Sawyer v. Mull

Filing 9

ORDER for the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff is barred from bringing this action under Heck and Edwards, and this action will therefore be dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 4/28/2015. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(nv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:14-cv-233-FDW
RANDY SAWYER,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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RANDY S. MULL,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. No.
1), filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A.
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Randy Sawyer is a North Carolina state court prisoner currently
incarcerated at Craggy Correctional Center in Asheville, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed this
action on October 2, 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as the sole Defendant Randy
Mull, the disciplinary hearing officer who presided over Plaintiff’s hearing for a disciplinary
infraction while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Marion Correctional Institution. Specifically,
Plaintiff was charged on March 17, 2014, with a class A12 infraction for requesting and
receiving illegal drugs from his mother, Billie Rollins. (Doc. No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff alleges that
the basis for the infraction was “information received on March 17, 2014 by Captain Jackson
from a confidential source.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges that the confidential source was a
recording of an inmate phone call, that Plaintiff requested the opportunity to hear the alleged
phone recording but was denied, and that he never asked his mother to bring drugs into the
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prison. Plaintiff alleges that, while he pled not guilty, he was found guilty by Defendant Mull
without any evidence presented at the hearing. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the infraction,
he “lost his minimum custody status, gain time credit days, visiting privileges (especially those
related to his 77 year old mother), and other hard-earned improvements in his custody status.”
(Id. at 4).
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Mull violated his due process rights under Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) by: (1) denying Plaintiff’s right to present evidence; (2)
failing to provide a written statement as to evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action; (3) failing to remain impartial; (4) denying “the requested evidence that the staff solely
relied upon to convict [Plaintiff] of the infraction”; (5) denying Plaintiff’s request for assistance
from staff at the hearing; and (6) failing to collect statements from named witnesses. (Doc. No. 1
at 2). Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as well as compensatory damages against Defendant.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and
the court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such
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as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable
under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.

DISCUSSION

Prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause, but prison disciplinary proceedings
are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full array of rights due a defendant in such
proceedings does not apply. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). In prison disciplinary proceedings where an
inmate faces the possible loss of diminution credits or solitary confinement, he is entitled to
certain due process protections. These include: (1) advance written notice of the charges against
him; (2) a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for taking any disciplinary
action; (3) a hearing where he is afforded the right to call witnesses and present evidence when
doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns, and a written
decision; (4) the opportunity to have non-attorney representation when the inmate is illiterate or
the disciplinary hearing involves complex issues; and (5) an impartial decision-maker. See
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. There is no constitutional right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses or to retain and be appointed counsel. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322
(1976); Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2004). As long as the hearing
officer’s decision contains a written statement of the evidence relied upon, due process is
satisfied. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 323 n.5. Moreover, substantive due process is satisfied if the
disciplinary hearing decision was based upon “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass.
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Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Federal courts do not review the
correctness of a disciplinary hearing officer’s findings of fact. See Kelly v. Cooper, 502 F. Supp.
1371, 1376 (E.D. Va. 1980). The findings will only be disturbed when unsupported by any
evidence, or when wholly arbitrary and capricious. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456; see also Baker v.
Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 933 (4th Cir. 1990). As long as there is some evidence in the record to
support a disciplinary committee’s factual findings, a federal court will not review their
accuracy.
The Court finds that, regardless of whether Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for a due
process violation under Wolff, Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed sua sponte as barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). In Heck, the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not bring an action pursuant to § 1983 for an “allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” without first having that conviction
or sentence reversed, overturned, expunged, or otherwise called into question. In Edwards, the
Supreme Court specifically extended Heck to the context of inmate disciplinary convictions,
holding that Heck precludes a § 1983 claim in a prison disciplinary hearing which has not been
previously invalidated, where the challenge would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
deprivation of good-time credits. Plaintiff alleges that he was sanctioned with the loss of good
time credit among other privileges, but Plaintiff has not shown he successfully attacked his
disciplinary hearing conviction. Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action, whether for
restoration of good-time credits, monetary damages, or declaratory or injunctive relief related to
the hearing, if a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the outcome of

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the disciplinary proceeding.1 Because awarding damages and/or declaratory or injunctive relief
to Plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the outcome of his disciplinary hearing, his
claim is barred under Heck and Edwards.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff is barred from bringing this action under Heck and
Edwards, and this action will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

2.

The Clerk shall terminate this action.

Moreover, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973),
prisoners seeking the restoration of good-time credits in federal court may only do so by way of
a writ of habeas corpus.
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