Yelton v. Colvin
Filing
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ORDER that the decision of the Commissioner, denying the relief sought by plaintiff, is AFFIRMED; denying 9 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr on 08/21/2017. (thh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 1:17-cv-00002-RLV
TONI BLACKWELL YELTON
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Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the court on the parties’ opposing Motions for Summary
Judgment (#9 and #10). The matter is ripe for review. Having carefully considered such
motions and reviewed the pleadings, the court enters the following findings, conclusions,
and Order.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I.
Administrative History
Plaintiff applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits in May 2013,
alleging that she became disabled on January 20, 2013. (Tr. 21). Her claim was denied at
the initial and reconsideration levels of review. See (Tr. 21). Plaintiff filed a timely request
for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held before
Tammy Georgian, an ALJ, on October 7, 2015, at which plaintiff had an attorney
representative present. (Tr. 21, 42). In a November 13, 2015 written decision, the ALJ
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denied the plaintiff’s claim. (Tr. 18-36). Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision.
(Tr. 15-16). The request for review was denied by the Appeals Council on November 16,
2016 (Tr. 1), rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.981. Plaintiff has exhausted her available administrative remedies and the
case is now ripe for judicial review under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.
Factual Background
It appearing that the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence,
the court adopts and incorporates such findings herein as if fully set forth. Such findings
are referenced in the substantive discussion which follows.
III.
Standard of Review
The only issues on review are whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
standards and whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990). Review by a federal court is not de novo, Smith v. Schwieker, 795 F.2d
343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); rather, inquiry is limited to whether there was “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Perales,
402 U.S. at 401 (internal citations omitted). Even if the undersigned were to find that a
preponderance of the evidence weighed against the Commissioner's decision, the
Commissioner's decision would have to be affirmed if it was supported by substantial
evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456. The Fourth Circuit has explained substantial evidence
review as follows:
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the district court reviews the record to ensure that the ALJ's factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence and that its legal findings are free of error. If the reviewing court
decides that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, it may affirm,
modify, or reverse the ALJ's ruling with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. A
necessary predicate to engaging in substantial evidence review is a record of the basis for
the ALJ's ruling. The record should include a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found
credible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record
evidence. If the reviewing court has no way of evaluating the basis for the ALJ's decision,
then the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation.
Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
IV.
Substantial Evidence
A. Introduction
The court has read the transcript of plaintiff's administrative hearing, closely read
the decision of the ALJ, and reviewed the relevant exhibits contained in the extensive
administrative record. The issue is not whether a court might have reached a different
conclusion had it been presented with the same testimony and evidentiary materials, but
whether the decision of the administrative law judge is supported by substantial evidence.
The court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
B. Sequential Evaluation
A five-step process, known as “sequential” review, is used by the Commissioner in
determining whether a Social Security claimant is disabled. The Commissioner evaluates
a disability claim under Title XVI pursuant to the following five-step analysis:
a. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will
not be found to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings;
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b. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found to be
disabled;
c. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment that
meets the durational requirement and that “meets or equals a listed impairment
in Appendix 1” of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will
be made without consideration of vocational factors;
d. If, upon determining residual functional capacity, the Commissioner finds that
an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a
finding of “not disabled” must be made;
e. If an individual's residual functional capacity precludes the performance of past
work, other factors including age, education, and past work experience, must be
considered to determine if other work can be performed.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps
of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). At
the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that other work exists in the
national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.
C. The Administrative Decision
At step one, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity during the period of her alleged onset date, January 20, 2013 and her date last
insured December 31, 2014. (Tr. 23). At step two, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: fracture of acetabulum (pelvis), chronic kidney disease, and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). (Tr. 23-27). At step three, the ALJ
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determined that the plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 27-29).
The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform light work, with several limitations. (Tr. 29). The plaintiff was limited to frequent
sitting, standing, and walking. (Tr. 29). The plaintiff’s RFC was further limited to never
climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and having no concentrated exposure to pulmonary
irritants. (Tr. 29).
At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff Yelton could perform her past relevant work.
(Tr. 34). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had not been under a disability
within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(g), at any point during
the period of her alleged onset date, January 20, 2013 and her date last insured December
31, 2014. (Tr. 36).
D. Discussion
The court has closely read plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law (#9-1) supporting her
Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff has made the following assignments of error:
I.
The ALJ erred in including inaccuracies in her RFC analysis, which would
preclude her RFC from being sound; and
II.
The ALJ erred in making an assumption about plaintiff’s failure to pursue
treatment without the requisite consideration.
(#9-1) at 4-5. Plaintiff's assignments of error will be discussed seriatim below.
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1.
Alleged Inaccuracies
Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in her assessment of the plaintiff’s RFC, alleging the ALJ
did not meet the requirements of SSR 96-8p. (#9-1) at 5. SSR 96-8p provides that the
“[RFC] assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence
supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and
nonmedical evidence (e.g. daily activities, observations).” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632,
636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34, 475). The RFC assessment
“must include a discussion of why reported symptom-related functional limitations and
restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted with the medical and other evidence.”
S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 37184, at *7. Remand may be appropriate where “an ALJ fails to
assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence
in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis frustrate meaningful
review.” Mascio, at 636 (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2nd Cir. 2013)
(per curiam).
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate plaintiff’s need for a cane. (#91) at 6. Here, the ALJ specifically found that the plaintiff’s impairments “did not result in
an ability to ambulate effectively” or in “a sustained disturbance in gait or station.” (Tr.
