum and Recommendation, holding that individuals do
not have a right to declaratory and injunctive relief under the FRCA. [Doc.
47]. The Plaintiff now requests that the Memorandum of Decision and Order
be certified as a final judgment in order to facilitate appellate review. [Doc.
52].
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent
part, “[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . the court
may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all,
claims or parties only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason
for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Certification under this rule is “the exception
rather than the norm” and should not “be granted routinely.”

Braswell

Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993). The
party seeking entry of a final judgment must show that certification is
warranted. Id.
In determining whether to certify a decision, the Court applies a two-part
test: (1) decide whether the judgment is final as to the relevant claim, and (2)

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determine whether there is any just reason for delay in entering a judgment
that may be immediately appealed. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
446 U.S. 1, 7-8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980).

Having carefully

reviewed the Plaintiff’s motion, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff fails to
satisfy either prong.
First, the Order dismissing the Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief under the FCRA was not a “final judgment” as contemplated
by Rule 54(b). To be a “final judgment,” the decision “must be a ‘judgment’
in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must
be ‘final’ in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim
entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Id. at 7, 100 S.Ct. 1460
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the litigation with

respect to the Plaintiff’s underlying FCRA claims has not ended; the Court
simply ruled that the Plaintiff is not entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief
should he ultimately prove successful on his FCRA claims. In other words,
the Court has not dismissed any of Plaintiff’s substantive claims, but rather
has held that Plaintiff if not entitled to certain remedies if he is successful in
proving those claims. This type of partial ruling is simply “not the stuff of Rule
54(b) certification.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1289 & n.1 (11th

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Cir. 2010) (holding that dismissal of request for injunctive and declaratory
relief was only a partial dismissal and not a final judgment disposing of an
entire claim).
In determining whether there is any “just reason for delay,” the Fourth
Circuit has enunciated several factors for courts to consider, including: “(1) the
relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the
possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future
developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court
might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence
or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in a set-off against
the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as
delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial,
frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.” Braswell, 2 F.3d at 133536 (citation omitted).
Applying the Braswell factors leads the Court to conclude that the
Plaintiff’s motion should be denied. The dismissal of Plaintiff’s requests for
declaratory and injunctive relief did not alter the parties or substantive claims
at issue in this litigation. Rather, the only effect of the dismissal was to
preclude the Plaintiff from seeking declaratory or injunctive relief should he

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prove to be ultimately successful on his claims. Of course, the need for
review of this decision may be rendered moot if the Plaintiff’s FCRA claims are
dismissed on the merits. Under these circumstances, allowing the Plaintiff to
appeal the dismissal of his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief while
his substantive claims continue to be litigated would not be a good use of
judicial resources.
For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s motion
that the Order dismissing his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief be
certified as a final judgment should be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Rule 54(b) Motion to
Direct Entry of Final Judgment [Doc. 51] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: August 28, 2012

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