United States of America v. MacAlpine

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER denying 31 Motion to Vacate. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 9/29/2014. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(nv)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:13-cv-00053-MR-DLH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
JAMES E. MacALPINE,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to
Vacate Judgment Under Rule 60(b). [Doc. 31]. The Government has filed
a Response to such motion, [Doc. 32], and the Defendant has replied [Doc.
33].
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Government initiated this action on February 28, 2013, seeking

to reduce to judgment several assessments for income taxes, penalties,
and interest against the Defendant James E. MacAlpine (“MacAlpine”).
[Doc. 1]. These assessments concern MacAlpine’s income tax liability for
the 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 tax years.

As reflected in certified transcripts, MacAlpine’s federal tax liabilities
for his 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004 tax years are based upon income
tax deficiencies the IRS determined after examining his filed income tax
returns for those years.1 MacAlpine did not file income tax returns for his
2005 and 2006 tax years. His federal tax liabilities for those years are
based upon the IRS’s determination of his income tax liabilities. [Id. at ¶4].
The Government served MacAlpine with discovery to attempt to
ascertain what evidence MacAlpine has in his possession that could
contradict the IRS’s determinations of his income tax deficiencies from his
2002 through 2006 tax years. In response, MacAlpine provided no factual
basis for disputing the IRS’s determinations.2
On February 28, 2014, this Court held a hearing upon the
Government’s motion for summary judgment.

Both MacAlpine and the

Government presented arguments to the Court at this hearing. On March
8, 2014, after careful consideration of both the oral arguments and the
written arguments of the parties, this Court granted the Government’s

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In part, the Government determined that MacAlpine was not entitled to claim certain
business expenses he reported on his income tax returns for these years.
2

For example, the Government requested that MacAlpine produce documents
substantiating his claimed business expenses. MacAlpine responded that he had no
such documents. [Defendant’s Responses to Interrogatories, Doc. 9-4].
2

motion for summary judgment [Doc. 9] and entered judgment against
MacAlpine [Doc. 30].
Thereafter, MacAlpine filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment Under Rule
60(b). [Doc. 31]. MacAlpine requests that the Court vacate the judgment
(1) because of alleged fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct by the
opposing party, and (2) because “[t]he Judgment is Void as a matter of law
and not in accord with the unambiguous Statutes of the United States
codified in Title 26.” [Doc. 31 at 1].
This matter is now ripe for disposition.
II.

DISCUSSION
Rule 60(b) allows the Court “[o]n motion and just terms [to] relieve a

party or [his] legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that
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justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In addition to establishing one of the
six grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b), the movant must also establish that
his motion was timely filed, that he has a meritorious defense to the action,
and that there would be no unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party by
having the judgment set aside. Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor
Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Circuit has established three factors that must be present
for a moving party to succeed on the basis of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion: “(1)
the moving party must have a meritorious defense; (2) the moving party
must prove misconduct by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the
misconduct prevented the moving party from fully presenting its case.”
Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir. 1994). Further, even after
such factors have been established, “the [C]ourt must balance the
competing policies favoring the finality of judgments and justice being done
in view of all the facts, to determine within its discretion, whether relief is
appropriate in each case.” Id., 24 F.3d at 630.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has established that “[a]n order is
‘void’ for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court rendering the decision
lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law.” Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F.3d 410,
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411 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc.,
167 F.3d 861, 871 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Fourth Circuit “narrowly construe[s]
the concept of a ‘void’ order under Rule 60(b)(4) precisely because of the
threat to finality of judgments and the risk that litigants . . . will use Rule
60(b)(4) to circumvent an appeal process they elected not to follow.”
Wendt, 431 F.3d 410, 411 (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes
Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 825 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980)).
Here, MacAlpine has failed to meet the standards to obtain relief
through a Rule 60(b) motion, either on the grounds of Rule 60(b)(3) or Rule
60(b)(4).

MacAlpine has essentially repeated his arguments from his

objections to the Government’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 16]
and his oral argument. [Docs. 18-21]. This Court has already addressed
such meritless arguments. [Doc. 29].

MacAlpine has added additional

citations to cases from the Supreme Court and each United States Circuit
Court, with reference to agency law and regulations. [Doc. 31 at 12-22].
MacAlpine has failed, however, to present any intelligible argument
regarding Government error in this case. MacAlpine has failed to assert a
meritorious defense, has failed to show any Government misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence, and has failed to demonstrate in any
manner that he was prevented from fully presenting his case. [Doc. 31];
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Schultz, 24 F.3d at 630.

Further, MacAlpine has failed to show any

jurisdictional problem or inconsistency with due process in this case. [Doc.
31]; Wendt, 431 F.3d at 411.
Further, MacAlpine requested that the Court take judicial notice of the
recent Supreme Court case of Clarke et. al. v. United States, 2014 WL
2765284 (2014), regarding the question of whether the Government’s
agents must answer McAlpine’s quesitons. [Doc. 33]. As the Government
aptly notes, “Clark grants no such absolute right [to question the IRS
agent].” [Doc. 19 at 1-2]; Clark, 2014 WL 2765284, at *5. Clark states:
As part of the adversarial process concerning a
summons’s validity, the taxpayer is entitled to
examine an IRS agent when he can point to specific
facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference
of bad faith. Naked allegations of improper purpose
are not enough: The taxpayer must offer some
credible evidence supporting his charge.
Id., 2014 WL 2765284, at *5.

MacAlpine has presented no credible

evidence of bad faith by the IRS agents in this case. In addition, McAlpine
has not shown that he ever undertook any ordinary discovery in this matter,
but rather has simply directed sometimes nonsensical questions to the
Government’s agents and demanded that they answer. MacAlpine has not
successfully refuted the substantive allegations of the Government’s
complaint nor asserted a meritorious defense to this action. Accordingly,
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MacAlpine’s Motion to Vacate Judgment Under Rule 60(b) [Doc. 31] is
denied.

ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to
Vacate Judgment Under Rule 60(b) [Doc. 31] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: September 29, 2014

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