The Biltmore Company v. NU U, Inc. et al
Filing
147
ORDER denying 125 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees. FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's Objection to 141 Plaintiff's Bill of Costs is SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART, and 134 Plaintiff's Bill of Costs is GRANTED to the extent that the Plaintiff is hereby awarded $9,502.25 in costs. FURTHER ORDERED that 132 Defendant's Motion for Clarification of Judgment and Order is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 1/22/2018. (khm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00288-MR
THE BILTMORE COMPANY,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
NU U, INC.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_______________________________ )
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 125]; the Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs [Doc.134]; and the
Defendant’s Motion for Clarification of Judgment and Order [Doc. 132].
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, The Biltmore Company (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), initiated
this action on December 23, 2015, asserting federal claims for trademark
infringement and cyberpiracy, as well as state law claims for unfair and
deceptive trade practices, against the Defendant, Nu U, Inc. (hereinafter
“Defendant”), for its alleged use of the Plaintiff’s registered mark BILTMORE.
[Doc. 1].
On April 5, 2016, with leave from this Court and the Defendant’s
consent, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint presenting five counts
against the Defendant. [Doc. 29]. The Plaintiff alleged in its Amended
Complaint that certain uses of BILTMORE by the Defendant infringed upon
its federally registered trademarks in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and
1125(a). [Id. at ¶¶ 73-89, 120-34]. The Plaintiff also alleged that the
Defendant’s use of BILTMORE in connection with wedding related services,
retail sales, and retail sales of branded merchandise constituted false
designation of origin in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). [Id. at ¶¶ 90-119].
The Plaintiff further alleged that the Defendant’s use of domain names
containing BILTMORE amounted to cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d). [Id. at ¶¶ 135-39].
On April 26, 2016, the Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaims,
asserting various affirmative defenses and two counterclaims: (1) a claim for
a declaratory judgment of non-infringement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et
seq. and (2) a claim for unfair competition and unfair and deceptive trade
practices in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, et seq. (“Chapter 75”). [Doc.
7].
On March 4, 2016, a Case Management Plan was entered and the
parties proceeded to engage in discovery. [Doc. 20]. On May 20, 2016, the
Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the Defendant’s counterclaims. [Doc. 35].
2
On December 30, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. [Doc. 35]. In that decision, the Court dismissed
Defendant’s Chapter 75 counterclaim. [Id.].
On January 10, 2017, both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
[Docs. 61, 63]. On January 27, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a motion to compel
certain discovery from the Defendant, which the Court denied as untimely on
January 30, 2017. [See Docs. 67, 74]. On March 24, 2017, the Court held a
hearing and denied both motions for summary judgment. [See Minute Order
dated March 24, 2017].
On May 15, 2017, the case proceeded to trial. [See Minute entry dated
May 15, 2017]. Upon conclusion of the Plaintiff’s evidence, both parties made
oral motions for the entry of judgment as a matter of law, which were denied.
[See Minute entry dated May 17, 2017]. Upon conclusion of the Defendant’s
evidence, both parties renewed their motions for the entry of judgment as a
matter of law, which were denied. [See Minute entry dated May 18, 2017].
Following three days of evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Plaintiff on the issues of infringement and cybersquatting. [Doc. 123]. The
jury further found that the Defendant’s trademark infringement was
3
intentional, willful, or in bad faith. [Id.].1 The Court entered a Judgment in
accordance with the jury’s verdict on May 25, 2017. [Doc. 124].
Following entry of the Judgment, the Plaintiff filed a motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Lanham Act. [Doc. 125, 134]. The
Defendant, in turn, filed a motion for clarification of the Judgment entered
May 25, 2017. [Doc. 132].2 The Defendant also has filed a notice of change
in circumstances related to its motion for clarification. [Doc. 146].
These
matters have been fully briefed and are therefore ripe for disposition.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiff’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees under the Lanham
Act
The Plaintiff moves the Court to find that this case is “extraordinary”
and to award $531,034.42 in attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act. [Doc.
125].3 The Defendant opposes the Plaintiff’s motion, arguing that this case
is not “exceptional.” [Doc. 133]. Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff’s requested fees are excessive. [Id.].
1
The Plaintiff did not seek an award of damages.
2
On June 29, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to file a proposed
surreply, which the Court denied on July 11, 2017. [See Docs. 140, 143].