29). In reviewing plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ noted that the plaintiff reported that she
“required a cane or walker for ambulation and tried to walk outside each day for 10 to 15
minutes.” (Tr. 30). The ALJ further noted plaintiff’s reported difficulty walking and
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discussed the plaintiff’s testimony about walking while shopping and walking around her
block. (Tr. 30).
The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of her symptoms were “not entirely credible.” (Tr. 31). The ALJ reviewed
the record evidence and detailed that the plaintiff was “ambulating normally without a
limp.” (Tr. 31). The ALJ also reviewed the findings of a physician who opined that plaintiff
would have difficulty walking or standing for prolonged periods, and the ALJ found that
this opinion was consistent with the RFC’s restriction to frequently walking or standing.
(Tr. 33). The ALJ also considered a report from the plaintiff’s son that the plaintiff had
difficulty walking among other activities. (Tr. 34).
Ultimately, the court’s task is not to determine whether the RFC should or should not
have included the use of a cane. Instead, the court is asked whether the ALJ’s RFC analysis
was supported by substantial evidence. The court is not “left to guess” here. The ALJ has
appropriately shown her work as to how she evaluated the record evidence as to the
plaintiff’s impairments related to ambulation. Accordingly, remand is inappropriate on this
ground.
2.
Assumption About Treatment
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made an improper assumption about plaintiff’s failure to
pursue treatment without requisite consideration. (#9-1) at 7. A Social Security claimant
may not be penalized for failing to seek treatment she cannot afford. Lovejoy v. Heckler,
790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986). As the Fourth Circuit has noted, it would be
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anathema to the “patent purposes of the Social Security Act to deny benefits to someone
because he is too poor to obtain medical treatment that may help him.” Gordon v.
Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ in the instant case relied on the “conservative course of
treatment for her physical and mental impairments to reject her allegations” of disability.
(#9-1) at 7. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not “consider Yelton’s inability to obtain
additional treatment” and “chose to assume that Yelton was incredible and that her
mental impairments were not severe because of her failure to get what was impossible for
her to get.” (#9-1) at 8.
Here, the ALJ noted that the “claimant was unable to afford a referral for mental
health treatment or ongoing counseling” and that the treatment of plaintiff’s depression
and anxiety was generally conservative and routine.” (Tr. 25). Rather than penalizing the
plaintiff for failing to seek further treatment, the ALJ reviewed the record evidence,
which noted that her mental health symptoms “were relieved with medication,
meditation, and a quiet environment.” (Tr. 25). In reviewing the severity of plaintiff’s
mental health impairments, the ALJ cited numerous exhibits and reviewed the treatment
evidence of several sources, including a treating neurologist, a pastor, and two state
psychological consultants. (Tr. 25-27, citing Exhibits 1A, 3A, 14F 18F, 19F, and 21F).
The court agrees that a plaintiff’s inability to afford more aggressive treatment is not a
sufficient basis for an ALJ’s findings as to the severity of an alleged impairment. See
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Kirkland v. Astrue, 683 F. Supp. 2d 395, 396 (E.D.N.C. 2010). This is not such a case.
The plaintiff’s symptoms of “depressed mood, fatigue, and poor concentration” were
“relieved with medication, meditation, and a quiet environment.” (Tr. 25). The treatment
was adequately successful in controlling her symptoms, and the ALJ reviewed treatment
notes to that effect. (Tr. 25-26). Accordingly, the ALJ found that the plaintiff’s mental
health symptoms were not severe.
Put another way, the ALJ recognized the plaintiff’s financial hardship, noting her
inability to afford a referral and additional stress due to her financial situation. (Tr. 25).
The ALJ here did not heavily rely on plaintiff’s inability to afford further treatment. C.f.
Kirkland, 683 F.Supp.2d at 396 (finding that the ALJ’s decision in that case relied
heavily on the “conservative course of Plaintiff’s treatment.”). Instead, the ALJ here
adequately reviewed the record evidence and examined the treatment and evaluations that
the plaintiff received in making a determination as to the severity of the plaintiff’s alleged
mental health impairments. See (Tr. 25-27). The ALJ found that the symptoms were
adequately controlled, inter alia, by medication and were therefore not severe.
It is a well-established rule in this Circuit that if “a symptom can be reasonably
controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling.” Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d
1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986). Because her mental health symptoms were reasonably
controlled by medication and treatment, it was reasonable for the ALJ to determine that
they did not affect plaintiff's ability to work. Horning v. Colvin, No. 3:14-cv-722, 2016
WL 1123103 at *4 (W.D.N.C. March 21, 2016); see Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638. Further,
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the ALJ made such a determination based on substantial evidence before her and
adequately showed her work, enabling judicial review of her determination. Accordingly,
plaintiff’s request for remand cannot be granted on this basis.
V.
Conclusion
The undersigned has carefully reviewed the decision of the ALJ, the transcript of
proceedings, plaintiff's motion and brief, the Commissioner's responsive pleading, and
plaintiff's assignment of error. Review of the entire record reveals that the decision of the
ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. See Richardson v. Perales, supra; Hays v.
Sullivan, supra. Finding that there was “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, supra at 401, plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, the Commissioner's Motion for Summary
Judgment will be granted, and the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
(1) the decision of the Commissioner, denying the relief sought by plaintiff, is
AFFIRMED;
(2) plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (#9) is DENIED;
(3) the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (#10) is GRANTED; and
(4) this action is DISMISSED.
Signed: August 21, 2017
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