Dalton v. Colvin

Filing 17

AMENDED ORDER affirming decision of the Commissioner, denying relief sought by Pltf; denying Pltf's 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment - Social Security; granting Deft's 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment - Social Security; and dismissing this action. Signed by District Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. on 10/25/2017. Amending 15 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment-Social. (ejb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 1:17-cv-00020
ANGELA D. DALTON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

AMENDED ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the court on plaintiff’s (#9) and defendant’s (#13) cross Motions
for Summary Judgment. The matter is ripe for review. Having carefully considered each Motion
for Summary Judgment, the court enters the following findings and Order.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I.

Administrative History
In January 2014, Plaintiff filed applications for a Period of Disability, Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), alleging disability since September
28, 2011, due to bipolar disorder, PTSD, severe anxiety, borderline agoraphobia, depression, left
leg reattachment pain, left leg shorter than right, bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome, and
fibromyalgia. (Tr. 19, 225). The applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr.
19). A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Charles R. Howard (“the ALJ”) on
November 4, 2015 (Tr. 19, 39-73), and on January 21, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying
the claims. (Tr. 19-32). On November 17, 2016, the Appeals Council denied review (Tr. 1-4),

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thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff timely
commenced the instant action for judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

Factual Background
The court adopts and incorporates the ALJ’s factual findings herein as if fully set forth.

Such findings are referenced in the substantive discussion which follows.
III.

Standard of Review
The only issues on review are whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal

standards and whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.
1990). Review by a federal court is not de novo, Smith v. Schwieker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir.
1986); rather, inquiry is limited to whether there was “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, supra. Even if the
undersigned were to find that a preponderance of the evidence weighed against the
Commissioner’s decision, the Commissioner’s decision would have to be affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, supra. The Fourth Circuit has explained substantial
evidence review as follows:
the district court reviews the record to ensure that the ALJ's factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence and that its legal findings are free of error. If the
reviewing court decides that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial
evidence, it may affirm, modify, or reverse the ALJ's ruling with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. A necessary predicate to engaging in
substantial evidence review is a record of the basis for the ALJ's ruling. The record
should include a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why,
and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.
If the reviewing court has no way of evaluating the basis for the ALJ's decision,
then the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation.

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Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
IV.

Substantial Evidence
A. Introduction
The court has read the transcript of plaintiff's administrative hearing, closely read the

decision of the ALJ, and reviewed the relevant exhibits contained in the extensive administrative
record. The issue is not whether a court might have reached a different conclusion had it been
presented with the same testimony and evidentiary materials, but whether the decision of the
administrative law judge is supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons outlined below, the
court finds that the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial evidence.
B. Sequential Evaluation
A five-step process, known as “sequential” review, is used by the Commissioner in
determining whether a Social Security claimant is disabled. The Commissioner evaluates a
disability claim under Title XVI pursuant to the following five-step analysis:
a. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be
found to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings;
b.

An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found to be
disabled;

c. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment that meets
the durational requirement and that “meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix
1” of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without
consideration of vocational factors;

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d. If, upon determining residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the Commissioner finds that
an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of
“not disabled” must be made;
e. If an individual's residual functional capacity precludes the performance of past work,
other factors including age, education, and past work experience, must be considered
to determine if other work can be performed.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the
inquiry rests on the claimant. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). At the fifth step,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that other work exists in the national economy that
the claimant can perform. Id.
C. The Administrative Decision
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since the alleged onset date of her disability. (Tr. 21). At step
two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe, medically determinable impairments:
status-post left lower extremity fractures, fibromyalgia, and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 22). Though
plaintiff further alleged headaches and carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ found that neither
qualified as severe within the meaning of the regulations. (Tr. 22). At step three, the ALJ found at
that none of plaintiff’s impairments or any combination thereof, met or equaled one of the
conditions in the Listing of Impairments at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 22-23).
Upon review of the record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the RFC to perform light
work, with the following limitations: cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; cannot have
concentrated exposure to hazards; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb

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ramps and stairs; can perform simple, repetitive, routine tasks for two-hour segments; can adapt to
infrequent and routine changes in a work setting that requires no more than occasional interaction
with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. (Tr. 23).
At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff could no longer perform her past relevant work
(“PRW”) as a CAN, cashier, and assembler. (Tr. 30). At step five, the ALJ found, based on
vocational expert (“VE”) testimony that, considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,
and RFC, that plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Such jobs include building cleaner, retail marker, and routing clerk. (Tr. 31, 69-71). Such finding
ended the sequential evaluation, with the ALJ finding that plaintiff is not disabled within the
meaning of the Act. (Tr. 19, 31).
D. Discussion
The court has closely read plaintiff’s memorandum of law (#10) supporting her Motion for
Summary Judgment (#9). Plaintiff has made the following assignments of error:
I.
II.
III.

The ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions of
plaintiff’s treating physician and treating provider;
The ALJ failed to sufficiently explain plaintiff’s mental RFC; and
The ALJ failed to provide a legally sufficient basis for his RFC finding.

(#12 at 5). The court will review these allegations of error to determine whether they are based
upon substantial evidence.
1.

The ALJ’s rejection of the opinion of plaintiff’s providers

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ did not provide sufficient reason for the weight given
to the opinions of plaintiff’s treating providers, Dr. Gillis and Ms. Francis, in arriving at his
determination of plaintiff’s RFC, and that such failure is grounds for remand. (#10 at 7-8).

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When determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge
from the evidence to his conclusion.” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2016). Failure to
include a “narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion” leaves the
court no choice but to order remand. Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636; see also Brown v.
Colvin, 639 F. Appx. 921 (4th Cir. 2016) (the court should not mine facts in the record to justify
the ALJ’s decision).
Here, the court finds that the ALJ has provided sufficient evidence in his rejection of the
opinions of plaintiff’s treatment providers. The ALJ repeatedly referenced the opinions and
findings of Dr. Gillis and Ms. Francis throughout his analysis, alongside the opinions that the ALJ
gave great weight. (Tr. 24-29, citing Exhibits B8F, B10F, B11F, B13F, B14F, B15F, B17F, B21F,
B22F, B25F, B27F, B28F). After discussing these well-cited conclusions, the ALJ clearly states
that he is rejecting the opinions of Dr. Gillis and Ms. Francis because their opinions are not
sufficiently supported by “acceptable clinical findings and are not consistent with the overall
evidence of the record, including Dr. Gillis’ and Dr. Francis’ own findings on examinations,” and
proceeds to explain that he gave other opinions greater weight since they have been “supported by
medical signs and findings and are consistent with the overall evidence of record.” (Tr. 29-30.).
Since the court has not been left to guess at how the ALJ reached his conclusions, the court believes
that the ALJ has shown his work appropriately and holds that his findings and conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence.
2.

The ALJ’s explanation for plaintiff’s mental RFC

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in his assessment of the plaintiff’s nonexertional
capacity, alleging that the ALJ did not make a complete mental RFC assessment as required by

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SSR96-8p. (#12) at 5. Social Security Ruling 96-8p explains the “[RFC] assessment must include
a narrative discussion describing how the evidence support each conclusion, citing specific
medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g. daily activities,
observations).” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 34, 475). The RFC assessment “must include a discussion of why reported symptomrelated functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted with the
medical and other evidence.” S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 37184, at *7. Remand may be appropriate
where “an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite
contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis frustrate
meaningful review.” Mascio, at 636 (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2nd Cir.
2013) (per curiam)).
Plaintiff’s argument is threefold. First, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to make an
appropriate finding as to plaintiff’s ability to stay on task. (#10 at 13-14). Second, plaintiff asserts
that the ALJ failed to provide a complete explanation of the effect of plaintiff’s moderate
difficulties in social functioning have on her ability to engage in sustained work activity. (#10 at
15). Third, plaintiff claims that the ALJ has not explained what effect plaintiff’s moderate
difficulties in maintaining activities of daily living have on her residual functional capacity.
In regards to plaintiff’s ability to stay on task, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to create
a connection between the record and his finding that plaintiff could not stay on task for more than
two hour segments. Since the ALJ failed to do so, plaintiff contends that the opinion is lacking and
must be remanded for further explanation. (#10 at 13-14). Courts within this district have found

that Mascio “only requires a remand when an ALJ's opinion is ‘sorely lacking’ in a manner