The Plaintiff’s motion uses the term “extraordinary,” while the Plaintiff’s memorandum in
support uses the term “exceptional.” [See Docs. 125, 126].
3
4
Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act authorizes a plaintiff in a trademark
infringement case to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees “in exceptional
cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Court may find a case to be “exceptional”
if it finds “in light of the totality of the circumstances, that (1) there is an
unusual discrepancy in the merits of the positions taken by the parties, based
on the non-prevailing party’s position as either frivolous or objectively
unreasonable; (2) the non-prevailing party has litigated the case in an
unreasonable manner; or (3) there is otherwise the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710, 721
(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting in part Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., -- U.S. --, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 n.6 (2014)) (other internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). A jury’s finding of willfulness, without
more, is not sufficient to support a finding that a case is “exceptional” within
the meaning of § 1117(a). See Exclaim Mktg., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 674 F.
App’x 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2016).
1.
Frivolous or Objectively Unreasonable
“A finding that a claim is objectively unreasonable is to be based on ‘an
objective assessment of the merits of the challenged claims and defenses.’”
5
Exclaim Mktg., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 5:11-CV-684-FL, 2015 WL
5725703, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2015), aff’d in part, 674 F. App’x 250 (4th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Old Reliable Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 635 F.3d
539, 544 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted)). Unless an argument
or defense is “so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it
would succeed,” such argument or defense cannot be found to be objectively
baseless for purposes of awarding attorney fees.” Exclaim Mktg., 2015 WL
5725703, at *7 (citations omitted).
Upon careful consideration of the arguments, affirmative defenses and
counterclaims asserted by the Defendant throughout the course of litigation,
the Court cannot conclude that the Defendant’s position was frivolous or
objectively baseless. Notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, this was a close
case on the issue of infringement. Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment on various claims and defenses prior to trial, and both motions
were denied. The Court’s denial of the Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion
strongly indicates that the defenses asserted by the Defendant were not
frivolous or unreasonable. See, e.g., LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 54 F.
Supp. 3d 444, 459 (W.D.N.C. 2014). For all of these reasons, the Court
6
cannot say that the Defendant was unreasonable in asserting that its use of
the Plaintiff’s mark did not constitute infringement.
2.
Unreasonable Manner of Litigation
A party’s unreasonable litigation conduct may also warrant a finding
that a case is “exceptional” so as to warrant an award of attorneys’ fees. See
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1757. “Typically, this prong is satisfied where
the non-prevailing party engages in some form of egregious conduct,” such
as filing false declarations or attempting to re-litigate issues decided prior to
trial. Exclaim Mktg., 2015 WL 5725703 at *8.
In arguing that the Defendant’s litigation conduct as a whole was
unreasonable, the Plaintiff relies primarily on the Defendant’s discovery
conduct and assertion of counterclaims. [Doc. 137]. Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that Defendant’s broad discovery requests and refusal to produce
an un-redacted copy of a report from Defendant’s trademark attorney were
unreasonable. [Id. at 5-6].
After careful consideration of the record as a whole, the Court cannot
say that this case was litigated in an unreasonable manner. The Plaintiff
never sought a protective order regarding the Defendant’s discovery
requests and the Defendant based its redactions of the report on the
7
assertion of attorney-client privilege.4 Moreover, the Plaintiff’s motion to
compel production of an un-redacted version of the report was denied as
untimely. [See Docs. 67, 74]. Further, although Defendant’s Chapter 75
counterclaim was dismissed, its remaining counterclaim survived both a
motion to dismiss and summary judgment. In addition, both parties
vigorously and aggressively contested the issues in this case. For all of these
reasons, the Court cannot say that the Defendant’s litigation conduct was
unreasonable.
3.
Compensation or Deterrence
Finally, the Court considers whether there is a need, based on the
particular circumstances of this case, “to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence.” Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 n.6
(quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994)).
First, the Court addresses the issue of compensation. While the jury
found that the Defendant willfully infringed the Plaintiff’s mark, the Plaintiff
did not seek an award for damages and there was no evidence that the
Plaintiff in fact suffered anything more than nominal harm as a result of the
4
The Defendant did not assert an advice of counsel defense.
8
infringement. The Plaintiff also presented no evidence of actual confusion
from any member of the purchasing public.
