Pickens v. Lewis et al

Filing 40

ORDER granting 29 MOTION to Dismiss. Dft Donna L. Woodruff (Assistant Director of Dental Care for the DOP, Individually and in Their Official Capacity) is dismissed from this action. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 2/21/2017. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(kby)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:15-cv-275-FDW
BRANDON MICHAEL PICKENS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
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vs.
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ROBERT C. LEWIS, et al.,
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Defendants.
)
___________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss by Donna L. Woodruff,
(Doc. No. 29).
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Brandon Michael Pickens is a North Carolina inmate, currently
incarcerated at Catawba Correctional Center in Newton, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed this
action on December 9, 2015, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against numerous defendants for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Mountain
View Correctional Institution (“MVCI”). On February 1, 2016, following an initial review, this
Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, specifying his factual allegations as to each
named Defendant. (Doc. No. 8). The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against several of
the named Defendants. On February 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, naming
various Defendants, including movant Donna Woodruff.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs based on Defendants’ failure to address and treat
appropriately Plaintiff’s mental health issues and his dental problems while he was incarcerated

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at MVCI from August 2012 to December 2012. Plaintiff’s allegations against movant Dr.
Woodruff (Assistant Dental Director in the North Carolina Department of Public Safety,
Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice) and Dr. Rickman (a dentist who provides
dental treatment to inmates at MVCI), arise out of dental care Plaintiff received while housed at
MVCI between August and December, 2012. In essence, Plaintiff contends that Drs. Woodruff
and Rickman violated his civil rights by allegedly being deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious dental needs. See (Doc. No. 9 at ¶¶ 6, 50, 73 (as to Dr. Woodruff) and ¶¶ 8, 73 (as to Dr.
Rickman). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at MVCI, he submitted
multiple sick call requests in an attempt to have two of his teeth treated with dental fillings, but
that the dental staff at MVCI, which included Dr. Rickman, placed him on the facility’s waiting
list rather than scheduling him for immediate treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 20, 27, 29, 40, 42, 48).
Plaintiff’s sole allegations against movant Dr. Woodruff arise out of her response to a letter
Plaintiff had sent to the Director of Prisons concerning his dental care at MVCI. Specifically, the
only factual allegation of indifference as to Dr. Woodruff is in paragraph 50 of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint:
On 11/28/2012, I received two correspondences from the Department of
Public Safety. The first one was from Donna L. Woodruff and was in reference to
a letter addressed to the Director of Prisons that was dated 11/7/2012, and
concerned issues in which I raised that related to my lack of dental care at MVCI.
(See Exhibit FF). Woodruff’s response simply advised me that I was on the
waiting list for fillings and further advised me to cooperate with MVCI’s dental
staff and recognize they are meeting the needs of many patients. (See Exhibit
FF). A copy of Woodruff’s response was sent to both Dr. J. Rickman and the
superintendent of MVCI. (See Exhibit FF). However, neither of the defendants
met my dental care needs nor did I receive my fillings. The second letter was from
R. Beddingfield and was in reference to a letter addressed Jennie Lancaster,
Secretary of Corrections, that was dated 11/12/2012, and addressed numerous
problems. (See Exhibit GG). Beddingfield advised me that my letter was
forwarded to Ms. White for review and disposition. (See Exhibit GG).
(Id. at ¶ 50). In Dr. Woodruff’s letter in response to Plaintiff, dated November 28, 2012, Dr.
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Woodruff reminded Plaintiff that the dental staff at MVCI had placed him on the dental clinic’s
waiting list for fillings; advised Plaintiff that the dental staff at MVCI would complete his dental
treatment as soon as possible; and encouraged Plaintiff to cooperate with the dental staff at
MVCI and recognize that the staff was serving the needs of many patients. See (Doc. No. 9-32
at 1). Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Woodruff was involved with his dental care at any time
after corresponding with him on November 28, 2012.
On September 28, 2016, Defendant Woodruff filed the pending motion to dismiss, arguing
that Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference against her should be dismissed as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 29). On October 4, 2016, the Court entered an order
granting Plaintiff fourteen days in which to file a response to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No.
31). Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss on October 13, 2016, and Defendant filed a Reply
on October 18, 2016. This matter is therefore ripe for disposition.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept the factual
allegations of the claim as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010). To survive the
motion, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To be “plausible on its face,” a plaintiff must
demonstrate more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plaintiff
therefore must “articulate facts, when accepted as true, that ‘show’ that the plaintiff has stated a
claim entitling [it] to relief, i.e., the ‘plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 678).

