Carson v. Astrue

Filing 26

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 23 Motion for Attorney Fees under EAJA. Signed by District Judge Richard Voorhees on 8/17/2015. (khm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-262
JAMES O. CARSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendants.

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ORDER

BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

(Doc. 23).

The Commissioner has

responded, (Doc. 24), to which Plaintiff has replied, (Doc. 25).
The parties do not dispute the fact that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. When the court
remands under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the plaintiff is the prevailing party. See
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Granting a motion for attorney’s fees and costs
to the “prevailing party” under the EAJA is proper “unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
The Commissioner has the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified.
United States v. 515 Granby, LLC, 736 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir.2013). Substantial justification does
not require the position to be correct but may be substantially justified if a reasonable person could
think it correct. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988). “The government can
defeat a claim for attorney’s fees by showing that its position had a reasonable basis in both fact

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and law.” Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 656 (4th Cir.1991).
“In determining whether the government’s position in a case is substantially justified, [the
Court] look[s] beyond the issue on which the petitioner prevailed to determine, from the totality
of the circumstances, whether the government acted reasonably in causing or in taking a
[particular] stance during the litigation.” Meyer v. Colvin, 754 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir.1993)). In making this
determination, “it is appropriate to consider the reasonable overall objectives of the government
and the extent to which the alleged governmental misconduct departed from them.” Id. at 14
(quoting Roanoke River Basin, 991 F.2d at 139).
First, the Court finds that “it is difficult to conclude that the Commissioner’s litigation
position was not substantially justified when . . . the Commissioner was correct with respect to
one of the case’s two issues.” Id.at 256. This Court originally ruled that the Commissioner was
correct with regard to the residual functional capacity but later vacated its decision because of
issues with SSR-00-4p. Further, with regard to SSR-00-4p, the Commissioner relied upon
Mosteller v. Astrue, No. 5:08-CV-003-RLV-DCK, 2010 WL 5317335, at *5 (W.D.N.C. July 26,
2010) rep. & rec. adopted, No. 5:08CV3-RLV, 2010 WL 5340600 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2010),
where Judge Keesler stated in a recommendation (that this Court adopted) that:
[C]laimants should not be permitted to scan the record for implied
or unexplained conflicts between the specific testimony of an
expert witness and the voluminous provisions of the DOT, and
then present that conflict as reversible error, when the conflict was
not deemed sufficient to merit adversarial development in the
administrative hearing.
Id. at *5. Although the Court ultimately concluded that SSR-00-4p required more from the
Administrative Law Judge, the Commissioner was not unreasonable in relying upon Mosteller at

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the time. Therefore, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified
and will not award attorney’s fees.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees under
the EAJA (Doc. 23) is DENIED.

Signed: August 17, 2015

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