As for the consideration of deterrence, the Court previously found that
the Defendant pursued reasonable -- albeit ultimately unsuccessful -affirmative defenses to the Plaintiff’s claim of infringement. This was not a
case where the Defendant persisted in litigation even though its defenses
were clearly lacking.
See, e.g., Design Res., Inc. v. Leather Indus. of
America, No. 1:10CV157, 2016 WL 5477611, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 29,
2016) (“This court recognizes the importance of deterring litigants from
pursuing their claims even when the claim has fallen apart following
discovery due to a lack of supporting evidence, reinforcing this court’s
decision to award attorney’s fees.”).
The Defendant proceeded with a
defense that had a reasonable prospect for success before a jury. The
deterrence factor in this prong is not for the purpose of deterring the
presentation of such reasonable defenses. For all of these reasons, the
Court cannot say there is a need to advance considerations of compensation
and deterrence.
9
Considering all of these factors, the Court concludes that this case is
not “exceptional” within the meaning of the Lanham Act, and therefore, the
Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1117(a).
B.
Plaintiff’s Request for Costs
The Plaintiff seeks an award of costs in the amount of $14,366.50
pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 134].
The Defendant objects to the Plaintiff’s request for costs and argues that the
costs are not justified under the applicable factors. [Doc. 141]. The
Defendant also argues that certain items in the claimed costs are not
recoverable. [Id.]. Specifically, the Defendant objects to the Plaintiff’s costs
for real time services in trial, the exemplification fee related to Denis Knapp’s
deposition, the deposition transcript for Plaintiff’s expert Chris Cavanaugh,
the deposition transcript for Defendant’s expert Frank McBride, and the
copies of trial exhibits. [Id. at 5-7].
A prevailing party may move for an award of costs pursuant to Rule
54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in pertinent
part: “Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides
otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the
prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The grant or denial of an award of
10
costs is a matter within the Court's discretion. Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp.,
186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir.1999).
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “the language of Rule 54(d)(1)
gives rise to a presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing
party.” Ellis v. Grant Thornton LLP, 434 F. App'x 232, 235 (4th Cir.2011) (per
curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Accordingly, it is
incumbent upon the unsuccessful party to show circumstances sufficient to
overcome the presumption favoring an award of costs to the prevailing
party.” Id. (citing Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 996 (4th Cir.1994)).
When a court denies an award of costs, it must “articulat[e] some good
reason” for doing so. Cherry, 186 F.3d at 446 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Essentially, the court must find that “there would be an
element of injustice in a presumptive cost award.” Id. Among the factors that
the Court may consider in deciding whether to deny an award of costs are:
“(1) misconduct by the prevailing party; (2) the unsuccessful party's inability
to pay the costs; (3) the excessiveness of the costs in a particular case; (4)
the limited value of the prevailing party's victory; or (5) the closeness and
difficulty of the issues decided.” Ellis, 434 F. App'x at 235 (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
11
In arguing that the parties should bear their own cost, the Defendant
relies primarily on the second and fifth Ellis factors. While the Defendant
argues that this case has already caused financial hardship, it does not
assert that it cannot actually bear the costs.5 Further, while the Defendant is
correct that the fifth Ellis factor weighs in its favor, that alone is insufficient in
this case to overcome the presumption of awarding costs. White v. White,
893 F. Supp. 2d 755, 759 (E.D. Va. 2012) (awarding costs to the prevailing
party where “the only factor that weighs against awarding costs is the
closeness of the issues decided [and] all other factors weigh in favor of
awarding costs”).
For these reasons, and because no other factor weighs in Defendant’s
favor, the Court finds that the circumstances in this case are not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of awarding costs to the Plaintiff. Thus, awarding
costs to the Plaintiff is appropriate in this case.
The expenses that may be taxed as costs under Rule 54(d)(1) are set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 as follows:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
Rather, the Defendant states that awarding costs to Plaintiff would be “inequitable.”
[Doc. 141 at 3].
5
12
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920. An “award of costs to the prevailing party is a matter firmly
in the discretion of the trial court.” Oak Hall Cap and Gown Co. v. Old
Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 899 F.2d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 1990).