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III. DISCUSSION
Defendant Woodruff contends that Plaintiff’s claims against her are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. The Court agrees. Because there is no explicit statute of limitations for
actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts look to the personal injury statute of
limitations from the relevant state. See Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955
(4th Cir. 1995) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-69 (1985)); see also Nat’l Adver. Co.
v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (4th Cir. 1991). In North Carolina, the statute of
limitations for personal injuries is three years. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16). Although the
statutory limitations period for Section 1983 actions is borrowed from state law, “[t]he time of
accrual of a civil rights action is a question of federal law.” Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th
Cir. 1975). “Federal law holds that the time of accrual is when plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id.; see Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,
170 (1949) (noting that “statutes of limitations . . . conventionally require the assertion of claims
within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights”); Blanck v. McKeen,
707 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that the statute of limitations “does not begin to run
until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the facts
forming the basis of his cause of action”). It is well settled that a defendant may raise the statute
of limitations as a bar to a plaintiff’s complaint by way of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the time bar is apparent on the face of the
Complaint. See, e.g., Dean v. Program’s Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 2005); Bethel
v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1978).
As noted above, the only allegation of indifference that Plaintiff makes against Dr.
Woodruff in his Amended Complaint is that she wrote him a letter, that he acknowledges

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receiving on November 28, 2012, in response to a letter he had written to the Director of the
Department of Corrections regarding his dental care at MVCI. See (Doc. No. 9 at ¶ 50 and
Exhibit FF). Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Woodruff played any further role in, or had any
further involvement with, his dental care at MVCI after writing her letter of November 28, 2012.
Dr. Woodruff’s alleged (but denied) indifference to Plaintiff’s dental needs was, therefore,
complete and Plaintiff’s purported cause of action against Dr. Woodruff accrued on November
28, 2012. See, e.g., Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1993) (civil rights action
accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury that is basis of action). Plaintiff,
therefore, had three years—until November 28, 2015—in which to file suit against Dr.
Woodruff.
Pursuant to the “prison mailbox rule” established in Houston v. Lack, 487 US 266
(1988), Plaintiff’s original Complaint is deemed to have been filed with this Court on the date
that he delivered the same to prison authorities for forwarding and filing. See also Wilder v.
Chairman of the Cent. Classification Bd., 926 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff signed and
verified his original Complaint on December 2, 2015, which would have been the earliest date
upon which he could have delivered it to prison authorities for forwarding to this Court.
Therefore, plaintiff’s original Complaint is deemed to have been filed with this Court no earlier
than December 2, 2015.1 See (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s original Complaint, which is deemed to
have been filed no earlier than December 2, 2015, is therefore untimely as to Dr. Woodruff.
In his response brief, Plaintiff argues that his deliberate indifference cause of action
against Dr. Woodruff did not accrue, and thus the three-year statute of limitations did not begin
For the purposes of Dr. Woodruff’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint relates
back to the date of plaintiff’s original Complaint under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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running, until Plaintiff became aware of the full extent of his alleged injuries, which he alleges
occurred no earlier than May 13, 2013, when dental staff advised him that his teeth had to be
extracted because they were beyond repair and could not be fixed with a fillings procedure.
(Doc. No. 34 at 2). Plaintiff’s argument is, however, erroneous, as Plaintiff cites no authority to
support his position that his claim did not accrue until Plaintiff became aware of the full extent of
the harm allegedly caused by Dr. Woodruff’s alleged indifference. Plaintiff’s Complaint shows
on its face that Plaintiff was aware of his alleged injury and harm, as well as Dr. Woodruff’s
alleged indifference, more than three years before filing this action, even if Plaintiff was not
aware of the full extent of his alleged injury at that time. Accord Brown v. Reese, No.
1:05cv29, 2006 WL 6093880, at **2-3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff’s
argument that her claim did not accrue until her cervical cancer was finally treated and she
discovered the full extent of her injuries, finding that the plaintiff’s “cause of action accrued
when defendants denied her medical treatment which in turn allowed the cancer to progress”),
aff’d, Brown v. Brenda, 223 Fed. App’x 221 (4th Cir. 2007). In short, Plaintiff possessed
sufficient alleged facts about the harm allegedly done to him by Defendant Woodruff more than
three years before filing this action. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint
that the alleged delay in providing him with dental treatment at MVCI was causing him
excruciating and unnecessary pain beginning on November 12, 2012. See (Doc. No. 9 at ¶¶ 42,
73). Moreover, due to his concerns about the alleged delay in receiving dental treatment while at
MVCI, and the harm that such delay was allegedly causing, Plaintiff filed a grievance on
October 8, 2012. (Doc. No. 35 at 6: Ex A to Reply Brief). In that grievance, which Plaintiff
submitted more than three years before filing this action, Plaintiff alleges: “To this day, I am still
awaiting my appointment to receive fillings and the delay of this by medical is detrimental to my

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dental health.” (Id.). Plaintiff was, furthermore, so concerned about the alleged delay in
receiving his dental treatment, that he submitted a letter to the Director of the Department of
Corrections on November 4, 2012, to which Dr. Woodruff responded by the letter of November
28, 2012. See (Doc. No. 9 at ¶¶ 38, 50).
In sum, since Plaintiff possessed sufficient facts no later than November 28, 2012,
regarding the harm allegedly done to him by Dr. Woodruff, his cause of action against Dr.
Woodruff accrued no later than November 28, 2012. Thus, Plaintiff’s action, which is deemed to
have been filed no earlier than December 2, 2015, is untimely as to Dr. Woodruff. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claim against to Dr. Woodruff is barred by the applicable three-year statute of
limitations, and the Court will grant Dr. Woodruff’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against
her.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss and
dismiss Defendant Woodruff from this action.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 29),
is GRANTED, and Defendant Woodruff is dismissed from this action.

Signed: February 21, 2017

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