Ellenburg v. Henderson County Jail et al

Filing 10

ORDER Pltf's 1 Complaint survives initial review as to Pltf's excessive force claim against Deft Brensen, but all other claims against all other Defts are dismissed. Pltf's claim of deliberate indifference t o serious medical needs is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to name specific persons who were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Furthermore, because the Court is abstaining from addressing any claim s purportedly brought by Pltf related to pending state criminal charges, those claims are also dismissed without prejudice. Defts Sherriff McDonald, Henderson County Jail and Greg Newman (County Prosecutor) terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 05/06/15. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail along with a summons form to fill out and return to the Clerk as Ordered.)(emw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:14-cv-290-FDW
EDDIE ELLENBURG,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
HENDERSON COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Doc. No. 1). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. On December 10,
2014, the Court entered an order waiving the initial filing fee and directing monthly payments to
be made from Plaintiff’s prison account. (Doc. No. 8). Thus, Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Eddie Ellenburg, a pre-trial detainee currently incarcerated at the
Henderson County Detention Center, filed this action on November 5, 2014, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right not to be subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution based on alleged
excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Plaintiff also alleges that
he has been wrongly charged with various pending state crimes. In his Complaint, Plaintiff
names as Defendants (1) the “Henderson County Jail”; (2) Greg Newman, identified as a “county
prosecutor”; (3) Sheriff McDonald, identified as the Sheriff of Henderson County; and (4)
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Shawn Brensen, identified as an officer at the Henderson County Detention Center.
The following allegations by Plaintiff are taken as true for the purpose of this initial
review:
On October 16, 2014 at 0600 hours officers of the Henderson County Jail opened
my cell door in the SHU along with another inmate’s cell. The other inmate came
directly into my cell, jumped on me while in bed and proceeded to punch me
about the head and neck area.
Thereafter an officer entered my cell and tazed me while I was still in my bed.
Officer Shawn Brensen.
I requested medical attention and was denied.
I’m now suffering panic attacks and waking up in cold sweats every time a door
opens in the night (which is every 15 minutes).
To this day I have received no medical attention nor have I been seen by the
psychology department.
Also the jail in concert has placed many very serious trumped up charges and
false allegations against me.
I have been told that this county doesn’t recognize the right to a fast and speedy
trial.
I am therefore incarcerated for an indefinite amount of time with trumped-up
charges, an exorbitant jail fee, and no prospect of a trial date in which I can get
into court and defend myself.
Many other citizens are also suffering this abuse and are being held in the SHU
where they can’t defend themselves being isolated from the courts.
(Doc. No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also alleges in the
Complaint that he has been wrongly charged with various state crimes and that he is innocent of
the pending charges. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including
dismissal of the pending state criminal charges against him, as well as compensatory and
punitive damages. (Id. at 4).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
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[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such
as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable
under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.

DISCUSSION

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim,
an inmate must satisfy both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious–and a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an
excessive force claim, the Court must consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the
relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted,
and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Albers, 475
U.S. at 320-21. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently reiterated that “[a]n inmate who is
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gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely
because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct.
1175, 1178-79 (2010). In Wilkins v. Gaddy, the Supreme Court observed:
This is not to say that the “absence of serious injury” is irrelevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry. “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor
that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought
necessary’ in a particular situation.” The extent of injury may also provide some
indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson, not “every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” “The
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily
excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” An inmate who complains of a “push or shove” that causes no
discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that
ultimately counts.
Id. at 1178-79 (citations omitted).
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “imposes
duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison
officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and
must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1992)). This is a low standard, as the
Supreme Court emphasized that “[p]rison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh.” Id. at
833 (internal quotations omitted). To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
(1) that the deprivation was objectively sufficiently serious—that is, the deprivation must be a
“denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and (2) that the defendant was
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s health or safety. Id. at 834 (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, “[d]eliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants actually knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee or that they actually knew of and
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ignored a detainee’s serious need for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567,
575-76 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Brensen
based on alleged excessive force by use of a taser gun in Plaintiff’s jail cell survives initial
review in that it is not clearly frivolous. 1 The Court will, however, dismiss without prejudice
Plaintiff’s general claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need because Plaintiff has
not identified a specific individual who was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs. That is, Plaintiff has not named any person at the jail who refused to treat him for his
alleged injuries.
Finally, as to Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint regarding the pending state criminal
charges and his allegation that his speedy trial rights are being violated, the Court will abstain
from addressing Plaintiff’s claims related to the pending state criminal charges against him. In
Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state
criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. 401 U.S.
37, 43-44 (1971). Under the Younger abstention doctrine, abstention is proper in federal court
when (1) there is an ongoing state court proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state
interests; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to present the federal claims in the
state proceeding. Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, the Court finds that all of the elements of Younger have been met. The Court will,
therefore, abstain from addressing Plaintiff’s claims related to the pending state charges. The

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Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a grievance as to this claim, but it is not clear from the face
of the Complaint whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court will,
therefore, reserve the issue of exhaustion for a determination following service on Defendant and
after giving Defendant the opportunity to raise exhaustion as an affirmative defense.
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Court notes specifically that, with regard to Plaintiff’s claim of a speedy trial violation while he
is awaiting trial in state court, Plaintiff may raise his concerns regarding speedy trial violations in
the North Carolina state court. See Brazell v. Boyd, 991 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1993).
The Court further notes that, to the extent that Plaintiff has sued the “Henderson County
Jail” as a Defendant, the Henderson County Jail is not a distinct legal entity capable of being
sued. Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff has named as a Defendant the prosecutor who
brought the charges against him, Defendant Newman is entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity for actions taken while performing traditional prosecutorial duties. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Next, Plaintiff has alleged no individual participation by
Defendant Sheriff McDonald in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Thus, Plaintiff’s
claim against Defendant McDonald is also subject to dismissal.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Complaint survives initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Brensen. All other claims
against all other Defendants are dismissed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), survives initial review as to Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim against Defendant Brensen, but all other claims against all other
Defendants are dismissed. Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff to amend the Complaint to
name specific persons who were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Furthermore, because the Court is abstaining from addressing any claims purportedly
brought by Plaintiff related to the pending state criminal charges, those claims are
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also dismissed without prejudice.
2.

The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a summons form to fill out and return to the Court so
that service may be made on Defendant Brensen. Once the Court receives the
summons form from Plaintiff, the Court will provide the forms to the U.S. Marshal
for service on Defendant Brensen.

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