Hudgins v. Sheriff Duncan et al
Filing
9
ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 07/05/17. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(emw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:17-cv-111-FDW
BARRY WILLIAM HUDGINS,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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SHERIFF DUNCAN, Sheriff of
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Buncombe County,
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
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Secretary Hooks, Department of
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Public Safety,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Doc. No. 1). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A. On May 16,
2017, this Court entered an order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and waiving the
initial filing fee. (Doc. No. 8).
I.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Barry William Hudgins, a North Carolina inmate currently incarcerated at
Harnett Correctional Institution in Lillington, North Carolina, filed this action on April 20, 2017,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Plaintiff has named Sheriff Duncan of Buncombe County as a
Defendant. Plaintiff has also named as a Defendant the “State of North Carolina, Secretary
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The North Carolina Department of Public Safety website indicates that Plaintiff was convicted
in Buncombe County in 2016 of being a habitual felon, and he was sentenced to 78-106 months
of imprisonment.
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Hooks of Department of Public Safety.” Plaintiff has alleged the following in the Complaint:
Judge Mark E. Powell issued an order on Feb. 2, 2015 issuing [Plaintiff] to be
immediately released from prison and . . . custody. [Plaintiff] was not released
from the jail until weeks later with no warrant or pending charges, nor this was
not part of any plea agreement. [Plaintiff] was being unlawfully imprisoned
without any pending charges, and or warrants, and no bond.
This is a clear due process rights violation under the 14th amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Then the Court is awarding Barry Hudgins with 1,357 days of credit days spent in
prison when he was not suppose to have been in prison, which is also a due
process rights violation under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
(Doc. No. 1 at 3-4). In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks damages of “$500.00 [a] day that I
spent in the county jail after Judge Mark E. Powell ordered [Plaintiff’s] immediate release but
stayed in the Buncombe County Jail weeks later without any warrants, pending charges, etc.”;
“$25,000 for the credit time days awarded by the judge (1,357 credit days)”; or for the Court to
“apply the 1,357 days toward the current sentence, currently serving by [Plaintiff]”; and a
temporary restraining order in the form of an “injunction against Buncombe County Superior
Court to not destroy any criminal documents.” (Id. at 4).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
under § 1915A, in any action against a government employee, the Court must conduct an initial
review and identify and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
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indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such
as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable
under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he was falsely imprisoned because he was held in
jail for several weeks after the criminal charges against him had been dismissed. A § 1983
claim of false imprisonment requires a showing of common law false imprisonment and a due
process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558,
1562-63 (11th Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1022 (1994). Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged a claim for common law imprisonment under North Carolina law, which
holds that “[f]alse imprisonment is the illegal restraint of one’s person against his will.”
Hoffman v. Clinic Hosp., Inc., 213 N.C. 669, 197 S.E.2d 161 (1938). Moreover, the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause includes the “right to be free from continued detention after it
was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.” Cannon v. Macon
Cnty., 1 F.3d at 1563. At least one other circuit has held that “[d]etention of a prisoner thirty
days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid court order or
warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.
1980).
This Court finds that, even if Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for a due process
violation, this action must be dismissed because Plaintiff has not presented sufficient allegations
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to impose individual liability as to any of the named Defendants. Here, other than identifying
Defendant Duncan as the Sheriff of Buncombe County at all relevant times, Plaintiff states no
allegations of any personal participation by Duncan in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s due
process rights. In his capacity as sheriff, Defendant Duncan serves as a supervisory government
official. Such an individual cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior because
this liability generally does not attach in a § 1983 action. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To hold Defendant Duncan responsible, Plaintiff must allege facts
tending to show that Duncan’s actions, or omissions, led to Plaintiff’s injury.2 Plaintiff has failed
to make such a showing. See West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (finding that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a timely release from prison where the sheriff had delegated
daily responsibility of the jail to a warden). Accordingly, Sheriff Duncan is dismissed as a
Defendant. Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff purports to bring a claim of individual liability
against Defendant Hooks, identified as the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public
Safety at all relevant times, Plaintiff alleges no personal participation by Hook and, instead, has
merely named him as a Defendant. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to impose
individual liability on Hooks, he will also be dismissed as a Defendant.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff purports to bring a claim for damages against the State
of North Carolina or the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, neither the State of North
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A supervisor may be liable for acts of his subordinates if (1) the supervisor is actually or
constructively aware of pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source, (2) the
official is deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) there exists an affirmative causal link
between the supervisor’s inaction and the constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791,
799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support a finding of supervisor liability
based on these three elements.
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Carolina nor its agencies constitute “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars
Plaintiff's suit for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies.
See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003).
For all these reasons, this action will be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, this action will be dismissed on initial review. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
2.
The Clerk is instructed to close this civil case.
Signed: July 5, 2017
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