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that ‘frustrates meaningful review.’” Ponder v. Berryhill, No. 1:15-CV-00289-RJC, 2017
WL 1246350, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting White v. Colvin, No. 3:15-cv-197FDW, 2016 WL 3381265, at *5 (W.D.N.C. June 14, 2016)). Here, the ALJ specifically found
that plaintiff “can sustain focused attention and concentration sufficiently long enough to permit
the timely and appropriate completion of tasks commonly found in routine and repetitive work”
but not for “detailed or complex work settings.” (Tr. 23). The ALJ supported this finding with
findings from doctors who treated plaintiff, such as State Agency physicians who noted that
plaintiff will “have some distractibility and slowed work pace due to her mental condition” and
suggested plaintiff could “carry out simple tasks for two hour periods over an eight hour day.” (Tr.
29, 236, 257). As a result, the court finds that the ALJ’s evidence was not so lacking that
meaningful review was frustrated, and that his opinion is thus supported by substantial evidence.
In regards to plaintiff’s moderate social difficulties, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed
to fully explain his social functioning analysis and findings, by failing to elaborate on what he
means by “interaction.” (#10 at 15). Plaintiff contends a failure to explain “interaction” (and
whether that means face-to-face, in the same room or area, on the telephone, via email, and so on)
is a fatal flaw that necessitates remand. However, plaintiff provides no legal basis for this assertion,
beyond a case from the 4th Circuit that urged ALJs to “show your work.” Patterson v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 846 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2017). Indeed, the court finds no legal
authority for the proposition that the ALJ must do more than explain and discuss plaintiff’s ability
to interact with others, or that there is some legal duty for the ALJ to articulate limitations on every
conceivable way on how “interaction” can take place. Here, the ALJ explicitly limited plaintiff to
a work setting “that requires no more than occasional interaction with the public, co-workers, and

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supervisors” and provides a detailed breakdown of supporting evidence and opinions from medical
professionals. (Tr. 23, 24-28). In doing so, the ALJ has satisfied his duty to provide substantial
evidence for his determination and thereby facilitate judicial review.
In regards to plaintiff’s difficulties with daily living activities, plaintiff argues that the ALJ
failed to explain whether plaintiff’s difficulties in maintaining activities of daily living have any
effect on her RFC, noting that Mascio requires an ALJ to account for limitations in activities of
daily living when analyzing a claimant’s RFC. (#10 at 17). However, the ALJ did account for
plaintiff’s daily living activities. Indeed, the ALJ specifically noted plaintiff’s ability to complete
a “wide range of daily activities during the relevant period, including: care for her baby all day, as
well as her older son, performing aspects of self-care, cooking, grocery shopping, housework,
driving, and managing finances,” as well as work activity after the alleged onset date. (Tr. 29). The
ALJ also specifically referenced a Third Party Daily Activity statement completed by plaintiff’s
then-husband, which further reinforced the ALJ’s analysis of plaintiff’s capability to perform daily
activities. As a result, the court finds that the ALJ again fulfilled his duty to provide substantial
evidence to justify his analysis of plaintiff’s daily activities and their effect on her RFC. Put

another way, the ALJ has adequately “shown [her] work.” See Patterson, 846 F.3d at 663.
3.

The ALJ’s basis for his mental RFC finding

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding on her RFC, specifically that she is capable
of performing simple, repetitive routine tasks and that she is able to maintain concentration and
persistence for two hour segments, conflicts with Dr. Carraway’s opinion; since the ALJ gave great
weight to Dr. Carraway’s opinion, this unexplained conflict demands remand. (#10 at 19; Tr. 573).
However, the court does not find that a conflict exists between the ALJ’s findings and accepting

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Dr. Carraway’s opinion. Dr. Carraway hypothesized that plaintiff’s ability to perform simple
repetitive tasks and to persist at those tasks “primarily would be limited by her objective physical
findings and somatic complaints.” (Tr. 573). Dr. Carraway does not suggest that physical
limitations exist. He only suggests that, if objective physical limitations are present, they would be
the primary limitation on plaintiff’s ability to perform simple repetitive tasks and persist at them.
Moreover, such physical limitations are not the focus of Dr. Carraway’s analysis, as he is a
psychiatrist. Thus, since there is no conflict between the ALJ’s finding and Dr. Carraway’s
opinion, and the ALJ did submit substantial evidence in support of his RFC finding, the court does
not find grounds for remand.
E. Conclusion
The undersigned has carefully reviewed the decision of the ALJ, the transcript of
proceedings, plaintiff’s motion and brief, the Commissioner and plaintiff’s cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, and accompanying memorandums. Review of the entire record reveals that
the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. See Richardson v. Perales, supra;
Hays v. Sullivan, supra. As this court finds that there was “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, supra at 401,
plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, the Commissioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment will be granted, and the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
(1) The decision of the Commissioner, denying the relief sought by plaintiff, is
AFFIRMED;

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(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#9) is DENIED;
(3) The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#13) is GRANTED; and
(4) This action is DISMISSED.

Signed: October 25, 2017

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