Millin v. Hill et al

Filing 9

ORDER granting 3 , as amended 7 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. It is further ordered that Plaintiff's 1 Complaint, as amended [5,6,8] are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 10/24/2016. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to provide the Plaintiff with this Order via email. (nvc)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00316-MR-DLH

GRANT MILLIN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
HONORABLE CALVIN HILL, NC
)
COURTS 28; TERESA WHITE,
)
ASSISTANT LEGAL COUNSEL, NC
)
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
)
COURTS, ET AL.; and MICHAEL
)
SHADRICK, HOUSING
)
MANAGEMENT INC. a/k/a SHADOW )
RIDGE ASSOCIATES LLP a/k/a
)
EVERGREEN RIDGE APARTMENTS, )
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed without Prepayment of Fees or Costs [Doc. 2], as amended [Doc.
7], and the Plaintiff’s request for electronic notification of pleadings filed in
this matter [Doc. 4].
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 1], as amended [Docs. 5, 6, 8], asserts

claims against the Honorable Calvin Hill, Chief District Court Judge of the

28th Judicial District; Teresa White, assistant legal counsel for the North
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts; and Michael Shadrick, the
owner of Housing Management Inc., for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and for equal protection violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 arising from an eviction proceeding in state court.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. United States

ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). “Thus, when
a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action, the action must
be dismissed.” Id. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that
may be raised at any time. See Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc.,
519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008). “If the court determines at any time that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
III.

DISCUSSION
In this action, the Plaintiff appears to challenge the outcome of an

eviction proceeding in a North Carolina state court. Under the RookerFeldman doctrine, however, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
the Plaintiff’s claims.

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The United States Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from state-court judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). As a corollary to this rule, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a party losing in state court . . . from
seeking what in substance would be an appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim
that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v.
De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars lower federal courts from considering not only issues raised and
decided in state courts, but also issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
the issues that are before the state court.” Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d
274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486). As the Fourth
Circuit has explained, “if the state-court loser seeks redress in the federal
district court for the injury caused by the state-court decision, his federal
claim is, by definition, ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state-court decision,
and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the federal district court.” Davani
v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006).

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The Supreme Court has cautioned that Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow
doctrine” which “is confined to cases of the kind from the doctrine acquired
its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005).

Accordingly, pursuant to Exxon, the Court must examine

“whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks
redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself. If he is not
challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply.” Davani, 434 F.3d at 718 (footnote omitted); Moore v. Idealease of
Wilmington, 465 F.Supp.2d 484, 490 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
In the present case, the Plaintiff challenges the action of a state court
in 16 CVD 2687, which resulted in his eviction from his apartment. Because
the Plaintiff does not allege any injury independent of this state-court action,1

It is clear from the Plaintiff’s lengthy filings in this Court that he seeks for this Court to
invalidate the state court judgment that has been entered against him. He also complains
that the state court did not reasonably accommodate his disability in the manner in which
the proceedings against the Plaintiff were conducted. As to any alleged ADA violation,
however, the Plaintiff asserts that the United States Department of Justice has intervened
in his state court proceedings [Doc. 5 at 2], and he attaches a letter of Assistant United
States Attorney Paul Taylor to the state trial court administrator to support this. The
Plaintiff, however, states that he cannot become a party to the DOJ proceedings
1

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the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. If the Plaintiff wishes to challenge the validity of the state court’s
order, he must do so in the North Carolina state courts.
Finally, the Plaintiff requests permission to receive notification by email
of any pleadings or papers filed electronically with the Court. In the exercise
of its discretion, the Court will grant the Plaintiff’s request.

See

Administrative Procedures Governing Filing and Service by Electronic
Means, at 3 (W.D.N.C., rev. Jan. 1, 2012).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit [Doc. 2], as amended
[Doc. 7], is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 1], as
amended [Docs. 5, 6, 8], is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s request for electronic
notification of pleadings filed in this matter [Doc. 4] is GRANTED. The Clerk

regarding any potential ADA relief as may be provided the Plaintiff. [Id. at 3]. Hence, the
only relief the Plaintiff seeks from this Court is that the state court judgment be “stay[ed]
or invalidate[d]” and that the effects thereof be “prevented.” [Doc. 2 at 20].
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of Court is respectfully directed to provide the Plaintiff with this Order via
email.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: October 24, 2016

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