In awarding costs pursuant to section 1920, the Court is further guided
by Local Civil Rule 54.1, which sets forth certain categories of costs that may
or may not be awarded to a prevailing party. This Rule states, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(F) Taxable Costs. Items normally taxed include,
without limitation:
(1) those items specifically listed on the bill of costs
form. The costs incident to the taking of depositions
(when allowable as necessarily obtained for use in
the litigation) normally include only the reporter's
13
attendance fee and charge for the original transcript
of the deposition;
(2) premiums on required bonds;
(3) actual mileage, subsistence, and attendance
allowances for necessary witnesses at actual cost,
but not to exceed the applicable statutory rates,
whether they reside in or out of this district;
(4) one copy of the trial transcript for each party
represented by separate counsel;
(5) costs associated with private process servers;
(6) fees for service of summons, subpoena, and
notices by private firms; and
(7) costs of the original videotape of a deposition and
the appearance fee of a videographer in lieu of the
costs of a transcript of the deposition.
(G) Nontaxable Costs. Items normally not taxed
include, without limitation:
(1) multiple copies of depositions;
(2) daily copy of trial transcripts, unless prior Court
approval has been obtained;
(3) copies of documents filed electronically; and
(4) attorney fees and attorney travel expenses;
(5) costs of shipping/mailing transcripts;
14
(6) costs for computer aided legal research including
paralegal charges and computerized indices or
optical discs produced for the benefit of counsel;
(7) costs associated with mediation;
(8) copy costs for any documents filed or served in
electronic format;
(9) pro hac vice fees;
(10) costs for extraction and/or electronic
configuration of data (emails) for the convenience of
counsel absent any agreement among the parties
pertaining to these costs; and
(11) costs associated with condensing a transcript,
putting transcripts on a diskette or providing Etranscripts in addition to counsel receiving the
original transcript.
LCvR 54.1.
Here, the Plaintiff seeks some items which clearly fall outside the
scope of recoverable costs, as shown by Local Civil Rule 54.1(G). The Court
will, therefore, disallow the exemplification fee for videotape excerpts of
Denise Knapp’s deposition ($375.00). Section 1920 provides that the costs
of an original deposition taken by the prevailing party are recoverable to the
extent that those depositions were “necessarily obtained for use in the case.”
28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). Under Local Rule 54.1(G)(1), multiple copies of
depositions are generally not recoverable as taxable costs. The Fourth
15
Circuit has held that a party is not entitled to recover the costs associated
with both transcribing and a videotaping a deposition, unless the party can
demonstrate “that both costs were ‘necessarily obtained for use in the case.’”
Cherry, 186 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir.1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)). “The
concept of necessity for use in the case connotes something more than
convenience or duplication to ensure alternative methods for presenting
materials at trial.” Id. at 449. The Court finds that while there are
circumstances in which both transcription and videotape excerpts may be
necessary, the Plaintiff has failed to make an adequate showing that both
the transcript and videotape excerpts were necessary in this case.
Likewise, the Court will disallow the Plaintiff’s claimed cost for the real
time services of the court reporter in trial ($3,082.80) because Plaintiff did
not obtain prior Court approval as required by Local Civil Rule 54.1(G)(2).6
The Court, however, will allow the costs for the deposition transcript for
Plaintiff’s expert Chris Cavanaugh, the deposition transcript for Defendant’s
The Plaintiff argues that an e-mail from this Court’s official court reporter represents this
Court’s pre-approval of real time transcript services. [Doc. 144 at 5]. The Plaintiff’s
argument is not well-taken. Foremost, the e-mail referred to by the Plaintiff is from the
official court reporter of this Court, not this Court itself. [Doc. 145-2]. Nowhere in the court
reporter’s e-mail does it indicate this Court had pre-approved real time transcript services.
Further, the court reporter’s e-mail clearly conveyed that the real time transcript service
was one of multiple options available to choose from and even informed the Plaintiff that
costs could be shared with the Defendant. [Id.].
6
16
expert Frank McBride, and the copies of trial exhibits. While the Defendant
argues that Mr. Cavanaugh did not testify at trial and was not required for
Plaintiff’s case, the Defendant moved for an extension of time to depose
Plaintiff’s experts, including Mr. Cavanaugh. [Doc. 49]. Moreover, Mr.
McBride was hired by Defendant to rebut the opinions of Mr. Cavanaugh.
Clearly, the taking of Mr. Cavanaugh’s and Mr. McBride’s depositions were
reasonably necessary at the time of their taking and the costs should be
awarded. LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 830 F.2d 522,
528 (4th Cir. 1987)(“A district court should award costs when the taking of a
deposition is reasonably necessary at the time of its taking.”) (citation
omitted). Further, the costs associated with making copies of the trial exhibits
should be awarded. The Case Management Order required the parties to
provide copies of the trial exhibits for the benefit of the Court and witnesses,
in the event of any unforeseen electronic technical difficulties at trial. [Doc.
78 at 5].
Based on the facts set forth in the Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs, the following
claimed costs appear to be recoverable under § 1920 and Local Civil Rule
54.1. Having addressed the specific objections to the above costs by the
Defendant, the following will be allowed:
17
Filing fee paid to Clerk of Court
$
400.00
Denise Knapp deposition transcript
$ 1,283.50
David Knapp deposition transcript
$
262.507
Frank McBride deposition transcript
$
313.10
Tim Rosebrock deposition transcript
$
926.20
Chris Cavanaugh deposition transcript
$ 1,734.00
Bruce Whitaker deposition recording
$
677.20
Ellen Rickman transcript copy
$
509.10
4/30/17 Copies of Trial Exhibits
$ 1,204.64
5/23/17 Copies of Trial Exhibits
$ 2,162.01
Certified copy of US Trademark
Registration
$
TOTAL COSTS
$9,502.25
30.00
Accordingly, the Court will award the Plaintiff $9,502.25 in costs
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
The Plaintiff indicates, in its reply brief, that the fee for David Knapp’s deposition
transcript in the amount of $743.30 was inadvertently omitted from its Bill of Costs and
that the fee reflected in the Bill of Costs is for making video excerpts of David Knapp’s
deposition. [Doc. 144 at 5-6]. The Plaintiff, however, did not file a supplemental Bill of
Costs. Further, the Plaintiff has not shown why both transcript and videotape excerpts
necessarily. Accordingly, the Court will only allow the fee associated with David Knapp’s
deposition as indicated in the Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs.
7
18
C.
Defendant’s Motion for Clarification of Judgment and Order
The Defendant moves for clarification of the Judgment pursuant to
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 124]. The Plaintiff
opposes the motion. [Doc. 135]. The Defendant has subsequently noticed
that it no longer requires any additional time to transfer the domain name
www.biltmorebride.com and believes it is now in full compliance with the
Judgment. [Doc. 146]. The Defendant, however, has not indicated that it has
withdrawn its motion for clarification.
The Fourth Circuit has recognized three grounds for altering or
amending a judgment under Rule 59(e): “(1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at
trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Pacific
Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998).
Rule 59(e) is considered an “extraordinary remedy” which the Fourth Circuit
has cautioned should be used only “sparingly” in exceptional circumstances.
Id. Such motions should not be used “to raise arguments which could have
been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to
argue a case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability to
address in the first instance.” Id. Ultimately, the decision to grant or deny a
19
Rule 59(e) motion is a matter within the Court's discretion. See Robinson,
599 F.3d at 407.
In its motion, the Defendant requests a specific timeframe to comply
with the Judgment. The only relevant remaining task contained in
Defendant’s motion is the elimination of the Plaintiff’s mark used in the
printed edition of “The Knot” magazine. [Doc. 132 at 2]. The fall and winter
2017 print editions of “The Knot” cannot be changed post-Judgment, as
those editions were issued pre-Judgment. However, the Defendant advises
that it will not use the Plaintiff’s mark in the upcoming spring and summer
2018 print editions of “The Knot.” [Id.].
The Court concludes that the Defendant has failed to establish that
altering or amending the Judgment is necessary to prevent manifest
injustice. The Defendant believes it is in full compliance with the Judgment
and has proposed the earliest possible time to eliminate the use of Plaintiff’s
mark from the printed edition of “The Knot.” Accordingly, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion declines to alter or amend the Judgment. Therefore,
the Defendant’s Motion for Clarification is denied.
20
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 125] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s Objection to the
Plaintiff’s Bill of Cost [Doc. 141] is SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED
IN PART, and the Plaintiff’s Bill of Cost [Doc.134] is GRANTED to the extent
that the Plaintiff is hereby awarded $9,502.25 in costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for
Clarification of Judgment and Order [Doc. 132] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 22, 2018
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?